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Australians feel that they possess a popular system of government that ensures 
the quickest possible realisation of any wish formed by the intelligent majority 
of the community. In the fullest and widest sense of the words, they govern 
themselves. A breach of order is not a revolt against any privileged social caste 
or outside rule; it is a purely irrational insult offered by citizens of a free country 
to themselves. And the perfect freedom of our institutions renders the obligation 
on each citizen of scrupulously observing the law more particularly binding, 
for it cannot co-exist with a tendency to riotous behaviour. 
—The Brisbane Courier, 
13 December 1878, at the time of the seamen's strike 
The moral element is, indeed, absolutely essential to industry. It is the foundation 
on which the whole industrial system rests. 
-David Syme, Outlines of an Industrial Science, 
London, 1876 
It is much better for people to be engaged in outdoor manly industry than to 
be mewed up in the reeking factories of a stinking city. 
—Cosmos, letter to the Brisbane Courier, 
1 May 1879, during the colony's main fiscal debate 
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PREFACE 
This is a history of port development, shipping services, and economic 
growth in Queensland. It is also an attempt to define the emergence of a sense of 
Austrahan economic nationalism. The history of the ports is considered in itself 
and as the product of the expansion of the economy and shipping, while the 
studies of the ports and shipping provide detailed examples of the argument 
about nationalism which is intended to unify the work. The result is a relatively 
straightforward discussion of ports and shipping, together with a selective 
treatment of Queensland's economic history. This approach is not an academic-
ally orthodox one. American historians, like Turner, Beard, and Hofstadter, 
have established an impressive tradition of speculative cultural history that is 
concerned with the meaning of the American past. Yet, until recently, Aus-
trahan historians have usually modelled their accounts on English examples 
which have been as skilful as American studies, but less concerned with the 
purpose of their national experience. Trevelyan, Clapham, and Asa Briggs, for 
example, have written excellent but comparatively empirical history.^ This 
work is an experiment which aims at combining the strengths of American and 
English historical techniques to interpret the Australian past. It is a mono-
graphic history of the Queensland ports as well as a much broader treatment of 
some of the widest issues in Australian history. 
This is primarily an economic history of the ports. Politically, some aspects 
of port history such as the evolution of port administration have been given a 
fair amount of attention, yet these are ultimately related back to the ports' 
worst economic dilemma in the period—their need to move to deep water. 
Port development was a colourful and often exciting affair, but the personal 
angle of port history has also been left to one side, and some of the most 
interesting questions about the ports still remain to be answered. What, for 
instance, was the exact influence of the port engineers and administrators on 
politicians in forming port policies? A general answer is given in the text but 
the full story still needs to be told. 
The discussion of port administration has been restricted to the Queensland 
ports and cross-references to other ports have been confined to Sydney, Mel-
bourne, and some English ports. This was partly because of the surprising lack 
of relevant historical studies of other Australian and overseas ports, but more 
importantly, it is one of my main points that port development in Queensland 
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was tangled inextricably with much wider political and economic problems. It 
would seem to be inherent in the nature of a port that its historical connection 
with the hinterland is the single most important determinant of the form of port 
administration. 
Otherwise, most stress has been placed on the economic reasons why ports 
succeeded or failed in the long run, so the early years in each port are dealt with 
briefly. Many small ports were set up on Queensland's coast after 1850 but 
what has been taken as most important here is why they survived. Port develop-
ment was invariably based on hinterland exports, so the account of Queensland's 
economic growth has been specially tailored to suit it to explaining this problem. 
Questions about exports, producing industries, and regional trade have been 
emphasized, while urban construction, and even the import trade, have been 
passed over. In the treatment of the ports' shipping services there are two 
limitations. Firstly, there is a shortage of accurate historical information about 
shipping freight rates, and, as Geoffrey Blainey has noted, also about the 
Australian shipping services.^  Secondly, in assessing port efficiency emphasis has 
been placed on berthage and port depths as short-run indicators of capability, 
but the long-term issue of how port placement was influenced by the form of 
port administration has been taken as the more important criterion. 
Lastly, in the discussion of the economy and the shipping services, only 
those features which were relevant to port development or to the question of 
nationalism have been brought out. No attempt has been made to write a 
history of waterside unionism. Instead, the special conditions which made the 
ports such troublesome areas of industrial militancy are discussed, as militancy 
directly afiected the ports, and as it can be seen as a particular expression of a 
wider nationalist opposition to unconditional economic growth. Periodization 
has been based on the basic phases of economic development. The political 
reasons for breaking the account at 1900, 1918, and 1939 are obvious, but the 
choice of 1885 might be disputed.^ Finally, the discussion of the structure and 
timing of growth may be partly erroneous because of the lack of published 
historical material on the Queensland economy.* All the economic statistics 
referred to in the text and not otherwise acknowledged are derived from the 
relevant physical production figures in the Statistical Registers. It is emphasized 
that at times they are only crude estimates. 
So much for reservations. A few words about the work's methodological 
basis may be helpful however. In Stuart Hughes's estimation each of the leading 
figures in Western social science between 1890 and 1930 stressed the need for 
something more than a rigorous scientific method in their disciplines. Croce, 
Mannheim, and Weber had different ideas about what this extra-rational 
procedure should involve, but they each chose to step past the barriers of 
orthodox reason.^ Croce took pains to warn historians against writing what he 
termed philological history—uncritical history that reproduces the past in its 
own terms and lacks contemporary relevance. Camus later made a similar point 
when he condemned purely historical thought as nihilistic.^ The element of 
"something more" in this study is my argument about Australian nationalism. 
To conclude: Australian port history is almost an untouched field and 
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regionalism has been specially influential in Queensland's past. This book places 
the ports in the foreground of the state's economic development, as a vital part 
of the regional transport systems, and examines their history as a case study of 
the growth of Australian economic nationalism in Queensland. 
Because a long time has elapsed between the book's original conception 
and its appearance in print, there are two recent works which deserve special 
comment. The first is Ray Evans's thesis, "Charitable Institutions of the 
Queensland Government to 1919" (M.A. thesis. University of Queensland, 
1969). This puts forward a much darker view of life in Queensland than the 
present work advances and should be read as an essential corrective to the over-
optimism of my interpretation. His concern is to explain why underprivileged 
people in Queensland were so shamefully treated. Part of his finding is that it 
was a result of the colonial obsession with economic development—with the 
respectability of success. Paupers, lepers, the mentally ill, prisoners, prostitutes, 
and drunkards were living proof that the new society was by no means a paradise, 
even for honest hard-workers. Yet, to an extent, I see our themes as being 
supplementary rather than contradictory. Another important source that I only 
reahzed to be relevant for this work after its completion is Michael Roe's book. 
Quest for Authority in Eastern Australia 1835-1851 (Melbourne University 
Press, 1965). As Roe points out in his discussion of "moral enlightenment", "a 
first principle of the creed was the minghng of 'material, mental, and moral' 
advance". My discussion of nationalism elaborates this identification. 
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AUSTRALIAN NATIONALISM: 
A Hypothesis 
National symbols and the need for security 
Before any society can develop the sense of symbols which will define its 
community, or nationality, a degree of security from external and internal 
disturbance is necessary. For each nation this is usually difficult to achieve. 
Although the Pax Britannica was an ever present guarantee against invasion, 
from its beginnings Austraha had certain fears to face up to. Firstly there was 
the period of great unrest in Europe during the fifty years after 1788. The strains 
of the Industrial and French Revolutions, among other contemporary up-
heavals, placed English society in a most unsettled condition. The inference 
may be crude but this period of early childhood stress made its mark on the 
isolated colony and security would always remain a paramount concern. 
Strategically, geography heightened this concern. Australia still is a Western 
society sheltering uneasily under an Eastern roof. 
The assurance of internal security, in the sense of maintaining a law-abiding 
and cohesive community, was as important a condition of the definition of 
nationalism. Here it is easier to stand on solid ground in retracing Australia's 
first steps towards a sense of self-identity. The cold voice of Hobbes, with its 
tones of deep pessimism about man's social relations, evoked a ready response 
from the descendants of convicts. The English habits of authority would find 
many practitioners in Australia. There was also another impulse which made the 
preservation of internal order important. As the epigraph from the Brisbane 
Courier of 1878 indicates, because of the absence of a hereditarily privileged 
class, any public unrest was an insult to the mass of free citizens. This was an 
excellent reason for the seeds of moderate British liberalism to find fertile soil 
in the Antipodes. The European politics of violence would be held in little 
favour by people who would boast of being more British than Britons. 
But how would Australian liberalism differ from Enghsh? Liberalism was a 
political state of mind which prevailed in America and in the white countries of 
the British Empire as well as in England. It was not essentially a national 
characteristic until some distinctive local values had been added to define 
Australian liberalism's points of difference from English and American practices. 
In a country hke Australia, caught between the decline of Britain and the rise of 
America as world powers, asserting national individuality would not be easy. 
AUSTRALL\N NATIONALISM 
Perhaps because of this, perhaps because the development of any society's sense 
of nationalism is a complicated affair, there were several paradoxes in the 
emergence of Australia's national symbols. For instance, Australians considered 
themselves anti-authoritarian. At the same time they were intensely law-abiding 
people. Ned Kelly, being quite unlike the majority of Australians who have 
respected the spirit of the law, was adopted as a hero in a society which was 
usually too genuinely democratic to require them. 
The Australian departure: The relation of moral and economic affairs 
Mozart wrote his final three symphonies in the same year that Arthur 
Phillip founded Australia. To put this in Jungian terms, these were synchronous 
events. Western Classical music had reached its zenith and Austraha would 
spend its first full century in the less sunny world of Beethoven and Wagner—the 
world of Romanticism. The spirit of Romantic democracy was then given its 
strongest expression with the French Revolution. As a result, while Australians 
never saw themselves as being as democratic as their distant American neigh-
bours, democracy was still a primary political aspiration in the nineteenth-
century Australian colonies. The other main influence that shaped Europe's 
future at that time was the Industrial Revolution. Because of the particular 
timing of the foundation of Austraha, a special and in some ways unique 
relation would be made between social values and industriahsm. To the English 
people, ethics and economics were usually separate: to Australians they were 
often the same thing. This identification of moral and economic affairs formed 
the basis of the new Australian nationalism and would guide economic growth. 
Another ex-British society in which the economic life was highly valued 
was the United States. For all its rapacity, American materiahsm was softened 
by religious and other social mores, and in a like manner Australian materialism 
was tempered by its own national ethos. But in contrast with Americans, 
Australians were much less other-worldly and less loquacious. They were more 
practically egalitarian and anti-rhetorical. Because of their distrust of language 
it was not clear in which way the new social imperatives would relate to Aus-
tralian society. In fact, as a less complex society than the United States—in that 
its foundation years were less diverse, and as the country remained more 
ethnically homogenous and geographically isolated—an unusually close con-
nection could come to exist between ethics and economics in Australia. 
Those unaware of this relationship would mistakenly see the new land as 
either an unregenerate working man's paradise where life was whiled away in an 
atmosphere of gregarious nihilism, or as an inferior copy of Enghsh society 
which was more materialistic and less genteel than the original. As national 
pride naturally preferred the first interpretation, mateship was enshrined as the 
definitive Australian value. Yet when the maternal aegis of England finally fell 
away in the twentieth century a new generation of Australians somehow felt 
themselves lacking in history and tradition. In the century of world war, 
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genocide, and the bomb, the simple virtues of mateship were not enough. In a 
world apparently determined on revolution and the destruction of all liberal 
values, the radical conservatism of Australian society seemed sadly out of place. 
To this outside world and to many Australians the traditions of mateship offered 
little or nothing as a means of explanation of the worth of the Australian 
experience. 
It is argued that a basic national value of long standing has been forgotten. 
It was never clearly enunciated and perhaps by its nature could not have been 
until recently. The attitudes that Australians adopted towards the development 
of their country between 1850 and 1941 were quite distinctively Australian, not 
Enghsh or American, and these meant as much to them as Manifest Destiny did 
to the Americans, or as much as Empire meant to the Enghsh. These attitudes 
were expressed through the relation of moral and economic affairs. The con-
nection between mateship and material progress in any systematic way, however, 
was rarely made by observers, or by Australians themselves. Yet, collectively, 
Australians could not disobey the dictates of their Romantic origins and 
mateship and economic expansion were identified. 
Put most simply, the argument is that the Enghsh were the first European 
people to successfully assert the Protestant separation of rehgious from economic 
life. Since then, Australia and America have been settled. The Americans took 
this new order of things to its ultimate limits; Australia developed more in the 
opposite direction. What misled many was that as the new amalgam of values 
was made the union was largely concealed by another national characteristic— 
the extreme reluctance of Austrahans to discuss ethics or to be introspective. 
This culminated in a distrust of political rhetoric which is still an enduring 
feature of Australian political life. Verbal reticence was one of the sharpest 
differences between Australians and Americans. The Austrahan equivalent of 
the intense and articulate American social debate over the national purpose and 
ideals was a general antipathy towards such discussion except in a plain Lawson-
like manner. Yet, partly because of this, the new nationalism would be more 
effective in Australia in the long run. In the sense of sharing certain basic values 
Australians were one people in 1939, while Americans were more a collection 
of peoples bound together by shared interests. 
In my view, the historians who have brought out the most distinctive 
features of Australian nationalism are T. A. Coghlan, Brian Fitzpatrick, Gordon 
Greenwood, and Russel Ward. Coghlan and Fitzpatrick emphasized the 
importance of economic life to Australians; Greenwood and Ward stressed the 
social elements of nationalism.^ My thesis is that nationalism was actually social 
and economic—that Australians equated moral and economic affairs. Mateship 
and materiahsm are equally important to Austrahans. There have been times 
when one has been stressed at the expense of the other, but I would argue that 
the underlying ideal is that they should be balanced. 
It was of singular importance that Australia was settled after the French 
and the Industrial Revolutions. At the end of the eighteenth century the French 
proclaimed the rights of man to the world, while the English showed how 
industrialization could make this ideal a practical possibility. While it distorts 
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both French and English history to conclude that therefore the French were 
more concerned with the morality of their society, whereas the English placed a 
higher value on material progress, there is an important element of truth in 
this. Undeniably, French society was also acquisitive, as Englishmen were often 
idealistic. Adam Smith was Professor of Moral Philosophy as well as of Political 
Economy, while there were humane and socially minded Utilitarians. Across 
the Channel, the Physiocrats had preceded the Classical economists and Saint-
Simon was also preoccupied with the economic rationalization of society. These 
examples could easily be multiplied, but the necessity of historical quahfication 
should not stop us from seeing that the French Revolution occurred en France, 
while the Industrial Revolution was first an English affair. Most of the world 
came to adopt democracy and industrialization in a variety of forms, yet origin-
ally they were breathtakingly daring French and Enghsh inventions. It is in this 
sense that it is argued here that modern English society separated moral and 
economic affairs. 
The ports and economic nationalism 
Historical discussions of nationalism have usually been couched in political 
and social terms. But Australian nationalism, it is suggested, can best be under-
stood by examining Australian attitudes to economic affairs. As Gordon 
Greenwood has pointed out, Australian nationalism, "in common with national 
movements elsewhere, was not only emotional, but also somewhat amorphous". 
The following chapters attempt to reduce this amorphousness by applying the 
above hypothesis about Australian nationalism to the development of the ports, 
the shipping services, and the economy of Queensland between 1859 and 1939. 
The problem is to consider how the nationalist identification of moral and 
economic affairs influenced the ports, their shipping services, and the aspects of 
economic growth most relevant to port development. The essential setting for 
the discussion, however, is the emergence of Australian economic nationalism 
in Queensland.^ 
1 INTRODUCTION Before 1859 
Port development in the Northern Districts of New South Wales before 
1859 was pragmatically crude. With the exception of the original convict ports— 
Brisbane, Ipswich, and Gladstone—the others which were opened up before 
separation had pastoral origins. After the termination of the convict settlements, 
growth in the original ports also depended on pastoral trade. Rockhampton was 
the only port to benefit from mineral discoveries. To expand these simple facts 
into a fuller discussion of trading relations between the ports and the economy 
before 1859 would not be very useful. The ports' early growth is best considered 
as a representative form of regional rivalry—a rivalry which marked the growth 
of the colony as a whole. 
Some social perspectives 
One of the issues which has lately been raised for re-examination by 
Australian historians has been the reason for Australia's foundation. Hancock's 
influential view, in 1930, was that the settlement decision was a matter of 
expediency for a British government perplexed by overcrowded prisons and the 
absence of a place of confinement after the American Revolution.^ His opinion, 
aimed at those who tended to romanticize the matter by treating the convicts as 
martyrs of a vicious penal system, has now itself been queried. Commercial and 
strategic factors have been suggested as possible reasons for settlement. If the 
foundation period is taken as, say, the first thirty years, then the case for 
accepting these more recent views seems to be becoming acceptable. Yet if the 
initial decision is temporally isolated the penal arguments remain unquestion-
ably strong.^ 
In discussing the settlement issue Brian Fitzpatrick has been one of the few 
to have related the British penal code to the wider question of British attitudes 
to poverty. His choice of Patrick Colquhoun's views to preface his work was 
apposite. Poverty, Colquhoun said, was a necessary and indispensable ingredient 
in society.^ The English, exhibiting a sense of moderation, decided that there 
could be too much of a good thing—even poverty. So they attempted to export 
it. In turn the Austrahan reaction was to equate moral responsibility with 
economic progress. Today, some two hundred years later, the most notable 
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achievement of Australian civilization has been to build a way of life where 
almost every white Australian need never fear hunger. 
The material well-being that Australians achieved in the nineteenth century 
explains many paradoxes of their political life. Colonial conditions quickly 
demonstrated the irrelevance of British conceptions of a fixed wage fund, and 
the seemingly conservative Legislative Councils of the fifties and sixties rapidly 
granted political democracy.* Employers had little to fear from people whose 
first aim was to become employers themselves. Tempered by the pecuharly real 
if ambiguous practices of mateship, a consensus of British liberal middle-class 
ideals unified Australians.^ The limits of Australian democracy were most 
evident in dealings with the natives. These were usually short and to the point. 
Aboriginals were given three choices: to get out, to cooperate, or to be killed. 
Another factor which helped to make the idea of progress so acceptable to 
Australians was that nineteenth-century Australia possessed a moving frontier. 
If less bountiful than that which led to California, it was still a vital stimulus to 
Australian hfe.® In short, a highly favourable chmate for economic development 
existed by 1859, and the belief that improved economic conditions would bring 
about moral advances was a social axiom. 
After the first convict settlement had been made at Botany Bay it was found 
necessary to establish prisons within the prison. So the Moreton Bay settlement 
was decided on. John Oxley, assisted by shipwrecked southern timber-getters, 
discovered the Brisbane River in 1823. He thought the river valley was a very 
favourable site and the first camp in the district was made at Redcliffe Point in 
1824. Shortly afterwards, either because of native hostility or due to health 
problems associated with the site, the encampment was shifted to Brisbane.' 
Oxley's original preference had been for the Enoggera Creek area but the final 
choice was made further upstream in a tight meander of the river. What was 
exceptional about Brisbane's establishment, compared with the other Queens-
land ports founded later, was that it was not a product of inland pastoral 
expansion.^ From the outset reservations were made about Moreton Bay's 
suitability for penal settlement. It seemed better suited for free colonization.' 
In 1827 the Darling Downs were discovered, which added to the existing 
reservations about the Bay's penal use, and Governor Darling spoke of Strad-
broke Island as a better site for a gaol. The Bay's convict population was one 
thousand by 1830, but the penal use of the area steadily declined after that 
until the convict camp was broken up in 1839." 
The early history of Moreton Bay was a study in brutality and degradation. 
The grey monotony of convictism varied only in degree between Moreton Bay 
and Norfolk Island, while around both captor and captive stretched the bush. 
"The land almost calls one to be lonely", felt Lawrence, "and then drives one 
back again on one's fellow-men in a kind of frenzy."^^ A spirit of darkness 
underlay the affection that Australians developed for their native earth. 
Economic and geographic factors played a part in keeping them to the edge of 
the country, but there was also another reason. Australian love of country 
could never be too far removed from a sense of distrust of the land. An almost 
overwhelming pioneer challenge brought forth a nearly totally urban response.^^ 
Before 1859 
Land, labour, and regionalism 
The axis around which early Australian history revolved was the need for 
the continent's basic physical development. For a time the assignment system 
satisfied both authorities and colonists, but then disagreements about whether 
the colony was a gaol or a new society increased. After 1820 the growing 
strength of the wool industry and influxes of capital and migrants carried the 
day for the brighter view. A number of issues were recurrently argued in the 
early years—the land problem, the achievement of responsible government, the 
cessation of transportation, and the assurance of an adequate supply of labour. 
In the colonial context these were all closely related and after intense discussion 
three decisions resolved New South Wales's problems: the abolition of trans-
portation in 1840, the land act of 1846-1847, and the granting of responsible 
government in 1852. In its dealings with the New South Wales squatters the 
British Colonial Office had continually stressed the dangers of dispersion to the 
colony. This emphasis, which later also informed Wakefield's colonization 
theories, did not derive solely from the desire for intensive agrarian settlement. 
Moral, perhaps even metaphysical, principles were involved. The traditions of 
an island people carried weight and the society's criminal origins added to the 
fears of the anti-dispersionists.^^ 
In Queensland the same problems were to be faced—the land question, the 
labour shortage, and transportation. In place of the demands of New South 
Wales for responsible government. Northerners substituted their own demands 
for separation from New South Wales. Decisions in the mother colony deter-
mined the North's solutions for responsible government and transportation, but 
separation and the labour problem gave a distinctive tone to Queensland's early 
politics. In turn, these two issues affected the most important early regional 
controversy—which town was to become the major port and capital city of the 
new colony. 
One of the most notable differences between Queensland's development and 
that of the southern colonies was the greater extent to which it defied the 
centralist tendencies which have characterized Australia's economic growth. 
The first Queensland squatters owed little or nothing to Brisbane and the town 
was not immediately used as a base for pastoral expansion as Rockhampton or 
Townsville would be. The early Brisbane merchants experienced difficulties 
because of pastoralists' preferences for Sydney suppliers.^* What was decisive 
was that Queensland's economic growth began at a time when other important 
financial centres already existed in Sydney and Melbourne. The importance of 
regionalism in colonial politics at that time seems difficult to exaggerate. When 
separation was imminent, claims for the right to be declared the new colonial 
capital were made by almost every town of any size—by Ipswich, Gayndah, 
Maryborough, Gladstone, Rockhampton, and of course Brisbane. A fierce 
struggle took place between Cleveland Point and Brisbane to decide which town 
would be the chief port for the Southern hinterland, while within Brisbane there 
were clashes over the placement of the port in the river. Again, the factions 
within the squatting interest were regional factions. Their apparent unity con-
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cealed a loosely woven pattern of the influence of squatters from the west, from 
the Burnett, from the north—then around Rockhampton—and of the original 
Downs pastoralists. These various colonial groupings successfully joined to-
gether to achieve separation and then continued on their own ways. 
Meanwhile development in Brisbane began to gain impetus. But the first 
steps were hesitant, as if the leaden years of convictism were too difficult a point 
of departure. Although the settlement had been broken up in 1839 the area was 
not officially pronounced open for settlement till 1842. Commercial depression 
then enveloped New South Wales and no official survey had been made of 
Brisbane until that year. The first fact meant that the colony's early free years 
were hampered by financial stringency—no bank existed in Brisbane till 1850; 
the second meant that prospective investors could not secure permanent building 
sites. It was only after the mid-forties that Brisbane began to make satisfactory 
progress.^® 
The separation campaign now began to blossom. Its first vocal supporters 
were the squatters and Brisbane employers, who saw as its corollary the renewal 
of transportation. Then from 1849 to 1852 the influence of J. D. Lang's radical 
immigrants steered the Brisbane employers away from favouring transportation. 
With this done squatters and townsmen combined uneasily to achieve colonial 
autonomy.^^ Administrative difficulty and the strength of regional interests had 
decided the issue in Queensland's favour. More than two decades later the 
arguments of a North Queensland separatist petition could have just as well 
been used in the earlier campaign to separate Queensland from New South 
Wales. "The principal reasons in favour of separation", an 1885 petition de-
clared, 
are (1) The great area of the country causes difficulties in the administration 
of government from the capital of the colony . . . adequate representation 
in the Legislative Assembly of the more distant districts cannot be obtained; 
while the most necessary public works are neglected in consequence of the 
distance from the seat of government. (2) The public loans obtained on the 
security of the whole of the Colony have been unjustly distributed owing to 
the preponderance of southern interests . . . while the revenue of the North 
has been applied to paying interest on the whole debt.^' 
The Queensland squatters' efforts to ensure an adequate labour supply 
began in 1840 with the creation of a local labour fund and continued through 
the decade. At first a British plan to establish a colony at Port Curtis for a better 
type of convict raised squatting hopes that cheap labour would be made avail-
able. But the settlement failed almost immediately because of a change in 
British policy following a change in government. Strong opposition had also 
come from the Queensland anti-transportationists—doubly irate that the plan 
would have given ex-convicts advantages over free settlers in purchasing land.^^ 
The details of the squatters' attempts to ensure a labour supply, however, are 
not relevant here. 
Before 1859 
The foundation of the first ports: Constant regional rivalry 
Brisbane 
What is relevant about the differences between the inland squatters and the 
Brisbane townsmen is the way in which they influenced the choice of a port for 
the South Queensland hinterland and a capital city for the colony. The squatters 
favoured Cleveland Point as a port and Ipswich as a capital city. Brisbane 
interests wished both honours to be conferred upon themselves, while the Port 
Curtis settlement was championed as the future capital by Sydney. Sydney's 
support for Port Curtis derived not so much from any affection for the small 
port, as from the belief that any settlement further south would win the trade 
of the Northern Rivers district of New South Wales. 
The squatters had two reasons for advocating Cleveland Point as the major 
hinterland outlet. Firstly, some difficulty was involved in sending pastoral 
produce through Brisbane. Wool drays arriving at South Brisbane, which had 
direct inland connection with the Downs sheep runs, then had to be ferried to 
North Brisbane before shipment. This delay could be avoided, squatters argued, 
by the drays continuing on after South Brisbane to Cleveland Point. Secondly, 
the squatters hoped to make the Brisbane townsmen more aware of their com-
mercial dependence on pastoralists and more sympathetic to squatting labour 
problems. Later small river steamers chugged up to Ipswich to replace the drays. 
Even then, squatters argued that Cleveland Point could be used to export 
directly to Britain, whereas wool going through Brisbane was transhipped at 
Sydney. This was the background of rivalry to the choice of the major southern 
port. 
In fact, to say that a port was chosen is partially misleading. It was only 
gradually that Brisbane inched ahead of its rivals. There is a legend that when 
Gipps visited Moreton Bay in 1842 he favoured Brisbane as the regional port 
because at Cleveland Point his boat had been unable to reach shore. He then 
had to wade through deep mud flats to reach dry land.^' It is true that he had to 
wade ashore and probably true that consequently he was not very impressed 
with the Point. But, as Coote has argued, in 1842 it was unlikely that Gipps was 
examining the area for a future capital. At that time it was more probable that 
the district's revenue-producing potential was his primary concern.^" 
The residents of Cleveland Point could make many criticisms of Brisbane's 
port weaknesses and Brisbane people could find as many faults with the Point. 
One of the early voyagers to Brisbane in 1833 had been forced to wait for twelve 
days at the entrance to the Bay before entering the river.^^ Apart from the bar 
and the difficult entrance channels at the river's mouth there was a series of 
mudflats through its course. "For about nine miles [14.48 km] the course is 
circuitous", an early river survey reported, "and in many places the channel 
narrows and shallows. Several banks must be crossed, . . . and heavy dredging 
would be necessary to clear and maintain cuttings."^^ For its part, Cleveland 
Point was exposed to the weather—a serious handicap for sailing vessels—and 
its approaches were marred by mud flats. The remedies for Cleveland's de-
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ficiencies would have been of great initial cost. A mile-long (1.61 km) jetty was 
needed to span the flats and large breakwaters were required to reduce the 
port's exposure. These weaknesses gave the champions of each port room for 
genuine disagreement as to which was the better. At the height of the debate a 
pig was captured swimming down the Brisbane River. It was quickly put about 
by Brisbane's supporters that the "amphibious grunter" had been aiming for 
the paradise of Cleveland's mudflats.^* 
By 1859, for all practical purposes, Brisbane had won out. Most specifically, 
this was because of two shipwrecks which befell wool shipments from the Point 
in 1847 and 1853. The pastorahsts backing the shipments felt the strain of these 
losses.^* More importantly, Brisbane became the area's leading port gradually. 
A number of events resulted in Brisbane's ascendancy. The first Brisbane land 
sales were held in Sydney in 1842; Brisbane was declared a Port of Entry in 1846, 
and a warehousing port in 1849; in 1850 a Customs House was erected. A year 
later a direct wool shipment was made to Britain and in 1853 the New Orleans, 
an American ship drawing 9\ feet (2.9 m), sailed up the river. The tonnage of 
shipping entering the port grew from 8,000 tons (8,128 tonnes) in 1848 to 16,800 
(17,069 tonnes) in 1853, and to 40,000 tons (40,642 tonnes) in 1858.^ 5 Brisbane 
had proved more amenable to gradual improvement than the Point. In 1855 
£1,000 ($2,000) had been voted for the Cleveland jetty, yet much more was 
required. It was never supplied. These considerations and the importance of 
Brisbane's established commercial services defeated Cleveland Point. By the 
time of separation there was little doubt that Brisbane would be Queensland's 
new capital and principal port. 
Ipswich 
Like Brisbane and Port Curtis, Ipswich owed its beginnings to the convicts. 
Oxley had discovered the Bremer River in 1824 and three years later Logan 
explored it. A plentiful supply of limestone was found near Ipswich's future site 
and was mined for building purposes. In 1842 Gipps regarded the townsite as an 
alternative one only and inferior to a site further downstream, but the District 
Surveyor was persuaded to leave the site unchanged. For navigational purposes 
the choice was an unfortunate one, yet as Ipswich became the centre of pastoral 
opposition to Brisbane the town prospered.^* Until 1846 a flat-bottomed barge 
was used as means of water transport between the two towns. In that year a 
small steamer took over the service. The facility of water as against road carriage 
gradually led to a number of small steamers being employed in the trade, but the 
possibilities of expansion were limited. Ipswich could only be made accessible 
to large steamers by a prohibitively costly programme of river improvements. 
In 1855 a survey pointed to the town's unfortunate position past the natural 
terminus of navigation and drew a dismal picture of the extensive work necessary 
to improve the river. The principal obstacle was the Seventeen Mile Rocks. 
They were barely covered at high water, "leaving however two channels, the 
first being . . . so difficult of approach . . . one of the small steamers plying here 
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was lately sunk upon these rocks, not having sufficient power to stem the rush 
through the confined opening".^' The second passage was also very difficult. 
Another serious problem was the river's susceptibihty to flood. After one deluge 
in 1857 the Brisbane Harbour Master reported nine land shps, "taking with 
them such a quantity of Earth that they form Islands, with trees and shrubs 
upon them nearby in the middle of the river''.^^ 
Difficulties of navigation as serious as these left only the possibility of costly 
improvements. However, the success of attempts to improve the Bremer 
ultimately depended on the outcome of the struggle between Ipswich and 
Brisbane for political power in the sixties. As Brisbane emerged victorious the 
likehhood of the Bremer being improved decreased. The completion of the rail 
hnk between Ipswich and North Brisbane in 1876 would ring the death knell of 
the river trade for years to come. 
Maryborough 
After the exploration of the district by Petrie and Russel in 1842 settlement 
was unsuccessfully attempted at Wide Bay. Five years passed before the port 
was re-established, during which time Burnett had extended the knowledge of 
the area. Aside from minor shoals, he found an entrance depth of some four to 
six fathoms (7.32 to 10.97 m) at the mouth of the Mary River and declared that 
large vessels could ascend the river for twenty to twenty-five miles (32.19 to 
40.23 km). In 1848 a boiling-down works was set up and in the same year the 
Moreton Bay Courier attempted to advertise the port's advantages: "At least 
three storekeepers have established themselves on the river Mary and stock and 
stations are to be found in all directions. Vessels are trading between this port 
and Sydney, and so little is thought of the trip from this river that a small coaster 
of sixteen tons [16.26 tonnes] . . . runs constantly between the Brisbane and 
the Maryborough."^^ The settlement was shifted downstream closer to deep 
water in 1855-1856 but Maryborough still made little progress. Its time for port 
growth would not come until the discovery of Gympie's gold in 1867. Till then 
the port sent out the usual colonial produce—wool, tallow, and hides—as well 
as some timber.^" 
Gladstone 
Gladstone's early development owed more to British colonial policy, and 
then to Sydney's speculative efforts in the separation contest between New 
South Wales and the Northern Districts, than to inland pastoral expansion. 
By the mid-fifties Sydney was aware of the imminence of separation. While still 
working against the proposal, it was also attempting to ensure that, if the 
separatists did win, then the split should take place as far to the north as possible. 
To this end. Port Curtis was supported. Originally the settlement had been 
intended to be a place for the rehabihtation of a better type of convict, but it 
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had lasted for less than three months. Afterwards little progress was made but 
settlement was still preserved. Then in 1854 Maurice O'Connell was appointed 
district Government Resident, the first wool exports were made, and the first 
land sales were held in Sydney. The town seemed on the verge of rapid growth. 
Speculation was the order of the day, as it was again during the second land 
sales in 1855—then held in Gladstone. Success seemed near but the local news-
paper struck a bizarre note of caution. 
Truth is truth and fiction is fiction and Gladstone is Gladstone, and a 
barren country behind, a barren country. Yes, my fellow residents, you 
bought your land . . . with the idea that the township of Gladstone must 
advance, and all of you in a few years become wealthy proprietors. The idea 
is truly ridiculous . . . do the citizens think this is going to be a second 
Melbourne ? Do they think that Australia is so overburdened with population 
that people will mob here for want of room, do they think that in a place 
where water is so scarce, where a back country is composed of nothing 
else but a series of rocky ridges and where on all sides it is very evident that 
the great Creator never intended but for the eagle to build her eyrie in its 
rocks, and the myall blacks to roam as undisputed monarch of it all. Do 
they think that in such a place, white men in numbers will ever make their 
home ?^ ^ 
This pessimism was justified. After 1855, as southerners withdrew their 
backing, the Port Curtis settlement declined. This decline was gratefully received 
in Brisbane. Previously Port Curtis's prospects had caused Brisbane some 
anxiety. The Moreton Bay Courier had written in deprecatory terms about 
Gladstone's economic capabilities, while in reply the Sydney Morning Herald 
had championed the small port. With what proved to be a mixture of prophecy 
and irony the Courier had concluded its summary dismissal of Gladstone's 
future: "all that remains is the mere chance of a goldfield being discovered."^^ 
When this happened in 1858 the discovery benefited Rockhampton rather than 
Gladstone. 
Rockhampton 
The founding years of Rockhampton lacked the excitement of events in 
early Gladstone but they also lacked disappointments. The port had been 
opened up by the Archers as a means of supplying their property and exporting 
wool. The first shipment had gone to Gladstone in 1850 where it was transhipped 
for Sydney. A months previously Rockhampton had been declared a Port of 
Entry.^ The early years were marked chiefly by steadily growing pastoral pros-
perity and a high percentage of shipping casualties in the river, which was never 
easily navigable.^* Then in 1858 Rockhampton and Gladstone were staggered 
to be told that they were the centre of what was reputed to be the largest and 
richest gold discovery on the Australian continent. The strike was at Canoona, 
close to Rockhampton, and was made at the beginning of September. Five 
thousand men from Sydney and seven thousand from Victoria set out for the 
new field, which soon proved a failure. Gladstone was almost deserted but 
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Rockhampton fared better as supplies for the diggings were landed there.'^ The 
situation was near chaotic and early in October a police inspector wrote: 
"Crowds of people continue to arrive, of whom the greater number seem utterly 
unprovided with money or provisions; and, consequently, failing to find gold in 
abundance on the surface of the ground, are compelled by necessity to en-
deavour to return."^* When the confusion passed, some of the miners had chosen 
to remain in Rockhampton and a small quantity of gold was being raised. 
Development in Gladstone, on the other hand, had received a severe setback. 
The importance of the facts of port settlement 
One result of the upsurge of interest in the area had been a careful estimation 
of the available port sites. Government officials sent there to supervise the 
diggings paid more attention to the question than pastoralists, who usuafly had 
only their immediate needs in mind. The Customs Officer wrote critically of 
Rockhampton and compared it unfavourably with the harbour at Gladstone.^' 
The Fitzroy's difficulties were specially remarked on. One steamer chuffed up 
the wrong channel for two days before discovering its error.^^ O'Connell also 
offered other reasons in favour of Gladstone. The entrance to Keppel Bay was 
more dangerous and difficulties of policing customs collections would be much 
greater in the Bay than at Gladstone.^* 
These were the few sensible statements made about possible port sites in 
the colony before separation. They had been made only as a result of unusual 
conditions arising from the gold rush and were not acted on. There was no real 
government policy towards port settlement before separation: regional economic 
interests decided where ports would be and how they were developed.*" Here 
Gladstone was the exception proving the rule. External access had been a fore-
most consideration in the settlement, but because Gladstone did not owe her 
origins to inland pastoral expansion growth would be retarded for many years. 
A fine natural harbour meant very little unless there was also ready access to 
producing industries in the hinterland." 
With the exception of Brisbane, Ipswich, and Port Curtis, every port opened 
in the Northern Districts before separation originated from pastoral needs. 
Cleveland Point, Maryborough, and Rockhampton were opened to supply the 
squatters who had opened up the hinterland behind each port. This was 
significantly different from European experience. There, Adam Smith observed, 
as by means of water-carriage a more extensive market is opened to every 
sort of industry than what land-carriage alone can afford, so it is upon the 
sea-coast, and along the banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every 
kind naturally begins to sub-divide and improve itself, and it is frequently 
not till a long time after that those improvements extend themselves to the 
inland parts of the country.*^ 
From their beginnings the early ports of Queensland were commercially de-
pendent on the pastoral industry. As other exports were developed, ports would 
be opened to suit new economic needs, rather than the reverse. This fact of 
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internal development preceding and leading to port development, as opposed to 
the initial circumstances of European port settlement, would not be grasped by 
the Queensland legislators when they set up the colony's port administration. 
Instead of a system of port responsibility being established the elements of 
regional discord and rivalry would be infused into port administration in the 
colony.*^ 
This view does simplify and to some extent distort the European experience. 
There, with more complex and traditional societies, a degree of interdependence 
between ports and their hinterlands always existed. In fifteenth-century England, 
for instance, the ports responded to the growth of the wool industry. 
Additionally, it may be considered that Queensland's port development was not 
opposed to the European pattern, but that it was at an earlier stage of maturity. 
These are useful quahfications in accounting for port growth in the old and the 
new world; nevertheless, the fact remains that ports and hinterlands developed 
together in Europe to a much greater extent than in Queensland. Amsterdam, 
London, Hamburg, and most of the large European ports had valuable com-
mercial carrying trades before the Industrial Revolution. The Queensland ports 
were not settled until the nineteenth century and were never entrepots in a com-
parable way. With industrialization in England, as Mantoux explains so well, 
the English ports extended their older functions and played a strategic role in 
the process of growth by funnelling the boom in external trade to the northern 
miffs.** Further, the English, Dutch, and German economies were not involved 
with older and much stronger economies as Queensland was with England and 
the other Australian colonies. These essential differences gave the nineteenth-
century European ports an enduring sense of national pride and importance that 
the colonial ports could not possibly have to begin with. 
It was the pohtical consequences of these differences which would be so 
troublesome for the Queensland ports. In his study of Liverpool's port history. 
Stuart Mountfield shows the clear division that had emerged between those 
concerned with Liverpool as a port and as a town at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century.*^ After years of difficulty, the town council's control of the port 
was broken and the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board was created to guide 
Liverpool's port development. This healthy sense of a division of interests 
between a port and its town was not possible in a new colony where ports had 
usually been founded overnight to meet the needs of inland producers. The 
Queensland politicians of the 1890s, however, transplanted an English method 
of port administration that was intended to regulate an unavoidable difference 
of interests between ports and their towns to an entirely different colonial 
situation where ports were much more dependent on their hinterlands and towns 
and had no established sense of tradition. In this sense, port administration in 
Queensland did not go through the same stage of evolution as it had in England. 
The application of a quite sophisticated administrative arrangement to ports at 
a much earlier stage of economic development would lead to unexpected and 
unfavourable results. 
Before 1859 15 
The neglect of port administration before separation 
The control of the port of Brisbane 
The administrative needs of the Northern Districts' ports were simply met 
in the pre-separation period by applying in toto the existing regulations and 
practices that prevailed in the ports of New South Wales. By 1842 a Harbour 
Master supervised the port of Brisbane and less important authorities such as a 
Steam Navigation Board and a Shipping Master had been appointed by 1855. 
The latter officials were a direct and quickly fading link with the British maritime 
past. The Shipping Master, for example, engaged seamen for visiting British 
vessels.*•' As Northern Districts' residents complained about the inadequate 
attention given to their district by the Sydney authorities, those concerned with 
the port of Brisbane pointed to their administrative grievances. An apparently 
generous sum of £10,000 ($20,000) had been granted in 1856 for improving the 
Brisbane River, but the growing likelihood of separation discouraged the New 
South Wales government from spending any more than £115 ($230) on actual 
programmes.*^ In 1851 the Bay's residents had paid for the first river survey 
themselves. Dissatisfaction was also voiced about the lack of flexibility in what 
administrative arrangements there were. An 1850 Select Committee recom-
mended local control of the Bay's pilotage service as a precondition of improve-
ment, but the imminence of separation again postponed necessary change.*^ 
When separation did take place, the administration of the port of Brisbane 
was taken over by the Treasury Department. In most other Queensland ports 
administration would be given over to municipal council control; therefore 
this calls for explanation. Several alternatives exist. The absence of municipal 
port control after separation may have been a result of the Council's lack of 
interest in the port. Or perhaps the Council thought it financially better for the 
town if the colonial government retained port control—as later critics would 
charge. Another possibihty is that Treasury control was a product of Ipswich 
pressure. Given the strength of Ipswich's politicians in the first ministries and 
the rivalry of Cleveland Point and Ipswich with Brisbane, this seems at least 
possible.®" Lastly, these explanations may be over-elaborate. Perhaps continuous 
control was the simplest organizational solution at the time. 
It is later argued that the first two of these possibilities had no factual basis. 
The Council was concerned with the port's development and Brisbane residents 
would pay as much for port improvements as would the residents of other 
Queensland ports.®^ Considering the remaining alternatives, it seems clear that 
administrative laziness was responsible, not regional discrimination. Rivalry 
between Brisbane and Ipswich reached its peak in the first half of the sixties and 
each town made the most of any possible cause for complaint against the other. 
However the Brisbane press carried no charges of this nature. This absent-
minded disposal of port administration was reasonable enough then with the 
small importance of the issue compared with more pressing concerns. It still 
created difficulties for the future. 
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Brisbane''s port disadvantages 
Careful development of the port was the more necessary as its physical dis-
advantages frequently rendered navigation difficult. An Inner Bar stretched to the 
northeast from Luggage Point, an Outer Bar approximately a mile (1.6 km) wide 
ran across the river entrance. Because of these bars the depths available upstream 
were inadequate and uncertain, varying from 10^ feet to 4^ feet (3.20 m to 
1.37 m). Some early residents could remember walking across the river on sand-
banks. An American ship drawing 9\ feet (2.90 m) reached the town wharves in 
1853, but this was exceptional. For years to come ships were unloaded near the 
Pile Light in Moreton Bay by lighters, which were then towed up to the 
wharves.^^ In 1855 a survey estimated that the Outer Bar and the main channel 
leading to the town could be cleared to 16 feet (4.88 m) high water at a cost of 
;(^43,700 ($87,400) over an eight-year period. The improvements were meant to 
adapt the existing channels®^ but Andrew Petrie thought this to be too com-
plicated. He suggested marking the channel with beacons, breaking up the 
bottom of the river with a plough-like device, and leaving the rest to the current. 
Definite improvements, however, either well or fooUshly planned, had to await 
separation.^* 
Some examples of early port maladministration 
The Queens Wharf was the only landing place in the early river. An 
expensive jetty had been built at Eagle Farm but it was rendered useless by the 
presence of a sandbank between the site and deep water which had not been 
noticed during the jetty's construction.^® This simple error suggests that the 
problem of inadequate administrative supervision of the port's growth was an 
important one. Two further examples of early port mismanagement strengthen 
the case for this view of port administration before 1859. To take firstly the out-
come of a contest in 1850 over wharfage rights. Early Brisbane comprised four 
settlements—North and South Brisbane, Kangaroo Point, and Fortitude Valley. 
The latter was out of the running for the development of the wharfage con-
cerned, but the first three settlements competed strenuously. As the contest 
intensified. North Brisbane split into factions: those supporting the development 
of wharfage at the Commissariat Stores (now the old State Archives) on the 
North Brisbane river bank and those who favoured wharfage construction at 
Petrie Bight. Most of the early wharves had been built at South Brisbane, 
notably the wharf of the Hunter River S.N.C. The company was then the sole 
regular source of commercial communication with the southern colonies. From 
1841 to 1844 its wharf was a giant tree-trunk laid parallel with the river; this 
makeshift arrangement regularly disappeared at high tide. The company's 
decision to shift to North Brisbane in 1844, where land was more cheaply avail-
able for expansion, attracted most commercial wharfage to North Brisbane in 
the future.®® 
This was the background to intra-port rivalry. The immediate cause of 
dispute in 1850 was the resident Customs Officer's wish to transfer the Queens 
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Wharf to the newly chosen Customs House site in Petrie Bight. This proposal 
aroused intense opposition from some South Brisbane traders. They had 
situated themselves near what they claimed was the original and still genuine 
Queens Wharf at the Commissariat Stores. As there could legaffy be only one 
Queens Wharf in the port the issue was joined. Those who wished to retain the 
advantages of their established situation requested that the Commissariat Wharf 
be made a sufferance wharf. But sufferance wharves. Customs Officer Duncan 
replied, were allowed "not for private emolument, but for public convenience. 
On this principle, although the population and business of the Port would in 
ordinary circumstances require but one sufferance wharf, its division into three 
townships seems to render three necessary . . ." But the Commissariat Wharf 
was not to be added to the list or recognized as the Queens Wharf.®' The dispute 
continued into the next year via merchants' petitions addressed to the Sydney 
authorities. Basically, Duncan was trying to ensure that future wharfage 
expansion should take place at Petrie Bight rather than near the Commissariat, 
because of the decided physical advantages of the Bight for wharfage and 
shipping. His actions were immediately supported by his superiors in Sydney, 
yet the dissatisfied merchants managed eventually to win out. The Queens Wharf 
continued, apparently illegally, to be recognized as such at the old Commissariat 
site and no replacement Customs Wharf was built.®® 
The second example of early port maladministration concerns the disposal 
of water frontages in the town reach of the river. A public road, traversing the 
North Brisbane water frontages from Garden Point to New Farm, had been 
reserved by surveyors with the surety that the reserve could be extended as far 
downstream in future as progress required. Yet in 1843 some of the frontages at 
Petrie Bight and at Margaret Street were sold to private owners—so vitiating 
the future plan. For this Coote blamed local residents, while Knight blamed 
some Sydney merchants. The disposal of the frontages automatically limited 
future port development. In 1895 Knight warned: "This alienation of river 
frontage will in the future tell even more disastrously against the shipping 
facilities of our port than now."®^ His prediction proved at least partly sound. 
The sale of key city water frontages before separation contrasted unfavourably 
with the moves then under way in Sydney to resume the central commercial 
water frontages at Circular Quay and replace them under pubhc authority.®" 
Pre-separation port administration: A balance sheet 
The list of debits against the administration of the port of Brisbane before 
1859 was a long one. Dissatisfaction with pilotage arrangements, careless dis-
posal of key water frontages, and the reversal of a sound decision to centre 
wharf expansion at Petrie Bight began the list. The negligible amount expended 
on port improvements, despite the physical disadvantages of the port, continued 
it. Finally, the most serious error was the way in which the administration of the 
port passed over to Treasury instead of municipal control, without any attempt 
at clearly defining where the responsibility for port development lay. However, 
the emergent ad hoc arrangements made for port administration before 1859 
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were not intentionally discriminatory against Brisbane. Port administration in 
Sydney and Melbourne followed the same uncertain pragmatic pattern. But the 
need for unified port authority would be sorely felt in Queensland in the years 
to come. 
The first shipping services 
A major concern which will arise later in this work about the activities of 
the various shipping companies will be the problem of how to distinguish 
Australian from British interests. Although the difficulty was not so serious in 
the early years, as they were usually synonymous, clashes of colonial interest 
with the Mother Country were perceptible even then. Until 1813 the East India 
Company possessed a complete monopoly of trade in the East, which theo-
retically included Australia. However, the Company took no part in the Aus-
tralian trade and the colonial authorities ignored the illegality of trading with 
American whalers and sealers."^ The Americans had built up a strong merchant 
marine and were serious rivals to British shipping until the mid-nineteenth 
century. It was largely political necessity which caused Americans to do this as 
their revolution had drawn a sharp line between what was American and what 
was British. In Australia such a clear distinction did not exist. Austraha was to 
build her own important coastal fleet, but it would take part in the overseas 
trade only in times of emergency. ^ ^ 
The importance of coastal shipping was only too clear to the residents of 
early Moreton Bay. An isolated direct shipment of wool was made to Britain 
in 1851 but until separation, and for some years after, Queensland exports had 
usually to be transhipped at Sydney before being sent to Britain.®* The treatment 
of the Northern Districts by the Hunter River Steam Navigation Company 
often led to controversy. The company was formed by residents of the Hunter 
Valley in 1839 and extended its service to Moreton Bay in 1841. The trade was 
briefly broken off", as some shareholders considered the profits were not worth 
the navigational risks, but then resumed in 1842.®* In 1851, as the company's 
deed of settlement required changing to widen the firm's capital structure, it 
became the Australasian Steam Navigation Company. 
From the A.S.N.'s beginnings complaints were made about its extortionate 
freight charges. At the time of the Canoona gold strike in 1858 hundreds of 
miners were stranded in the district as the field failed and the government had 
to intervene to reduce the A.S.N.'s passenger fares to Sydney.®® Generally, the 
forties and early fifties were profitable years for the coasting trade. Freight on 
general cargo carried from Brisbane to Sydney was 20s. ($2) per ton (1.02 
tonnes) in 1842 and this charge rose gradually until in 1853, even after a general 
rate decline, it was 45s. ($4.50).®® Other serious criticisms of the A.S.N.'s trading 
habits were also made; that the company overloaded its boats and that it 
followed the dangerous practice of storing ship's cargo and even coal in quantity 
on deck.®' On the other hand, the company had donated money to assist the 
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colonists in improving the port of Brisbane and had marked the Outer Bar 
channel with beacons in 1849.®^ As for the complaints about overloading and 
storage, these were common problems in the Austrahan shipping trade at the 
time. The Steam Navigation Act of 1853 was passed to prevent them. With the 
company's monopoly position in the trade there was some substance in the 
A.S.N, manager's defence to an early Select Committee: "there will always be 
some complaints made against a Company of this nature, whether with or 
without reason."®^ Nevertheless, in the next period relations between the A.S.N, 
and the colony would be strained to the point where a local shipping concern 
would be floated in competition. Meanwhile, the fact that northerners were 
dependent on a southern company for shipping services was readily brought 
forward by southerners as one more indication of their lack of fitness for self-
government.'" 
Had any of the pre-separation schemes for postal communication with 
England via Torres Strait eventuated, the A.S.N.'s importance to Moreton Bay 
might have been reduced and later clashes avoided. The scheme was fully dis-
cussed in New South Wales in the forties, but the unwillingness of Victoria and 
Tasmania to contribute towards a route not directly benefiting them stopped 
any progress towards a northern service. In contrast, others had revealed a 
sense of vision about the future importance of Asian trade with Australia. "The 
advantages we should derive from our Indian possessions and other ports of the 
East", Robert Towns had argued, "would be greater than any direct advantages 
from postal communication with the Mother Country."'^ However, because of 
colonial opposition and the outbreak of the Crimean war, direct postal com-
munication with England via Torres Strait was continuaffy postponed. What 
remained was Queensland's awareness of the value of the route. The colony 
would eventually manage to establish the service.'^ 
Until that time Queensland shippers occupied a costly position in the 
Australian shipping trade. Yet it is likely that the expense of Sydney tranship-
ment to the northern pastoralists was more than offset by declining overseas 
freights. In the twenties wool freights had been high but faffing port dues in the 
United Kingdom, one of the steps being taken towards Free Trade, brought 
freights down to a penny to a penny halfpenny (1 cent to 1.5 cents) per lb 
(0.45 kg) by 1836, and to five-eighths of a penny (just over 0.5 cents) per lb 
(0.45 kg) by 1861. This decline in wool freights was part of a general decline in 
shipping freight rates taking place during the century.'* In the world freight 
trade the Australian market was usually a minor one. Pastoralists benefited 
from the first decline in general rates between 1815 and 1851, but the rapid 
expansion of the Australian services began at a time when international freights 
were upset by the Crimean war and the Australian gold rushes. The general 
dechne reasserted itself in 1870-1873 and continued until 1908-1909.'* 
Conclusion 
With their beginnings as rejects, if not martyrs, of British society, Aus-
39 INTRODUCTION 
tralians felt a compelling need to create a sense of social solidarity. As the 
grounds for their rejection had usually been poverty and an inability to cope 
with the demands of English capitalism, their response was to emphasize material 
well-being as the basis of the new solidarity. The Austrahan departure was to 
relate a sense of community with capitalism by stressing social egalitarianism. 
They identified moral and economic affairs, and the material success that was 
quickly won seemed to prove that this relation was sound. As a result, British 
hberal principles were endorsed wholeheartedly by the colonists. Liberal 
democracy was accepted by Australians in the fifties by common consent; 
in Europe it was achieved only by the Liberals and the Right imposing agree-
ment on the Left by force.'® Cooperation was more efficient than constraint in 
Austrahan affairs, so Australian liberalism proved more durable than the 
European political solutions. Further, as liberalism hmited the field of possible 
political difference, religious and regional issues became more important points 
of disagreement for Australian politicians than questions of ideology.'® 
The condition of settlement was one of the first vital facts of Australian 
history. A second was the nature of the new land that the pioneers faced. In 
contrast to the gentle small-scale verdancy of the Enghsh countryside there 
loomed the unfamiliarity of the Australian bush covering a continent of im-
mense size, much of which was waterless and barren. The English settlers were 
alarmed by fears of dispersion to the extent of imagining a race of mad nomadic 
tartars in the outback. An agrarian ideal was therefore a most attractive one to 
set against the pastoral reality and its utopianism ensured it of support from 
the society's radicals." 
Port development before 1859 reflected the wider regionalism which was the 
basis of Australian growth. Queensland broke away from New South Wales, as 
Victoria already had, and as New South Wales had separated from England. 
Regions developed in Queensland which desired separation from South Queens-
land and each other. Within them the ports fought out trade battles, and by 1859 
Brisbane had emerged as the principal Southern port, and Rockhampton as the 
Centre's main outlet. Each had defeated port rivals and their struggle was part 
of wider political contests. Indeed, regionalism and pohtics were almost insepar-
able in the colony. Yet Brisbane's port difficulties before separation were due to 
neglect, not regional discrimination. Port administration was ignored by the 
New South Wales government throughout the entire colony, not only in the 
Northern Districts. Regionalism had, however, hampered the shipping services. 
One of Queensland's first post-separation concerns would be to reduce its 
dependence on the A.S.N., and to improve its overseas links by a Torres Straits 
route. 
In setting up economic institutions Austrahans would state their differences 
from English practice. Usually adaptation of English methods would suffice, 
yet more sweeping changes could be made if necessary. In less important matters, 
such as port development, the British example normally held sway. No attempt 
was made in Queensland to devise methods of port organization suited to local 
conditions until the nineties depression made it unavoidable. Even then, 
insufficient aUowance would be made for the colony's special needs. The relation 
Before 1859 21 
between the ports, shipping, and the economy was not always direct, but each 
would be inffuenced by a general attitude—the emerging sense of economic 
nationahsm. For the English people traditional diversity dominated, or at least 
balanced, economic activity. The relation that Australians made between moral 
principles and economic practice would be a good deal more direct. In the 
foundation years this was an advantage in pioneering an empty country, yet 
eventually Austrahan nationalism would place limits on economic development, 
on the ports, and on the shipping services in Queensland. 
THE ECONOMY^ 1859-1885 
Flux and Becoming 
After 1859, as economic problems began to pile up in Queensland with the 
unpredictable workings of the first immigration and land legislation, it was as 
well that a sense of buoyant optimism prevailed. This sense suffered some hard 
knocks in the next twenty-five years but it was never really displaced. There were 
some firm foundations for confidence. The wealth of the colony was only 
beginning to be tapped and there was the happy example of the southern 
colonies' economic success. After 1860 Australia's national income grew faster 
than any other country's, excepting America's, and after 1870 the international 
economy expanded with unprecedented speed. Australia shared in this market 
through England and had the best of two worlds: its place in the Enghsh market 
was assured, yet after 1856 Australia was free to develop its own institutions 
without Imperial restraint.^ But there were less favourable omens as weh. The 
European balance of power changed decisively with the unification of Germany 
and the growth of the American and German economies. British pohtics 
presented a serene enough surface but this calm concealed grave weaknesses.^ 
While these changes were proceeding Queenslanders were completely absorbed 
with the economic development of their new colony. 
The three Queenslands: A regional framework for economic growth 
The broad patterns of political and economic change in nineteenth-century 
Queensland cannot be fully appreciated without explicitly recognizing the 
strength of regionalism in contemporary affairs.^ The unity achieved in the 
colony to win separation was quickly shattered and factional politics were 
firmly re-established. Until the needs of local government were partly satisfied 
in 1878 and 1879, a large share of each parliamentary session was taken up with 
members ensuring that their districts received a due share of public expenditure. 
There were two main separatist movements in the period; the first was led by 
Rockhampton in the late sixties, the second by Townsville and Mackay in the 
eighties. Both campaigns were conducted against a background of colony-wide 
dissatisfaction with centralized administration. This centralization was dictated 
as much by economic interests as by the administrative difficulties of governing 
an area the size of Queensland. The continuing feud between Brisbane and 
Ipswich after 1860 was one example. Rail construction began in 1864, but the 
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first line ran from Ipswich west and was not connected with the colony's major 
port till 1876. "We made the mistake at the outset", the Brisbane Courier 
belatedly realized, "of commencing our main fine of railway at a distance from 
the principal port and principal centre of population; it starts from one second 
class provincial town and stops at another, and of course does not pay . . . 
The line has been constructed amidst gross blundering and grosser knavery."* 
The core of the first separation movement was the Rockhampton pastora-
lists. Both Charles Archer and Sir Charles Nicholson were large landholders and 
were thought to support separation as a first step to securing freehold rights.® 
In addition, Rockhampton residents insisted on the town being made a rail 
terminus. Although North Queensland played a secondary part in the first 
separation movement, some Northern support was given. "Commercially fleeced 
by Sydney", complained Bowen's Port Denison Times, "we have been and are 
politically tyrannised over and robbed by Brisbane . . . our position has 
resembled that of the outlying provinces of the early Roman Empire, which 
were left to the tender mercies of needy pro-consuls."® In 1869 Mackay suggested 
that the North should become a crown colony in preference to remaining under 
Southern domination; two years later Kennedy electors claimed to have chosen 
the English freetrader John Bright as their Commons representative.' 
However, this first movement petered out in the early seventies. Land 
legislation in 1869 satisfied Central pastoralists and in 1872 Rockhampton was 
given her railway. "We have secured the guarantee of Justice without separa-
tion", concluded the Rockhampton Bulletin; "In a word", translated the Bo wen 
Times, "we have got our railway and are admitted to a more or less adequate 
share in the public plunder."* The voices of the main dissentients had been 
stilled but the Rockhampton campaign continued for some time. In 1874 the 
Bulletin wanted the Centre to join the North in a general two-colony division, 
while the opposition journal, the Rockhampton Argus, advocated a tripartite 
separation, breaking Queensland up at the Dawes Range and at Cape 
Palmerston.* 
The second separation movement came closer to success than the first 
and is better known. It was led by sugar growers desirous of retaining Kanaka 
labour.^" Thus the essence of the separation movements was clear enough: 
regional economic interests determined to develop; personal political rivalry; 
and a long-standing Austrahan unwillingness to take seriously the problems of 
local government. In Queensland, A. A. Morrison has pointed out, local 
government was imposed from above rather than developed directly from 
below." Until Samuel Griffith's 1878 act, and its extension to rural areas by 
Thomas Mcllwraith in 1879, municipal incorporation had been permissive and 
unsuccessful. The 1878-1879 acts made it compulsory and, even if it was only a 
beginning, the situation was improved.^^ 
The economic strengths of the three regions changed rapidly as the colony 
was opened up and the following pages consider the producing industries in this 
light. The South almost entirely dominated every form of production. In 1885, 
of a public debt of twenty-six million pounds, ten millions had been incurred by 
the South, two by the Wide Bay and Burnett, three and a half by the Centre, 
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four by the North, and six generally.^ * This statistical separation of Wide Bay 
from the South was more apparent than real. Funds were expended on develop-
ing the area but much of its trade flowed to Brisbane rather than to Mary-
borough. The kind of complaint made by the Maryborough Chronicle in 1861— 
"our representatives are utterly powerless in the hands of the overwhelming 
majority arrayed against them from Brisbane and the Downs''^ *—would be 
repeated by the North and Centre. 
To take only one preliminary example, the distribution of early manu-
facturing industry pointed to almost complete Southern dominance. Further, 
although Brisbane's share of production was greater than the combined shares 
of the North and Centre, there were other important manufacturing towns in 
the South—notably, Ipswich, Toowoomba, and Maryborough. In the other 
regions production was concentrated in a few towns.^ ® This was some indication 
of the way in which the South would be the only region to achieve a degree of 
economic diversity. The population figures also indicate the much greater 
importance of the South.^ ® 
This was the framework of regional rivalry within which the colonial 
economy developed. It was an integral part of economic expansion, but past a 
certain point commercial rivalry became as much a threat as a stimulus and then 
was an important reason for the regional separatist campaigns. R. G. Neale's 
explanation of the Queensland separation movements is sound. Separatism was 
the regional grievance of new and rapidly expanding areas where economic 
development outran the political and administrative capacities for government. 
It was defeated by Southern opposition, federation, and perhaps most import-
antly by the gradual readjustment of pohtical power which took place as the 
North and Centre were settled.^' However, troublesome legacies of the regional 
differences would remain even after federation. The South would be the only 
region to diversify its economy to any degree; concomitantly it would be the 
only region with enough population and industry where inland town settlement 
could successfuUy take place. Population and industry in Central Queensland 
were concentrated in Rockhampton. In the North several towns developed, but 
with the exception of mining centres such as Charters Towers these were more 
products of the North's great distances than of its economic growth. These 
regional economic differences would be reflected in the manner of growth of the 
main regional ports. In the North and Centre the ports would feel a greater need 
for local control and would establish Harbour Boards to that end. Quahfication 
is later made of this view, but basically it was true that their moves towards local 
port control were assisted by and part of the general movement of regional 
separatism. 
The structure and timing of growth 
Net benefits to the south and centre 
Pastoral success. The period saw the pastoral industry firmly established 
as the colony's first producing industry. There was a major expansion in pastoral 
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activity from 1860 to 1867. A sharp downturn then followed from which 
recovery did not take place till 1871/1872. Though confused, the years 1872 to 
1877 saw real if restrained growth and consolidated the earlier success. Activity 
dechned again from 1877 until 1881 when fresh expansion took growth to record 
levels. Finally, in 1883 another reaction set in. The first phase of expansion, 
1860-1867, centred in increases of stock and land leasing, with a moderate 
amount of land ahenation. The second phase of growth differed in that land 
alienation was more important; stock increases played a less prominent part, 
while leasing retained its importance. After a third decline in activity from 1877 
to 1881 the boom of the early eighties began and land alienation, leasing, and 
stock figures all shot up rapidly. 
By 1885 Queensland carried a greater number of cattle than any other 
Australian colony. As late as the seventies this had not seemed hkely. Cattle 
numbers trebled between 1860 and 1872 yet most of this expansion was geared 
to the local market. The pastoralist's preference for sheep was based on an 
inadequate knowledge of the chmate and on the more difficult marketing 
problems of carrying beef.^ * As sheep were being moved out of the coastal 
districts in the seventies many squatters changed to cattle. Lower labour and 
capital requirements, greater ease of movement in time of drought, and higher 
beef prices between 1872 and 1882 stimulated by miners' demands, were the 
inducements to change. However, by 1882 the beef market was becoming 
saturated and the industry had to await the development of marine refrigeration 
before expanding again.^ ® 
South and Central Queensland were the most important pastoral regions 
and the growth of Central cattle numbers closely approximated increases in the 
South. When divergences did occur, as in 1882, they usually pointed to the 
lesser stability of the Centre as a carrying area. The same pattern emerged in the 
growth of sheep numbers, except after 1881 when Central totals surpassed 
Southern. The North concentrated on cattle raising. By 1868, after several 
failures, attempts to establish sheep in the region were given up. Even so, the 
eighties saw some moderate expansion in Northern sheep numbers. Cattle 
stocks had also fallen off between 1868 and 1874, but thereafter grew rapidly— 
even in 1882-1884 when the rest of the colony's cattlemen were in difficulty. 
Agricultural failure. "They have fenced—many of them—they have 
resided, they have built huts, houses, stockyards; dug wells, made reservoirs, and 
effected very valuable improvements, but the condition of cultivation has been 
a total failure."^" This verdict of the Rockhampton Land Agent in 1867 strikes 
a sufficiently gloomy note to characterize the plight of most Queensland farmers 
between 1860 and 1885. Despite repeated government statements that small 
farmers would be given every assistance, colonial agriculture barely managed to 
get off the ground. In 1884 Queensland cultivated less acreage per head of 
population than any other Australian colony.^^ Total production grew slowly 
with only one marked fluctuation, a sharp decline in cultivation in 1878-1880 
due to drought. Agriculture in the colony managed to confine itself almost 
entirely to the South; the South's share of production between 1860 and 1885 
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on a quinquennial basis varied between 92 per cent and 98 per cent. After 1880 
Northern production appreciably increased, while Central cultivation peacefully 
stagnated for the whole of the period. 
The principal crops raised were maize, vegetables and garden produce, and 
green fodder. Cotton growing was also of some importance between 1867 and 
1873, and the early agrarians had held high hopes for the crop. But after some 
initial success by 1873 American cotton fields were recovering from the devasta-
tion of the Civil War. This and other technological hindrances put an end to 
cotton growing in Queensland for some time.^^ Another crop which had seemed 
promising was wheat; growing expanded till 1864, then declined. Technological 
problems had again hindered production. Rust and drought made crop pro-
ductivity fluctuate wildly.2^ 
The growth of the sugar industry is discussed separately, but even when 
sugar is included as an agricultural product the performance of Queensland's 
agriculture was extremely poor. There was no shortage of explanations for 
failure. High transport costs, a shortage of markets, comparative capital dis-
advantages, and technological difficulties were the obstacles to agricultural 
success. Lacking navigable rivers, let alone an efficient road and rail system, the 
farmer faced insurmountable problems. When a transport network began to 
function creakily in the eighties the capital structure was tied to the pastoral and 
construction industries and, to a lesser extent, to mining. Aside from the wider 
difficulties Australian farmers faced in developing a new continent, Queens-
landers were also hampered by the novelties of a tropical climate.^* By the end 
of the period the early agrarian ideals were beginning to wear thin. In 1884 the 
Brisbane Courier commented that even the old guard of the squatting party 
had abandoned their former attitude of hostility to railway extension because 
they had become assured that settlers would not follow the lines.^ ® 
Mining and sugar open the north 
Mining. By 1860 all that remained of Queensland's first gold rush at 
Canoona were memories. A few men were making a living from fossicking 
around Gladstone and Rockhampton, but gold mining was practically ended. 
Some coal shafts had been sunk close to Ipswich to supply the small steamers 
on the Brisbane River, yet overall the mining industry was stagnant. Fourteen 
years later a transformation had taken place. By 1874 the colony raised more 
gold than any other except Victoria, and copper and tin deposits had also come 
to be of importance. Gold was the basis of mining expansion for the period, 
though to 1866 the value of other minerals raised was greater. One disappoint-
ment was coal mining. Despite high hopes a coal export trade had not 
developed.^® 
In 1867 the yellow metal was found at Gympie and the Cape River fields 
in the North were opened. As a number of small fields were also being worked 
in the Centre, mining activity was then more evenly distributed through the 
colony than at any later time. The golden dominance of the North began with 
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the seventies: in 1872 Ravenswood and Charters Towers were worked, in 1873 
the fabulous Palmer. The South retained as many miners as it did only because 
of Gympie's steady production. Yet the North's dominance in gold mining was 
not as great in other minerals. Most of Queensland's copper came from Peak 
Downs in the Centre, while Stanthorpe's tin benefited the South. Later, however, 
Herberton and Ravenswood in the North became important sources of tin and 
silver-lead.^' The boom years of mineral production were from 1867 to 1874, 
interrupted only in 1868. Production fell after 1874 but total output remained at 
a high level. Another upswing in 1880 fell off quickly until increased output 
levels in 1883 led to the rich mid-eighties. 
Quartz mining employed more miners than alluvial digging. The major 
exception was the Palmer—the North's richest field after 1873. The Towers and 
Ravenswood diggings, though rich, had only limited amounts of alluvial gold. 
In contrast, the Palmer's early years fulfilled the highest hopes of the small 
digger. Yet even in 1875 when the field was at its peak 49 per cent of Northern 
miners were engaged in quartz mining. By 1880, when the Towers and Cape 
River were producing more than the Palmer, the proportion of quartz miners in 
the North had risen to 90 per cent.^* In the South alluvial workings had never 
been of great importance; from the first Gympie was worked as a quartz field. 
The small Central diggings at Clermont, Calliope, and the Boyne were more 
suited to alluvial production, but by 1885, with Mt. Morgan's treasure being 
raised, quartz mining also became dominant in the Centre. 
Mining technology was extremely crude despite the importance of quartz 
mining. This was partly due to the form of the mining companies on the fields. 
Usually they were small cooperative groups with only limited resources; a lack 
of funds was often a cause of failure of the smaller mines. More favourably, 
taxation does not seem to have been excessive. A gold export duty had been 
levied in 1864 but was finally repealed, after many attempts, in 1874. Greater 
difficulties arose over the area of mining leases and the labour terms of the lease 
when companies were involved.^^ 
Sugar. As an export base the sugar industry was of little value to the 
colony till the late seventies. Cultivation was important by 1885 but it was still of 
much less worth than either pastoral or mineral production. The real growth 
which took place between 1869 and 1874 and between 1875 and 1879 was in the 
face of declining long-run prices brought about by the expansion of European 
beet sugar growing. Then improved prices in the eighties, along with the 
industry's success in siphoning off" a sizeable quantity of the general investment 
boom, led to extremely rapid growth after 1882. Regionally, the industry would 
be vital to the North, but as late as 1880 more sugar was still grown in South 
Queensland. In order of importance, the principal Southern sugar districts were 
Maryborough, Logan, Brisbane, and Bundaberg. To 1880 most of the North's 
sugar was grown round Mackay and, to a lesser extent, at Cardwell. In 1885 the 
North had approximately 30,000 acres (12,141 hectares) under sugar—the South 
had some 24,700 (9,996 ha). Over half of the North's sugar was then grown 
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around Mackay, while Ingham, Ayr, Cairns, and Mourilyan were the main 
secondary suppliers. 
The abohtion of slavery in North America had created favourable con-
ditions for the industry's initial growth in Queensland, yet sugar growers, Uke 
the rest of the colony's farmers, had difficulty in coping with novel climatic and 
technological difficulties. Early strains of cane had been imported from Java 
and Mauritius, but by 1875 most Queensland sugar was of the Bourbon variety. 
The devastation wreaked by an attack of rust in that year then encouraged the 
use of a hardier type, which also better suited the industry's spread to the north. 
Early miUing technology was primitive but by the mid-seventies processing was 
being rapidly improved, notably by the introduction of vacuum pans. At the 
end of the period a fairly sharp line had emerged between large and small 
growers and the importance of the former was increasing. In this regard the 
establishment of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company's Homebush plantation 
in 1883 was significant, yet crop productivity did not appreciably improve before 
1885.3" 
The economy 1860-1885: Rapid but uneven development 
After separation from New South Wales there was an initial economic boom 
based on pastoral, rail, and construction activity until the 1866 financial crisis 
signalled a halt. Even without the shock of 1866 a downturn would have taken 
place as pastoral growth had been too reckless. As well, the scale of the govern-
ment's rail outlays had been more than the colony could afford. Construction 
held at a high level of activity through 1867 and gold was discovered, but a bad 
drought kept the economy working sluggishly till 1871. Improved pastoral 
seasons, an increase in mining output—which had dechned in 1868-1869—and a 
renewal of construction activity then led to recovery. The pastoral industry 
remained the basic source of the colony's export income. It was displaced only 
brieffy from this position by mining in 1874. Mining output then gradually 
decreased, while remaining at a fairly high level. Construction investment also 
declined after 1874 tiff 1878 and the next general recession took place at the 
end of the seventies. Pastoral activity and mining and manufacturing investment 
fell away in 1877, as rail capital formation already had. The next growth phase 
was the strongest in the period: between 1880 and 1884 the pastoral and sugar 
industries prospered and in 1880 and 1883 mining output rose. After lagging till 
1882 rail building rapidly increased. Lastly, construction boomed to 1884. 
The three expansionary phases in the period, therefore, were 1860-1866, 
1871/2-1877, and 1880-1884, while recessions occurred in 1867-1869/70, 
1878-1879, and in 1884. In the first growth phase pastoral and construction 
activity was most important; in the second, pastoral, construction—if less so 
from 1874 to 1879—and mining; in the third, pastoral, construction, mining, 
and sugar. Rail expansion was of increasing importance in each phase and was 
a major factor in the growth of 1880-1884.31 
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There were several significant differences between the growth of the 
Queensland and Australian economies in the period. As an export base and area 
of capital formation the pastoral industry was of relatively more importance to 
Queensland—the simple result of the colony's later development and geo-
graphical suitability. Another difference was that construction activity in 
Queensland was much less stable than in the Australian economy. Construction 
outlays in the colony seem to have been more sensitive to change because of the 
economy's heavy dependence on the pastoral industry. Lastly, mining was more 
important as an export base for Queensland, while manufacturing capital 
formation was much less important. There was a difference in the timing of 
growth, as well as structurally. Australian aggregate economic behaviour 
between 1860 and 1890 was remarkably stable; mild declines in Domestic 
Product took place only in 1863, 1871, 1879, and 1886.^ 2 In Queensland reces-
sions of some seriousness were experienced in 1867-1868/70, in 1878-1879, and 
in 1884. This greater cyclical instability was the result of the economy's lack of 
balance. 
In sum: economic growth in Queensland between 1860 and 1885 was rapid 
but uneven. The economy was very dependent on the pastoral industry, and 
the South was the only region that had to any extent achieved some economic 
balance. Mining and sugar were both important in the South, as was the 
pastoral industry, and what httle agricultural and manufacturing activity there 
was to 1885 took place in that region. Conversely, the Centre and the North 
were economically very vulnerable. Until the opening of Mt. Morgan in the 
eighties the Centre depended entirely on the pastoral industry, and until the 
expansion of the sugar industry, also in the eighties, the North was as dependent 
on its mineral wealth. This was the period of greatest regional economic in-
equality. The different stages of development between the three regions would 
be redressed to some degree as time passed, yet the rapid progress of the South 
to 1885 gave it advantages over the North and Centre of an enduring nature. 
As the South was so important economicaUy Brisbane stood out as the 
colony's principal port, and even Maryborough matched the port trade of the 
largest Central and Northern ports. The advantage of the South's more balanced 
economy was evident in that inland settlement could take place and a number of 
small but important towns grew up. In the North there was little inland settle-
ment other than in mining towns. Further, though a number of ports were 
estabhshed to serve the North's hinterland, trade in the South concentrated 
almost entirely on Brisbane. The Centre, less well endowed for inland settlement 
than either of its adjoining regions, and with a smaller hinterland to serve than 
the North, had the worst of it—no inland settlement and concentration of trade 
at one port. 
The politics of economic change: The British liberal unanimity 
British liberalism 
What sort of economic society did early Queenslanders want to build? 
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Why especially did they value the ideal of an agrarian environment ? To answer 
questions of this kind it must be recalled that most of the colonists were English, 
Scottish, and Irish as well as Australian. The majority were imbued with the 
traditions of British liberalism—that nebulous, but very real, state of political 
mind which contributed so much to British life. In assessing British liberalism 
few are neutral. Preliminary confusion maybe avoided by reahzing that liberalism 
was essentially the British way of exercising power, of which Britain then pos-
sessed so much. With this done assessment varies with values. A more stark 
contrast could hardly be provided than by opposing Oswald Spengler's apprecia-
tion of liberahsm to Sir Keith Hancock's. Spengler was totaffy sceptical of the 
freedom that English hberalism affowed. "Politically gifted peoples do not 
exist", he stated; "those which are supposed to be so are simply peoples that are 
firmly in the hands of a ruling minority and in consequence feel themselves to 
be in good form."^^ Hancock, for his part, admitted that British liberalism was 
concerned with power but argued that it was used for the cause of peace and 
freedom.3* Most Austrahans have agreed with Hancock's more generous view. 
That the liberal traditions were important in the New World has been 
recognized explicitly by some recent American scholars. In reaction to the lack 
of apphcability of Marxist historical categories to the American past, they have 
discerned a liberal political unanimity in the United States. From this viewpoint, 
America's marked differences from European experience may be explained in 
terms of the non-existence of feudahsm and of the great natural wealth of the 
American continent.^® These suggestions are plausible and useful, yet their 
originators have not sufficiently acknowledged that the liberal traditions came 
from Britain. After the sixteenth century Britain was significantly different from 
continental Europe. To use Joseph Schumpeter's distinction, British capitahsm 
was pacifistic whereas Europe's was dynastic.^ ® Between the Whigs and the 
Tories of eighteenth-century England the most notable feature of their relations 
was their agreement in opposition. By comparison with European practices, 
British pohtical parties were agreed on fundamentals."' 
Colonial adaptation 
Like Americans, Australians lacked a feudal past. But, because the wealth 
of their land was not as magnificent, at a very early stage Australians became 
insistent that minimum standards of welfare for the average man (never the 
common man) should be set up and preserved. Politics developed accordingly. 
As Morrison writes of early Queensland society, each man wished to be his own 
master: "parliaments of those days were collections of property owners of 
different kinds . . . behind most of the major political conflicts were issues con-
cerning the dominance of special kinds of property.""* But without the grander 
trappings of tradition colonial economic rivalries appeared as little more than 
sordid commercial squabbles when seen through English eyes. In 1862 Governor 
Bowen wrote to Richard Cobden attempting to persuade him to tour Queens-
land. "Ministries are upset in Australia", he remarked, "not so much on great 
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principles of policy, but rather on wrangles about the distribution of the general 
revenue among the public works.""* But Sir George misunderstood. These 
"wrangles" were quite rightly the central issues of colonial politics. In a new 
society of homogeneous hberals the great political issues were the economic 
issues. 
The plainest expression of the hberal finks between colonists was political. 
There was a common interest in capitahst development in a pohticaUy demo-
cratic framework. The granting of manhood suffrage in the fifties seemed to be 
a radical innovation, but in the colonial hberal world it was a unifying rather 
than divisive factor.*" Many colonists were aware that their pohtical agreement 
was very different from European traditions, and even from the more moderate 
practices of England. But because of the strength of European precedent and of 
the extent of democratic restlessness after 1789, when a labour movement did 
emerge in Queensland some of its opponents saw it as a possibly revolutionary 
party. Their fears were groundless. The Labor party, with few exceptions, was 
as imbued with the liberal tradition as were Liberals themselves. 
Another distinctively Australian liberal bond was the imperative colonists 
felt to develop their environment. This was a more or less sacred duty. However, 
colonial conditions did not favour the explicit statement of other worldly 
justifications. At the time some may well have been more blunt, if pressed, 
replacing Christian with Capitalist motivation. But in Austraha these were 
intertwined: moral progress followed from economic success. When justification 
for Austrahan capitahsm was put forward—it rarely was because its legitimacy 
was thought so obvious—it was invariably expressed in either Christian terms 
or in religiously flavoured language. When John Stuart Mill was given an 
honorary seat in the Commons the Brisbane Courier enthusiastically approved. 
By studying economics he had spent his life "in the study of the highest and most 
important branch of human knowledge"—except rehgion, the paper quickly 
added.*^ 
Public policies and economic change: The trinity of hope 
The struggle of Queenslanders to subdue their land after 1860 was part of a 
wider Austrahan battle with the environment. The colonists hoped to expedite 
economic progress through large-scale policies of immigration and railway 
building directed towards intensive land settlement. An agrarian society had 
been decided on as the most desirable form of life. It is an exaggeration, yet it 
may be said that the colonists were erecting a trinity of hope. The trinity's apex 
was the solution to the land problem, its two supports were the rail and 
immigration programmes. Around this trinity the colonists declared their faith, 
or the lack of it, in the basic tenets of their new economic nationalism. 
The land industries: Pastoralists vs. agrarians 
By late 1860 Queensland's Governor could claim that the land question had 
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been quickly and satisfactorily resolved.*^ The government saw their land and 
immigraion laws neatly linked by the Land Order system of immigration and 
anticipated ready success in settling the land. Many colonists were not as 
sanguine. "It is usual", the Courier warned in 1862, "to speak of the pastoral 
interest passing by easy natural transition into the agricultural interest, but 
when this period of transition will commence it is not in us to guess. In Queens-
land it wiff be a struggle, accompanied by violence and bitterness."*" 
Pastoral land legislation. Land orders were the backbone of the govern-
ment's first immigration scheme.** The system began in the colony with an 1860 
act that established favourable conditions for pastoral expansion. Intended to 
settle small men on the land, in practice it alienated much of the colony's best 
agricultural land to pastoralists.*® This was the first bitter pill of disillusion that 
the agrarians had to swallow. In a few years their fears began to be realized. The 
tenure system had created a monopoly which practically excluded small free-
holder agriculturists.*® Yet, what was failure for the early agrarians was success 
for the colony's economic development. The first pastoral land laws had suc-
ceeded in encouraging a southern pastoral influx.*' 
In 1866 the Settled Districts leases held under the 1847 regulations, which 
had been the cause of so much agrarian complaint, were due to expire. Bowen 
had intended that the original favourable terms would be modified and as the 
great day drew near the agrarians girded their loins. "With the new leases", the 
Brisbane Courier emphasized, "pre-emptive right will cease in the older dis-
tricts."*® But it did not. Macalister's agrarian land bill proposed a minimum 
alienation price of £1 ($2) an acre: this was enough to revive the fear of free 
selection in the heart of the most confident squatter. However, amidst the 
confusion of the constitutional and legislative crises of 1866, the biff was lost.*** 
Popular agrarian dissatisfaction had reached a peak in 1866 and then 
declined. However, other voices were being raised against the pastoral interests, 
some of which came from within the walls of the citadel itself. In 1863, after an 
outbreak of sheep scab, stock importation was prohibited. The outside squatters, 
in the midst of expansion, had to obtain new stock from their Downs cousins. 
Stock prices had risen, as had the tempers of the outside squatters. The public 
had now learned to distinguish breaks in the squatting ranks and was prepared 
to assist graziers in difficulties. Times had changed since 1865 when Macalister 
had rejected out of hand a relief petition from the Northern pastorahsts.®" 
This was the state of pastoral affairs immediately before the 1868 and 1869 
acts. A disappointed but insistent public demand for agricultural settlement 
ensured that the 1867 election was fought around a Liberal land bill.®i In 
addition, the extension of settlement had reduced the powers of the Downs 
squatters in the Assembly, and the Gympie gold discoveries and sugar expansion 
reinforced agrarian arguments that the pastoral industry would not always be 
the colony's only economic mainstay. For these reasons the 1868 act which dealt 
with the Settled Districts—so defined to include the Downs for the first t i m e -
seemed to be an unprecedentedly fair compromise.®" 
Although it threw open thousands of acres for farmers and was the most 
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radical agrarian measure to that time, the Brisbane Courier remained un-
satisfied. It looked at the act's operation with dubious eyes. "The Liberal 
members", warned the paper, "are inchned to be liberal with the squatters. 
Existing interests are quite safe in the hands of either side of the House."®" As 
they usuaUy must be in a liberal society, one might add. As the position of the 
outside squatters became desperate the agrarians were prepared to assist them. 
Rents were lowered, leases were extended, and squatters were allowed to pre-
empt. Lilley's ministry, which passed the relief act, was regarded as the first 
Liberal ministry.®* By 1876 it was clear that the Brisbane Courier's fears had 
been justified. The result of the attempt to classify the land according to quality, 
a notable Queensland innovation, had led to almost 100 per cent of the con-
ditional purchases made being classed at the minimum grade.®® Of nine thousand 
selections covering more than three miffion acres (12,141,000 ha) made after 
1868, half had been taken by 267 persons, of whom only 90 were without 
squatting connections.®® So much for the hopes of the agrarians. 
But the political situation of the mid-seventies was very different from the 
palmy squatting days enjoyed by earlier parhaments.®' The agrarians pressed on 
and influenced both the 1876 Crowns Lands Bill, concerned with agricultural 
settlement, and the Settled Districts Leases Bill of the same year, which involved 
pastorahsts. The first act drew on the lessons of previous agrarian failures. A 
flexible bill, it struggled anew with the old problem of dummying in its many 
forms. The Leases Bill was aimed primarily at the Downs. It was a severe law 
for pastorahsts and was balm for Liberal agrarian wounds.®® Yet before it 
became operative drought intervened and with the severe pastoral setbacks of 
the late seventies the government saw that the law was not widely applied. For 
good measure, in 1882 Mcllwraith abolished the auction principle and extended 
Settled District pastoral leases for a further ten years.®" 
Agricultural land legislation. The practical success of pastoral land 
legislation meant the failure of agricultural legislation. In the light of this failure 
the principal agrarian acts may be briefly summarized. In 1860 an act allowed 
agricultural selection in blocks of from 40 to 320 acres (16.9 to 130 ha) at £1 ($2) 
an acre (o.4 ha). This ahenation price was much more than prospective farmers 
could afford, but there was a sub-clause which permitted those selecting less than 
320 acres to lease adjoining land for only sixpence (5 cents) an acre (0.4 ha). 
However, theory and practice quickly diverged. Those who took advantage of 
the sub-clause often took up so much land they had nothing left to hve on, let 
alone make the required improvements. The act was meant to work in con-
junction with the land order system—the operation of which still rankled in 
agrarian minds a quarter of a century later.®" Even by 1865 it was claimed that 
the colony's agricultural land laws were the equivalent of a subsidy for New 
South Wales agriculture.®i Changes in the laws in 1863 and 1866 made little 
difference to the rate of agrarian occupation. The 1868 act was hailed as the 
most important measure to date, but the classificatory system failed badly.®" 
Douglas's 1876 act therefore ended classification and tried to improve the work-
ing of the homestead clauses by making extensive resumptions. The results? 
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"Selectors found that they could sell their homesteads to large landowners in 
their neighbourhood at a greatly advanced price, so they fulfilled their con-
ditions, sold out and sought larger investments . . . The large estates are be-
coming larger, and small farms and decreasing in numbers."®" 
Immigration: "I want people.'" . . . in the towns ?^^ 
It was repeatedly emphasized in the early years of Queensland's immigration 
schemes that they were not merely a partial policy for development. The land 
order scheme was meant to establish a direct relation between immigration and 
land sales, and in 1863 Premier Herbert made it clear that immigration was 
directly related to the general rate of economic growth.®® This viewpoint would 
be tempered in the future according to the colony's reception at the London 
loan market, yet future ministries usually agreed. After 1860 it was mainly 
Queensland and to a lesser extent South Australia and New South Wales which 
accounted for the greater part of Australian assisted immigration until 1900. 
Major land and immigration acts were passed almost at the same time. 
The land acts of 1860, 1863, 1866, 1868-1869, 1872, 1876, and 1882 were 
paraffeled by immigration acts or regulations in 1860, 1864, 1869, 1872, 1875, 
and 1882. As clear a correspondence cannot be shown between the migration 
laws and migrant arrivals. There were three principal phases of immigrant inflow 
in 1861-1863, 1872-1875 and 1880-1883 and in each the role of assisted immi-
gration was extremely important. Yet it is likely that the laws assisted rather 
than caused the inflows. The increases in the eighties, for example, began two 
years before the 1882 act.®® • 
Queensland's first problem in wooing migrants was that there were so many 
more attractive suitors. In the North Americas the fortune hunter and republican 
democrat could go to the United States, while the loyahst could go to Canada.*' 
Both countries were so much closer to England and American land policy was 
beheved to be the most generous in the world to the smaU selector. Alternatively, 
both Brazil and New Zealand offered inducements to immigrants. There was 
also the preference of most Australian immigrants for the temperate chmate of 
the southern colonies instead of the sweltering conditions in Queensland. In a 
more direct way as well, the barometer of the colony's immigration inflows was 
the weather. Large influxes of migrants would often be followed by dry spells 
causing unemployment; this would usually lead to public outcries against 
continued immigration. Finally, administrative practices left much to be desired. 
The number of different schemes put forward confused many prospective 
immigrants.®® 
It was a persistent Liberal charge that the squatting party was opposed to 
immigration. This was untrue; the Conservatives did want immigration—for one 
thing the pastoral industry suffered from an endemic labour shortage.®" The 
more relevant point was that the Conservatives wanted a different type of 
immigrant. They could point out, with justice, that the immigrants brought out 
by Liberal governments to settle on the land stayed in the towns. In reply, 
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Liberals could claim with as much justice that the colony's land legislation 
favoured the squatter and that the natural obstacles in the way of agricultural 
success were greater. Here Palmer's immigration policies were illuminating. 
When the colony was in the doldrums Palmer wanted to stop immigration 
altogether—and the Liberals were inclined to agree. Usually though, he argued, 
it was more desirable to introduce employers rather than employees as immi-
grants.'" In practice, he rarely restricted the flow of immigration in normal 
economic times. 
Yet by 1885 the hopes of many of the community had been disappointed by 
the results of the immigration programmes. Queensland had lost many immi-
grants to the southern colonies. In 1885 half the year's arrivals went to the south 
and the 1881 census calculated that over the preceding decade there had been a 
border loss of two thousand persons per year.'^ Equally disturbing was the fact 
that there had been so little closer rural settlement. The condition of settlement 
which gave rise to the Brisbane Courier's cry of 1865—"are we eternally con-
demned to be buried under a mountain of wool, hides, and tallow?"—was so 
changed by 1893 that Macrossan could complain to Mcllwraith about the 
strength of the popular urban vote.'" The squatters might have given way to 
the people, but the people were in towns—not on the land. 
Rail construction: A guarantee of economic success? 
Queensland's first fine ran from Ipswich west, leaving Brisbane isolated and 
fuming. The squatters favoured Ipswich and strongly backed the line. More 
generaffy, however, squatting support for rail construction seems to have varied 
with the seasons. When they could afford to pre-empt along the proposed route 
they favoured building, and vice versa.'" What was more constant was their early 
opposition to Brisbane. The turning point in the Brisbane-Ipswich contest was 
the clearing of the Upper Flats in the Brisbane River in 1871, which allowed 
large vessels to reach the town wharves. Previously, the use of the Bremer and 
Upper Brisbane rivers was more economic than the use of the crude inland 
transport services between the towns. Until large vessels could reach the Brisbane 
wharves there was no point in extending the Ipswich rail line to Brisbane. This 
was weU understood. Macalister's 1865 argument, that the object of rail policy 
was to provide for internal communication, not to compete with water transport, 
was not bhnd regionalism but sound reasoning.'* 
In the same way it may be argued that the use of the narrow rail gauge in 
Queensland was reahstic, with the colony's vast distances and limited funds. 
Yet at the time there took place a considerable debate on the question, and there 
was a body of opposition to the narrow gauge. The railways engineer foremost 
in campaigning for its use was later described as the man "who drove the first 
nail in the coffin of Queensland".'® The question is related to the emergence of 
colonial nationalism. These were Queensland's earliest years, but not Aus-
tralia's. To the extent that early Queenslanders are regarded as British colonists 
their adoption of the narrow gauge was realistic: if they are seen as Australian 
pioneers they were shortsighted.'® 
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After 1866 raffway construction had to be sharply curtailed. In ensuing 
years Conservatives such as Palmer and Ramsay argued for budgetary adjust-
ment as a prerequisite to further pubhc works. The Liberals were more zealous. 
Macahster and Lilley favoured further rail extension." After 1872 conditions 
improved and as squatting power was sapped by urban growth political parties 
began to coalesce. By the mid-seventies it is possible to speak of a Conservative 
rail policy favouring trunk extensions into the interior. In contrast, Liberals 
wished to build branch lines to assist farmers and protested against the con-
centration on "one or two lines" favouring only one class.'® As building con-
tinued apace both parties became concerned over rising interest commitments 
and in 1876 Griffith tried to sell land for construction funds. However, by 1884 
he had thrown caution to the winds and negotiated his famous £10,000,000 
($20,000,000) loan.'" 
As a result of the policies decided on in the period, Queensland adopted the 
most decentralized rail system of the Australian colonies. Geography had much 
to do with this, and also the fact that Brisbane never occupied the same dominant 
intra-colonial position as did the capitals of the southern colonies. But what was 
decentralization for the colony as a whole was centrahzation for the regions that 
the railways penetrated. The establishment of rail links with the hinterland 
increased the already strong locational pull of Townsville and Rockhampton 
for future industry—especially manufacturing—in North and Central Queens-
land, as well as increasing Brisbane's economic dominance in the South. 
Apart from strengthening political and economic regionalism in the colony 
the railways had another effect, less definable but as important. As time passed 
and railways failed to fulfil the extravagant hopes that had been held for their 
success, disillusion began to spread amongst those who had expected a trans-
formation. Wilham Coote, an urban Liberal and earher champion of rail 
construction, labelled the argument that railways would lead to land settlement 
as the cant of the day. "What have these railways done? What may they be 
expected to do ? How are we to pay the interest, not merely on their cost, but on 
the whole large loan gathering upon us? Take for instance the Southern and 
Western. On the townships in its vicinity existing when it was started it has 
exerted an unappreciable effect . . . Railways create settlement! What do 
fourteen years tell us on that hand?"®" Thus cracks were beginning to appear in 
the facade of at least one of the liberal society's beliefs: railways as a means of 
economic success were beginning to lose their glamour. At the time of the 1883 
transcontinental debate Groom, the agrarian leader, opposed the line. Railways, 
he openly stated, had not created settlement in Queensland.®^ But colonists still 
believed for a time in the importance of rail construction. In the period, regard-
less of the differences between political interests, there was fundamental agree-
ment on the desirability of economic growth in the existing framework of law 
and morality. Railway extension, it was further agreed, was a pathway to 
economic success and therefore should be undertaken. There were differences of 
opinion as to the timing or the type of construction, but overall the striking 
feature was the agreement concerning the importance of rail construction as a 
precondition of economic growth.®" 
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The trinity in 1885 
The trinity of hope's success required two things: that the colonial economy 
should develop rapidly and that the new society would be built along equalitarian 
lines, resulting ideally in agrarian settlement. But the colonists' efforts to trans-
form their environment met with mixed results. The economy did develop 
quickly, yet the failure of agrarian settlement was the exception to the colony's 
rule of pastoral success. The land laws worked to the benefit of pastorahsts, not 
agrarians; the immigration programme brought settlers, but these remained in 
the towns rather than settling on the land; and railway construction did not 
produce the results expected of it—agricultural production was less stimulated 
than was urbanization. Nowhere did the persistent unreality of agrarian aims 
show through more clearly in these years than with the question of rail con-
struction. Only a policy of branch line building could help farmers. Yet 
branches, by definition, had to be built from existing and preferably profitable 
trunk lines. Sheer necessity dictated that this had to be the time of trunk line 
construction aimed chiefly at serving pastoral needs. Only in the next century, 
when a trunk system had been put down, could branch line building stimulate 
agriculture. 
This unreality was so characteristic of many agrarian arguments that their 
sincerity must be questioned. They may have been created by other interests as 
a deceptive window dressing. To put the question in its political context: in the 
early years colonial political divisions were mainly urban-rural with sectarian 
and radical elements as well.®" As the community grew the divisions between 
squatters and urban Liberals became steadily blurred. Further historical research 
will certainly reveal inconsistencies in the simple Liberal-Conservative di-
chotomy.®* In this work, however, the dualism is retained as the early statements 
of economic nationalism are most clearly made in these terms. But it must still 
be asked whether Liberal agrarian demands were representative of urban desires. 
Were they perhaps just so many phrases that the urban middle classes put in 
the mouths of arriving immigrants and the landless classes? Or were they a 
shifting combination of both? 
This issue will be pursued in the discussion of the economy after 1885. 
At the end of the colony's first period of growth the achievement was a rather 
puzzling mixture of economic success and failure. Those who had wished to see 
Queensland developed as magnificently as the American west were disappointed. 
Economic policies, regardless of their moral worth, could not create another 
California out of the scrub and mallee country of the Queensland bush. Yet 
disillusion with this aspect of the economic performance v/ould not become 
widespread till after the nineties depression. At the time, the partial failure went 
unnoticed by most as a high standard of living had still been achieved. But the 
original social ideal could not be easily forgotten. As the labour movement 
grew, agrarianism became more diffuse and less explicitly popular but remained 
an economic ideal. If anything, it became more effective because of its greater 
generahty: by 1932 Forgan Smith would speak of primary production as being 
the natural occupation of mankind.®® 
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Conclusion: The claims of regionalism and agrarianism 
In 1859 Queenslanders were faced with a vast expanse of land to explore 
and settle. Because a class struggle did not divide their allegiances they met with 
much economic success. This unanimity was an extension of the traditions of 
British political moderation; what was distinctively Australian was the new 
type of egalitarian democracy. Mateship was as important as money and 
economic development had a moral aim. Queenslanders had pursued their twin 
goals of economic progress and agrarian settlement by means of a pragmatic 
mixture of land, immigration, and railway policies. To emphasize the definite 
ends that the colonists had in mind and the practically religious sense of duty 
that encouraged them, these policies are described here as a trinity of hope. 
The Queensland economy did expand rapidly, but while agrarianism failed, 
regionahsm was an important means of growth. Set against the weakened moral 
authority of the trinity in 1885 was the economic reahty of three Queenslands— 
each with a sense of separateness from the others, and dependent on pastoral 
and mining activity instead of agriculture. The colony's economy had grown 
apace but it was regionally and structurally unbalanced. Only the South achieved 
a reasonable degree of balance. Port development was determined by these 
results. The most important port was in the South; the second was in the Centre; 
the third was in the North. The lopsided growth of the North and Centre made 
them more politically sensitive and separatist movements sprang up in each. 
These would aff'ect the movement towards local port control which was under 
way. After 1885 agrarianism and regionalism would influence economic poUcy 
and cut across standard political dividing fines. The economy's weaknesses 
would be obscured by the political rhetoric and reasoning of agrarianism and 
eventuaUy worsened by it. In this way limits to economic growth would be 
imposed by Austrahan economic nationalism. 
3 SHIPPING SERVICES 1859-1885 The struggle against isolation 
For most of the period the Australian coastal shipping companies did not 
come into contact with the overseas hues. When they finally did the problem 
was how to distinguish Australian companies from British; differences between 
the two would usually be more a question of degree than of clearly divergent 
interest. The plainest statement of Australian economic nationahsm made in 
the industry was at the time of the seamen's strike in 1878. But usually Queens-
land's early shipping problems were more specific and the efforts to improve 
trading services were another aspect of economic regionahsm. Because of the 
continent's isolation from the world's main trade routes the Australian run bore 
the load of high shipping freights. As trade usually ran along the south and then 
up the eastern coast of Australia, Queensland occupied an isolated and costly 
position in the intra-Australian services. The colonists' reaction was to attempt 
to reduce their dependence on southern coastal shipping and to make an overseas 
Torres Strait route viable. 
The shipping services 
The overseas and coastal lines 
In 1871 Queensland's share of total Austrahan shipping tonnage was a 
small 3 per cent. By 1881 this had increased to 11 per cent but Queensland had a 
smaller direct trade. For every ten tons of cargo carried overseas from Australia 
in 1881, Queensland carried seven.^  These figures reflect the economic and geo-
graphical disadvantages Queensland faced. Its isolation in the Australian trade 
necessitated that much of its trade be transhipped to the south before being sent 
overseas. This increased the colony's freight bill, and the lack of balance in the 
economy provided fewer cargoes for backloading. Lastly, although there was a 
rapid changeover to steam by British owners after 1860, sailing ships remained 
dominant in the Australian trade for some time. The early steamers used in 
Austraha did not usually run to Queensland where cargoes were less certain." 
The greater capital costs of steam eventually caused shipowners to combine, 
either loosely or in cartels. However, this took place largely, if not entirely, out 
of the period. In the Queensland overseas services there was a high degree of 
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relatively free competition. After the unsettling effects of the gold strikes on 
Australian shipping had died away, there remained a number of Liverpool and 
London companies working in the trade. The Liverpool lines were at first con-
cerned with immigrants, then shifted into clipper building for the wool trade. 
Some major Liverpool companies were the White Star, the Black Ball and 
Black Star, and James Beazley's line. Trading from London was the P. & O., 
which had the Austrahan mail contract, and the Orient Steam Navigation Com-
pany. Lastly, there was the British India line—which would become the colony's 
means of establishing the Torres Strait run—and the Eastern and Australian 
company. The latter was a much smaller Liverpool organization but it would be 
involved in the two major shipping controversies of the time, the 1878 strike and 
the dispute over the B.I.'s Torres Strait contract." 
The world's first large-scale shipping agreement, usually termed a Con-
ference, took place in Calcutta in 1875. A deferred rebate system was devised in 
1877 and introduced into the Australian trade in 1884.* One of the few reliable 
pieces of contemporary testimony about the Conference's operation in the 
Queensland trade was a Liberal Agent-General's despatch in 1884. The Aus-
tralian trade was then controlled by the Associated Brokers. These included 
the London lines, the Orient line, the P. & O., and the B.I.S.N. In Queensland 
the London lines and the B.I. dominated trade. Australian attempts to break 
into the tightly knit world of British shipping were few. Mcllwraith McEachern 
successfully formed a company and reduced freights in the Australian trade, but 
found it more profitable to join the London Brokers.® Conference activities in 
Queensland, however, were more important after 1885. 
By the mid-eighties most of the major Australian coastal shipping com-
panies had been formed. Huddart Parker was founded in 1876, Howard Smith 
in 1854, and Mcllwraith McEachern c.1874; in 1885 the Melbourne Steamship 
Company was set up and South Australians had formed the Adelaide Steamship 
Company in 1875.® The principal coastal company on the Queensland coast for 
most of the period was the A.S.N., the descendant of the Hunter River Steam 
Navigation Company. Other companies which came to be of importance in the 
trade were Burns, Philp, Mcllwraith McEachern, Howard Smith, and the 
Queensland Steamship Company (Q.S.S.). However, by the eighties the A.S.N. 
ran mainly in the South and Central Queensland trade, along with Howard 
Smith, while the Northern trade was catered for by a number of concerns— 
Mcllwraith McEachern, James Burns, and Gilchrist Watt and Parbury. In 1881 
the latter companies combined to form the Q.S.S., the object of which was to be 
a feeder service for the B.I., as the B.I. had replaced the E. & A. Coy. in the 
Straits service.' Thus the tendencies of overseas shipping towards combination 
were apparent in the Queensland coastal trade. 
The new arrangements were gauged to meet different needs and to give 
owners more room for commercial manoeuvre. While the Q.S.S. was now a 
major coastal company, one of its members—Burns—could continue his 
association with Robert Philp in another large trading company, Burns, Philp, 
which ran a coastal and island service. Also, Andrew Mcllwraith could take 
over Walter Reids, an important Rockhampton merchanting firm, in 1881.® 
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Some years after the formation of the Q.S.S. the need for greater cooperation 
with the B.I. was felt necessary, so in 1885 the British India and Queensland 
Agency company was formed. The participants were the dominant holders in 
the B.I., Mackinnon, Mackenzie, Gray Dawes & Co., and Mcllwraith 
McEachern." Accuracy about these complicated changes is essential as in 1887 
the B.I. & Q.A. acted as agents for the Q.S.S. to purchase the A.S.N, and form 
the Australasian United Steam Navigation Co., the A.U.S.N., successor to the 
A.S.N.^" The new company would dominate Queensland's coastal shipping for 
the next half century, as the A.S.N, had done during the colony's first two 
decades. 
Shipping freight rates 
The general decline in world shipping freight rates in the nineteenth century 
was a result of the changeover from sail to steam and of the increased utilization 
of shipping.^1 There were two major stages of freight declines, 1815-1851 and 
1870/3-1908/9. The years between 1851 and 1870 were confused by the Crimean 
war and the Australian gold discoveries, but in the Australian trade wool 
freights feh from one penny to a penny halfpenny (1 cent to 1.5 cents) per lb 
(0.45 kg) in 1836 to five-eighths of a penny (just over 1.5 cents) per lb (0.45 kg) 
in 1861. New South Wales wool freights declined further through 1865 to 1871 
when the 1861 price was restored till 1875. Then rates declined to the end of 
the period.^" 
Queensland overseas freights were usually above New South Wales levels. 
After 1876 the Orient line ran in the Australian trade and the southern colonies 
benefited, but it was still claimed that Queensland's services were less certain and 
more expensive than those of the other colonies.^" The question was whether 
reduced overseas freights in the Australian trade counterbalanced Queensland's 
extra freight charges. Conclusions must be tentative, but advantages probably 
outweighed disadvantages.^* The Northern ports especially suffered from heavy 
freight costs which were to some extent unavoidable because of the distance 
concerned. Faced with immense transportation problems, the North utilized 
coastal shipping to overcome its difficulties to a greater degree than did the other 
regions. In the process, the North's trading links were forged with Sydney rather 
than Brisbane. To send a ton (1.02 tonnes) of general cargo from Brisbane to 
Sydney in the period cost 10s. to 15s. ($1 to $1.50); to send the same cargo from 
Normanton to Brisbane cost 150s. ($15)." An additional cause for Northern 
complaint was the opinion that these charges were as much due to the A.S.N.'s 
coasting monopoly as to the distances involved.i® 
There was a tendency for coastal and intercolonial freights to hamper trade 
while overseas charges assisted development. In the seventies the efforts of 
Bundaberg maize growers to export to the North were hindered because of this. 
When attempts were made to organize a local carrying company the A.S.N. 
reduced its rates on maize from 17s. 6d. ($1.75) to 12s. 6d. ($1.25) per ton 
(1.02 tonnes), but transport costs stiff defeated the growers. In contrast, hard-
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wood cutters could pay 30s. ($3) per ton (tonne) to profitably ship their produce 
to Britain." Direct comparison is difficult, but this instance of coastal freights 
restricting enterprise and overseas charges encouraging it seems representative. 
The struggle against isolation 
The A.S.N, vs. the Q.S.N. 
One of the most important features of the colony's post-separation shipping 
history was the struggle between the Sydney-based A.S.N, company and local 
shipping ventures. When direct competition with the A.S.N, failed the colony 
would still try to limit the company's monopoly powers wherever possible. The 
Company—as the A.S.N, was referred to because of its dominance—had been 
through hard times since its formation in 1842, but in the late fifties the Queens-
land run made the A.S.N.'s fortune. One frequent colonial complaint would be 
that the Company overcharged Queenslanders to subsidize its workings in the 
other colonial trades. The A.S.N, was jealous of its Queensland trade and met 
any challenges with stiff opposition. As McKellar, the Company's historian, 
puts it: "not one of the many opposition concerns . . . ever correctly estimated 
the doggedness with which the Company would pursue its ultimately suicidal 
pohcy of eliminating rivals."^ ® 
After separation, Brisbane interests were irate that the A.S.N, would not 
extend its Sydney-Maryborough-Gladstone service to include Brisbane without 
being guaranteed a mail contract. In reaction they formed the Queensland Steam 
Navigation company. The Q.S.N.'s nominal capital was £50,000 ($100,000) and 
its boats were London-built paddle-steamers.^" Among the Q.S.N.'s directors 
were Robert Towns, George Raff, and T. B. Stephens. The company immedi-
ately had to face a rate war with the A.S.N, brought on by the Q.S.N.'s lower 
charges. The A.S.N. Brisbane-Maryborough-Rockhampton passenger fares had 
been 80s. ($8) and 120s. ($12), while the Q.S.N, charged 45s. ($4.50) and 80s. 
($8). By the end of 1861 the A.S.N.'s fares had fallen to 40s. ($4) and 60s. ($6)."" 
However, the benefits of these lower charges to shippers and passengers were 
offset by the increased irregularity of the services. This was a less welcome 
result of the rate war."^ By 1865 both companies were feeling the strain. Against 
the Q.S.N.'s assets in wharf and shipping properties was balanced a sizeable 
overdraft at the Bank of New South Wales. Other assets still permitted the 
Q.S.N, to make a marginal profit, but complaints were made about valuation 
procedures and the failure to set up a depreciation fund."" In the past the 
A.S.N, had made similar mistakes. The Company had not provided for 
depreciation untff 1857; this had brought about a painful stock devaluation. 
But the A.S.N.'s financial habits had improved. The Company reported a sub-
stantial loss in 1865 yet ultimately it proved sounder commerciaffy than its 
rival."" 
At this time the Q.S.N.'s mail contract came up for renewal. Parliament 
agreed to its continuation but support for the Q.S.N, was not general.^* A 
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complicating factor was the doubt about whether the government's support for 
the Queensland company was an attempt at public enterprise and therefore—by 
the logic of Free Trade reasoning^mistaken. Such a restraining view was 
usually genuine, even if it also made a reliable red herring. A more particular 
objection against continuing support for the Q.S.N, was that intercolonial 
freight reductions had prevented a direct wool trade between the colony and 
Britain. Of greater importance was the objection that the amount of the contract 
would be insufficient to restore the Q.S.N.'s sagging finances."® Meanwhile the 
two companies had come to a temporary truce. The struggle had reduced both 
passenger and cargo freight rates but the Q.S.N, still had not won the public's 
support. Equally disturbingly, rumours about the company's financial weak-
nesses continued to circulate. FinaUy, in 1867 the Q.S.N, was faced with the 
choice of either raising £50,000 ($100,000) in new capital or ending its opera-
tions. Protracted negotiations with the A.S.N, ensued and the Q.S.N, sold out 
to its rival in 1868 for £42,500 ($85,000)."® The Brisbane Courier declared the 
Q.S.N.'s defeat "a disaster to the colony"."' 
In part the venture had failed because the Q.S.N.'s local appeal had been 
offset by the greater commercial advantages of using the A.S.N.; the larger 
concern could undercut any freight rate the Q.S.N, offered. Another important 
cause of defeat may have been that the Q.S.N, was seen as a Brisbane-Ipswich 
company rather than a colony-wide enterprise. This was what the A.S.N.'s 
Sydney manager had argued—that Northern opposition to the Queensland 
company was mainly responsible for its faffure. This seemed plausible, yet the 
charge was explicitly rejected by Bowen's newspaper, the Port Denison Times. 
"The Northern ports", the paper counter-claimed, 
look upon the indirectness and inefficiency of their means of communication 
with Brisbane as one of their grievances . . . So far from exhibiting any 
unworthy jealousy as to trade filtering through any other port than their 
own, the mercantile community of Brisbane have erred in precisely the 
opposite direction by showing a culpable indifference to the Northern trade 
which legitimately belonged to them, and which they have allowed to slip 
through their hands into the grasp of the merchants of Sydney."® 
Bowen's protest may have been justified. The North rarely spoke with one voice, 
but at that time Bowen was still an important Northern centre. In any case, the 
basic reason for the Q.S.N.'s failure was that the company had been spht in its 
control. It had two boards of directors, one in Brisbane and one in Sydney, and 
a number of A.S.N, directors were shareholders in the Q.S.N. Contradictory 
policies had been followed as a result."" At one stage the division of authority 
had been quite clear. In the 1865 mail contract renewal debate, McLean, an 
East Downs member and one of the Q.S.N.'s largest shareholders, had opposed 
continuance of the subsidy. He did this not out of loyalty to his Free Trade 
principles, as he claimed, but because his holdings in the A.S.N, were greater."" 
The A.S.N.'s victory brought it much ill-feehng. During the next ten years 
complaints against the Company were frequent and periodic skirmishes took 
place between the government, usually when the Liberals were in power, and 
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the A.S.N. Accusations of excessive freights and inadequate services continued 
to be made, as well as charges that the Company was dangerously negligent in 
its sailing practices. The A.S.N, was also accused of purposely irregular sailings 
when mail contracts were being negotiated to ensure satisfactory terms."^ One 
important clash took place in 1869 when T. B. Stephens, Liberal Treasurer and 
an ex Q.S.N, director, subsidized the Havilah to carry some coastal mails. 
In reply the A.S.N, increased its Northern postal rates. Stephens's next step 
had been to enforce strictly the customs regulations on A.S.N, vessels in the port 
of Brisbane, thus delaying them, while the Havilah was exempted from the same 
regulations. This inconvenienced the A.S.N, but it more seriously distressed 
those outports which depended on the Company and Stephens had to 
acquiesce."" Six years later when a comparable difficulty arose the Brisbane 
Courier reminded colonists of the A.S.N.'s power to cause trouble "by playing 
a game of bo-peep with the post office"."" 
Another Liberal attempt to compete with the Company was made in 1871 
by Lilley's administration. Alarmed at the A.S.N.'s growing strength he pur-
chased the Governor Blackall as a mail boat, without parliamentary sanction. 
The issue contributed to his ministry's downfall and the ship was disposed of by 
Palmer's incoming ministry."* Yet Liffey's move had met with some success. The 
Brisbane Courier was usually inclined to support Palmer, but this time favoured 
Lilley: "The behaviour of the A.S.N. Coy. at the time was admittedly past 
endurance . . . If the Governor Blackall were moored in the river and left there 
to rust and rot tffl she sank, in three or four years the cost of her construction 
would be saved by the better bargain which her construction enabled the late 
government to make with the A.S.N. Coy.""® Again in 1871 and 1875 proposals 
for a Queensland shipping company came to nothing."® Yet each time they 
aroused interest as the A.S.N, was under fire for its conduct of the mail service. 
Clashes resulted from a contractual stipulation that a fixed amount of cargo 
space should be reserved for Brisbane's trade with the North. A good deal of 
Northern commerce still remained with Sydney—this the contract was intended 
to remedy. The Company's problem was that it was not unusual for the space 
to be left partly unused by Brisbane merchants. The issue came to a head in the 
mid-seventies when general criticism was being made of Brisbane's wharfage 
inadequacies. This shortcoming was related by some to the A.S.N.'s trading 
monopoly."' The Company attempted to find a loophole in the contract by 
running from Sydney, but this brought a sharp censure from Queensland's 
postal authorities."® 
By such means the A.S.N.'s strength was slightly hmited. A more real 
restraint was the competition of other shippers. By the mid-seventies the A.S.N. 
did not possess the same monopoly power it once had. After 1873 the E. & A. 
Coy. ran through Torres Strait and took some A.S.N, trade; Howard Smith, 
Mcllwraith McEachern, and James Burns were also competitors. So the 
A.S.N.'s presence in the Queensland trade came to be reluctantly accepted by 
most colonists. The general feehng towards the Company was summed up by the 
Brisbane Courier: "So long as the A.S.N.'s interest happens to jump with ours 
they will behave so as to please us, but not one moment longer"."" 
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The Torres Strait route 
In assessing Queensland's prospects at the time of separation the Times had 
predicted that a Torres Straits mail service would be difficult to establish.*" 
This estimation was sound. The colony's first parliament had passed a resolution 
in 1860 favouring direct connection with England via the Straits, but other 
matters were more urgent and a ship was not chartered to perform the service 
until 1865.*! Financial recession a year later ended regular navigation through 
the Straits and it was not re-commenced till 1873.*" The new service was pro-
vided by the E. & A. Coy. and worked well. However, when its contract expired 
in 1880, its place was taken by the British India Company, a larger company in 
which Queensland commercial interests had a more direct concern. 
The B.I. had early links with the colony. In 1864 it had unsuccessfully 
tried to arrange terms for a Straits contract and bought land at Cardwell with 
future northern expansion in mind. But Cardwell had not developed and the 
B.I.'s energies in Queensland lay dormant till 1880 when they were given use 
and guided by Mcllwraith. In that year the E. & A.'s Straits contract expired 
and the B.l. was eager to take the service over. Mcllwraith had arranged the 
details of the contract earlier in London. What he now required was parlia-
mentary approval—and there was the rub.*" The parliamentary dispute on the 
issue was unique in Queensland politics. The opposition knew that Mcllwraith 
had made a preliminary arrangement with the B.I. and that this required 
ratification. Griffith, lacking a majority, could not defeat the proposal outright. 
Therefore he adopted stalling tactics in an attempt to delay the debate's closure 
until the contract's ratification date had passed. 
Griffith considered McIIwraith's agreement with the B.I. unconstitutional. 
He also thought the contract inadequately binding, and as the marathon debate 
dragged on he managed to see other objections. The service was not closely 
enough related to the colony's immigration schemes. Further, the port of 
Brisbane would not be able to take the B.I. ships for years to come.** Mcllwraith 
argued in terms of the North's practical need for a Straits service, something 
which both parties were basically agreed about. Because of Queensland's 
isolation from the Australian trade and its greater amounts of seasonal cargo, 
steam services, then very costly to keep idle, had not often been used in the 
colony's overseas trade. This strengthened the need for a northern line.*® 
Implicit in Griffith's opposition and generally underlying Liberal hostility to the 
proposal was the feeling that the Conservatives were helping to create a shipping 
monopoly. The recent Steel Rails corruption scandal, so damaging to Mcllwraith 
in Liberal opinion, still rankled. Tradition was also important. The charges that 
the contract was of excessive cost recalled Lilley's earlier complaints when he 
had intended to use the Governor Blackall.^^ Eventually, defeated by the 
B.I.'s willingness to wait until opposition died away, the Liberal's brief was lost 
and the service was established. 
The B.I.'s first workings in the trade disappointed those who had hoped for 
immediate success. In the first months there was very little change in the estab-
lished pattern of Northern trade.*' Fortunately, the lack of success was only 
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temporary; after 1880 the B.I.'s Northern trade rapidly expanded. As a mail 
service the route could not serve Brisbane as weff as the P. & O.'s southern run 
already did, but for ports north of Maryborough mail services were greatly 
improved.*® As a cargo service, however, the B.I.'s Northern success was 
unqualified. It was described as ushering in a new era of progress for the 
colony.** 
Labour militancy: The 1878 seamen's strike 
In attempting to overcome their shipping isolation in the period colonists 
had one important advantage—waterside labour mihtancy was limited to one 
brief outbreak in 1878. Moreover, the conditions of the seamen's strike made it 
significantly different from the labour disputes which proliferated in the industry 
after 1885. Queensland politics in the nineteenth century were usuaUy very 
sensitive to any economic issue involving the use of coloured labour. In 1878, 
just prior to the seamen's strike, the matter was most pressing. The Chinese 
exclusion act had recently been passed to stem the inflow of Chinese attracted by 
North Queensland's gold, and the campaign to end the use of Kanaka labour 
in the sugar industry was gaining ground. One Liberal propaganda device 
successfully employed in the North Brisbane election of that year provides some 
idea of the depth of feehng aroused by the issue. A two-horse van was driven 
round the constituency by a white man crudely made up as a Kanaka, while 
placards on the van declared derisively "Vote for Massa Palmer & Black Man ", 
while the Sambo driver "conveyed to the pubhc Mr. Palmer's fearless loyalty to 
the sugar interests".®" 
The background to the strike was that the A.S.N, faced difficulties from 
increased competition. In particular, the E. & A. Coy. was trading to Singapore 
and cutting into the A.S.N.'s trade. TThe Company's reply was to enter the China 
trade and to employ cheap Chinese labour on its boats. Naturally enough, the 
A.S.N.'s white seamen and waterside labour in Sydney and Brisbane took a dim 
view of the Company's attempted economies and went on strike. This action 
drew sympathy from most sections of the community. Where a few days pre-
viously the Brisbane Courier had been arguing for the retention of Kanaka 
labour in the sugar industry, the paper supported the men's cause without any 
sense of contradiction. And indeed none existed: the liberal attitude to racial 
exclusion was essentially pragmatic. 
Present-day historical discussion of the White Austraha policy tends to 
take one of two views; that the reasons for immigration restriction were 
primarily economic, or that they were predominantly racial.®^ It is possible to 
see the same reasons being put forward in favour of the seamen in Queensland in 
1878. "An influx of such a race as the Chinese", the Brisbane Courier wrote, 
could not be permitted without endangering the most important work the 
Australians have to do—the building up of a community capable of the 
highest European civilisation, and fitted to fill a worthy place in the 
federation of Australia and the civilised world . . . They feel that in per-
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mitting these human ants to swarm into their workshops and crowd the 
European artisans out of every handicraft, they will cut away the very base 
on which their society rests.®" 
While a working class sympathizer stated the case for exclusion with a greater 
stress on labour's rights: "the elevation and independence of the working classes 
formed one of the chief features of European civilisation, but with the Asiatics 
the upper classes were wealthy and powerful, while the lower classes were 
degraded and ignorant. There was no middle class to be the backbone of the 
nation, as in England. It was on the English, and not on the Asiatic foundation, 
that we desired to base our Australian nationality."®" But these were differences 
in emphasis only, not in kind. In the Australian liberal world an ethical argu-
ment was also economic and vice versa. Those who argued for exclusion on 
economic grounds could also subscribe to the views of those who emphasized 
the value of Australia's emerging civihzation and the impossibility of assimilating 
peoples of radically different cultures into an egalitarian democracy. The 
Brisbane Courier was not contradicting itself in supporting the cause of Kanaka 
labour and the seamen's strike. The Kanakas had proved a race capable of 
control, introduced for a specific purpose, whereas the Chinese influxes into 
Victoria and the North had taken place against Australian wishes.®* 
So the seamen's strike was supported by those who usually opposed any 
form of labour militancy. "As a rule", the Brisbane Courier reminded its 
readers, "strikes are bad things . . . But, if anything can justify a strike, the steps 
taken by the Company would do so . . . The differences between the Company 
and its seamen is entirely exceptional in its principal features and bears no 
resemblance to the ordinary characteristics of strikes. This it is which makes it 
not a Sydney or Brisbane question, but a question of vital interest to the whole 
of Australia,"®® Only when the seamen came near to violence did their non-
labour sympathizers withdraw support from the men. Hence in 1878 the 
maritime labour unions were fortunate. Public sympathy for their cause had 
placed them in a strong position and the A.S.N, had to give up its attempt to 
employ Chinese labour. By using moderate methods and making their principal 
grievance one which touched on a basic national value—the maintenance of a 
White Austraha—the unions had won their first important battle with maritime 
employers. So, in 1878, to the extent that the A.S.N, was an Australian com-
pany, a limit to competition with British shipping had been imposed by Aus-
tralian labour and sanctioned by the community.®® 
Conclusion: Qualified success 
Queensland's efforts to reduce her shipping isolation had met with qualified 
success in the period. First of aff, the technological conditions of the Australian 
shipping industry favoured the establishment of a large number of ports on the 
Queensland coast. This was a necessary starting point in the coming search for 
the most efficient trade outlets. The economics of sailing vessels favoured small 
to medium ports more than could those of steamships. In addition, until the 
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change to steam significantly increased the size of vessels in the Queensland 
trade the ports did not have to provide deep water. More negatively, Queensland 
had to pay higher intra and inter-colonial freight rates and its lack of economic 
balance made regular backloading uncertain. Lastly, the ports were served by 
several important shipping companies for which competition was a basic element 
of trade. Shipping rationalization only became notable late in the period. 
The particular shipping services, however, did not satisfy colonists. Their 
discontent about this was not merely local intransigence or commercial hostility 
but another instance of the regional rivalry which marked economic develop-
ment in general. Yet Queensland's attempts to set up a local shipping company 
had failed because of regional distrust and divided control. After the Q.S.N.'s 
sale the colony was reduced to depending almost entirely on the A.S.N, until 
other competitors appeared in the mid-seventies, some of them local. The 
second effort to improve the colony's services was more successful. With the 
problems of distance the North faced, the B.I.'s Torres Straits run and the 
expansion of Northern coastal shipping were a major transport innovation. 
The North's coastal towns benefited in a way in which it had been hoped that 
railways would assist the colony's interior. 
After 1885 waterside militancy continued, but the community, in contrast 
with its attitude in the 1878 strike, usually disapproved of labour's stand. It was 
therefore ironical that labour's future demands were to be not so different from 
those endorsed by the public in 1878. As a result, maritime labour would become 
baffled and belligerent to the point where it would be one of the most disruptive 
industrial unions. What was clearer in 1885 was that the Austrahan shipping 
companies would be hindered in competing with British services by Australian 
labour. 
4 THE PORTS 1859-1885 Port establishment: The result of regional 
economic rivalries 
The most striking feature of the history of the ports between 1859 and 1885 
was the fierce regional contests that took place between them. No less than 
fourteen new ports were established on the Queensland coast by 1885 and the 
majority owed their settlement to the needs of inland pastorahsts, as had the 
earlier non-penal ports. Riding on the wave of the pastoral expansion of the 
early sixties, ten ports were settled before 1865 and most of these were in the 
North. Bowen, Mackay, Cardwell, and Townsville grew up on the northeast 
coast. Somerset, the only port founded for immediately non-economic reasons, 
was perched carefully on the tip of Cape York peninsula. In Central Queensland 
only two small ports were developed, at Broadsound and Baffle Creek. Finally, 
the ports of Normanton, Burketown, and Sweer's Island dug tenaciously into 
the shores of the Gulf country. After this onslaught no other ports came to life 
until the gold strikes of the seventies except for Bundaberg in 1866, yet another 
pastoral outlet. Only three more ports were opened in the period: the Northern 
gold ports of Cooktown, Cairns, and Port Douglas were settled in 1873, 1876, 
and 1878. By 1875 Somerset had been found unsatisfactory and the portsite was 
moved a few miles further north to Thursday Island. These, along with the ports 
opened before 1859, were the ports of Queensland to 1885.^  
The physical development of the ports 
In only one instance in the period was the outcome of an inter-port trade 
competition decided by the geographic superiority of a port over its rival. This 
was when Cairns was preferred to Port Douglas for inland rail connection. 
Otherwise, as ports were developed to meet hinterland needs, facility of access 
was all important. Because of this, many of the colony's ports were situated on 
river sites and could only be reached by vessels with a shallow draught. As the 
future of the shipping trade lay with large steamers this meant that the river 
ports either had to improve their rivers or shift their portsites downstream. This 
also affected some ports that were not on rivers, such as Townsville, which stiff 
required a better site. 
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The southern ports 
In the port of Brisbane in the early sixties the most pressing necessity was 
that a bar cutting should be made as quickly as possible. Parts of the Outer Bar 
allowed only A\ feet (1.37 m) l.w. Dredging had begun in 1862 along the lines 
of a plan of the Portmaster, G. P. Heath, and superintended by Captain Francis, 
a southern engineer. But as dredging proceeded, Francis became convinced that 
another channel could be developed to greater advantage. His proposed changes 
were officially approved, yet the difference of opinion persisted and blossomed 
into a controversy which had to be resolved by a Select Committee in 1863. 
As work on Francis's plan had already been begun the Committee's proceedings 
smacked of retrospection and few were surprised when Francis's preference was 
confirmed. The decision met with general approval. Heath warned that cutting 
the channel as Francis suggested was "an enormous speculation, with ten 
chances to one of failure", but he could find no supporters." 
By 1866 the channel had been completed at a cost of some £16,000 ($32,000) 
with an entrance depth of lOJ feet (3.2 m) l.w. Two years previously the Inner 
Bar cutting had been made. These improvements solved the river's entrance 
problems for a time." The next difficulty was the mudflats that stretched from the 
bars to the town reaches—in 1868 only 1\ feet (2.29 m) l.w. was available in the 
Upper Flats.* Cutting was under way but some were growing impatient. "We 
have hardly yet", the Brisbane Courier wrote brusquely, "got to the extent of 
wishing the Francis channel filled up again, but certainly that vast outlay 
remains comparatively thrown away for want of the supplementary cutting of 
the Flats."® Some success had been won by 1872. The Upper and Eagle Farm 
Flats were cut to 10|- feet (3.2 m) l.w. and the Hudson, drawing 15 feet, could 
sail out of Brisbane directly to London with the use of the tide.® The Francis 
channel still had some disadvantages but Brisbane's achievement remained an 
important one. In 1875 ships displacing 18 feet (5.49 m) could reach the Brisbane 
wharves and, as the E. & A. Coy.'s handbook for that year acknowledged, this 
was Brisbane's great advantage over the other Queensland ports.' Of more 
immediate importance, the provision of deep water in the river was a turning 
point in the struggle between Brisbane and Ipswich. This will be explained 
presently. 
Another navigational drawback was the existence of alternative approach 
channels to the bar cutting. After 1844 the Freeman, or Middle, Channel had 
been most frequently used. Shipowners preferred the South, or Ship, Channel 
because of its proximity to the Sydney-Brisbane run, but it was often dangerous.® 
Then in the mid-seventies the channels altered and the question was reopened. 
There were three possibilities. As well as the Freeman and the South channels 
there was the North, or Howe, Channel.^ Complaints had been made about the 
continued use of the Freeman and by 1877 difficulties had increased to the point 
where a Royal Commission inquired into the matter. The majority report was 
indecisive, stating that each channel had advantages. But while the Commission 
proposed the weather disposed. In 1879 the Freeman's depth was stiff declining 
and the Ship Channel had been closed, but the North could offer a depth of 19 
to 26 feet (5.79 to 7.92 m). It remained the main entrance to Moreton Bay.^" 
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Between 1859 and 1885 there were two major periods of wharf construction 
in the port of Brisbane: the first was in the mid-seventies, the second was in the 
early eighties. Before 1859 the only important wharves were the Queen's Wharf 
in front of the immigration depot, the A.S.N, wharf adjacent to Eagle Street, 
Raff's wharf at Petrie Bight, Harris's wharf at Short Street, and Robert Towns's 
wharf at South Brisbane. In 1864 the ill-omened Q.S.N, opened a wharf close to 
their competitors the A.S.N., and in 1865 a government wharf was built at 
Lytton to tranship rail stores and plant. In the same year the Queen's Wharf 
was also extended. No large wharves were built then till 1875 when two were 
constructed at Petrie Bight by the government.^^ In the early eighties Gibbs 
Bright and Coy. erected an overseas wharf at Kangaroo Point opposite to 
Parbury, Lamb and Raff's wharf at the Bight. Two more medium-sized wharves 
were built at Petrie Bight in 1880 and 1883. Lastly, another important addition 
to the port's physical equipment was the construction of a Graving Dock at 
South Brisbane in I88I.1" 
In the mid-seventies the adequacy of the port's wharfage was a subject of 
heated debate—as were most aspects of port affairs at that time. The struggle 
between Brisbane and Ipswich had emphasized the trading importance of the 
port of Brisbane. The clearing of the Upper Flats in 1872, which permitted 
larger vessels to reach the town wharves, was a turning point in the towns' trade 
rivalry. By 1875 one consequence of Brisbane's victory was the extension of the 
southern trunk railway to the capital. The imminent fruits of this success caused 
much discussion about Brisbane's commercial future and in particular how the 
rail line could be connected with the Brisbane wharves. What stimulated further 
interest in the port was the formation of the Melbourne Harbour Trust in 
Victoria. Also, local suggestions were being made that wharfage expansion was 
a necessary prehminary to breaking the A.S.N. Coy.'s monopoly of Brisbane's 
shipping trade. This discussion reached its peak when a Select Committee was 
appointed to inquire into the adequacy of the port's wharfage accommodation 
in 1875. The Committee's terms of reference directed attention specifically to 
deciding on the best possible rail-wharf connections and the best areas for future 
wharfage expansion. Yet many other matters relevant to the port's growth were 
also looked at in the course of the inquiry. Its members were selected Brisbane 
traders and politicians who were familiar with the waterfront and the inquiry 
promised to be a timely and important study of the port in the context of several 
wider issues. 
However, the Committee's most striking and disappointing feature was the 
extent to which it immersed itself in the practical details of wharfage expansion. 
It almost entirely ignored the wider administrative matters relevant to the port's 
growth. This omission was more the result of an awareness that most of the port 
wharfage was privately owned and expected to remain that way, than because of 
any lack of ability on the Committee's part. It fulfilled the requirements of the 
terms of reference thoroughly and carefully and the extensive survey of the 
details of the port's growing pains was of great value." To this extent, the 
Committee had shown at least as much perspicacity as had their counterparts 
in an 1874 inquiry in the port of Sydney. But the Sydney Committee had one 
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advantage that the Brisbane body lacked: their administrative situation was 
relatively well defined, and the New South Wales government had taken steps to 
resume the Circular Quay wharfage.^* In Brisbane the administrative position 
of the port was poorly defined and the government showed no signs of taking a 
more active role. 
No government action foUowed the 1875 Committee's findings with respect 
to either rail-wharf connections or preserving room for future wharfage ex-
pansion. The points where the Committee had touched on the port's shipping 
monopoly and on wharfage rights were also not taken up. The government's 
inaction was less serious in the former matters than in the latter. Private enter-
prise worked out its own plans for wharfage expansion fairly successfully and 
rail-wharf connections were also managed capably enough when the time came. 
But economic pragmatism reached its limits in the port at this point. The neglect 
of the port's administrative needs was not so important in the 1870s but it would 
become so in a very short time. Stiff, despite difficulties, by the eighties Brisbane 
was a thriving commercial centre. One visitor ascending the River in 1880 
could paint a vivid picture of trading activity: 
After we enter the Brisbane River, there are all the evidences of an approach 
to some important centre of commerce. The river winds in and out among 
richly-wooded slopes, or broad reaches of mangrove-covered swamps. 
Various small craft spread their tiny sails, and skim lightly over the stream, 
which, however, nowhere attains any great breadth. River steamers pass and 
re-pass, with their funnels vomiting huge volumes of smoke; some with the 
old-fashioned paddle-boxes very high out of the water, others with a huge 
revolving wheel right astern. Big ships of over 1,000 tons [1,016 tonnes] 
burthen lie anchored in mid-stream. A steam dredge is busy deepening the 
channel in parts; row-boats flit to and fro; wharves and private landing 
stages project into the water from almost every point.^ ® 
While Brisbane managed to cope with the usual physical problems of 
development, it had to bear an extremely heavy cost which neither of the main 
ports in Central or North Queensland had to worry about. The handicap was 
Ipswich's persistent demands to be recognized as the head of navigation of the 
Brisbane River. In 1870, when of the total Harbours and Rivers vote of 
£178,100 ($356,000), some £168,300 ($336,600) had been expended, the cost of 
improvements to the river below Brisbane totalled £54,900 ($109,800) while 
Ipswich's share was £20,400 ($40,800). Until the mid-seventies Ipswich consumed 
more port funds than any other Queensland port except Brisbane. Many of the 
outports were not opened till the mid-sixties or later and therefore were not early 
competitors for port funds. Yet those ports founded before separation, such as 
Rockhampton, fared badly in comparison with Ipswich's financial treatment. 
In 1870, when Ipswich had received £20,400 ($40,800), only £13,000 ($26,000) 
had been spent on the port of Rockhampton.^® 
There were more obstacles to navigation in the Upper Brisbane and Bremer 
Rivers than in even the Fitzroy—which is saying a good deal.^' But Ipswich's 
demands for favourable treatment were supported by the value of the Brisbane-
Ipswich river trade. In 1871 it was worth some £20,000 ($40,000).^ ® The political 
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conditions which bolstered Ipswich's position had pre-separation origins. The 
early squatters had preferred the town to Brisbane. Their support for Cleveland 
Bay as a port had seriously threatened Brisbane and the traditions of rivalry and 
antagonism between Brisbane and Ipswich took many years to die away. 
Certainly, in the sixties they were still very much alive. As the fortunes of the 
pohtical struggle between the two towns fluctuated, the most direct result of the 
conffict on port development was Ipswich's influence on the Brisbane River 
Bridge scheme. 
The first moves to bridge the river between North and South Brisbane 
aroused strong opposition in Ipswich. The bridge should not be permitted to 
prevent navigation from Moreton Bay to Ipswich, protested Ipswich's residents. 
Because of their pressure a swing bridge was incorporated into the original 
design. This sharply increased construction costs for the Brisbane Council. By 
1865, when a temporary structure had been erected, Ipswich complaints flew 
thick and fast that sufficient provision had not been made for the convenience 
of steamers passing through to Ipswich. However, the financial collapse of the 
Brisbane Council after the 1866 recession put an end to the importance of the 
bridge issue. When construction again became possible Ipswich's political power 
had been reduced.^^ 
But in the mid-sixties this reduction was far from predictable. Any difference 
was made the most of by the rivals and the strain of their struggle was taking 
effect by the seventies. "If it can be shown", the Brisbane Courier wrote tiredly, 
"that there are no insuperable obstacles to our getting water for ships to float 
in above Brisbane, by all means let the head of navigation be above Brisbane. 
It surely would be better that we get a real head of navigation somewhere, 
instead of remaining any longer as we are without one anywhere.""" Just before 
the Upper Flats were cleared to allow the entry of medium to large vessels to the 
Brisbane wharves in 1871, Ipswich's supporters made a last desperate attempt to 
win the day. They tried to initiate a survey of Victoria Point to facilitate the 
eventual move to deep water in Moreton Bay."^ In the light of later campaigns 
to this end the suggestion seems eminently reasonable, yet in fact it was not a 
clear-sighted prediction of things to come. It was but one more episode in the 
incessant competition between Brisbane and Ipswich. 
If Ipswich was Brisbane's regional Achihes' heel, then Brisbane occupied 
the same position in relation to the other Southern ports. Both Maryborough 
and Bundaberg managed to secure only a small share of the pastoral exports 
which were essential to expansion in the sixties. They had to wait for mineral 
discoveries and the rise of the sugar industry before they could establish even a 
reasonable rate of growth. Because of the bar at its river's mouth, Bundaberg 
was a difficult port like Brisbane and Rockhampton. Maryborough was better 
for pioneering purposes. The channel of its river was narrow and tortuous in 
parts, but it was deep and there was no bar at its mouth. Even in 1864, before 
the river had been dredged, ships drawing 14 feet (4.27 m) could enter the port."" 
Until the Gympie gold strikes Maryborough depended on pastoral exports and 
to a lesser extent timber production. After 1865 sugar also became a valuable 
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export base. However, as the industry developed it would shift northwards, 
leaving Maryborough behind."" 
Bundaberg had been established in 1866 but, while exporting from 1872, 
no real growth began till the eighties. The town's prospects had been marred by 
its protracted struggle with Maryborough during the seventies to determine 
which port would be the outlet for Mt. Perry copper. Facility of hinterland 
access decided the issue in Bundaberg's favour reasonably swiftly, but the 
Mt. Perry-Bundaberg rail connection was delayed for many years. On the one 
hand this was due to Maryborough's opposition, especially as Walsh, the 
Minister for Works, was also the member for Maryborough. On the other, the 
ports' rivalry was used by the Legislature to delay the granting of either rail 
connection while the Southern trunk line was extended further."* 
Bundaberg's river was physically similar to the Brisbane River and was a 
difficult one. There was an Inner and an Outer Bar, the latter's l.w. depth being 
only 6 feet (1.83 m)."® Dredging did not begin till 1884, but by the next year 
depths of 71 feet (2.29 m) l.w. on the bars and 9 feet (2.74 m) in the channel had 
been made available."® Bundaberg had originally been placed on the north side 
of the river until floods in 1875 caused the town-site to be shifted to the south 
bank."' The port's early exports, apart from pastoral products, were maize and 
small quantities of timber until the discovery of copper at Mt. Perry in the early 
seventies and the growth of the sugar industry ushered in a welcome phase of 
expansion. 
77?^  central ports 
The navigational difficulties of the Fitzroy River were a constant source of 
concern and sometimes embarrassment to those connected with the port of 
Rockhampton. The Fitzroy followed a long and twisted course for a tidal river, 
as did the Brisbane. The principal impediment to shipping in the river was the 
Upper Flats, through which a channel had been cut by 1865. But it had quickly 
silted up again. Though cut once more in 1866, siltation had lowered the l.w. 
level to 2f feet (0.84 m) by 1868."® As early as 1864 a scheme of training waffs 
for the Flats had been planned, but this remained unimplemented, as did another 
plan to construct a canal parallel to the course of the river. These unfulfilled 
improvements gave Rockhampton residents cause for complaint. In 1868 the 
Rockhampton Morning Bulletin charged that Francis's original plan for the 
Fitzroy had been purposely ignored as "Mr. Macalister thought the river could 
be cut up more to the advantage of Brisbane"."" 
But Rockhampton's port problems could also induce complaints in another 
direction. It became the duty of Gladstone's member of Parliament to em-
phasize Rockhampton's port shortcomings whenever possible. In 1879, for 
example, he took pleasure in reminding the House that the year previously the 
Governor Blackall, then a controversial ship, had been stranded in the Fitzroy's 
shallows. However, Rockhampton wielded a big political stick. In reply 
Opposition leader Dickson promised that in the near future the Fitzroy would be 
one of Australia's finest rivers."" This was most unhkely. Before 1877 £14,400 
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($28,800) had been spent on improving the Fitzroy. By 1880 a further £56,000 
($112,000) had been expended and it was estimated that for the existing works 
to be successful a further expenditure of £85,000 ($170,000) would be neces-
sary."^ 
The Bulletin's, attitude to its port's problems was usually cheerily 
optimistic."" This optimism was excessive but it had at least one sound founda-
tion—the value of Rockhampton's geographical position. In 1860 Governor 
Bowen had clearly seen Rockhampton's advantages over the other Central 
ports. He admitted the superiority of Gladstone's harbour to the dubious reaches 
of the Fitzroy but realized that "the river affords a more ready access to the 
interior of the colony and consequently the settlement of Rockhampton has 
advanced more rapidly.""" The Bulletin was no less astute in the matter than the 
Governor. "Rockhampton ever since its establishment", the paper wrote, "has 
been the chief port of the districts in its rear. In fact Nature made it so, and not 
pohtical influence.""* The distinction was an important one. Moves were then 
afoot amongst Gladstonians to vary their annual parliamentary petition for the 
recognition of Gladstone's better port by suggesting that rail connection should 
be made between Gladstone and Rockhampton. 
In the same year, 1875, the Bulletin's optimism subsided sufficiently for the 
paper to estimate the port's future possibilities soberly and, as would emerge, 
prophetically. "In a year or two", the journal wrote, 
should the Flats have been removed, the boats will possibly run up to our 
wharves, and thus enable our merchants to compete effectively with their 
southern contemporaries. If this be deemed impracticable, the formation 
of a deep water port at the river mouth may overcome all difficulties. 
At any rate, let us hope that no childish fear of injuring Rockhampton will 
deter our merchants . . . If the steamers will not come up, we must clearly 
go to them, or surrender the immense advantage of our fine harbour and 
central situation."® 
Here the problem had been raised which would perplex future generations of 
Rockhampton residents—the need to shift the portsite to deep water. Despite 
the disadvantages of the Fitzroy no move was made to deeper water in the 
period. It would be delayed for years afterwards by those who wished to retain 
the portsite in the town. The establishment of Port Alma in Keppel Bay owed 
httle to those concerned with the port of Rockhampton. Thomas Mcllwraith 
had founded Port Alma in 1881 to silence those opponents of his transcon-
tinental raffway who argued that Rockhampton's port was not a fit link in such 
a scheme. But Rockhampton had not asked for the new port. Nor did the town 
knov/ of the decision until the work was in progress."® 
Because Gladstone occupied such a subordinate position to Rockhampton 
in these years disputes between the two ports were infrequent. Gladstone 
presented an annual petition to the government arguing that its harbour was 
the best in Queensland and therefore more trade should be directed its way. 
But Rockhampton did not bother to answer Gladstone's repeated complaints 
unless they were unusually barbed: the town's port position seemed impregnably 
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Strong."' In the years before separation Gladstone had Sydney's backing for the 
new colony's capital. As these hopes died and the Canoona gold strikes were 
made closer to Rockhampton, Gladstone's prospects worsened. "Trade has 
very much decreased", a Customs official reported in 1860, "and the population 
has dwindled to about one hundred including the Government Resident's 
establishment and the police force.""® Captain Maurice O'Connell had done his 
best as Government Resident. He had consistently championed Gladstone-otvex 
Rockhampton and the other Queensland ports."* When an 1860 Committee on 
inland communication asked O'Connell if the Central Queensland trade would 
pass through Gladstone or Rockhampton, he favoured Gladstone. His reason 
was that pastoralists would save on the costs of river carriage involved in 
shipping through Rockhampton. Unless O'Connell was including the cost of 
improving the Fitzroy in his calculations, his reasoning reffected either a total 
lack of knowledge about the high cost of inland transport or a very dear affection 
for Gladstone.*" 
About the magnificence of Gladstone's harbour, however, there could be 
no doubt. The E. & A. Coy. saw it as the best in the colony and, as Nisbet 
pointed out in 1875, there seemed no practical limit to the accommodation that 
could be provided for the largest vessels.*^ Yet, for the period Auckland Creek 
instead of the harbour catered for the port's limited trade. "Gladstone is land 
locked by mountains", Anthony Trollope wrote, 
and has no back country to support i t . . . a prettier spot or more melancholy 
town one could hardly find . . . The busy port of the town, consisting of a 
little wharf, two or three stores, and a customs house, stands about a 
quarter of a mile [402 m] up a small creek just broad enough to allow the 
steamboats to be turned in it. The creek opens into a magnificent harbour 
but for vessels to lie against the shore, the little muddy creek at present 
affords the only useful spot.*" 
The Creek was about three hundred feet (91.5 m) wide and, apart from a small 
inside bar, managed between 12 and 24 feet (3.66 and 7.32 m) at l.w. The early 
wharfage was all built around the Creek. The Queen's Wharf, the first buiff, was 
leased by the A.S.N, as a coahng depot till 1865 when it was re-leased by a local 
cattle exporting firm.*" The town had been officially settled at Barney Point, but 
business continued to cluster round the Creek. In the harbour a number of 
deep-water sites were avaffable. At Barney Point, for example, there was 30 feet 
(9.14 m) of water four hundred yards (366 m) from the shore. Yet in 1884 the 
first jetty was built from Auckland Point, closer to the port's established 
business firms.** Despite its outstanding harbour Gladstone would have to wait 
almost a hundred years before large-scale port growth would begin. O'Connell's 
early hopes proved misplaced and optimism about the port was replaced by the 
mood of the Gladstone Observer's statement in 1871: "between grasping 
absentee landlords and stupid local magnates, Gladstone has been kept in the 
background."*® 
The only other sizeable port in Central Queensland at that time was Broad-
sound. Known also as St. Lawrence, the port was set up in 1860 as the site of a 
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boiling-down works. Except for a small pastoral trade the settlement stagnated 
till the Peak Downs copper mines were opened up. Because of the height of its 
tidal rise, some 23 feet (7.01 m), as well as its rapidity, the port was one of the 
most dangerous on the coast. With each tide the channel would disappear and 
be replaced by a huge sandbank, dry at low tide. After a cyclone destroyed the 
port's only wharf in 1874, the portsite was shifted upstream to Waverley Creek.*® 
This was a satisfactory situation but the fortunes of St. Lawrence ebbed with the 
falling price of copper and no port trade was recorded after 1879. This had been 
predicted as far back as 1868 by the residents of Bowen: "Broadsound does not 
command any great extent of back country."*' Connor's Range presented 
obstacles to shippers through Broadsound and the longer route to Rockhampton 
was usually preferred. 
The northern ports 
The first port in North Queensland was Port Denison, which came to be 
known as Bowen. Unlike many Queensland ports, Bowen was not a river port 
and had only to run a long jetty out to reach deep water. As Bowen was the base 
for the pastoral expansion of the North in the early sixties the jetty was readily 
granted by the government, being taken over by the Bowen Council in 1868.*® 
But as Townsville grew, Bowen waned, and the government became less con-
cerned with the port. All wharfage at that time was built of hardwoods which 
could rapidly deteriorate under unfavourable conditions. By 1872 the Bowen 
jetty was infested with woodrot and three years later was coming apart. The 
government patched it up and did a small amount of dredging in the port to-
wards the end of the period, but the level of trade did not warrant any further 
improvements.*" 
Townsville proved to have better inland access. This and the effects of the 
1866 recession ended Bowen's brief period of expansion. The town took a little 
time to realize that its recovery from the 1866 slump was not going to take place. 
In 1865 Townsville, according to Bowen's Port Denison Times, had been "our 
amiable young friend", and as late as 1868 the Times still spoke of an amicable 
rivalry between the two ports.®" But by the mid-seventies when Port Denison's 
trade was still dechning the truth seeped through—another port served Bowen's 
hinterland better than could Bowen itself.®'^  
Bowen's lack of fortune was equalled by Cardweff's—a port further north. 
Cardwell possessed an even better harbour than Bowen, some said one of the 
best in Queensland. Cardweff's only improvement necessary to attain 24 feet 
(7.32 m) l.w. was a jetty.®" Opened in 1864 as a pastoral port for the lush Valley 
of Lagoons country, it had also been of importance because it was the closest 
port to the Gulf country. Some speculators believed that Cardwell had a chance 
of becoming the capital of a new far northern colony, but these prospects quickly 
vanished. Difficulties in supplying the inland pastoralists because of the rough-
ness of the hinterland cancelled out the navigational advantages of the port: 
"the road to the interior . . . is very difficult and dangerous", reported the Port 
Denison Times Almanac in 1868.®" In the late sixties Cardwell was almost 
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deserted. The seventies saw the port's fortunes improve as the Etheridge, 
Gffbert, and Einasleigh fields sent some of their gold through Cardwell, but 
trade then feff away to a level even lower than Bowen's. 
The success of the ports of Townsville and Mackay contrasted with the 
failure of Bowen and Cardwell. From the late seventies Mackay was an import-
ant Northern port and from its beginnings Townsville was the North's major 
port for the period. The ports of Townsville and Mackay were far inferior to 
those of Cardwell and Bowen navigationally, but their hinterland access was 
much better and this was decisive. 
Mackay's Pioneer River, an impressive sight at high water, performed a 
vanishing trick at the turn of the tide to reveal an abundance of sandbanks and 
shallows. In the early sixties conditions in the river were bad enough and they 
soon became worse. In 1862 there was a channel over the river bar a quarter of 
a mile (402 m) wide and 16 feet (4.88 m) deep at high tide; at l.w. the channel 
was nearly dry and the river was only navigable for a few miles (km) upstream. 
Heath had favoured the port in 1862 but two years later he admitted that it 
could not become a place for shipping of any size. In the next few years con-
ditions deteriorated. In 1862 the l.w. level at the town had been 6 feet (1.83 m); 
by 1867 it varied from only 1 to 2 feet (0.30 to 0.61 m).®* In the late seventies 
shipping no longer came into Mackay's river. This created major problems 
for the port.®® Towards the end of the period Mackay's energetic member, 
Hume-Black, was attempting to persuade the government to construct a 
sheltered harbour at Flat Top. But Mackay would have to wait for many years 
and for another energetic parliamentary representative before its port difficulties 
would be overcome. In 1884 when ocean-going steamers refused to call at even 
Flat Top Island, Mackay residents realised that a drastic remedy was necessary. 
A public meeting was held to consider the alternative sites for a deep-water 
port.®® So, in principle, Mackay was Queensland's first river port to make the 
move to deep water. Mackay's prospects for future growth depended on the 
expansion of the sugar industry. Established first as a pastoral port, Mackay's 
early business had run at a low level. Then during the seventies trade had sprung 
up with the Peak Downs district. Copper had been sent down and pastoral 
provisions were backloaded. Mackay competed with both Broadsound and 
Rockhampton for this trade. Fortunately for the port, when copper prices 
began to faff sugar cultivation could take its place as an article of export. 
Townsville, in comparison with Mackay, did not have to wait for success. 
The sixties were years of very rapid growth. This was achieved in spite of rather 
than because of its port. Like Gladstone, Townsville had a small tidal creek 
that was the centre of early commercial activity. But in Gladstone if Auckland 
Creek was small it was surprisingly commodious: Townsville's Ross Creek was 
more comparable with the Pioneer River in terms of port adequacy. It had both 
rocks and a bar at its mouth and severely inconvenienced early port users. 
"Passengers by the monthly steamer", recalled a contemporary when describing 
the port's early condition, "were either landed on the slippery rocks, or stranded 
waiting for the tide to enable the small launches to float over the bar which 
blocked the entrance to a mangrove fringed and alligator infested creek on the 
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banks of which a wharf or two had been erected."®' Some residents could even 
remember when it had been possible to walk across the mouth of the creek at 
low tide.®® The rocks were quickly blasted away but the bar was not as readily 
dealt with. In 1866 the l.w. depth to Ross Creek was \\ feet (0.46 m); 12^ feet 
(3.81 m) was available some way up the creek at high tide, but it was unsafe for 
vessels drawing any more than 7 feet (2.13 m). By 1880 the position was much 
the same. Obviously Townsville had more than its share of port difficulties. As 
Donnely points out, it was fortunate that the name originally given to the port 
was not "the Shallows".®" But the community was an energetic one and the large 
amount of trade passing through the port made the government sympathetic to 
Townsville's demands for improvements. An artificial harbour was necessary, 
the same solution that would be ultimately found for Mackay's difficulties. 
In the port's early years, however, it was not easy to foresee this solution. 
The first attempt made to improve Ross Creek was in the sixties. A "corduroy 
contraption" which acted as a training wall was erected in the creek to increase 
the flow of water through the entrance channel, but this quickly failed. Then in 
1874, as it was considered that the creek's depths were inadequate because of 
the siltage coming from the nearby Ross River, the next step was to run a break-
water out to prevent this inflow. Again, little success resulted. In 1885 the 
creek's entrance depth was only 3 feet. To make matters worse, vessels were 
being damaged by rocks in the creek berths.®" Yet a solution seemed near. Plans 
for an enclosed harbour had been drawn up and the work was in progress. The 
Outer Harbour plan had been an object of some disagreement amongst those 
concerned with the port. In the mid-seventies there had been several demands for 
the construction of a breakwater from Wickham Street close to the established 
traders. However, this improvement would have been of benefit only in the short 
run. Nisbet and successive Harbours and Rivers' engineers had favoured the 
building of the breakwater jetty from Magazine Island. This would protect the 
entrance to Ross Creek, unlike the other proposed jetty, and form the basis of 
a harbour for the Bay. The 1885 plan extended these principles.®^ 
Improving the port of Townsville was expensive, but no more so than the 
relative cost of developing the ports of Rockhampton or Brisbane. By 1885 
£86,000 ($172,000) had been spent by the government on Townsville's harbour 
improvements. Of this, about £65,000 ($130,000) had gone towards the 
Magazine Island breakwater and £15,000 ($30,000) to the paraffel Western 
breakwater.®" Apart from the jetty extended through the seventies, most of the 
town's wharfage was in Ross Creek. The town council had been endowed with a 
large water frontage which it had rented to private interests—among others, the 
ever present A.S.N., Burns, Philp, and a timber company. There was also a 
Queens Wharf.®" 
The reason for the establishment of the port of Townsville was that the port 
should serve as a pastoral outlet. J. M. Black was instrumental in the port's early 
success. Before the discovery of Ross Creek he had used a landing place in a 
branch of the Burdekin as a pastoral provisioning centre. However, in 1864 
floods destroyed the small port at Wickham and also isolated Bowen, so the 
move was made to Townsville at Cleveland Bay. Subsequently, it has been 
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suggested that Black's personal reasons and the reluctance of Bowen's people to 
allow the stench of a boiling-down works to contaminate their air influenced 
the decision to use Townsville.®* In reality. Black had not hesitated, and his 
motives were really more in line with the usual reasons for port settlement. 
Firstly, proximity: Bowen was "a good port far away", but Black wanted "a 
bad port close handy". Secondly, facihty of inland access: "the road to Bowen 
was very long and troublesome."®® 
Queensland could no longer be described as a gigantic livestock run by 
the mid-seventies. Minerals and sugar were additional export bases, and these 
new developments in the economy led to the settlement of new ports and 
supplemented the trade of others. Of the Northern gold ports Cooktown, the 
outlet for the Palmer diggings, was by far the most important. Between 1874 
and 1878 the value of its trade surpassed Townsville's. As well as the wealth of 
the Palmer, Cooktown exported timber and was at times used by beche-de-mer 
fleets as a base. The inlet which served Cooktown as a port was fairly satisfactory. 
Like most Queensland ports Cooktown depended on the tide. In 1883 the 
Gunga, drawing \9\ feet (5.94 m), cleared the port at high water. The l.w. depth 
was a good deal less, some 13 feet (3.96 m) in 1885. Wharfage was in short 
supply but Cooktown usually managed well enough to cope with trade 
demands.®® After 1878 the port had to take second place to Townsville, yet 
Cooktown was the next most important Northern port till 1882. 
Cairns's port was the Trinity Inlet which offered some 18 feet (5.49 m) at 
l.w. inside a bar shallow enough to prevent large vessels using the port.®' The 
original landing place had been a small wharf at Smith's landing, a short 
distance up the Inlet, but there had been little room there for port expansion. 
When the town-site was surveyed on the beach, the new wharfage was built 
snugly alongside. The first Cairns wharves belonged to Burns, Philp, Wilson 
Hart, and some local merchants.®® 
The early port history of Cairns and Port Douglas was one more example 
of regional economic competition coming to a head in port rivalry. Cairns was 
founded in 1876 to serve the Hodgkinson goldfields. Previously the port had 
been used by beche-de-mer fishermen gathering mangrove firewood. Then, as 
an easier inland route was opened from the fields to Port Douglas in 1877—the 
country at the back of Cairns was "exceedingly low and intersected with 
swamps"®"—the pattern of trade altered to Cairns's disadvantage. To add to 
Cairns's difficulties, the opening of the Herberton tin fields after 1880 gave 
Port Douglas another important economic drum to beat. Some of the tin was 
exported through Cairns, but the port had to look elsewhere for other export 
bases. The development of a small timber trade gave some relief, yet until the 
decision was made to link Cairns and Herberton by rail in 1885 the port's 
prospects were dim. 
J. M. Macrossan, one of the ablest champions of Northern rights, had 
sharply censured Griffith's government for its delay in deciding where the port 
outlet for the Herberton fields would be. The terms he used in doing so recalled 
the controversy about the Mt. Perry-Bundaberg line a decade earlier. "So long 
as they could keep the railway dangling between the ports of Cairns and Port 
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Douglas," Macrossan charged, "they commanded the votes of both places."'" 
Though the reports of the government's raffway engineers favoured Cairns, 
Port Douglas residents cast aspersions on these. They unsuccessfully campaigned 
for a further "independent" survey. What came out of the argument was an 
important additional reason for the choice of Cairns: the port of Cairns was 
superior to that of Port Douglas.'^ At least one instance, therefore, had emerged 
in the pattern of Queensland's port development of one port being preferred to 
another because of its greater navigational advantages. 
The difficulties of developing ports on the shores of the Gulf of Carpentaria 
were great. The Gulf shoreland was low-lying and flat. Where rivers existed, the 
tides moved slowly and channels through the bars at the rivers' mouths were 
hard to find. "The fatal defect of our northern territory", explained the Queens-
lander in 1879, "has been the absence of any good shipping port on its shores."'" 
Still, the needs of inland graziers could not be neglected and Burketown, 
Normanton, and Carnarvon were settled for pastoral purposes. 
In 1865 the government was proposing to survey portsites when Towns 
and Coy. settled Burketown.'" The port was situated some twelve miles in from 
the Gulf on the Albert River, but this distance was a direct measurement. By the 
time vessels had steamed up the confines of the river to the town they had 
traveffed thirty miles (48.28 km).'* At spring tides vessels drawing 10 feet 
(3.05 m) could reach Burketown, yet the depth of water at the town was usually 
8 feet (2.44 m). In 1866 the settlement was ravaged by plague and Landsborough 
moved the government's estabhshment to Carnarvon on Sweer's Island. The 
plague gave Burketown a bad reputation in itself but Landsborough was also 
aware of the hmitations of the original settlement's port.'® He realized that if the 
Gulf was to have a future port of any size it would have to be on the mainland, 
so after examining the sites available in 1867 he established Normanton. 
The Norman River, like the Albert, had its weaknesses. Normanton was 
fifty-eight miles (93.34 km) by river from the coast—the direct distance was 
twenty-two mffes (35.41 km). The river bar allowed only A\ feet (1.37 m) at l.w. 
but there was a tidal rise of 9 to 12 feet (2.74 to 3.66 m).'® Normanton itself was 
set on a barren ironstone ridge in very flat country. Despite these drawbacks the 
settlement became the Gulf's most important port. Besides meeting pastoralists' 
needs, Normanton supplied the Gilbert, Etheridge, and Cloncurry goldfields. 
In the eighties Burketown made a moderate recovery but Sweer's Island had 
been abandoned." 
Inland pastoral expansion had been the usual reason for the development 
3f portsites in the colony after 1859. The reasons for the establishment of 
Somerset, however, were of a different order. There had been no shortage of 
nquiries into the possible advantages of a northern port bastion. In 1855 
R-obert Towns, for one, had spoken of the advantages of a Torres Strait trading 
oute. Subsequently Governor Bowen was enthusiastic enough to personally 
;xamine the intended portsite. Close to the landing place, he reported, there 
vas good anchorage "sheltered from aff winds, for a limited number of vessels, 
vhile whole fleets might ride safely at anchor no great distance [away] . . . On 
Ubany Island, and on the opposite mainland, from which it is separated by a 
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deep channel only one third of a mile [536.4 m] broad, there is also abundant 
pasturage, large tracts of soil suitable for gardens and for general cultivation."'® 
Significantly he went on, "a small armed steamer . . . at Cape York would com-
mand the whole of the commerce between the South Pacific and Indian 
Oceans".'" For this was the essential reason that the port was established: to 
fly the Imperial flag proudly and, if possible, profitably. Bowen's vision elicited 
some sympathy from the recently formed colonial Council. Its members pro-
fessed interest in the project "not as colonists, but as British subjects, enter-
taining a logical and patriotic regard for the honour and advantage of the . . . 
Empire".®" But sentiment was not enough. By 1875 the portsite had been found 
unsatisfactory and Somerset, originally hopeful of becoming another Singapore, 
had been removed to a new site. Somerset was too far away from the route of 
vessels trading through the Strait and the port's anchorage was troublesome, so 
the settlement was shifted further north to Thursday Island. There greater 
success was met with. By the end of the period Thursday Island was the centre 
of lucrative pearl-shelling and beche-de-mer fisheries as well as the trans-
shipping port for Gulf-bound cargo and passengers. ®i 
In the pattern of colonial port settlement Somerset had been an exception. 
It had not been founded because of inland expansion. Otherwise, all of Queens-
land's ports, except for the original penal settlements, had been set up for that 
purpose. The original preference of British-born administrators for fine natural 
ports had to be ignored by local producers wherever satisfactory hinterland 
access did not exist. But by 1885 the physical weaknesses of the ports which had 
initially won out were becoming costly. They would either have to re-situate 
their portsites or improve their rivers. 
Port efficiency 
The provision of pilotage and lighting. The geographical size of Queensland 
and a lack of knowledge about the ports' navigational capacities made the 
provision of adequate pilotage and coastal lighting a difficult task. In 1864 a 
Select Committee had recommended specific improvements in the colony's 
lighting system and had made a general survey of future needs. Three years later 
rapid progress had been made and over four hundred miles of marked channels 
had been put down. This was a much more extensive network than the southern 
colonies possessed.®" The provision of pilotage was still more difficult. The 
Queensland ports worked under pilotage laws and regulations derived directly 
from Port Jackson statutes. There, legislation had been for a seaport and did not 
allow for the greater costs of river pilotage, or for the navigational intricacies 
presented by the Barrier Reef and the many islands off the Queensland coast. 
To meet local needs the Pilotage Act of 1870 devised a system of dues based on 
the distance of pilotage and the tonnage of the vessel. In this way, ships calling 
at more than one port which previously had to pay pilotage dues at each were 
more fairly treated. The Act succeeded. The river ports, Brisbane, Maryborough 
and Rockhampton, paid heavier dues, while Mackay, Gladstone, and Towns-
vffle were reheved of part of their pilotage expenses.®" 
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One problem which remained was the treatment of small coasting vessels. 
The Act did not sufficiently remit light and pilotage dues for these and this over-
sight was corrected by regulation in 1871. Between 1871 and 1876 these arrange-
ments worked smoothly but in the latter year an attempt was made to re-enforce 
the collection of dues. This was immediately opposed by the owners of the 
vessels until the codificatory Navigation Act of 1876 formally acknowledged the 
1871 regulations.®* In 1882 the existing dues were entirely swept away by 
Mcllwraith as part of his efforts to make the Torres Straits shipping service 
viable. Previously where ships had paid dues according to tonnage, they now 
paid dues based on the number of passengers and amount of cargo landed. This 
innovation resulted in a loss to the Treasury, particularly from the abohtion of 
light dues, but it was an important incentive for shipowners to use the route and 
remained in force till 1919.®® The Queensland adaptation of port legislation for 
pilotage and fighting to suit local conditions had proceeded only gradually. Yet 
considering the initial handicap of the colony's physical size a brave effort had 
been made. 
Port depths and wharfage adequacy. Because of the extensive use of 
lighterage in the ports of TownsviUe, Rockhampton, and Brisbane in the 
period, the provision of efficient wharfage facUities did not assume the same 
importance before 1885 that it later would. Even so, immediately after the end 
of the extensive use of hghterage in Brisbane in 1872 the port's wharfage capacity 
had been tested and found wanting. A point that requires emphasis here is that 
wharfage inadequacy was not always a simple lack of linear footage. In 1875 
George Raff, a leading Brisbane merchant and wharfowner, had argued that the 
real cause for complaint was the want of storage room or conveniences at the 
wharves to allow vessels to discharge cargo quickly. "Most shipmasters", he 
stated in terms which were strikingly similar to the findings of inquiries into the 
Australian waterfront after 1945, "are glad to employ steam winches in dis-
charging; but they always find the work hindered by the cargo not being taken 
from the wharf as fast as it is landed; and they find it impossible to get con-
signees to do this. What is wanted is store accommodation on the wharves, and 
facihties for taking a ships cargo under cover as fast as it is landed, and the power 
to compel consignees to pay rent for every day over due date."®® The difficulty 
for wharfage managers in Brisbane, and to an even greater extent for those 
concerned with outport wharfage, was the seasonality of the wool trade.®' As 
wharfowners were well aware, when wool and other pastoral exports were cleared 
away, except for the import trade the same wharves which had previously been 
overcrowded would often be idle. Wharfage construction in the mid-seventies 
and early eighties eased Brisbane's wharfage difficulties but the expansion of 
trade after 1880 showed that the port's wharfage capacity remained inadequate.®® 
Complaints about this would continue to be made after 1885. 
The largest ships in the Australian trade in the period weighed between one 
thousand and one thousand five hundred tons (1,524 tonnes). Towards the mid-
eighties larger vessels of two thousands tons (2,032 tonnes) were being more 
frequently employed. Few of the Queensland ports could cope with vessels of 
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this size. This limitation had been one of Griffith's arguments against 
McIIwraith's Torres Strait shipping scheme—Brisbane would not be able to 
take ships of two thousand tons (2,032 tonnes) for another five years, till 1887.®" 
Mcllwraith quibbled over the time necessary to improve the port but agreed that 
Brisbane could not immediately accommodate such ships. Yet the Brisbane 
River was superior to the Fitzroy River or to Ross Creek. After the clearing of 
the Brisbane Upper Flats in 1871, ships of one thousand tons (1,016 tonnes) 
drawing 10 feet (3.05 m) could reach the town wharves. In 1885 the Fitzroy's 
Upper Flats had a depth of 5 | feet (1.68 m) l.w., while the Ross Creek's bar was 
dry at low water."" In practice, however, the ports managed to surmount their 
many physical shortcomings by lighterage. 
In 1885 the programme of port improvements had been reasonable, if not 
always successful. The southern colonies did not have Queensland's long 
coastline, nor a chain of over a dozen ports. In 1876, when the Melbourne 
Harbour Trust was appointed, vessels drawing more than 12 feet could not 
make the Melbourne town wharves. This placed Queensland's port performance 
in a brighter light."^ Nevertheless, the greater demands placed on the ports by 
the rapid economic development of the eighties emphasized their inadequacies. 
Regionalism, railways and the patterns of port trade 
Regionalism and railways 
The outstanding feature of early port development, in relation to the 
growth of the economy, was the way in which the regional trade contests 
between ports were a microcosm of the wider regional economic competitions 
which were the mainspring of the colony's growth. The ports competed for the 
trade of their own regional hinterlands and, wherever possible, for the trade of 
hinterlands served by other ports as weff. This was the background against which 
the particularistic port contests assumed their widest economic significance. 
The division of the colony used in this study which concentrates only on 
three principal regions of Queensland—Northern, Central, and Southern— 
considerably oversimplifies the economic realities. For the purposes of more 
fuffy explaining port and economic development in South Queensland, for 
example, probably five regions would be the minimal requirement for a satis-
factory account. These would be the districts of East and West Moreton to be 
regarded as the immediate hinterland for the port of Brisbane; the Wide Bay 
and Burnett regions as the hinterland for the ports of Bundaberg and Mary-
borough ; then three inland regions—the Darling Downs, the Warrego country 
and the land to the west of the Warrego, and finally part of the Barcoo country 
extending through to Taroom. These districts were competing and competed 
for regions. They were competing for population and for capital; their trade 
was competed for by the alternative ports. While the first competition was not 
usually thought of as such, the second certainly was. Consider the regional trade 
contests involving the South's principal ports. Brisbane competed with Rock-
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hampton for the Barcoo trade and for the Darling Downs trade with Ipswich. 
The port also competed aggressively for trade that went through Maryborough 
and Bundaberg, and defended itself against trade incursions into its border and 
far western trade made by northern New South Wales and Adelaide."" 
The competition between Brisbane and Ipswich was the most important 
port contest in the period. Their rivalry came to a head in the early and mid-
seventies and coincided with the first phase of wharfage expansion in the port 
of Brisbane. This expansion was made necessary by the strains imposed by the 
recovery of Southern trade after the recession of 1866-1871. The rivalry between 
the two ports stimulated Brisbane to complete the first important stage of its 
river improvement programme with the cutting of the Upper Flats in 1871-1872. 
This decided the issue of rail connection between Ipswich and Brisbane in the 
latter's favour. During the debate over Brisbane's port capabihties two other 
important issues had also been raised: the desirability of creating a Harbour 
Trust for the port, and the dissatisfaction prevalent with the A.S.N. Coy.'s 
monopoly of Brisbane's coastal shipping trade. 
The years 1871-1874 had therefore seen almost all the relevant problems of 
colonial port development raised in the port of Brisbane under the pressure of 
inter-port competition. The port's physical capabihties had been reassessed and 
improved; its administrative needs had been considered, if not satisfied; a vital 
rail-port linkage had been made; and the role of the shipping services had been 
queried. The necessity for a deep-water port in Moreton Bay for Brisbane had 
even been indicated. The particular circumstances of these issues were unique to 
Brisbane but the same problems in kind would arise in most of the port contests 
to come. 
In this list of matters which involved the ports, the one that would assume 
more significance thereafter was the question of rail-port connection. Because 
of the great distances to be spanned in the colony, and because of Queensland's 
pohcy of constructing three trunk lines from the three main ports in each region, 
the situation where port competition could be decisively influenced by rail con-
nection did not often arise before 1885. Yet, in three instances it had been vital: 
in the competition between Brisbane and Ipswich, between Maryborough and 
Bundaberg, and between Port Douglas and Cairns."" 
The case of the competition between Brisbane and Ipswich was not typical 
of that which would usually take place between two ports for rail connection. 
Such rivalry was ordinarily between ports some distance apart which were 
competing for a rail line that could serve only one of them. In contrast, Ipswich 
lay directly inland from Brisbane and was already connected with the hinterland. 
The other two rail-port contests were more typical of others to come. The 
difference between the two was that for Maryborough and Bundaberg the 
question of outport rail connection had become important because rail building 
had advanced furthest in the South; for Port Douglas and Cairns raff hnkage 
was essential as the far north was out of reach of the Northern trunk line. 
After 1885 connection to the expanding rail network would intensify port 
competition. 
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The patterns of port trade 
Intra-regional port relations: a series of monopolies. Sharply contrasting 
capabilities for port maintenance had been revealed by the regions to 1885 but 
one feature common to each was the monopoly of intra-regional trade by each 
region's principal port. Brisbane's share of Southern port trade in the period was 
88 per cent, whUe Rockhampton's regional share was 92 per cent. Townsville's 
hold on Northern port trade was less strong, at 45 per cent."* The existence of 
this port monopoly in Central Queensland was natural enough. The only existing 
alternative ports to Rockhampton were Gladstone and St. Lawrence, neither 
of which commanded an extensive pastoral hinterland. Gladstone managed to 
scrape enough pastoral custom together to continue trading, but little more. 
St. Lawrence depended on the copper production of Peak Downs, but this was 
not sustained. The region's one chance of port diversification was mineral 
discoveries. These were realized but worked entirely to Rockhampton's benefit. 
Mt. Morgan was only a short distance away from the Centre's main port. The 
explanation of Rockhampton's monopoly in the period was as simple as that. 
Because of the valuable economic assets of the port of Maryborough— 
sugar and Gympie's gold—it at first seems surprising that Brisbane's dominance 
of the South's port trade was a complete as it was. For a few years after the 
Gympie strikes Maryborough's trade rivalled Rockhampton's and Townsville's 
and in the colony's port trade hierarchy Maryborough usually ranked third or 
fourth. Compared with Brisbane, however, it was a question of relative size: 
the magnitude of Brisbane's trade overshadowed Maryborough's contribution. 
In the North, Townsville was never as important as Brisbane or Rockhampton 
were in their regions. During the five years after 1875, when Cooktown poured 
out the Palmer's wealth, Townsville's share of regional trade feff to 34 per cent. 
Also, Townsville had not been the first port settlement in the North. Between 
1863 and 1867 Bowen had been the foremost regional port. These were the only 
two ports to exceed Townsville's trade levels, but there were a number of 
secondary ports as well which were important in the North. These were Cardwell 
between 1872 and 1876, Cairns from 1877 to 1878 and from 1883 to 1885, 
Thursday Island from 1882 to 1885, and Normanton from 1878 to 1885. The 
North's greater degree of port diversification was the result of the geographic 
magnitude of the area and the dispersion of mineral deposits. 
Inter-regional port relations: Southern dominance. Brisbane and Rock-
hampton always occupied first and second place respectively in the list of the 
colony's six most important trading ports. Untff 1870 Maryborough ran third 
and was then ousted by Townsville. The importance of Bowen and Gladstone 
between 1860 and 1870 was a result more of the absence of other competing 
ports than of their particular success. It would not endure. Other important ports 
after 1870 were Cooktown and Broadsound, both mineral outlets, and Mackay, 
a sugar port. Brisbane's dominance in total port trade was notable. Its share for 
the period was 57 per cent, while the shares of Rockhampton and Townsville 
were 16 per cent and 8 per cent. 
As settlement spread to the North the South's share of total port trade was 
Port establishment: The result of regional economic rivalries 67 
reduced but still remained a substantial 65 per cent over the twenty-five years. 
Fluctuations were less marked in the Centre; the level of trade remained prac-
tically constant there between 1865 and 1880. In the North, because of the 
region's later settlement, trade was not comparable with the levels of other 
regions till 1870. Then, with the mineral discoveries, the area made a special 
contribution to total port trade between 1874 and 1877. 
The export bases: a struggle for diversification. The three export bases that 
meant progress to the early ports were pastoral products, minerals, and sugar. 
Pastoral exports were most important to the South and Centre. The pastoral 
industry in the North suffered an initial setback and had to wait until fresh 
developments took place in the eighties. Of the two main pastoral regions, the 
Centre depended more heavily on pastoral production than did the South; still, 
not till near the end of the period did Central flocks and herds match Southern 
stock numbers. Rockhampton's notable expansion in port trade after 1879 was 
directly related to Central pastoral expansion. 
The North's deficiencies as a pastoral area were compensated for by the 
importance of the region's mineral deposits. Mineral production meant the 
establishment of a port, but was not a guarantee of permanence. Cooktown, 
which had been the port outlet for the Palmer's gold, and Port Douglas, the port 
for the Hodgkinson, were two examples of Northern ports which had blossomed 
and then quickly faded. Otherwise, the North's most important port, Towns-
ville, benefited from the production of its hinterland mineral fields. Until the 
opening of Mt. Morgan in the mid-eighties the Centre could draw on no com-
parable body of mineral wealth. Again, as Mt. Morgan's output went through 
Rockhampton, no geographical diversification of port settlement took place in 
the Centre. The South was not as well off as the North, or as unfortunate as the 
Centre, in this regard. Gympie's gold went through the port of Maryborough 
and acted against Brisbane's strong centrahzing pulls, while Mt. Perry's copper 
benefited Bundaberg. Lastly, the expansion of sugar cultivation was another 
valuable decentralizing aid for the outports. Till the eighties sugar growing was 
as developed in the South as in the North, which assisted Maryborough and 
Bundaberg. Again, in the North the growth of Mackay after 1877 and of Cairns 
towards 1885 were also results of the expansion of the sugar industry. 
Conclusion: The regional setting for port rivalry 
By 1885 the balance of export bases between Queensland's regions, from 
the point of view of port development, had resulted in the definition of three 
sharply different areas. The Southern ports were in the most secure position; 
the future of the ports in the North and Centre was less assured. Until the work-
ing of Mt. Morgan the Centre was completely dependent on pastoral production 
as an export base; similarly, until the expansion of sugar cultivation. Northern 
prosperity depended on mineral production. In contrast, the South was an 
important pastoral region and also a centre of mineral and sugar production. 
Additionally, the region had the best prospects of agricultural development. 
fiS THE PORTS 1859-1885 
Ultimately if the ports were to be more than pastoral or mineral supply dumps, 
some form of intensive hinterland settlement had to take place. Yet what agri-
cultural development there had been so far was confined to the South and to 
sugar growing in the North. The Centre was the least well endowed region of the 
three. By 1885 the South had the highest degree of inland settlement of any of 
the regions. Its prospects for port maintenance were marred only by the con-
centration of intra-regional trade at the port of Brisbane. 
This was the time of greatest regional economic inequality between 
Southern, Central, and Northern Queensland. The issue of regional separation 
would be one of the colony's most perplexing political issues until federation, 
and the relations between the principal inter-regional ports reflected this wider 
dissatisfaction with Southern dominance. Prospects of serious clashes between 
Brisbane and Rockhampton seemed specially likely. The Centre's undiversified 
economy was much weaker than the South's and it was also more closely 
connected with the Southern economy than was the Northern. At least in this 
way. Northern isolation had its advantages: much of Townsville's shipping and 
commerce gravitated naturally to Sydney before Brisbane. This situation 
increased the sensitivity of Rockhampton's position in the struggles to come. It 
was clear that there would be no shortage of these—even putting direct disagree-
ments about the port to one side. It was a Rockhampton-based movement that 
led the first campaign for intra-colonial separation in the sixties. Again, in 1883 
one of the reasons that McIIwraith's transcontinental railway scheme foundered 
was Rockhampton's opposition, springing from the fear of Southern trade 
incursions into the centre."® 
The unsatisfactory administrative conditions for port growth 
As Brisbane had to fight the New South Wales government before 1859 for 
its local port rights, the outports now fought the new colonial government in 
Brisbane for their independence. Yet, compared with the claims on pubhc 
attention of raffway, land, and immigration pohcies, port administration 
remained a secondary public concern. The campaign for local port control 
therefore was only sporadic, even if at times intense. By the end of the period 
the outports had succeeded in winning a degree of local control in practice in 
their affairs, but this would not receive formal government recognition until the 
nineties. 
So far the explanation of the development of port administration is clear 
enough. However, to move from these introductory statements about the 
relation between port administration and regional separatism to the practicality 
of what was taking place in the ports before 1885 can be confusing. It must be 
emphasized that as early port improvement was straightforward and pragmatic, 
early port administration was also ad hoc and flexible. Yet this flexibihty did not 
always necessarily benefit the ports. The port of Brisbane had already suffered 
from conflicts of opinion about its development. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this work to examine the personal 
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influence of those locally concerned with the ports on the government's port 
policies, there was much room for such influence and it was significant. The ways 
in which it was generally so can now be shown. The first improvement most 
ports needed was dredging, but there was usually not enough recorded know-
ledge of the ports' physical character to guide any further works. This was not 
so important as long as port trade levels were low and ships were not large. The 
Marine Board controlled all port improvements and until the formation of 
Harbour Boards there were no marine engineers for each port. The Board's 
Chief Engineer could rely on the local Portmaster for detailed knowledge of 
port navigation, but not for the specialized knowledge needed to improve the 
port by building training walls or breakwaters. 
What was most unusual about the early phase of the ports' development 
vis-a-vis port administration was that with one exception no serious intra-port 
clashes took place about port development policies. At first this was because the 
ports had just been established and local economic interests were not strong 
enough to influence the government. This situation quickly changed with the 
economic growth of the port but another early restraint on port policy disagree-
ments was that at that time no one was sure of what improvement policies were 
technically desirable or even possible. 
In considering the administrative changes that took place during the move 
towards local port control in the period, it is useful to divide the port adminis-
trative system into two parts. These parts often overlapped in practice, however, 
and the division is no more than a helpful starting point in assessing a com-
plicated administrative situation. Firstly, the government carried out all 
improvement schemes. These were financed, but not directly, and only in part, 
by receipts from the three sources of port revenue. These sources were the 
receipts from light dues, pilotage, and general port dues, and corresponded with 
the basic activities the government was concerned with—coast and harbour 
lighting, pilotage, and dredging and river improvements. The second sphere of 
administration involved the relations between the government and local port 
interests, municipal and private, and the formulation of policies for port 
development. 
The hesitant definition of developmental responsibility 
The practical day-to-day needs of the early port administrators were better 
dealt with than the needs of policy makers. A Marine Board had been appointed 
in 1862 to supplement the workings of the Portmaster's department. The Board 
was concerned with harbour and river improvement; the Portmaster's depart-
ment supervised coastal hghting and pilotage."® The scale of port dues had been 
established by a series of acts in 1862, 1866, and 1870. These were then codified 
by the Navigation Act of 1876, while the powers of the Marine Board were also 
more carefully defined."' However, even this part of the administrative system 
had its inadequacies. Separation had left a legacy of port legislation to the 
colony which was in various ways a burden. The tardy adaptation of New 
South Wales pilotage laws to Queensland's needs has already been mentioned."® 
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Further, the many acts which governed the ports were derived from Imperial 
legislation which was not always readffy accessible to colonial administrators. 
This the 1874 Navigation Bill attempted to remedy by repealing some twenty-one 
existing acts which controlled the Portmaster's department and the Marine 
Board."" 
However, the uncertainty that typified early port administration had its 
most serious effects when the government came into contact with local interests 
and municipalities over port developmental policies. Theoretically, local 
authorities were to share in the management of the ports from their beginnings. 
After 1860 it was standard surveying practice that when a new town was laid 
out possible wharfage areas were reserved for the municipality.^"" Yet theory 
often bowed to practice and this devolution of authority did not take place at 
every port. There was much inertia in the administrative system. Local interests, 
either in conjunction with the municipality or separately from it, had usually to 
take the first steps towards local port control or they would not be taken at all. 
The general rule—with the notable exception of the port of Brisbane—was that 
the more prosperous the port the more probable it was that its local Council or 
Harbour Board of Advice would help decide what improvements should be 
made to the port. 
The generalization that economic success led to local port control, however, 
requires qualification. It was not only the port of Brisbane which did not con-
form to this rule, but the port of Maryborough as well. The explanation of the 
exact relations between the local authorities, local enterprise and the government 
in each port cannot be undertaken here, but Maryborough's early history shows 
that there the move towards local control did not succeed despite Maryborough's 
commercial expansion. Because Maryborough had been settled before separa-
tion, potential wharf sites had not been reserved for the council. In itself this 
was not an immovable obstacle to the local authority's involvement in the port, 
but in Maryborough's case the Council was initially tardy in recovering the 
initiative for the port's management.^"! Even though Gympie's gold invigorated 
Maryborough's commercial climate and a Harbour Board of Advice was set up 
in 1896, a Harbour Board was never appointed. Conversely, as the port of 
Bowen's experience proved, local control was no guarantee of port development. 
The first established Northern port, its early importance was reduced by the 
growth of competitors. Local interests grimly carried on the fight for adminis-
trative control in the face of the port's declining economic fortunes and were 
eventually rewarded with a Harbour Board. But this could not restore Bowen's 
pride of place in the North or even greatly encourage trade.!"" 
The long-run question as to whether local interests and authorities would 
play a determining role in their port's development was decided by the fortunes 
of the port hinterland. But hinterland success did not ensure trouble-free local 
port control any more than local control ensured port success. The achievement 
of local control in those ports which were economically successful could be 
hindered by intra-port disagreements between differing local interests, or be-
tween those, the government, and the hinterland producers. It was here that 
early port administration was most unsatisfactory. In the move towards local 
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control there was a series of clashes between town councils and the government, 
between private interests and local authorities, and between the councils and 
hinterland producers. These early disagreements did not assume the proportions 
they would in later years, but they were the result of the same administrative 
neglect which underlay the later clashes. 
Mackay's port administrative problems were not as serious as Rock-
hampton's but are still noteworthy. The early development of the port had been 
very gradual, almost reluctant, and pioneers had acquired the town's wharfage 
sites at bargain prices. When the original purchasers found their water frontages 
slipping into the Pioneer River they pressed the government for assistance, and 
for some time the government paid the costs of building retaining walls for the 
frontages. However, by 1869, as the town councff had been incorporated, 
demands were made for the owners to share the expense of the retaining works. 
The Council became determined that the original properties should be resumed, 
but the owners were reluctant to forego their property rights—in 1879 they 
asked £20,000 ($40,000) for land that had originally cost them £879 ($l,758).i"" 
The most serious early clash over local port rights, however, was between 
Rockhampton's Council and the government. On two occasions the government 
interfered with what the municipality considered to be its wharfage rights. In 
1863 the government wished to grant the A.S.N. Coy. a wharf site. This the 
Council strongly, and eventually successfully, opposed. The dispute roused 
Rockhampton tempers and acted as an overture to the separation campaign that 
Rockhampton would launch in the next few years. "Let anyone look", appealed 
one correspondent of the Morning Bulletin, 
at what the Rockhampton corporation have done in the way of wharfage 
accommodation and compare it with what has been done in Brisbane . . . 
take any stranger and set him in the midst of Brisbane and he would have 
to pay a guide to take him where the shipping were to be found . . . it is to 
reduce Rockhampton to the same state of chaos that the present thing at 
Brisbane now called a government would commence the blockade of your 
fine river frontages . . . till bit by bit your river is fenced in against you.^"* 
Considering the thoughtless or culpable disposal of the Brisbane water frontages 
before separation, this warning was justified despite its lack of temperateness. 
Indeed, this intemperateness was characteristic of the passionate regional 
rivalries of the time. 
What weakened the Rockhampton Council's bold stand for its regional and 
port rights was that many Central pastoralists felt that the wharfage dues they 
paid to the Councff were spent on city streets rather than on river improvements. 
"It is right that this money should be spent in improving the wharves and river 
approaches", mollified the Bulletin, "and it has been so spent. We do not ask 
the people of Barcoo and Springsure to pay for our streets, though they certainly 
derive some benefit from them; but we expect that they will not object to paying 
their fair contributions to our wharves."^"® So the thorny and persistent problem 
of the division of interest between the port and the town had arisen in Rock-
hampton for the first but by no means the last time. The paper's views on the 
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matter notwithstanding, the difference of opinion between Rockhampton and its 
hinterland producers would be an important factor in the failure of Rock-
hampton's separation campaign, and also in the town's failure to successfully 
develop its port.^ "® 
The weaknesses of early port administration also affected the port of Bris-
bane, if in a different way from the other ports. In Brisbane the municipal 
council was never as closely connected with the development of the port as were 
the councils in Rockhampton, Townsville, and most of the outports. In many 
of the colony's ports the government's neglect of port administration hampered 
the emergence of local port authorities, but at least these did eventually establish 
themselves. Despite an at times energetic campaign, a coordinating authority for 
the port of Brisbane was never appointed. The Brisbane Council retained, amidst 
some confusion, only a small water frontage.!"' Private interests had been active 
in the port before the Council's incorporation in 1859 and they were much more 
important in inffuencing the port's developmental programmes. The port role 
played by the municipal councils in Rockhampton and Townsville was taken in 
Brisbane by the town's Chamber of Commerce. F. H. Hart, a leading member 
of the Chamber in the seventies, was also a member of the Marine Board, and 
there was a good deal of unofficial contact between the two bodies when port 
affairs were involved. 
From time to time the Chamber spoke out in favour of forming a port 
authority for Brisbane. The closest that these attempts to set up a Brisbane 
Harbour Board came to success was in the seventies. Shortly before the forma-
tion of the Melbourne Harbour Trust, the Brisbane Courier had advocated the 
principle for Brisbane as well. The Chamber of Commerce and the Councff 
favoured the idea, while the government had appointed a River Trust for 
Ipswich in 1871. The general view was that this was a trial for the method before 
it was applied to Brisbane."® But the campaign failed. It did so apparently 
because of the opposition of the Portmaster and Chairman of the Marine Board, 
G. P. Heath, who considered a Trust would place charges on shipping that 
would be excessive at such an early stage of the port's development.^"" Heath's 
opposition was reinforced by the demands of some local traders for lower port 
charges.!" 
With this defeat the campaign for a Brisbane Harbour Board ended for the 
period. The first move towards local control in the colony's chief port had failed 
because of insufficient local enthusiasm, and because of the unique historical 
conditions of the port's pre-separation development compared with Rock-
hampton's or Townsville's. At the time this did not seem so serious. As vital as 
the formation of a coordinating authority was for Brisbane, it was of very small 
importance in the context of other colonial political issues. In the nineties, 
however, it would reemerge as a more pressing matter. 
Regional complaints about the allocation of port funds 
"It is undeniable", claimed the member for Maryborough in 1865, "that 
the pre-eminence of Moreton Bay is solely owing to government expenditure. 
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to maintain which a perpetual drain is made on the other portions of the 
colony, and the very life sucked out of them.""! Financially, Maryborough did 
have something to complain about. By 1886 Gladstone, a much smaller port, 
had received a greater share of port outlays.^!" Yet, taken overall, regional 
charges of undue favouritism could not be upheld. Expenditure at the main 
ports was usually fairly well tailored to the value of their trade. When the 
question arose as to whether the major ports were entitled to as much of port 
outlays as they received, interests at the smaller ports claimed that their larger 
cousins were larger because of generous government fiscal treatment. The larger 
ports' reply was that they were favoured because they were larger. Short-run 
expenditure did favour some ports over others—notably Brisbane, Ipswich, and 
Rockhampton in the early years. Outlays on the Northern ports were small until 
the late seventies, while Bundaberg had to wait till the eighties. Yet, in the last 
analysis, the regional distribution of funds had been fair. Ports were developed 
at this time more because of their hinterland connections than because of their 
harbours. Complaints about port favouritism could not change this fact, which 
practically guaranteed an equitable distribution of funds. 
Conclusion: Port administration to 1885 
As Queensland and Victoria broke away from New South Wales, and 
North and Central Queensland attempted to break from the South, the Queens-
land outports tried to throw off the influence of the government in Brisbane. 
Port success ordinarily led to local control and it was this move which was the 
basic fact which port administration had to come to terms with in the period. 
This most healthy process, in a country where the British traditions of local 
government were usually neglected, was marred by government inaction. This 
inaction exacerbated the port administrative disagreements rather than reduced 
them.!!" 
The most serious early clash was in Rockhampton and involved the local 
authorities, the government, and the hinterland producers. These regional 
contests would be the principal future source of difficulties for the ports. 
Regionalism was a stimulus to port development and towards local port 
control, but past a certain point it became a handicap instead of a help. Regional 
disagreements were most harmful when ports had to change their sites, as in 
Mackay, Townsville, and, most seriously, Rockhampton. Regional energies 
might have been controlled and turned to advantage, but as port administration 
was a secondary matter and because the larger outports had considerable 
influence in deciding on their own improvements, they were not. The only com-
pensation was that port administration was never taken up directly by the 
regional separatists. This was only a short-run benefit, however, as after 
separation had failed regionalism continued to exert a harmful influence on the 
ports. 
In sum, the devolution of port control was taking place without any sys-
tematic regulation. The matter would not become serious until later, but what 
was embryonically present in the early disputes between local interests and 
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hinterland producers was the difference of interest between a port and its town. 
Ports and coastal towns had been founded together in Queensland and no sense 
of differentiation existed between the two. Consequently, the legislators who 
appointed Harbour Boards in the nineties were unaware that the Boards would 
follow the earlier Council precedents when a clash arose between the town and 
the port. 
A better definition of the colonial ports' situation could have drawn on 
several models. In 1857 the Mersey Dock Corporation had been appointed to 
administer the port of Liverpool and a number of English ports had come 
under the Trust method of regulation. In Australia, Tasmania and South 
Australia were using the Marine Board method, while the Melbourne Harbour 
Trust had been set up in 1876. No comparable body was established in Sydney, 
but there the government controlled the Circular Quay wharfage and a series of 
inquiries into the port in the mid-seventies had cleared the way ahead. In 
contrast, the Queensland ports were left without guidance. No major changes 
were made in port administration until the nineties. Until that time in any 
political discussions of the ports the principles of port development were sub-
ordinated to local rivalries and needs.!!* 
Conclusion: The precarious foundation for futive local port control 
The facts of settlement came first. Ports grew in response to the development 
of different export bases and most of the pre-separation ports had been settled 
to meet the needs of pastoralists. Brisbane, Ipswich, and Gladstone had penal 
origins, yet their continued development depended on the pastoralists. The few 
ports without pastoral foundations were brought to life by the seventies gold 
strikes. Only Somerset was settled for immediately non-economic reasons and 
the port's artificial origins enabled it to be easily moved when its site was found 
unsatisfactory. The expansion of the sugar industry did not call for more port 
settlement but it was vital to those smaller ports which had found pastoral trade 
insufficient to initiate development: this was the experience of Bundaberg and 
Mackay. 
As hinterlands had developed before ports, the first criterion for a port was 
the extent to which it could serve an already existing hinterland. Facffity of 
inland access was all-important as against the physical quality of the port itself. 
By 1885 neither of the principal ports in the North or the Centre could be 
favourably compared with their intra-regional rivals. Rockhampton and 
Townsville were decidedly inferior to Gladstone and Bowen in navigational 
terms yet the latter would be little more than scenic attractions for years to come 
The question which would worry the established ports in future would be 
how—with the increasing size of shipping—deep-water port facilities could best 
be provided. Either the portsite had to be moved or costly river improvements 
had to be undertaken. 
As port settlement foffowed inland economic growth this sequence reversed 
English experience. English towns had existed for centuries before their ports 
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had developed; in the colony ports and towns were founded together. Port and 
town interests would be clearly separated in England when port authorities were 
appointed. In Queensland no such separation would be made. The colonial port 
authorities would work inefficiently because of this and regionalism would 
entangle port administration and hamper the ports' moves towards deeper water. 
Local port control would become merely one more weapon in the colony's 
already weff-stocked arsenal of regional rivalry. 
The neglect of port administration contrasted unfavourably with the 
detailed attention given to local issues during inter-port contests. It cannot be 
completely explained as a result of the ports' secondary economic position. 
This neglect was also due to the influence of an economic nationalism which 
simplified complex matters to moral or economic terms. When the ports became 
an object of political interest in later years the realities of regionalism in port 
affairs would be taken for granted and glossed over by politicians. The debate 
about the proper functions of Harbour Boards would be uninformed on the 
level of administration and trivially detailed about local port requirements. To 
1885, the same concentration on local detaff had been shown while the ports' 
broader needs had been neglected. 
In physical terms port improvement had proceeded reasonably well. 
Pffotage and hghting had to be adapted to Queensland conditions. This had 
taken place only gradually, but with the initial handicap of the colony's size any 
other result was unhkely. Physical improvements varied from port to port. The 
depth in Brisbane, 15 feet (4.57 m) l.w. in 1885, was satisfactory enough but 
trade expansion highlighted the port's weaknesses. Townsville and Rock-
hampton had fared less well, yet lighterage reduced their deficiencies. Com-
plaints about inadequate wharfage accommodation, especially in Brisbane, 
involved criticisms of handling and storage conditions as much as of lineal 
wharfage shortcomings. This would remain a problem for years to come. In all, 
a genuine effort had been made to overcome the ports' early difficulties. Yet the 
demands of developing so many ports had spread the government's financial 
outlays over-thinly and administrative change had been lacking. The economic 
growth of the eighties placed demands on the ports which they could not meet. 
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Consolidation 
The years between 1860 and 1885 had been difficult but rewarding for 
Queenslanders. They had been preoccupied with land, rail, and immigration 
programmes. Other issues now began to take precedence—the rise of a labour 
party, the prospect of Australian federation, separatism, and the Boer War. 
The major economic fact of the post-1885 period was the depression. It made the 
recognition of unionist rights and the exclusion of coloured labour very urgent 
matters. The perplexed colonists could not find reassurance by looking home-
wards. England had more than its share of troubles. The loss of economic 
supremacy to Germany and America indicated to the outside world that Britain 
was no longer the bastion of liberal security it once had been.! In Australia the 
events of the nineties terminated nineteenth-century expansion and optimism 
and left a pervasive residue of disillusion in the Australian spirit." Yet, in 
Queensland, this was as much a result of the colony's failure to make the 
economy conform to its wffl between 1860 and 1885. An agrarian environment 
had not been created and the economy was seriously unbalanced. 
The three Queenslands: The defeat of the separation movements 
Amidst the new sea of strange troubles that Queensland floundered in there 
was one famihar worry: regional dissatisfaction with central government. Even 
if economic change in the period partly redressed the economic regional im-
balances, the South retained most of Queensland's industry and people." The 
question of regional discontent with what separatists often described as "Bris-
bane rule" had lain hke an incubus at the heart of Queensland politics since 1860. 
The issue was a constant frame of political reference. There were two important 
separatist movements in the period: a Northern campaign in the mid-eighties, 
and an effort by the Centre and the North in the early nineties. There was then 
a final attempt by both in the late nineties. 
The mid-eighties movement is usually explained in terms of the desires of 
the Northern sugar planters to retain Kanaka labour. As Griffith's Brisbane 
government had legislated against the continued employment of Kanakas, the 
planters led the agitation for Northern separation. In doing so they could draw 
on the general regional dissatisfaction that existed with Brisbane administration. 
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They were opposed in the North only, though importantly, by miners, who 
formed the nucleus of the intra-regional anti-separation leagues.* This explana-
tion has been queried, however. It has been suggested that some mining towns 
did support separation.® The issue is a complex one and cannot be taken up 
here. What is certain is that as divisive factors in the region's separation 
campaign, regional rivalries within the North itself were as important as the 
clash of different intra-regional economic interests. Whereas Mackay and 
Townsville had preserved amicable relations between themselves because their 
commercial hinterlands were non-competitive, Bowen and Cairns were much 
less favourably disposed towards Townsville. "It is felt in this district", the 
Cairns Morning Post wrote in 1889, "that Separation is merely a mixed question 
of coloured labour and Townsville's interests . . . Cairns would prefer to remain 
with Queensland as a whole . . . than to be the bond slave of a huge commercial 
syndicate."® Rivalry between the port-towns in the North was economic, but in 
the widest sense. Allegiance to the towns could cut across economic interests on 
class lines. Intra-regional opposition to separation on the grounds of both 
economic interest and regional rivalry defeated the period's first separation 
movement. 
The next few years transformed the balance of political power in the colony. 
This was so especially in the North, as there Labor attained unprecedented 
electoral strength. Confident of future success the party now definitely supported 
separation in both North and Central Queensland. But political sands had 
shifted in other directions as well to counterbalance Labor's support for 
separation. The Northern sugar interests had been placated by the renewal of 
Kanaka labour by Griffith's and McIIwraith's coalition government in 1892. 
They were also aware that Labor would oppose the use of Kanakas. Therefore 
the planters and small sugar growers withdrew support from the separatist 
cause.' 
The fate of the early nineties movement in the Centre was the same even if 
its circumstances were quite different from the Northern situation. Whereas the 
separation movement in the Centre had some support from Central pastorahsts 
in the mid-seventies, the later movement was much more a purely urban effort 
on the part of Rockhampton. There is clear evidence that many Central inland 
towns opposed separation.® The intra-regional hostility between Rockhampton 
and its hinterland was a crucial fact of political life in the Centre; it came out in 
the struggle for a deep-water port. Pastoralists favoured either Port Alma or 
Broadmount, while Rockhampton rarely saw past the advantages of improving 
the Fitzroy river—thus retaining port trade at the town. The port rivalry was 
an important factor at the time of the second separation campaign and con-
tributed to the inland's distrust of Rockhampton." 
Motions in favour of separation were passed in parliament in 1892 and 1893 
but these proved to be only paper endorsements. After Macrossan's death the 
Northern movement lacked a spokesman of stature, and it lost impetus with the 
imminence of federation.!" jj^jg ^^s not true of the Centre. Strong efforts were 
stiff made by the Central separatists in the late nineties.!! At the time of the 1899 
federation referendum, inland Central Queensland had been pro-federalist, but 
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Rockhampton had strongly opposed federation before separation. The town had 
been right in assuming that federation meant the practical defeat for the 
Queensland separatist movements.!" 
The genesis of the movement in the period was clear. It was basically a 
result of regional economic development outstripping the political and adminis-
trative capabilities of the central government to cope with new regional needs. 
Time remedied this and the political possibility of separation was ended perman-
ently by federation. The opposition to separation within the two discontented 
regions, however, was not only a matter of a clash between economic interests 
along class hues, but also of intra-regional rivalries. This latter factor has not 
been granted the importance it merits as a divisive element in the regional 
separation campaigns. Nevertheless, Southern opposition was probably a more 
important reason for the faffure of the separatist movements than these internal 
divisions within the movement itself. Another reason was that the traditional 
channels of appeal to the British government on such affairs were almost 
obsolete. By the eighties colonial separatist petitions still found their way to the 
Colonial Office, but the English authorities were unwilling to take any initiative 
in such a matter unless expressly asked to do so by the colonial government.!" 
Separation was defeated but three Queenslands still existed. A definite sense of 
regional awareness had emerged by 1900 and it would endure. The separation 
campaign reached its peak at the same time that the foundations were being laid 
for the administration of the Queensland ports, and port administration would 
be hampered because of the regionalism which was written into it. 
The structure and timing of growth 
Pastoral boom and depression 
The pastoral industry remained the colony's foremost producing industry 
and export base but its performance was marred by great fluctuations. Between 
1883 and 1886 the industry adjusted itself to new heights. From 1886 to 1892 
a boom occurred comparable with that of the early eighties; the boom then 
broke, but cattle numbers increased till 1894. Yet the industry was not recover-
ing. The years from 1896 to 1898 were bad, and were worse after 1898.!* 
The development of the frozen meat trade was the most notable structural 
change in the industry. With the first successful shipment in 1888 new vistas 
opened for colonial pastoralists. Many saw the trade as a possible antidote to 
the depression and after 1892 it was an important source of export income. Yet 
a number of difficulties had to be overcome.!® Most of the early meat-freezing 
plants seemed to rapidly solve the problems of the new process, though what 
was possible technologically was not always done practically. Initially, high 
freezing costs were complained of and early shipments suffered badly from bone 
taint. The government had not hesitated to assist the trade.!® In 1895 an act 
provided for the examination and certification of all England-bound meat. This 
theoretically solved the problem of ensuring a consistent export standard but 
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marketing difficulties were not as susceptible to legislation. Shipping and insur-
ance costs were high and storage conditions in London were criticized.!' These 
problems were solved before 1900. A number of plans had been put to the 
government to speed the industry's growth. The most notable result, an 1893 
assistance act, placed a compulsory levy on stock owners to provide a fund for 
assisting meat manufactures.!® New meat works were then set up at Gladstone 
in 1893, and in Bowen and Brisbane in 1895. 
Yet, aff in all, the pastoralist faced a long list of debits after 1885: severe 
droughts, declining wool prices, and insect plagues to begin with. In addition, 
there was the growth of a militant labour movement and the financial problems 
of the nineties. Against these debits graziers had some substantial advantages to 
draw on—the effects of fencing and irrigation, the increases in rail mileage, and 
the development of the meat-freezing trade.!" The account balanced for most of 
the period, but ultimately it became clear that this depended on English book-
keeping. In sum, 1883-1886 were years of pastoral readjustment. Although the 
character of capital formation had changed in the industry,"" boom followed 
tiff 1892. Then, after years of difficulty, the 1898 drought came as a coup de 
grace. 
Regionaffy, the South and Centre dominated sheep raising, while running 
sheep continued to be a more hazardous occupation in the Centre than in the 
South. In 1885 the North's share of sheep numbers was 6 per cent; this rose 
to 20 per cent by 1900. The increase was due less to Northern expansion than to 
dechnes in the other regions. Regional cattle shares were more equable. Again 
the South was the most important region, while the North and Centre alternated 
for second place. Movements in Northern and Southern cattle numbers were 
very similar; the Centre's were most volatile. The Centre was the weakest hnk 
in the colonial pastoral chain. So the South retained primacy as a pastoral region 
after 1885, followed by the Centre. Readjustment in the period, however, saw 
the North reach a position of new importance by 1900. 
Continued agricultural failure 
In 1885 Queensland's share of Australian cultivated land was 3.7 per cent; 
by 1900 it was 4.8 per cent. Despite this slight improvement, in 1900 the colony 
cultivated the smallest amount of land per head—less even than Western 
Australia."! The principal difference in the composition of Queensland and 
Australian agriculture was the importance of sugar as a tropical product and the 
absence of wheat growing in the colony. Cultivation remained restricted largely 
to the South. Central agriculture barely existed, while without sugar Northern 
cultivation fared little better. 
The obstacles to agricultural success were a strange environment, an un-
certain climate, and the unwillingness of farmers to use the latest farming 
methods. The Department of Agriculture, operative after 1888, made strenuous 
efforts to improve Queensland farming techniques but the results were not 
encouraging. Crop yields continued to ffuctuate widely."" Maize remained the 
most frequently grown crop. Only in the last years of the period did wheat 
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farming become important although protective duties had been placed on 
imported flour in 1892. Much good wheat land still remained in pastoral hands. 
The Agricultural Lands Purchase Act of 1894 aimed at redeeming Downs wheat 
lands."" Agriculture in the North, apart from sugar, depended on fruit growing. 
Colonial resistance to Chinese cultivators was one hindrance to Northern 
agricultural progress, but distance was a more important factor."* In any of the 
regions of Queensland, farmers who lived more than a few miles away from 
towns were faced with the lack of a market because of the prohibitive cost of 
inland transport."® Branch railway construction was the necessary solution for 
this difficulty. 
Mining's brilliant success 
After the mid-eighties drought pastoral expectations were uncertain and 
sugar growers were also plagued with difficulties. The situation of the mining 
industry was strikingly different. The high level of mineral production achieved 
by the beginning of the eighties was sustained and after 1890 the wealth of 
Mt. Morgan was tapped. In 1888 Mcllwraith could speak proudly of mining as 
"the great means by which industrial settlementis tobeattractedtoourshores"."' 
While the record output of Mt. Morgan was not to be equalled for many 
years, the value of total mineral production was maintained at a high level 
between 1890 and 1896 and shot up tiff 1900. These were the years of brilliant 
mining success. 
The North continued to dominate gold production but there was a reversal 
of shares between the Centre and the South. After 1887-1888 the Centre pro-
duced greater quantities of gold because of Mt. Morgan's production. Yet the 
mine did not entirely fulfill its early promise. Only in 1888-1889 did the Centre 
raise more gold than the North. Central and Southern production depended on 
Mt. Morgan and Gympie. The North's primacy was due chiefly to the sustained 
output of Charters Towers and the discovery of Croydon. Towards 1900 
earlier fields that had been worked and left were reopened—most notably, the 
Coen and Hamilton. Etheridge, Ravenswood, and Cloncurry were also import-
ant Northern fields by 1900."' 
There were few signs at this stage that base metal mining would replace 
gold production as Queensland's principal source of mineral wealth. "In 
Southern and Central Queensland", an observer wrote in 1892, "there is copper 
and coal, silver, lead, antimony; graphite and cinnibar have also been found. 
In the North behind the sugar district of Cairns, the back country is so highly 
minerahsed that this part of the colony is regarded by those who know its 
capabilities as the probable centre of all the riches of the future . . . this mineral 
wealth has been but scratched.""® This was the trouble. For many years this 
side of Queensland's mineral wealth was only scratched. Lack of demand was 
the hindrance: base metal prices were depressed. Coal was the most valuable 
base mineral raised in the period, but the development of Queensland's base 
mineral wealth had to wait for the new century."" 
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Sugar collapses 
There seemed no end to the problems of the colony's sugar industry. Some 
of its difficulties were due to the competition of European beet sugar in world 
markets, which had depressed world sugar prices."" To worsen matters, the 
contemporary Australian marketing arrangements were highly competitive—in 
contrast with the industry's later practices. Lastly and most controversially, 
the struggle to end the use of Kanaka labour on the Queensland cane fields 
unsettled the industry and restricted investment. 
After rapid growth in the first half of the eighties, cultivation and production 
figures declined rapidly. The 1885 level of land under cultivation was not 
equalled till 1893. Physical production suffered less than export receipts, 
although the second half of the eighties was again the worst time. After 1890 
receipts reffected the increased scale of real production, but they rose above the 
mid-eighties figures only in 1898 and 1899. Regionally, the North began to draw 
ahead of the South as a producing area, but the South stiff retained an important 
share of the cane crop."! 
The economy 1885-1900: Depression sets limits to growth 
In each of the three expansionary phases before 1885—1860 to 1866, 
1871/1872 to 1877, and 1880 to 1884—construction and pastoral activity were 
the co-initiators of growth. As the economy diversified, new sectors made their 
contribution: mining in the second phase, sugar and mining in the third. Rail 
outlays had become more important and were specially so in the last phase. A 
definite break came with the mid-eighties. After 1883 drought brought a sus-
tained decline in pastoral expansion; similarly, the long-run trends in the figures 
for population and immigration were reversed and the sugar industry had to 
battle to maintain itself. The golden glow of Mt. Morgan and the general mining 
boom after 1885, however, together with rising urban land values, distracted 
colonists from the serious difficulties of pastoral and sugar production. 
After the 1886 drought pastoral expansion began again, but this expansion 
was not so much a process of advancement, or even consohdation, as one of 
shoring up. However, the real estate boom went on and construction outlays 
kept rising. After a lapse in 1886 rail expenditure followed suit. Mining expansion 
continued to make good the deficiencies in export receipts caused by the 
depression of the sugar industry, and even imports turned upwards again in 1887. 
These frothy years, which seemed to be a renewal of the prosperity of the early 
eighties, lasted till about 1890. Then public rail outlays and private construction 
expenditures fell sharply. Loan funds dried up and imports declined from 
1888 to 1894. The worst years of the depression in Queensland were from 1891 
to 1893. Mining and pastoral activity were maintained well enough but con-
struction and rail outlays reached their lowest point. Manufacturing experienced 
its worst years between 1891 and 1895,"" while the sugar industry did not begin 
to recover till the mid-nineties. There was then a levelling out process between 
1893 and 1895. 
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In some ways the colony had weathered the depression better than New 
South Wales or Victoria. As a prize for this it received an unusual inflow of 
southern capital and labour between 1895 and 1897. Mining and sugar expanded 
rapidly and rail and construction outlays slowly recovered. Then a cruel if not 
unusual blow fell with the onset of another major drought, and the pastoral 
industry sank into a new depression after 1898. Mining prosperity was again the 
colony's strongest mainstay in a time of crisis. In sum, phases of growth in the 
period were in 1887-1888/1889 and 1895-1897. The years 1883/1884-1886 and 
1890-1893 saw severe recession and depression respectively. The last years of 
the period cannot be isolated from those immediately following and were a 
mixture of growth and recession."" 
The nineties depression placed several limits on the Queensland economy. 
To begin with there was the absolute setback to production. While the Aus-
tralian turning point did not come until 1889, Queensland's troubles were evident 
after 1883/1884. This difference in timing was a factor in the explanation of the 
second important colonial variation from the Australian depression experience. 
Partly because Queensland had already been through the miff in the mid-
eighties, the nineties crash did not affect public finance as drastically as in the 
southern colonies. This, and the greater importance of mining to the colonial 
economy, softened the letdown."* But if Queensland's short-run depression 
performance was encouraging, the long-run prospects for the economy were not. 
It was this aspect of the depression's effect on the colonial economy which was 
most harmful. Whereas New South Wales and Victoria had managed to build up 
viable manufacturing industries, Queensland had failed to do so. Manu-
facturing growth in the colony had been slowed by the depression, but it was 
more serious that manufacturing's sectoral composition had been so badly 
affected. In future Queensland's manufacturing expansion would be directed 
more towards traditional manufactures, such as food-processing. This was not 
likely to initiate the growth of secondary industry on a large scale. So in 1900, 
with the pastoral industry sinking to new depths of depression, the colony had 
to depend on the expansion of mining and sugar production. 
In the same way that the Queensland economy benefited in the short run 
because of its different stage of structural development, the regions reaped some 
short-run benefits. The economic growth of the period aided the newer regions 
as much as the older. Mining expansion greatly strengthened both the Centre 
and the North; the maintenance of the sugar industry in the face of difficulty 
reinforced the Northern economy; lastly, the North benefited by default as 
regional ffuctuations in the pastoral industry left the North an important centre 
by 1900. 
So the North fared best from the economic changes of the period. Its 
increased share of population and the near success of its separation movement 
was a result of its new economic strength. The Centre also improved its 
economic balance as Mt. Morgan established the mining industry in the region, 
but this was offset by pastoral depression. These changes tended to reduce the 
distance between the South's development and that of the other regions. Still, 
South Queensland remained the strongest part of the colony. It was the principal 
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pastoral region, had an important share of sugar and mineral production, and 
a complete monopoly of what little agricultural and manufacturing activity 
there was. The most significant result of these economic changes for port growth 
was that a limit had appeared to the colony's development. A corresponding 
limitation would now have to be placed on the ports. Future inter-port com-
petition would be to maintain rather than to establish trade. 
Public policies and economic change: The displacement of the trinity 
The trinity of hope had lost much of its aura by 1885 and the next fifteen 
years made its failure painfully clear. This was made bearable for colonists by 
forgetfulness rather than explicit rejection. Through the period, when circum-
stances allowed, they would fitfully start and attempt to revive the old aims. 
But the agrarian ideal had lost much of its attractiveness. A rapid succession of 
events diverted the colonists' attention and made the fifteen years after 1885 a 
crowded and unreflective period. The question was, what had replaced the 
trinity as a social ideal and how would this affect economic development? 
Railways and immigration: The remains of a spirited policy of public works 
By 1900 railway construction and assisted immigration were no longer 
viewed as important means of growth directed towards agrarian ends. Attitudes 
to both had become much more prosaic. To consider firstly immigration. The 
luckless coincidence between assisted immigration acts and major droughts 
continued after 1885 and the achievements of the programme were only 
moderate compared with the preceding period. Again many of the assisted 
immigrants had left for the southern colonies and most of those who remained 
in Queensland stayed in the towns."® Attitudes to assisted immigration had 
become more sceptical with these continued failures. There had been opposition 
to immigration from the colonial working classes at times of economic distress 
before 1885, but opposition now became a more permanent feature of the 
pohtical landscape. By 1900 the Labor party had a plank in its platform opposing 
state-aided immigration."® 
The situation was reversed with the government's railway programme. 
As so many colonial workers were dependent on the railways for employment 
the principle of state rail construction was endorsed. Yet, while rail construction 
was more assured of sustained government outlays, a qualitatively different 
attitude towards railways emerged. Railway revenue played a growing part in 
the government's financial calculations. Politicians perplexed by fiscal difficulties 
began to view the railways as a source of revenue rather than as a develop-
mental project. What tended to obscure this change in attitudes to rail con-
struction was the controversial issue of private rail building. 
After Griffith had defeated Mcllwraith in the 1883 election, he carried the 
rail programme through to heady levels, but private construction was frowned 
on. In 1884 he repealed the 1880 Railway Companies Act which had laid down 
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the principles under which private firms could construct fines in Queensland. 
The Liberal arguments against private railway building—that large capitahst 
rail syndicates would take over the colony—touched responsive chords in the 
colony. Only with the economic stringency of the late eighties could the cry for 
private rail construction be respectably raised again. After much discussion and 
more economic duress, the Rail Land Subsidies Act was passed in 1892 by 
the coalition government of Griffith and Mcllwraith. It restated the principles 
of the earlier 1880 companies act. So the strains of depression had forced 
Griffithian liberalism to make an about face on the principle of private rail 
building; and rightly, for a more important principle was involved—the com-
munity's economic well-being."' 
Public policy looked with a kindly eye at prospective railway financiers after 
1892, but the capitalists seemed insensitive to the state of the government's 
affections. Only in 1897 did something definite eventuate when the Chillagoe 
fine was built to develop the region's extensive copper deposits."® Before being 
approved the project had been strenuously opposed by Labor politicians, who 
were continuing the Liberal tradition of hostility to foreign capital. Ironically, 
the venture was shrouded in scandal and charges of corruption. It was an 
unhappy precedent for future private rail building."" But the debate about private 
construction was set within a more important framework, if it was less discussed. 
Disillusion had set in about the developmental powers of rail construction and 
more stress was being placed on railway revenue. This scepticism had been 
voiced by Coote as early as 1879. By the time of the 1892 private companies act 
the idea of railways transforming Queensland into another Cahfomia had 
passed weff away. "It is assumed of course", Griffith said in introducing the act, 
"that the construction of railways is desirable."*" Previously it had been un-
necessary to make this assumption explicit. 
The recognition of the limitations of the railways was more striking as the 
period had seen an impressive amount of building. By 1900 there had been a 
50 per cent increase on the amount of track put down by 1885. The colony's 
population was more than two and a half times less than that of New South 
Wales, but almost the same length of track had been laid, if of a smaller gauge. 
Despite the ambitions of the programme, the inescapable difficulty was that 
Queensland had a pitifully small number of people per mile (kilometre) of 
track: 180, compared with 479 for New South Wales, and the United Kingdom's 
1,885. As a result, the colony had the lowest rate of earnings per train-mile 
(kilometre) of any Austrahan colony.*! -phe happiest view in 1900 could only be 
that the future would benefit. Even then there was the possibility that long-run 
changes in technology could reduce the worth of railways as a transport 
medium. 
The land industries: The uneasy transition from agrarianism to labour 
radicalism 
Attitudes towards the railway and immigration programmes had changed 
completely by 1900. The same change could be seen in the land policies of the 
Consolidation 85 
period. The colony's economic hmitations were more frankly recognized and a 
less Utopian approach could be made to the question of agrarian settlement. 
With the decrease in interest in agrarianism the colony's radical political 
energies were channeffed in other directions. What was significant about the new 
radicahsm vis-a-vis economic growth was the way in which it related to the 
earher agrarianism. 
The death of agrarian illusion. By the eighties a gulf had appeared between 
the continuing statement of agrarian ideals and economic realities. The cause 
stiff attracted radical support but its chances of success were vanishing quickly. 
In 1881 a blunt intra-governmental report was submitted on the agricultural 
prospects of the Downs. Its pubhcation was restricted for a time but finally it 
appeared in 1884. Groom's Toowoomba Chronicle admitted that it was an 
injurious but accurate assessment of the Downs' progress.*" The heavy economic 
blows that fell on the colony in the next two decades showed that the agrarian 
movement had one of the weakest skuffs. Interest in the land question declined 
as more exciting political issues appeared. In an 1897 report on land settlement 
Groom and his feffow Commissioners were reduced from earlier promises of a 
bountiful agrarian future to the plainer conclusion that "an ample livehhood is 
obtainable from the soff in this colony".*" 
The 1884 land act demonstrated that a sense of limitation about the extent 
to which legislation could change economic reality was rapidly emerging. After 
years of agrarian agitation for better land laws the 1884 act was seen by many 
as a triumph. But, while it restricted pastoral rights in principle, no real induce-
ments were offered to prospective cultivators.** The 1884-1886 drought 
cautioned the government from adding to pastoral difficulties. Then the 
economic trials of the foffowing years ensured that policies towards the colony's 
most important producing interest would be sohcitous. The act was the beginning 
of a transition to more realistic government attitudes towards land utilization.*® 
Complaints that the 1884 act was the government's revenge on squatters for 
years of agrarian frustration were quite ridiculous. Only months before, the 
Liberals had been criticized for forming an unholy alliance with the western 
pastorahsts to defeat McIIwraith's transcontinental proposals.*® Would this 
affiance then turn on the industry as a whole ? Certainly not. Any doubt about 
the government's concern for pastorahsts was resolved in 1886, when amend-
ments were made to the 1884 act to assist graziers to cope with the drought.*' 
Agrarians had to wait another ten years for any practical legislation to meet 
their needs. Then an 1894 act began a long series of repurchase legislation 
intended to resume agricultural land from pastoralists. But between the 1884 
and 1894 acts the agrarian cause had run out of steam. Some 30,000 acres more 
were brought under crop in the colony in the ten years after 1874 than between 
1884 and 1894.*® Where some had suspected the failure of Queensland's agri-
culture in 1885, by 1900 it was an accomphshed fact and the radical cause had 
found new voices and new outlets. 
The radical transition. To foUow this change in the direction of radicalism 
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it is necessary to again ask whether agrarian demands were truly representative 
of urban desires. The changes in political alignments after 1885 make it possible 
to answer the question, and the answer is in the negative. In the first twenty-five 
years of Queensland politics the agrarian cause had served as a rallying point for 
those dissatisfied with the political status quo. At the outset this had been 
essentially a pastoral status quo. But with the early achievement of pohtical 
democracy and the growth of towns it was only a matter of time until the 
greater numerical forces of urban radicalism would win out. When Mcllwraith 
argued at the time of the 1884 land act that there had never been a fight between 
the people and the squatters for possession of the land for settlement, the vital 
quahfication which made his claim plausible were the words "for settlement".*" 
Agrarianism had been a method of attack on established pastoral wealth by 
urban middle classes as well as a working-class demand for agrarian settlement. 
As Duncan Waterson writes of the experience of the Downs: "it was the store-
keepers of the three major country towns, Dalby, Toowoomba, and Warwick 
who . . . with the small farmers, contested and finally broke the squatters 
stranglehold . . . once the selectors were established . . . and the power of the 
squatters was broken, the storekeepers' radicahsm waned and died. By 1893, 
they, as well as the surviving squatters were the economic conservatives of the 
Downs."®" 
As the labour movement gained strength in the later decades of the century, 
the urban middle classes could then see that they possessed some common 
interests with their rural-class cousins. The agrarian cause was therefore no 
longer needed and could be dispensed with. This is of course an oversimplifica-
tion and grants a degree of purposiveness to the politics of the time which may 
be too great, but it is basically what took place. The realization was also 
generally dawning that regardless of politics, agricultural cultivation was then 
simply not an economic proposition in the colony. The original agrarianism had 
had its day. The relevant question in 1900 was what relation would exist between 
the new labour radicalism and the older agrarianism. 
A simple transference of energies could not take place between the two. 
Though the radical cause stemmed from urban working-class demands, much of 
the radical political vocabulary was coloured with sentiments drawn from the 
bush rather than the towns. This was a product of the historical conditions 
which had given rise to a sense of Australian social nationalism. This nationahsm 
was formulated in rural bush terms—the Australian Legend that Ward so vividly 
describes—but it was not directly related to agrarian ways. More, it was opposed 
to it. Here was a basic contradiction in the colony's nineteenth-century social and 
political history: the emergent bush labour ethos clashed with the earher 
agrarian radicahsm. From seeing a future agrarian society of smiling homesteads 
on every side, the working class came to see the small farmer as a "cocky"—a 
word that was a synonym for meanness and stupidity.®! 
Liberal agrarian concern for the sugar industry 
The sugar industry played a peculiar psychological role in forming economic 
expectations in the period, a role much greater than its sectoral economic 
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importance warranted. Between the years 1885 and 1892 and in the century's last 
years the industry was the most politically volatile sector of the economy. 
Sugar politics were inextricably tangled with the issues of separation, unionism, 
coloured labour, and federation.®" The trinity of hope had been displaced as an 
article of economic faith but Queenslanders still subscribed to the liberal 
unanimity. This was made clear in the treatment of the coloured labour exclusion 
issue in the industry. It also showed that agrarianism still possessed political 
appeal. 
After their prosperity in the early eighties colonial sugar growers feff on 
hard times. If the dominant note in the frozen-meat trade through the period 
was optimism, in the sugar industry it was uncertainty and pessimism. The 
industry's profitability began to be earnestly debated and this general question 
tended to be reduced to a more particular query—could sugar be profitably 
grown in Queensland without the employment of cheap coloured labour?®" 
The attitude that tropical labour could not be performed by white men under-
went only gradual change and a kind of plantation society had begun to emerge 
in the North.®* By the mid-eighties, however, opposition to the use of non-white 
labour was widespread. With the growing strength of the Liberal and Labor 
parties, confrontation with those who favoured the use of Kanakas was un-
avoidable. It was unfortunate that this came at a time when the colony badly 
needed economic peace and quiet. 
The coloured-labour issue was the closest thing to a dividing line that 
existed in the colonial liberal world. Although Griffith's and McIIwraith's 
attitudes to the question before 1885 had been more in agreement than the 
supporters of either would have cared to admit, Griffith took a more definite 
stand with the growth of the Northern separatist movement.®® Part of his reply 
to one separatist petition was an excellent definition of the strengths and weak-
nesses of Liberalism: 
I am strongly impressed with the view that a representative government, in 
which the influence of the employers predominates, is not fit to be trusted 
with the control of inferior races . . . If, therefore it is seriously intended 
that any part of Australia should be thrown open to Asiatic immigration, 
it seems to me that only those parts should be selected which are considered 
clearly unfit for European settlement, and that they should be constituted 
a separate territory and governed as a Crown Colony by Imperial Officers 
who will act with impartial justice between the inferior and superior races.®® 
The essential difference between this view and Labor's position was the lesser 
assertiveness of Australian rights. Labor would not have suggested a crown 
colony for coloured labour anywhere in Australia. 
Then in 1892 Griffith was forced to temporarily reintroduce Kanaka labour. 
No alternative existed, he said, if the system of small farmers which had been 
inaugurated in the industry was to be upheld. "When people are in sore straits", 
the Telegraph answered his critics, "they are apt to resort to desperate 
remedies."®' The explanation was just that. Years of economic difficulty had 
forced a re-evaluation of attitudes towards the labour issue. To see the action 
88 THE ECONOMY 1885-1900 
as unprincipled and contradictory is to ignore the power of the liberal harmony. 
Liberahsm was shot through with the strains of a deeper hberahsm common to 
each political party, and the most important hberal bond was agreement on the 
worth of economic development in a democratic framework. When time changed 
a situation so that a previous action threatened the economic well-being of the 
conamunity it was not only in order, but essential, for the action to be rescinded. 
What was as significant was the form of the statement which announced the 
decision for re-introduction: that it was particularly the phght of the small 
growers which deserved assistance.®® Agrarianism, in short, stiff possessed its 
moral appeal. 
The trinity of hope in 1900 
Economic transformation in the colony had been attempted through the 
apphcation of a trinity of hope—a composite of land, rail, and immigration 
pohcies. But by 1885 it was clear that the colonists had misplaced some of their 
hopes. Economic progress had been made, but its price was a non-agrarian 
urban community. In the next fifteen years immigration was frowned on by 
those who feared unemployment; railways were valued for their revenue-
earning ability and as a source of employment rather than for their powers of 
development; lastly, the agricultural failure became apparent to all. The 
clamour for agrarian land legislation died away as a more realistic approach to 
land settlement began to emerge. The radical cause, which had previously been 
an agrarian radical cause, became linked with the fortunes of the labour move-
ment. Though steeped in bush values the emergent labour ethos was inclined to 
be anti-agrarian. 
The politics of economic change: The limits to labour militancy 
"McIIwraith's ministry is regarded as a squatters' administration and is 
opposed by the party who are assumed to represent the centres of population."®" 
Even in 1880 this English description of Queensland pohtics was inadequate. 
As the end of the century approached, most colonials sensed that if there was 
one definite political dividing line it had changed. Contemporary political com-
ment usually placed great weight on the importance of personahty, but at times 
the crux of the pohtical matter was revealed.®" During the 1888 election the 
Telegraph observed that "the reason why no subject can be raised into one for 
a trial of strength between parties in Queensland is that on the whole there is no 
difference of opinion amongst the bulk of the people on that class of subject".'! 
Colonial politics had jelled into a mould which the arrival of the Labor party 
sealed rather than shattered. The heritage of liberal traditions put the same 
political ground under each party's feet as long as the main goal that the 
colony had been founded for—to develop the environment on the basis of 
democratic capitalism—remained intact. For a few days at the time of the 
nineties strikes it seemed that class divisions would be asserted. But the fright 
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passed away quickly. Laborites then settled back into the same comfortable 
chairs that the Liberals and Conservatives already occupied. 
The circumstances of the strikes as well as the establishment of cooperative 
communities and the reactions to their failures were enough evidence that Labor 
possessed no coherent platform.®" Yet the absence of theory in the party is most 
meaningful when placed against the wider colonial background where the only 
theory was an anti-theory: the unspoken liberal consensus. In this regard the 
Enghsh paraffel is vital. Andrew Shonfield has argued that the nineteenth-
century English freetraders were proselytizers and system builders, only their 
pragmatism obscured this.®" The identification of moral and economic affairs 
by Austrahans was also pragmatic and this often concealed the social ideahsm 
inherent in many of the contemporary economic debates. The Queensland Labor 
movement was quite uninterested in theory. "Queensland socialism of this era", 
June Stoodley writes, "was little more than advanced liberalism of an evolu-
tionary Fabian rather than a revolutionary Marxist type."®* Perhaps the memory 
of the loss of the first radical cause, as it had the specific aim of creating an 
agrarian society, frightened those who otherwise might have been more definite. 
The faffure of radical agrarianism contributed to the feehng of resignation 
and disappointment which was penetrating the labour movement. For aff its 
naive optimism, the radical cause between 1860 and 1885 at least possessed a 
sense of exuberance which stemmed partly from the proclamation of a specific 
social goal. In contrast. Labor came to pride itself on being a party without a 
theory. It had only the broadest aims that were expressed in the real but hope-
lessly general terms of mateship and equalitarianism. The new radicalism would 
not permit economic expansion to take place in future without restriction. The 
1891 strike was in itself a shock to the business community,®® but in the years to 
come Labor opposition to unrestrained economic growth would be more 
effective for working within the liberal democratic tradition. 
Conclusion: Regionalism, agrarianism, and labour radicalism in 1900 
Queensland was much less of a colonial society in 1900 than it had been in 
1885. The colony was about to become an Australian state and the pattern of 
politics and economics that had emerged would not be significantly changed in 
the next fifty years. The economy had weathered the depression and diversified 
its exports, but production rested on a primary base and the prospects of future 
growth were limited by the structure of the economy. The same combination of 
short-run benefit and long-term disadvantage marked the economic growth of 
the later developed regions. The Centre and North had strengthened their 
positions and reduced the distance between themselves and the South, yet they 
depended almost entirely on primary production and remained economically 
vulnerable. 
The moral approach to economic development which had been embodied 
in the trinity of hope received many severe setbacks after 1885 and a sense of 
the colony's limitations emerged; the liberal unanimity, however, was preserved. 
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and the new labour radicalism subscribed to the older beliefs. Correspondingly, 
the separation campaigns failed and regionahsm remained. Yet the trinity and 
separatism left substantial legacies, if of a nebulous kind: regionalism decisively 
influenced port administration for the worse and agrarianism remained as a 
submerged threat to economic growth. 
In 1885 the loss of the radical agrarian cause had been concealed by the 
gloss of economic well-being; in 1900 the radicals had been more successful 
politically but this gloss had vanished. It is an exaggeration to say that Labor 
triumphed after the nineties strikes, yet it did seem that years of Labor rule were 
imminent.®® Optimism about economic development had given way to a sense 
of resignation. The attitudes of Labor leaders was indicative: "They seem to fear 
the corrupting inffuence of too great prosperity", one acute American historian 
observed. "They do not wish to experience an expansion of wealth and well-
being that would reconcile the people of the country to what they consider a 
vicious system of social organisation."®' The labour interlude about to begin 
would carry many of the nineteenth-century radical hopes and fears through to 
the new century with little adjustment. Eventually, the agrarian ideal carried 
over into the new labour radicalism and hindered economic growth. 
6 SHIPPING SERVICES 1885-1900 The formation of the coastal services 
After 1860 Queenslanders had attempted to overcome their isolation from 
the normal Australian-European shipping routes. Their first step had been the 
introduction of a Torres Straits service, which had succeeded; the second had 
been the foundation of a Queensland coastal shipping company, but this had 
failed. To 1885 building up an efficient sea transport system had received a due 
share of attention, yet in the next fifteen years these efforts markedly decreased. 
This was partly because the shipping companies provided better services. Still, 
the public neglect was unfortunate and is specially frustrating for this history. 
The period was a formative one for the Austrahan shipping industry, but a 
contemporary awareness of the lack of pubhc knowledge about the services only 
came graduaffy. After 1885 the colony's shipping trade was improved in several 
ways. The diversification of the economy made it easier for producers to bargain 
for better freight rates; the A.S.N.'s power in the coastal trade was limited by 
competition from other companies; finally, the Torres Strait route was main-
tained despite the depression. Less favourable was the emergence of militant 
waterside labour unionism. In this period radical labour nationahsm set the 
stage for a critical examination of the industry after 1900. 
The overseas services 
Structural change 
Queensland's isolation from the regular Australian trading routes had 
decreased but was still a problem. The colony's share of total Australian ton-
nage movements declined between 1881 and 1891 as a result of the general 
depression-caused decline in intercolonial trade, but a greater share of its goods 
was still moved directly overseas. As Australian bulk exports developed in the 
late nineties more tramp vessels plied the trade, but the Queensland economy 
was not as developed, and the colony did not benefit appreciably from the new 
services. It was notable that the average tonnage of coastal vessels grew as 
quickly as the tonnage of overseas liners.! Australians put their maritime business 
energies principally into setting up an efficient coastal trade. Eventually, it was 
compared favourably with the United Kingdom's local services. Yet these 
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energies were rarely directed into the overseas sphere. Mcllwraith McEachern 
was organized in 1875 for the Queensland trade, but the company was adminis-
tered in London and in 1887 amalgamated with the B.I. & Q.A. Through the 
period Australian tonnage was not statistically distinguished from British." 
Since the early eighties the Australian trade had been organized by con-
ference agreements. It was but one trade amongst others which had been 
organized by British shipowners. In 1885 the South East Asian trade had been 
arranged and then reorganized in 1893 and 1897. However, in the last two 
decades of the century the liner conferences met with the twin difficulties of 
tramp competition and continuing liner freight rate declines." France and 
Germany entered the running in the Australian trade in the mid-eighties, and 
both the Norddeutscher Line and the Messageries Maritimes accounted for an 
increasing, if stffl small, share of the trade. In 1901 the British share of total 
Australian tonnage moved was 85 per cent, 8 per cent less than in 1881.* 
After 1900 the difficulties besetting British shipowners were to lead to a 
sharp difference of opinion with the Austrahan shipping companies over the new 
Commonwealth's Navigation Act. Till then, however, the Imperial ties seemed 
unassailably strong and few Australians seemed to know much about the 
activities of the British shipping lines. As the Courier remarked in 1887 with only 
token misgivings: "while the future is a matter of uncertainty, the past, so far 
as the doings of the ring are concerned, are not very much more clearly 
revealed."® There was no clear dividing line between what was Australian and 
what was British in the industry. It did not seem that there was so much difficulty 
in being both at the same time. 
The Torres Strait route 
In 1885 the hard fought for Torres Strait mail service was at last a reahty. 
Two years later the original contract with the B.I. & Q.A. was renewed, but by 
1890 the financial pressures of the depression were pinching and the govern-
ment's subsidy for the service was reduced from £55,000 ($110,000) p.a. to 
£32,500 ($65,000) p.a. The condition of the public purse continued to worsen 
and in 1895 the subsidy was stopped.® Yet this did not mean the end of the 
straits service; the B.I. had become involved with the development of the frozen 
meat trade. Previously the story of the B.I.'s association with the colony had 
been colourful but discontinuous. The trouble had been that Queensland 
exports rarely made up profitable cargoes for the back haul from Brisbane to 
London.' After 1885, however, meat cargoes provided the stabffity necessary to 
attract the company's regular trade. 
It had been reahzed for some time that the invention of a means of pre-
serving rather than curing meat would find a ready English market.® Finally, in 
1888 the first successful shipment of frozen meat was made and by 1890 it had 
become an important colonial export. The B.I. and Mcllwraiths had been con-
nected with the trade from its beginnings. In 1885 the B.L had purchased the 
remains of Christison's Poole Island freezing venture at Bowen, which had been 
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ravaged by cyclone. A complex system of arrangements was eventually developed 
between shippers and exporters, but the trade's early years were marred by 
problems. "Shipping difficulties", complained the Telegraph in 1893, "have 
harassed the enterprise, we need a Queensland Frozen Meat Shipping Company 
as weff as a Queensland Meat Freezing and Export Company."" 
Facilities gradually improved. The most important outward meat shippers 
were a combination of the B.L, Gray Dawes & Coy., and J. B. Westray & Coy. 
After the B.I.'s interest, the next largest was the Federal-Houlder-Shire line, 
which became active in 1894 through Houlder's interest in the Argentine and 
New Zealand. When Edwin Dawes became chairman of the New Zealand 
Steamship Coy. the commercial circle was closed and the F.H.S. line was linked 
with the B.I. grouping. Another company connected with these two interests 
was the Tyser line, which chartered vessels to work in the Queensland meat 
trade. These services all ran through Torres Strait. It is now preventively difficult 
to estimate the trade or tonnage passing through the Strait in any period of 
time, but the service had proved a valuable asset to the colony. 
Overseas freight charges 
World ocean freight rates declined steadily after 1885, except between 1896 
and 1900 when war raised rates.!" xhese freight movements mainly concerned 
the European and Atlantic trades but applied to Australia as well with some 
variations. As before 1885, because of the trade's isolation freight costs were 
higher. It seems that the most substantial reductions had been achieved by the 
mid-eighties. Wool freights had stabilized at c.^d. (0.15 cents) per lb (0.45 kg) 
since 1861, while the P. & O.'s cargo freights had declined most rapidly between 
1869 and 1887. Yet the freight market was still an important factor aiding 
growth. Lastly, between 1896 and 1900 there were some Australian variations 
from the wider pattern. Rises in wheat freights occurred in 1894-1896 and 
1899-1900. Wool freights again increased between 1892 and 1896.!! 
In the Queensland trade, isolation from the Australian routes was an added 
imposition. Yet it is likely that the colony benefited from the reductions in 
overseas freights. The particular scale of charges varied with the product. 
Whereas dairying was an industry composed of small farmers, the meat trade 
was monopsonistic and connecting links existed between shippers and producers. 
The rate treatment of producers by the shipping companies reffected these 
facts.!" 
The coastal services 
The A.U.S.N.'splace in the coastal trade 
The years from 1885 to 1900 were most formative for the Austrahan com-
janies which served the Queensland coastal trade. The relations between the 
najor coastal companies—the Adelaide Steamship Company, Howard Smiths, 
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and the A.U.S.N.—as well as several smaller companies were extremely fluid. 
As McKellar remarks, these years were "the most fascinating era in the develop-
ment of the various lines; their gains and growth . . . presented a picture quite 
unlike that of any other country's sea trading".!" The ruthless competition and 
rate wars between the companies in the period seem more suited to the American 
scene than to Queensland's comparatively peaceful economic history.!* 
One of the most striking themes of the earlier years, the friction between the 
Queensland government, the public, and the A.U.S.N., was restated. Yet 
compared with the hostility aroused by the A.S.N.'s destruction of the Q.S.N, 
and the frequently intransigent attitude of the A.S.N, towards its mail contracts, 
disagreement was slight. After 1885 it arose in connection with the government's 
difficulties in providing a rehable Gulf mail service. To some extent opposition 
to the A.U.S.N, was new as it was related to labour's rising aspirations. But the 
friction between the Company and the government—at least Liberal govern-
ments—had begun years before. 
After 1888 the A.U.S.N. ran a weekly mail service to the Gulf for £5,000 
($10,000) p.a. The Company was now permitted to transship cargoes for the 
Gulf at Cooktown; previously it had been required to run directly through.!® 
The contract was renewed on a fortnightly basis in 1893, but in 1898 when it 
expired again no tenders were offered for the service. The bleak fact was that the 
Gulf trade had failed to develop. Croydon was a valuable mining field but the 
region's prospects were not promising. "Thirteen years ago", the member for 
Croydon complained in 1899, "there was a weekly mail service to the Gulf, 
then it got to a fortnightly service, then to a three weekly service, and now there 
was no service at all."!® -^^j. ^^g j^^ j^.^  jji^ giy IQ \JQ i^ addition to the lack of 
economic development of the region, another difficulty was the Brisbane 
Chamber of Commerce's requirement that the A.U.S.N. boats should give 
preference to Queensland instead of southern cargoes. In practice, this meant 
that shippers to the Gulf had to serve five days' notice to the A.U.S.N. so that 
shipping space could be allotted. Both the Chamber and the A.U.S.N. drew 
criticism on these counts. 
The second main clash between the Company and the government over the 
mail services involved the Central Queensland ports. In 1892 the A.U.S.N. 
charged the government an £11,000 ($22,000) annual subsidy for its coastal 
service to the Central and Northern ports. By 1898 the Company was asking 
some £22,000 ($44,000) for the contract.!' Meanwhile the government's bargain-
ing position had been considerably strengthened. In that year the coastal railway 
reached Gladstone. The mails could now be sent to Gladstone by rail and 
thence by a small coastal packet to Rockhampton to connect with the A.U.S.N. 
service. Further, the dredging of the Narrows between Gladstone and Rock-
hampton had been carried out. This was a project of long standing which per-
mitted smaller vessels to go from the two ports inside Curtis Island, and saved 
much traveffing time.i® Lastly, the Emu Park to Broadmount line had been 
completed. Some, particularly T. J. Byrnes, now spoke of running a small 
government steamer from Gladstone to Broadmount to meet the raff con-
nection. This would eliminate the need for the A.U.S.N.'s service between 
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Brisbane and Rockhampton.!" 
However, the government chose to settle with the A.U.S.N. for a less costly 
service. Before the negotiations had been completed, Byrnes—"the most out-
spoken opponent of coastal mail carriage by sea"""—had died. In one sense 
3yrnes's opposition to the A.U.S.N. continued earlier radical opposition to the 
Company's trading power. The situation in the late nineties recaUed Lilley's 
)urchase of the Governor Blackall in the seventies. But in another way Byrnes's 
)pposition was new. The emerging Labor principles, with their emphasis on state 
interprise and hostihty to private trading monopolies, were influencing many 
Queensland pohticians. 
As in the preceding period, however, the most definite hmit to the A.S.N.'s 
rading power remained the rivalry of other shipping companies. After the 
^.S.N.'s amalgamation with the Q.S.S. and overseas interests in 1887, an agree-
nent was made between the new A.U.S.N. company and Howard Smiths—now 
he two major coastal companies on the Queensland coast. Under the terms of 
heir agreement, the A.U.S.N. was not to trade past Melbourne, nor to engage 
n the coal trade south of Sydney. This meant that the A.U.S.N. handed its share 
)f the Adelaide flour trade to Smiths. In return. Smiths were not to sail past 
vlackay, and were to share the Maryborough, Bundaberg, and Mackay sugar 
rade with the A.U.S.N. In the last resort, the viabihty of these trading arrange-
nents depended on the actions of the other Australian shipping companies. 
The A.U.S.N.'s worst fear was that the Adelaide Steamship Company (A.S.C.) 
vould enter the colony's trade. This happened in 1893 when the A.S.C. secured 
in important C.S.R. contract for sugar carriage."! 
Apart from competition between the major coastal companies, some 
mailer concerns managed to maintain themselves. Most notably successful 
vere J. B. Moxon's in the Guff" and Northern fruit trade, Wilham Colhn in the 
Vide Bay trade, and Brydon Jones and the Isis Investment Company in the 
Jurrum coal trade. Relations between the several competing companies in these 
'ears changed constantly. While Smiths and the A.U.S.N., say, were engaged 
a a general cargo rate war, they might stiff have maintained agreement on one 
ine. Broadly, Smiths and the A.U.S.N. were partners tiff 1891; then a com-
letitive and confused period followed. Freight rates, after reaching an all-time 
owin the coastal trade in late 1894, gradually rose in 1895. By 1897 the A.U.S.N. 
nd the A.S.C. had arranged a new "joint interest". The effect of the rate wars 
nd the competitive conditions of the period on Queensland traders must now 
le considered. 
Coastal freight charges 
As in the overseas trade, coastal freight charges often depended on the 
trength of the interest being served. In this light, two of the most opposite 
rades were sugar and general cargo. The first, under the guiding hand of 
:.S.R., was relatively highly organized by 1890; the general cargo trade was 
nuch more amorphous. Between 1890 and 1892 the A.U.S.N.'s charge for 
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C.S.R. sugar carriage between Mackay and Sydney varied only between 20s. 
($2) and 16s. ($1.60) per ton (1.02 tonnes). The general cargo rates from Sydney 
to Brisbane, however, were as much as halved by trading competition in the 
nineties: charges fell from 10s. ($1) per ton (1.02 tonnes) in 1888 to 5s. (50 cents) 
in 1893. Regionally, the Gulf benefited from the reduction in general cargo rates 
when in 1892 Moxon's challenged Smiths and the A.U.S.N. Moxon's went under 
in the rate war that followed, but the A.U.S.N. had reduced its original charge 
to Normanton from 70s. ($7) to 25s. ($2.50)."" Smaller competitors did not 
always succumb, however. A notable success was won by William Collin in the 
Maryborough and Bundaberg trades. Coffin drew on local goodwill built up 
from his long personal connection with the area. During the troubles with the 
A.U.S.N. over the use of Chinese labour in the seventies, he had quickly made 
inroads on the Company's trade, and it had never quite made up the leeway. 
As well as sharing in the area's general cargo trade, Colhn secured some C.S.R. 
sugar contracts."" 
The situation in the coal trade was not comparable with either the sugar or 
general cargo trades. Unlike either, the Burrum coal business had a number of 
medium-sized producers who were themselves shippers. Against these, the 
A.U.S.N. and Smiths carried Ipswich coal. Brydon Jones and the Isis Invest-
ment Company were persistent competitors, but by 1900 the Isis Company had 
agreed to restrict itself to supplying local demands, while the joint interest 
carried coal north, and sugar south."* The fruit trade resembled the general 
cargo trade insofar as small producers could not combine to form a powerful 
enough group to influence freights. Attempts to estabhsh banana growing in the 
North were very susceptible to the strain of sea transport costs. As Burns, 
Philp were also engaged in the Fijiian fruit trade to the southern colonies, the 
A.U.S.N.'s treatment of Northern fruit growers was not always fair. The 
Company was strongly criticized for its fruit-carrying practices, if sometimes 
unjustifiably. The trade was a difficult one to cater for."® 
A complaint made in 1900, that "the A.U.S.N. does what it likes with fares 
and freights","® applied equally well to the twenty-five years after 1860. The 
only difference by 1900 was that the A.U.S.N. had replaced the original A.S.N. 
Yet some significant changes had taken place in the way the coasting companies 
traded. Economic diversification had created a number of different export bases 
and the different producers could exert some degree of control over the com-
panies. But to generahze about the rate issue without qualification would be as 
unwise as to present no opinion. Some ill effects of the way the coastal com-
panies traded were striking. In 1892 when a flour mill opened at Maryborough 
it was immediately crushed by the A.U.S.N.'s reduced carriage rates for Adelaide 
flour. Usually rate wars did not benefit traders other than in the short run. At 
one point in the nineties it was cheaper to ship flour from Melbourne to Bris-
bane, than from Sydney to Brisbane."' 
But cut-throat competition was of little benefit to those traders who wanted 
a regular shipping service as well as a cheap one. To isolated areas such as the 
Gulf, regularity was an essential quality of an efficient service. McKellar's 
opinion that "though there was a long pastoral crisis from 1894 to 1902 . . . this 
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affected the (A.U.S.N.'s) income only slightly in comparison with the damage 
done by the rate wars""® is itself sufficient ground to conclude that the period 
had not seen the Queensland trade's requirements adequately met. The 
A.U.S.N.'s monopoly of coastal trading had been broken, yet during the peace 
after a rate dispute traders had been mulcted to pay the cost of the wars. 
Labour militancy: The 1890 maritime strike 
Before 1900 waterside labour militancy was not as continuous or as dis-
ruptive as it was to be in the next century. Yet the early disputes were important 
in themselves and as indications of future militancy. A coalescence of the mari-
time labour unions gradually took place. The first maritime labour council in 
the southern colonies had been formed in Newcastle in 1885."" These early 
labour organizations were not specialized bodies and included wharf labourers, 
seamen, shipwrights, and other maritime employees."" Employers' associations 
were also forming. An Australian association had been organized in Sydney in 
1884, but had not worked satisfactorily. The New South Wales Steamship 
Owners' Association grew in importance and in time the Union Steamship 
Company, Howard Smiths, Huddart Parker, and the A.S.C. associated them-
selves on this level. Lastly, in 1895 the more formal Australasian Steamship 
Owners' Federation (A.S.O.F.) was constituted."! Exactly when the first water-
side labour unions were formed in Queensland is not clear. Perhaps the earliest 
was the Maryborough W.W.U. in 1886. There wharf labourers worked a twelve-
hour day for Is. (10 cents) an hour."" By that time there were 270 wharf labourers 
in the colony. There were 370 in 1891, and 1,000 in 1901. In the latter year, 500 
of these worked in Brisbane, 120 in Townsville, 80 in Cairns, 40 in Mackay, 
25 at Bundaberg, and 20 each at Thursday Island, Rockhampton, and Mary-
borough."" 
In the 1890 strike the employers' organizations and the unions came firmly 
to grips with each other. Wage demands were usually the starting point of 
waterside labour disputes, but they invariably widened into a conflict about 
unionist rights. Severe competition between the coastal companies as weff as 
the wider economic problems of the period caused owners to attempt wage 
reductions. "The steamboat companies", the Brisbane Courier urged labour 
at the time of a near-strike in 1892, "would wfflingly sit at the feet of the sea-
men's secretary or any other man who would show them how income was to be 
increased.""* But, not unnaturally, labour was preoccupied with its own needs. 
At the time of the 1890 strike, wage claims made by the ships' officers began the 
dispute. It almost immediately broadened into the question of recognition of 
unionist rights. Although shipowners were eventually prepared to meet the 
officers' wage claims, they refused to recognize the officers' affiliation with the 
seamen's union."® 
The reception of the strike in the colony differed from that given to the 
earlier seamen's strike. Disapproval was immediately expressed by the Brisbane 
Courier, which had supported the seamen's cause in 1878. "Already there is a 
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Strong feeling", the paper wrote, "that the seamen in asking what the masters 
cannot afford, the wharfers in asking what is iffegal, and the shearers in asking 
what is tyrannical, are rapidly plunging the colonies into distress.""® As the 
duration of the strike extended and some small-scale violence took place, the 
journal became more critical of the strikers. 
In the South their wrath extends to the stopping of the Sydney ferries and 
thinks to "bring matters to a head", in Adelaide by leaving the port and 
city in darkness. In the North they interfere with a man's right to work 
not by pickets only as in Brisbane, but by penalising the "blackleg" with a 
fine of £10 [$20] or £20 [$40]. They forcibly prevent consignees from 
removing their own goods . . . and maltreat the police. Their chagrin boils 
over in abuse of the press."' 
In 1878 the seamen's opposition to the A.S.N.'s employment of Chinese crews 
was supported by most colonists. There had then been a fortunate conjunction 
between radicalism and nationalism. But in 1890 the White Australia ideal was 
not in any danger. To the community this was an important difference in asses-
sing the maritime strike. Others were that it came at a time of great economic 
distress and that it was being pursued by immoderate means. Because of these 
differences the strike was condemned by the community. 
Yet from the point of view of the strikers, the 1890 dispute was in an 
important way an extension of the 1878 clash—not a different matter. The 
question of unionist rights had been implicit in the earlier strike, but that dispute 
had been won before the pros and cons of the place of unionism in the maritime 
industry had been fully argued out. A question of values was involved in 1890 
as much as one of economics. "The events of the past week", the Manifesto of 
the Queensland Maritime Council declared, "relating to the marine officers and 
the shipowners do not, we think, caff for further explanation than to say that 
because the officers have proved themselves men by asserting their right of 
freedom to aflffiate with other labour bodies, the shipowners threaten to try 
and starve them into the submissions of forsaking that right which we well know 
is for our common good.""® 
Yet recognition of unionist rights on the waterfront would be difficult to achieve. 
This was a basic cause of the dissatisfaction that pervaded industrial relations 
in the industry after 1900. During the 1890 strike the shipowners set up Free 
Labour Bureaux using non-union labour. This effective retort to unionist 
challenge would be a standard tactic for owners in the future. 
There were technological reasons to do with the structure of the industry 
itself why waterside labour was in a more isolated and weaker position than 
other unions."" However what is more relevant for this history about the 
vulnerability of the maritime labour unions is that the indeterminacy over what 
was British and what was Australian in the industry was a source of trouble. It 
may be true that economic competition between Australian and British shipping 
was a cause of concern for owners in the southern colonies, but in Queensland 
the principal coasting company, the A.U.S.N., had connections with the British 
companies. More generaffy, relations between the Australian coastal companies 
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and the British overseas lines were far from being clear-cut.*" Waterside labour 
therefore came under the direction of an English as weff as an Austrahan 
employing force and English labour relations were much less generous than 
Australian. 
This uncertainty of obligation worsened labour relations in the Australian 
maritime industry. Moreover, for several reasons it was likely that waterside 
disputes in Queensland would run a more violent course than those in the 
south. Wharfage in the colony's largest port was privately owned and attempts 
to coordinate the port's administration had failed. Further, the emergent 
Queensland labour movement as a whole had more of a rural-craft character 
and less of an urban-industrial orientation than the southern movements. It was 
less sympathetic to militancy while waterfront unionism usually stood to the 
pohtical left. These factors encouraged waterside clashes in the colony. A final 
aggravation was the dominance of the Queensland coastal trade by non-
Queensland companies. The earlier opposition to the A.S.N, as a southern 
company, and the clash with the A.S.N, in 1878, may have carried over into 
labour attitudes to the coastal services after 1885. They still were mostly 
southern-based and the A.U.S.N. had formed links with the British overseas 
fines. 
The strike was fought out chiefly in the south, until wharf labourers and 
seamen came out in Queensland in August 1890. At one stage 1,000 men were 
reported to be on strike in Brisbane and some 500 were out in other ports in the 
colony. But by mid-October the strike had failed.*! Support for the cause in the 
colony had been of hmited duration but there is some evidence that it was of 
greater intensity than in the south. "Nowhere has the determination of the 
combatants been more impressively evinced than in Brisbane", the Brisbane 
Courier reported. "Compared with Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney have been 
half-hearted and dilatory."*" In sum, while the 1878 strike had been approved 
of by the community, the 1890 clash had been frowned on. Also, in Queensland 
local conditions made militancy come closer to extremism than in the southern 
colonies. 
Conclusion: Further success 
The Queensland shipping services had been more successful than before 
1885. The large number of companies trading to the colony and economic 
expansion made it possible for the number of ports to be greater in this period 
than in any other. The ports of call of the ocean liners were usually restricted to 
the main colonial ports, but the changeover to steam had not yet made the many 
smaff secondary ports obsolescent. Yet the services had begun to be rationalized. 
The A.U.S.N.'s merger with the B.I. was the shape of things to come. 
Meanwhile, the ports reaped the benefits. Trade diversification made it 
more possible for producers to ship on a commodity basis and gain some 
control over shipowners. The shipping of the colony's main exports was now 
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better organized. The general cargo and smaller trades were less well served, 
but overall the freight services had improved. Regionally, it was to North and 
Central Queensland's advantage that the sugar and meat trades were carried on 
by a few sellers. In the meat trade these were often associated with the shipping 
companies; in the sugar trade C.S.R.'s bargaining power was introduced into 
marketing. Also, the A.U.S.N.'s monopoly power was reduced by other coastal 
companies and some small Queensland traders, and the Torres Strait services 
had been maintained. 
Counting against these results was the disruption in the coastal trade caused 
by fierce competition. As this declined, it seemed that the years to come would 
see the shipping services reach peak efficiency. The worst potential danger was 
maritime labour militancy. It was here that Australian nationalism could exact 
its price on the waterfront. The problem would be an Australia-wide one, yet 
local conditions in the colony made it likely that militancy would be less frequent 
in the Queensland ports but more extreme. 
7 THE PORTS 1885-1900 The regional victors emerge 
Tiff the eighties the Queensland ports had been developed in an experi-
mental fashion; if they had worked tolerably well until then it was because of 
the limited trade they catered for. As the economy grew, a larger amount of 
public funds was devoted to the ports without very successful results. When 
Harbour Boards were set up in the nineties it was agreed that the ports were 
coping badly with the increased trade and larger vessels. But for many ports 
improvement was not simply a case of developing the existing portsite. It became 
essential for some to make deep water available either by shifting their sites, by 
building artificial harbours, or by improving their rivers. The Harbour Boards 
were appointed with these needs in mind. 
Despite the ports' difficulties, public interest in them was shown only in 
the last years of the period and not when the Boards were created. Rail con-
struction and the sugar industry, and the labour movement and the depression, 
consumed political attention. The neglect was unfortunate. Because of the 
uncritical adoption of English methods, the Board system of port administration 
increased the strength of regionahsm in port affairs rather than the reverse. 
The physical development of the ports 
The main regional ports 
In 1886 the Brisbane River could offer 15 feet (4.57 m) l.w. to the town 
wharves. In practice this meant that ships drawing 21 feet (6.40 m) and dis-
placing 1,200 tons (1,219 tonnes) could saff up the river.! The immediately 
desirable future depth was considered by the Marine Board to be 20 feet 
(6.10 m). Although no engineering obstacles existed to prevent this depth being 
obtained, the Lytton Rocks could only be cleared to 15 J feet (4.72 m) and the 
use of costly rock drilling plant was necessary." Between 1886 and 1889 the 
depths on the bar and in the river varied from 14 to 16 feet (4.27 to 4.88 m). 
Then, in 1893, Brisbane experienced its worst flood and the Outer Bar's depth 
fell from 15 to SJ feet (4.57 to 2.59 m); in the river, depths fell to as low as 6 feet 
(1.83 m) in some places." By 1898, however, when the Marine Board formulated 
a comprehensive plan for the river's development, 18 feet (5.49 m) had been 
restored. 
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The comprehensive plan, which was basically a continuation of earlier 
work done in the river, called first of all for the removal of the tips of the 
Kangaroo, Garden, Kinella, and Buhmba Points to facffitate navigation and 
increase the river's scour. Secondly, six training waffs were provided for at a cost 
of over £150,000 ($300,000). River dredging was to continue with the eventual 
aim of achieving 26 feet (7.92 m) l.w. Further, it was recognized that the bar 
could be dealt with only by regular dredging and it was planned to reopen 
Freeman's Channel as the major entrance to the port.* Lindon Bates, an 
American marine engineer of world repute, visited Brisbane in 1898 and gave 
his professional blessing to the proposed improvements. He based his depth 
assessments on conditions in the Suez Canal which then had a depth of 26 feet 
(7.92 m) l.w. This, he considered, would be sufficient for the foreseeable future. 
By 1900 the first training waff at Hamilton had been completed. Kangaroo Point 
had been cut back two hundred feet (60.95 m), and 20 feet (6.10 m) l.w. had 
been provided in the river.® Yet dissenting voices could be heard about the 
desirability of the improvements and about their quality as well.® 
Another contemporary port issue was whether the existing Northern 
approach channel was the best available. It tended to shift its banks and, while 
it remained the chief entrance to the port, by 1897 the North West channel was 
safer in rough weather. Most traders continued to use the Northern entrance, 
however, as the use of the North West Channel involved vessels coming from 
the south in another sixteen miles of navigation after passing the Northern. 
In 1895 a private syndicate offered to reopen and maintain the Southern Channel 
on a toll basis. The Marine Board's reaction to this was noncommittal, while 
the Brisbane Courier opposed the plan, rather vaguely upholding the freedom 
of the seas. There the issue foundered, as negotiations between the syndicate and 
the government broke down.' The North Channel remained the port's main 
entrance tiff 1900, but the Marine Board often spoke of restoring the Freeman, 
or Middle, Channel. It carried less water than the Northern approach but it was 
simpler to navigate and improve. In the next period it would be adopted as the 
best approach to the port.® 
In assessing the activities of the recently formed Rockhampton Harbour 
Board in 1897 the Marine Board reported that the Fitzroy had never been in 
a better state." This was true, but even then parts of the river could offer no more 
than 61 feet (1.98 ra) l.w. In 1889 Sir John Coode, another visiting port expert, 
had drawn up a plan for improving the Fitzroy which approved of the work 
completed and in progress. His plan, which incorporated earlier improvements, 
consisted of a complex system of training walls, banks, and dredged channels. 
In 1898 Bates added his endorsement and predicted that the scheme would soon 
afford 20 feet (6.10 m) l.w. to visiting ships. Then, he enthused, "with the river 
in new harness, sweeping around easy curves and over short crossings . . . Rock-
hampton may rest assured that ships of deepest draft will seek its wharves in 
accordance with the unvarying principle that commerce makes its conquering 
way to the Head of Navigation".!" ^^^ navigation's head continued to be held 
high. By 1900 there was only 10 feet (3.05 m) l.w. in the river.!! 
Townsville's efforts to improve its port met with more success. The con-
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struction of the artificial Outer Harbour continued and in 1887 Coode approved 
of the work done. He drew up a plan for future expansion which included an 
outer basin to be cleared to 15 feet (4.57 m) l.w.!" An artificial harbour was quite 
essential for the port of Townsville. Previous attempts to improve the Ross 
Creek bar had failed and conditions inside the Creek were often unsatisfactory. 
"They have to deal not with shingle and sand", the member for Townsville 
explained in 1891, "but hard rock. They have to blast the rock to pieces and then 
dredge it out, and when they have dredged the hole . . . they have to dredge a 
channel to the sea to allow the ships to get in . . . the ships float in on the tide 
and sink down into the hole made to receive them as the tide recedes, and they 
have to wait until the tide rises them up again to go out."!" By 1900 only 6 feet 
(1.83 m) l.w. was available in the creek's mouth.!* siltation continued and after 
floods in 1890, 1892, and 1896, Bates suggested that a levee be built in the creek. 
At the end of the period there was 22 feet (6.70 m) l.w. at the Outer Harbour 
wharves, but Platypus Channel—the Harbour's entrance—afforded only 15 
feet (4.57 m)!® 
The outports 
The two Southern outports Maryborough and Bundaberg were river ports 
and they suffered accordingly. In 1887 l.w. in the Mary River was 10 feet 
(3.05 m), in the Burnett l.w. was 10| feet (3.20 m), and attempts at dredging both 
ports met with little success. Floods reduced the Burnett's available depth to 
5i feet (1.68 m) in 1890 and to A\ feet (1.37 m) in 1893. The Mary was not very 
much affected by the floods, but no advance was made in providing deeper water. 
After 1895 a new alignment of cuttings was tested in the Burnett but by 1900 
neither river had improved its position from what it had been in 1887. In fact 
the Mary's depth had fallen to 8 feet (2.44 m), and the Burnett's to 9^ feet 
(2.90 m).!® 
In contrast with Maryborough and Bundaberg, beset as they were with 
navigational problems, Gladstone was in the happy position, as Bates put it, 
of having little to do "beyond building additions to wharves or sea walls, and 
dredging to a limited extent in the vicinity . . . as trade increases".!' gy^ j^j^ j] 
the end of the period there was precious little increase in Gladstone's port trade. 
In 1892 siltation had lowered the available l.w. depth in Auckland Creek to 
7 | feet (2.29 m). Since the government wharf built at the Point had attracted 
little use, the Marine Board thought the value of further dredging in the creek 
doubtful. Therefore in 1895 the jetty's approaches were cleared to 21 feet 
(6.40 m).!® 
Another naturally well-endowed port which was barely used was Bowen. 
A swinging basin had been cut around the head of the Bowen jetty but, until 
the cattle and meat trade revived in 1887, the port's trade ran at a low level. In 
1894 the l.w. depth in the basin was 17 feet (5.18 m). Bates had remarked of 
Bowen and Gladstone that both belonged "to the class of ports which nature 
in a kindly mood predestined for commerce".!" But nature was not enough, it 
seemed. 
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Mackay was not as good a natural port. "Its mouth", Coode commented 
in 1887, "is blocked by a shifting sand bar. Between the latter and the wharves 
the channel is tortuous and subject to variation . . . the conditions of rainfall 
are such that the river is generally either in a state of gorge, or of drought.""" 
Despite dredging and an unsuccessful attempt to construct a sheltering break-
water in 1882, by 1895 the same story was to be told—"at low water the river is 
dry right across"."! Coode drew up three alternative plans for the port's improve-
ment. For immediate purposes he recommended the adoption of the least costly 
which entailed the projection of two training banks out to deep water near 
Flat Top Island. This would cost £108,000 ($216,000) as against £472,000 
($944,000) and £607,000 ($1,214,000) for the other two."" Coode's plan did not 
noticeably improve the port and Bates later saw little point in implementing 
either of Coode's alternative schemes. Port Newry, to the north of Mackay, 
was now being seen as the district's future port."" 
Northern ports physically more fortunate than Mackay were Cooktown, 
Port Douglas, and Cairns. Cooktown maintained a l.w. depth of at least 13 feet 
(3.96 m) for the period; by 1900 the bar held 15 feet (4.57 m), the wharves 
18 feet (5.49 m). The cuts that had been made held well and required little 
maintenance."* Cairns was less lucky than Cooktown. The Trinity Inlet was 
capable of depths of up to 18 feet (5.49 m) at l.w., but the bar prevented larger 
vessels from entering. The first cuts were made in 1890, deepening the bar to 
13 feet (3.96 m), but two years later siltation had reduced this level to 10 feet 
(3.05 m), and to 3^ feet (1.07 m) by 1896."® Likening Herberton to Cairns in an 
unusual moment of dejection, the Cairns Morning Post saw the two as "the 
impossible town and the impossible harbour"."® In 1897 the bar was re-cut to 
13 feet (3.96 m), but by 1900 this had fallen to 10| feet (3.20 m)."' Port Douglas's 
position was similar to Cairns's. Inside the port's bar some 18 feet (5.49 m) of 
water was available but there was only 6 feet (1.83 m) on the bar itself. The bar 
was difficult to clear and was not regularly dredged in the period—much to the 
disgust of the residents of Port Douglas."® 
The remaining Northern ports of economic significance, apart from the 
Gulf ports, were Innisfail and Thursday Island. Their physical capabihties and 
problems were quite dissimilar. Thursday Island's harbour was more comparable 
to Bowen's. Though naturally a good one, a lengthy jetty had to be run out to 
deep water. Navigational difficulties caused by tidal influences frequently 
prevented ocean-going traders from lying alongside the jetty, which after 1892 
had a l.w. depth of 22 feet (6.71 m)."" Innisfail, depending on a sugar and fruit 
trade, was inland from the Mourilyan harbour. The harbour itself was adequate, 
with 19 feet (5.79 m) l.w. at its entrance, yet further upstream there were serious 
impediments to navigation and four miles from Innisfail a bar reduced l.w. to 
2 feet (0.61 m). Towards the end of the period a campaign was under way to 
adopt Mourilyan as the deep-water port for Innisfail by building a light tramway 
between the town and the coast."" 
With the opening of the Croydon gold field after 1885 Normanton's port 
had difficulty in coping with the increased trade. There was less than 5 feet 
(1.52 m) l.w. on the bar in 1888 and little improvement had resulted by 1900 
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despite an intensive dredging programme based on Coode's suggestions. In 
1890 the bar was cut to 9 feet (2.74 m) but E. A. Cullen—the Marine Board's 
principal engineer—warned that the cutting was insufficiently wide and would 
resfft. His warning was correct: by 1893 the level had returned to 6 feet (1.83 m). 
Finaffy, in 1900 Bates drew up a new plan for improvements. It remained to be 
seen what could be done for the port. Burketown did not receive the same 
amount of port attention. In 1900 the l.w. depth on the bar was 3^ feet (1.07 m)."! 
The criteria of physical port efficiency: port depths and wharfage capacity 
The l.w. depths of Brisbane, Rockhampton, and Townsviffe in 1900—20,10, 
and 15 feet (6.10, 3.05, and 4.57 m) respectively—appeared to be quite in-
adequate by contemporary world port standards. In the same year London's 
entrance depth was 30 feet (9.14 m). New York's would soon be 40 feet (12.19m), 
and Sydney's was 28 to 41 feet (8.53 to 12.50 m)."" Some of the colonial outports, 
such as Thursday Island, Gladstone, and Bowen, were comparable to Brisbane 
in terms of available port depths, but all of these were small ports. Of the major 
outports in 1900, the depths of Bundaberg and Cairns were closer to Rock-
hampton's dismal achievement than to Townsville's levels, and Mackay's l.w. 
river depth was zero. Yet the hindrances to the colonial ports because of their 
depth shortcomings may not have been as serious as these rather bleak facts 
would at first seem to indicate. 
Other major ports managed well enough without the generous depths of 
the ports of Sydney, New York, or London. In 1890 Liverpool offered only 17 
to 18 feet (5.18 to 5.49 m), while Bremen and Hamburg—both large Continental 
river ports—managed with 17 and 26 feet (5.18 and 7.92 m) respectively."" In 
1900 when the Brisbane Courier remarked that overseas mail steamers could not 
ascend past Pinkenba in the Brisbane River, but that this was much the same 
situation as existed in Hamburg, the paper was not just being complacent."* The 
achievement of adequate port depths was an important preliminary step in the 
creation of efficient ports, but there were some short-run alternative solutions. 
Further, the finest natural ports could not be considered truly efficient unless 
wharfage equipment had kept pace with trade demands. As the Brisbane 
Courier stated in 1899 at one of the rare times that the paper systematically 
considered the port of Brisbane's needs, port improvement meant something 
more than dredging and reclamation."® 
The basic short-run solutions were the use of lighterage plant and the tidal 
rise. Each of the three major ports had to use the tide to cope with larger vessels 
while Rockhampton and Townsviffe also extensively used lighterage. Even with 
tidal assistance, however, by 1900 Brisbane could not directly deal with the large 
overseas vessels of 2,500 tons that were becoming common in the trade."® 
As weff, the cost of the lighterage crutch was a high one. In Rockhampton the 
move to deep water was made in the period—or rather, the decision to move was 
made—to avoid the difficulties of the Fitzroy and the burden of hghterage 
charges. In TownsviUe the artificial Outer Harbour was completed but large-
scale hghterage fingered on past its justifiable time. While the smaller outports 
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could make as efficient use of tidal assistance as the larger ports they could not 
equally benefit by using lighterage. Here the larger ports had a basic advantage: 
they could achieve economies of scale by the use of specialized lighterage plant. 
Whether the outports could use lighterage as profitably for more than a short 
period of time depended on individual port requirements. Normanton and 
Cairns, for instance, both faced heavy lighterage charges. In Cairns the issue 
became controversial. The claim was made that lighterage profits were passing 
indirectly into the pockets of the coastal shipping companies which, in turn, 
refused to berth at the wharves."' Cairns eventually solved its problem but 
Normanton could not. 
In this light, the port of Brisbane could manage to cope with most trade 
demands—providing that the tonnage of vessels did not increase excessively. 
Yet serious deficiencies remained. In 1899 when the first Houlder fine vessel 
called, pointed criticisms were made of Brisbane's wharfage capacity. "The 
storage accommodation", the Brisbane Courier agreed, "as compared with 
what exists in other places, is small and the conveniences provided to other ports 
as cargo is unloaded are practicaffy non-existent in Brisbane.""® And again, 
when the Marine Board's principal engineer returned from an overseas port 
inspection tour in 1900, his emphasis was more on the necessity of adequate 
wharfage accommodation for the ports than on better port entrance depths."" 
With the growing importance of wharfage adequacy to port efficiency, the 
fact that the Brisbane waterfront was largely under private control brought the 
question of port improvement directly back to the need for creating a co-
ordinating port authority. Similarly, the role of the port authorities would be 
vital in improving the capabilities of Rockhampton and Townsville. Both had 
to change their portsites: Rockhampton from the town to Broadmount or Port 
Alma; Townsville from Ross Creek to the Outer Harbour. However, to 1900 a 
Brisbane Harbour Board was not set up and the Boards at the two major 
outports aligned themselves with those who wished to retain the portsite at the 
town. It was these shortcomings which marred the performance of the major 
Queensland ports in the period and to a great extent governed the efficiency of 
the established portsites.*" 
Rail-port linkages and the patterns of port trade 
Rail-port linkages 
In its pre-depression phase colonists saw rail construction as part of a major 
developmental process; after the depression more mundane considerations 
became dominant. With this sense of disillusion surrounding rail construction, 
the role of the ports in the economy attracted more public attention than it had 
for some time. "Of late years there has grown on our people a sense of the 
value of our ports and harbours", wrote the Courier in one discussion of the 
ports' needs in 1899. "We do not here discuss the relative value of railways . . . 
but say that the Government have recognised in most satisfactory fashion the 
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demand that has arisen all over our coasts for clearer outlets to the ocean 
highway . . . nothing more important has occurred in 1898 than the visit of 
Lindon Bates, the American dredging expert."*! 
The period saw several rail-port linkages decided on and the railways were 
more important to the ports in the transport network at this time than earlier 
or later.*" Before 1885 the relation between the ports and railways had been 
simple enough as questions of competition between them had rarely arisen. This 
state of affairs remained largely unchanged to 1900. The coastal line reached 
from Brisbane to Gladstone by 1898 but the major regional ports were still not 
joined. After 1900, with the coastal connection reaching further north, rail-port 
competition became a reality. Nevertheless, the linkages made between 1885 
and 1900 were in several cases quite decisive in intra-regional port rivalries. 
Connections to the smaller ports. Apart from the extension of the coastal 
line from Maryborough to Bundaberg in 1887 and from Brisbane to Mary-
borough in 1881, three other lines were laid down that decided the future of 
individual ports in the pre-depression stage of rail building. These were the 
Normanton-Croydon, Cairns-Herberton, and Cooktown-Laura lines. With 
the first there was little debate over whether any other Gulf port was more 
suitable. The physical capabilities of Normanton and Burketown were not very 
different and the relative convenience of the former's position decided the matter. 
The line was one of the few constructed to serve a mining field that fulfilled its 
purpose efficiently and well. Its success seemed almost predestined. Funds were 
close at hand from an existing vote for a Gulf-Cloncurry line, which had itself 
been a compromise produced by the failure of a transcontinental scheme. The 
line proved to be the least costly of any of the colony's nineteenth-century 
construction efforts and it arrived at Croydon in time to assist the field's develop-
ment.*" 
For the Herberton mineral fields there were three alternative ports—Cairns, 
Mourilyan, and Port Douglas. A Select Committee had decided that Cairns 
possessed advantages over its rivals, yet charges of political favouritism hngered 
on. The engineering problems posed by joining the inland to the coast were the 
least for Cairns, but it was decisive that the port was more suitable for future 
development than were its rivals. "The harbour at Cairns is very much larger 
than the harbour at Mourilyan", the Post Master General explained, "and the 
harbour at Port Douglas is no harbour at all."** In contrast with the 
Normanton-Croydon line, the Cairns rail-port linkage achieved little immediate 
success. Because of the roughness of the terrain, construction proved extremely 
difficult and by 1893 the line had only reached Mareeba; then construction was 
interrupted by the depression. Yet, the line had decided that Cairns would be 
the far North's principal port outlet, as the Normanton line had established the 
primacy of that port in the Gulf. Stffl further north, the Cooktown-Laura line 
could not win a comparable prize for the port of Cooktown. The inland mineral 
fields were on their last legs by the time construction was under way.*® 
The major rail-port connections. In the post-depression phase of rail con-
struction the difficulties of the major Central and Northern ports helped to 
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determine the placement of three important lines. For Rockhampton the prob-
lem was this. Granted that a deep-water port was necessary—an assumption 
which many Rockhampton residents strongly denied—should the railway from 
the town run to Port Alma, or to Broadmount? The problem for Townsviffe, 
with respect to the extension of the Bowen line northwards, was whether the 
route should extend northwest to join the Townsville-Charters Towers line, as 
originally intended. The alternative was to run directly north to Ayr to meet the 
southerly extension of the Townsviffe-Ayr line. Finally, the question of joining 
the Northern and Central trunk lines at a point inland aroused direct opposition 
between Townsville and Rockhampton. 
The protracted struggle over the situation of Rockhampton's portsite began 
in 1887 when fourteen hundred Rockhampton residents petitioned the govern-
ment to move the port to Port Alma—a suggestion which met with immediate 
opposition from the majority of the townspeople. It later became a notorious 
fact that at that time, to ensure re-election, some local members of parliament 
had had to pledge their support for retaining the port at the town wharves.*® 
Griffith had acquiesced in this opposition and had not run a rail connection 
between the town and McIIwraith's earlier established wharves at Port Alma.*' 
But what was most significant about this first clash over the Rockhampton 
portsite was not the outcome—which had been certain enough—but the circum-
stances of the affair. The original dissentients had wanted to make the rail 
connection between the town and Port Alma along the southern bank of the 
Fitzroy, rather than by extending the link directly southwards. Fear of future 
Gladstone port competition, in short, seems to have been real even at that time. 
Eight years later in 1895 when rail connection was finally made with Keppel 
Bay, the Rockhampton Chamber of Commerce still favoured Port Alma, but 
only if the rail line ran along the Fitzroy, not towards Gladstone. "What the 
Western people want", explained the Rockhampton Morning Bulletin, "is a 
railway to deep water, and the joker who cried out 'Gladstone' at the Mayoral 
wine party at Longreach may not be cognizant of the fact that the latest Port 
Alma project contemplates the crossing of Raglan Creek near Port Alma and 
the continuation of the railway to Gladstone."*® Which was much to the dis-
pleasure of the Bulletin, the Rockhampton Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Council. 
By 1895 the pressure of western pastoralists had determined the government 
to make a deep-water rail connection for Rockhampton, but the decision had 
been made to develop Broadmount, the other alternative portsite, instead of 
Port Alma. The Lake's Creek meatworks was established on the north side of 
the river and favoured Broadmount, which was also on the same side of the 
Fitzroy. The town was on the south bank. The ensuing contest between the 
champions of Broadmount and Port Alma led to an official investigation in 
1895. When Philp announced the government's decision in favour of Broad-
mount he could reasonably say: "There is not a single point that has not been 
fully investigated with the object of discovering which is the best and most 
practicable way of providing facilities for the exports that come from the 
Central districts which is the sole object of this line. After years of investigation 
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we have found that not Rockhampton, but Broadmount, is the more practicable 
way of carrying out our object."*" 
Part of Philp's statement referred to a possibility which deeply disturbed 
Rockhampton. To fully appreciate the context of this decision to make the 
Broadmount connection, the issue must be seen as less important when set 
against another. A more pressing concern was the protection of Rockhampton's 
port trade from the proposed Winton-Hughenden extension of the Northern 
trunk line—a line which would funnel much central-western trade into Towns-
ville's port. Because of this danger to Rockhampton's trade any question in-
volving the town's rail-port connections had to be tactfully handled by the 
government and Philp's announcement of the decision to develop Broadmount 
observed this need. Some members felt no such constraint. "When the Central 
railway is extended to Broadmount", threatened George Thorn, "there wiff be 
no such place as Rockhampton. It will be blotted out altogether; all the trade 
wffl go to Broadmount."®" 
The port at Broadmount was tidal, but it could supply 13 feet l.w. with a 
rise of 8 feet—conditions much better than the Fitzroy's. The line was also 
cheaper and shorter than the Port Alma-Rockhampton connection. The 
difficulties of building to Port Alma owed much to the inhospitable back 
country that surrounded the port. The member for Rockhampton had to admit 
that "the surrounding country consists to a considerable extent of mud flats".®! 
The 1895 inquiry made an apparently careful examination before reporting in 
Broadmount's favour, but their findings would be critically reviewed by a later 
committee.®" The Broadmount decision was also being made when moves were 
under way to appoint the port's first Harbour Board. It would soon be stated 
that its primary object was to retain the portsite at the town wharves in Rock-
hampton. 
This then, was the wider context: the Rockhampton-Townsville rivalry 
over the Winton linkage and the unanimity in Rockhampton that development 
would take place first of all at the town wharves. The attitude of the district's 
parliamentarian showed the conflicting loyalties he felt obliged to reconcile. 
While agreeing with the government's choice, he still suggested that the wharves 
at Port Alma should be maintained for future use. Then, as a sop to the town, 
he added: "Notwithstanding the extension to deep water, eventually the western 
pastoralists will find that they will still be able to send their wool down the 
Fitzroy from Rockhampton to deep water in lighters, at a less cost than they 
will be able to rail it for."®" Such a hope seems best described as political 
optimism. According to Philp, pastoralists were paying a lighterage bill of 
£12,500 ($25,000) p.a. on 100,000 bales of wool. This could be halved by the rail 
connection, and similar reductions in lighterage charges would be realized for 
frozen meat shipments.®* 
The conditions under which the decision to construct the Broadmount line 
was taken, therefore, made the matter seem of little importance. Rockhampton 
residents still thought that the port's future lay in the development of the town 
reaches of their river and that the newly appointed Harbour Board would work 
efficiently to that end. A far more immediate concern was the Winton extension. 
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Together, these factors made the Broadmount connection acceptable, if not 
popular, in Rockhampton. Philp's plan was condemned by the member for 
Port Curtis as an instance of preferential treatment to private interests, but 
what most seems to have determined the government's decision was the lesser 
cost of the Broadmount extension at a time of acute financial difficulty.®® 
The second major rail-port linkage concerned the ports of Townsville and 
Bowen. In 1883 a line had been authorized from Bowen to the west to connect 
with the Charters Towers-Townsville line. It was cheaper and shorter to build 
this than to directly join Townsville and Bowen by a coastal rail hnkage. The 
preliminary northern section of the line was constructed and then work lapsed. 
As the member for Bowen could later complain, "Why has the railway been 
made half-way and left there in the bush? It ends nowhere."®® Ultimately, in 
1899 a Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into the matter. While 
Bowen and many Charters Towers interests favoured the completion of the 
original plan, Townsville wanted a coastal link between the two ports. Bergl 
and Coy., a large Bowen meat freezing concern, were prepared to agree to con-
struct the western extension under the terms of the Railways Guarantee Act. 
Many Bowenites claimed that, with the Towers market opened up to the port, 
Bowen could become a successful agricultural region. Without rail connection, 
existing sea freight charges between Townsviffe and Bowen made this im-
possible.®' 
Those favouring the original plan stressed Townsville's shortcomings as a 
port and contrasted Bowen's advantages. The Commissioners summed up the 
views of the pro-Bowen camp: "The artificial harbour of Townsviffe is neither 
entirely safe nor reliable . . . delays must always occur there . . . the harbour dues 
there must always be heavier than at a natural port such as Bowen . . . [we] 
believe that there is a certain substratum of truth in these affegations."®® During 
the debate over Townsville's port capabilities very little emphasis was placed on 
the port's available entrance depths. This was as weff for TownsviUe, for there 
was little to compare between the ports as natural ports—Bowen was so much 
better. Yet with the aid of its artificial harbour, the port of Townsville's capacity 
of 15 feet (4.57 m) l.w. was not much less than Bowen's. What Townsville's 
critics most persistently harped on was the costliness of the port's lighterage 
arrangements, the backwardness of cargo handling methods on the wharves, 
and the inadequacy of wharfage accommodation. These criticisms, in turn, had 
to be related to other contemporary complaints made about the Townsville 
Harbour Board's mistaken policy of developing the Inner Harbour inside 
Ross Creek as well as the Outer Harbour.®" 
Taken all in aff the port's critics made out a strong case, especially against 
the level and extent of lighterage charges. As the lightering was done by Burns, 
Philp, and as Mr. Philp happened to be Premier, this was a delicate matter.®" 
The inquiry's conclusion, even if equivocal and qualified, was that the western 
extension was more desirable,®! but on Townsville's side stood the unassailable 
fact that it was an established port and trading centre. Bowen was only a small 
town with an unrealized port potential. Methods of cargo handfing could be 
sharply and justffiably criticized at Townsville, but Bowen was not equipped to 
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deal with the flow of trade passing through the larger port. 
It should be recalled that the town's early trading strength had never been 
its port, but its geographical position in relation to the hinterland. Philp keenly 
appreciated this and explained it to the Commissioners. "The Townsville people 
opened up Hughenden and Winton. They were more pushing? They had the 
best geographical position." "And the most pushing business men?" queried 
one Commissioner. "It would not have made a bit of difference if they had 
pushed in Bowen", Philp calmly rephed, "because the Burdekin had to be 
crossed at two places from Bowen and only at one from Townsvffle; besides the 
road from Townsville was fully sixty miles shorter."®" This had been Towns-
ville's port strength and Charters Towers gold had finally ended Bowen's 
chances of Northern primacy. Townsville and Bowen were linked eventually by 
rail but the connection was made as Townsville had wished. Nevertheless, the 
port of Townsville was working inefficiently. 
The debate over the proposed rail extension from Hughenden to Winton 
in 1895 again revealed Townsvffle cast in the forbidding role of the "Octopus of 
the North" by the opponents of the extension. Townsville as insistently argued 
that the port was the natural outlet for the trade concerned. Rockhampton and 
Townsville were directly opposed on the issue, and as Rockhampton was 
gradually bested a parallel was drawn by one parliamentarian that pointed to 
the importance of the decision to Rockhampton: "At one time the wrongs of 
Ireland were the topic of everyday discussion throughout the civihsed world; 
b u t . . . I am inclined to think they were but trifling when compared with the 
ivrongs of Central Queensland."®" The tone was ludicrous but the matter was 
rery serious for Rockhampton. As Philp had recently been made Minister for 
Railways, the major Central town needed every ounce of available support to 
stop the extension.®* 
By the time the actual decision was made the issue had been intensively 
lebated for years previously.®® Rockhampton's first line of defence had been to 
'all back on its own interpretation of the colony's principles of rail construction. 
The proposed link, it was complained, involved a "radical departure from our 
ong recognized principle of railway construction—the construction into the 
nterior of our three main trunk lines".®® But this argument was abruptly 
•ejected by another representative of Central Queensland. Taking the line due 
vest had been a mistake initiaffy; more fertile country could have been utihzed 
)y building to the north. Thallon, the Railways principal Traffic Manager, 
:ntertained fewer iffusions than either. When asked his opinion about the most 
avourable extension he replied that the making of railways was purely a political 
natter.®' 
If Rockhampton too readily took the mantle of sole spokesman for Central 
Queensland on its shoulders, it did so no more frequently than Townsville did 
or the North. However, in this case Townsville interests could criticize Rock-
lampton's objections to the line more specifically. Firstly, there was the danger 
)f future competition between a Rockhampton-Winton line and the Cloncurry-
Townsvffle-Gulf fine. Rockhampton's reply to this was reasonable enough: that 
t was a speculative assessment of the effects of future fines, whereas the Winton-
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Hughenden line would damage the already established trade of Rockhampton's 
trunk line.®® Townsviffe's argument that the existing pattern of trade favoured 
the Winton-Hughenden extension was more difficult for Rockhampton to meet. 
There was the plain fact that Winton was nearly 180 miles (290 km) closer to 
Townsviffe than to Rockhampton. Since the construction of a Hughenden-
Winton road in 1884 the trade of most central-western stations had gone to 
Townsville. More settlement had developed in the Hughenden-Winton direction 
than from Winton to the south and a short-lived attempt to connect Winton 
with the Central trunk line had been firmly opposed by Winton interests. 
Finally, the government's concern to make the best rail-port connection for 
the Winton trade was heightened by South Australian competition for the 
pastoral supplies trade in the far west of the colony. The basic facts of distance 
placed Rockhampton at a grave disadvantage: "Taking Birdsville in the extreme 
south-west as a centre, the distance from Normanton is 650 miles [1,046 km]; 
from Adelaide 750 miles [1,207 km]; from Townsville 780 miles [1,255 km]; and 
from Rockhampton 850 miles [1,368 km] . . . the whole of Western Queensland 
is in reality the back country of Normanton, Adelaide and Townsville."®" After 
the evidence had been duly considered by a Select Committee, the government 
approved the fine. Rockhampton had been caught between the North's united 
front and the indifference of the South—as well as of many central-western 
interests. An exchange between one of the line's opponents and the Surveyor-
General provided an illuminating epitaph for the contest. At the Committee's 
sittings a map had been on view which represented recently drawn up meat and 
dairying districts in the colony. It showed that two-thirds of the Centre's existing 
production belonged geographically and commercially to the North. "Was not 
your object in defining the meat and dairy districts", the pro-Rockhampton 
member of the Committee enquired of the Surveyor-General, "to define them 
according to the nearest port for each?" 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then according to your statement, two-thirds of the Central meat and 
dairy district ought to be in the Northern district ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you made any calculations as to how much of the Southern 
districts would be nearer to Rockhampton than to Brisbane? 
A. I find I have not made any such calculation, but you can see by the 
map that a very considerable part of the Southern meat and dairy 
district is nearer to Rockhampton than to Brisbane. 
Q. I am sorry you did not extend your calculations to the Southern district. 
A. To tell you the truth, I did not think the Hughenden to Winton railway 
would reach so far south.'" 
The Surveyor-General's concluding remark was either ironic or naive. In any 
case, the exchange gave substance to Thallon's earlier statement that the making 
of railways was a purely pohtical matter. 
Railways and ports 1885-1900: harmony before the competitive storm. Of 
the four coastal rail-port connections in the period three had been free from 
The regional victors emerge 113 
controversy. The extensions to Maryborough, Bundaberg, and Gladstone were 
largely taken for granted. Brisbane had nothing to fear from connection with 
its small intra-regional outports, and Rockhampton was too involved in its own 
railway difficulties to be greatly concerned about the coastal line reaching 
Gladstone. It had been the northernmost line, the Bowen extension, which had 
caused the worst disagreement. Despite a valiant fight against Townsviffe, 
Bowen had lost out. The port of Townsville remained superior in the North as 
the connection was made coastwise towards Townsville.'! 
The other non-coastal lines affecting the ports were made to Cairns, 
Normanton, Cooktown, Broadmount, and between Hughenden and Winton. 
The last two of these were as controversial as the Bowen connection had been. 
The contest between Port Douglas and Cairns was as crucial for the ports in-
volved as the rail-port contests between Bowen and Townsviffe and Townsville 
and Rockhampton were. But the Port Douglas-Cairns competition was only 
between two intra-regional outports, whereas the Broadmount and Winton 
conflicts involved at least one main regional port. In the case of the Hughenden-
Winton line, Townsville had won out over Rockhampton, as it had over Bowen. 
With the Broadmount connection, it was not a case of inter-port rivalry but one 
of intra-port competition. The Broadmount line represented Rockhampton's 
decision to move to deeper water. As the Fitzroy River remained unimproved 
this was reassuring, but it was not certain that port trade would inevitably 
redirect itself through Broadmount with the completion of the line. Townsville 
had won every rail-port contest it had engaged in to 1900 and Rockhampton 
had been defeated. 
In the South, if Brisbane's success in extending its rail network had been 
less noticeable than Townsville's, it was more effective. As well as adding to her 
Southern trunk line westwards and southwards, a border linkage had been 
completed; as the coastal line reached further north, more and more trade 
would be funnelled down to the capital.'" The railway map of Queensland in 
1900 revealed an unevenly balanced relation between the main regional ports. 
The Southern and Central lines were approximately parallel and non-
competitive, but the coastal line had reached Gladstone and would soon reach 
Rockhampton. Further, the Northern trunk line was not parallel with the 
Central trunk but reached down towards it. Rockhampton was in an unenviable 
position. The period of rail-port harmony that had benefited the port so far 
would now come to an end. Finally, the inquiries into the rail-port connections 
had shown that the main regional ports in the North and the Centre were not 
working efficiently. In both, hghterage costs were high and wharfage conditions 
were unsatisfactory. 
The patterns of port trade 
Intra-regional port relations: The consolidation of the regional port mono-
polies. The fifteen years after 1885 saw the hold of the three main colonial ports 
strengthened on their region's trade. Brisbane's share of South Queensland's 
port trade remained constantly high: 88 per cent in the preceding period, 87 
per cent in this one. The increases for Rockhampton and Townsville were from 
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92 per cent to 97 per cent, and from 45 per cent to 60 per cent respectively.'" 
The pattern of intra-regional relations which had emerged to 1885, with the 
trading dominance of one major port in each region, had been accentuated by 
1900. Again the monopoly of the main regional ports was strongest in the 
Centre and least strong in the North. In the Centre, only after 1898 with the 
advantage of rail connection did the level of Gladstone's trade accelerate. 
Townsviffe's Northern monopoly of trade was not as strong as was Rockhamp-
ton's or Brisbane's regional position. Quite a number of smaff Northern ports 
maintained a steadily important level of trade. In the South, the five years after 
1885 also saw Brisbane's port place slightly reduced, but after 1890 Mary-
borough's trade fell away and Brisbane's dominance was restored. 
Inter-regional port relations: the beginnings of re-adjustment. Rockhampton 
and Townsville now clearly emerged as the colony's second and third ports, and 
several Northern outlets took places in the list of principal ports. Brisbane's 
dominance of total trade was maintained, but was significantly reduced—from 
57 per cent between 1860 and 1885 to 42 per cent between 1885 and 1900. 
Correspondingly, the shares of the main Northern and Central ports increased: 
Townsville's from 8 per cent to 19 per cent, and Rockhampton's from 16 per 
cent to 20 per cent. These figures reflected the greater development of the 
Northern and Central economies. Rockhampton was the second most important 
port through the period, yet after 1895 it was pushed out of its place by Towns-
ville. This was more notable as Rockhampton dominated its region's trade 
more completely than did Townsville. Of the second trio of important ports, 
Maryborough's position was being reduced by Bundaberg's expansion. With 
the exhaustion of its inland gold fields Cooktown dropped out of the list and 
Cairns and Normanton appeared as new Northern ports. Mackay barely 
managed to maintain its place in 1900 but had been the fifth port through the 
period. 
There was a less direct relation between changes in Southern and total port 
trade after 1885. Yet Southern fluctuations usually were a dominant influence 
on the course of total trade. To 1885 Central and Northern trade patterns had 
broadly approximated those of the South with fewer variations. Yet by 1900 
Northern port trade had become more autonomous. This tendency began just 
before 1885 as the region found its feet. Only in the mixture of growth and 
recession from 1897 to 1900 did the North closely follow Southern economic 
change. The pattern of Central trade, however, behaved as it had to 1885. 
The failure of the economy to diversify: A basic limitation to port growth. 
No new export bases were developed except frozen meat. Otherwise, pastoral 
products, minerals, and sugar remained Queensland's staple exports. Again the 
pastoral industry benefited the South and the Centre more than the North, but 
some notable inter-regional changes still took place. The Northern sheep 
flocks, if small in comparison with those of the other regions, had by 1900 
almost equaffed the size of Central stock numbers. This was a result of the 
reductions wrought by the drought in the major pastoral regions. More 
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positively, the North's cattle industry had performed well and had surpassed 
the Centre's. The Centre had fared badly, but the growth of the frozen meat 
trade benefited the regions. Lastly, the South remained the strongest and most 
stable pastoral producer. 
Mineral production was again more important to the North than to the 
other two regions, but the Centre was strengthened considerably by the main-
tenance of production at Mt. Morgan. In the South the less spectacular but 
reliable production of Gympie's field and some base minerals remained the 
principal sources of mineral wealth. By the nineties, however, Gympie's output 
was beginning to decline. The North, in contrast, had a number of gold and base 
mineral fields to tap. What the Hodgkinson had meant for Port Douglas and 
Cairns, the Cape River and Ravenswood fields for Townsville, and the Palmer 
for Cooktown before 1885, Croydon meant to Normanton, Herberton to 
Cairns, and Cloncurry to Townsville after 1885. Sugar production met with 
great difficulties after the mid-eighties yet it had still been vital in securing the 
development of several colonial ports. Most notably, Bundaberg and Cairns 
had benefited. As sugar growing gradually shifted northwards, adding to the 
North's economic resources, Maryborough's sugar production levels would fall 
away. 
The North had strengthened its regional capabilities for port maintenance. 
The sugar industry emerged as one of the colony's most important producing 
industries and was centred in the North; the North's regional share of mineral 
production was relatively greater than those of the other regions; lastly, the 
region had improved its pastoral position. In contrast, despite the slight im-
provement in the Centre's economy, it remained the weakest region, while the 
South was still the strongest, with the bulk of people, rail mileage, trade, agri-
culture, and manufacturing. The Centre's lack of diversification could be seen 
in Rockhampton's almost complete dominance of intra-regional port trade. 
More generally, the depression had limited the colony's growth and the 
ports. After the first stage of port settlement to 1885 the ports could undergo 
more specialized development or new ports could be settled in response to new 
export bases. Continued port expansion required either more export bases or a 
reorientation of the economy away from rural production. The second prospect 
was not realized. Manufacturing was largely tied to primary product processing. 
As for new export bases, only frozen meat had been developed. Further, the 
depression had shown that the capacity of the established producing industries 
to expand was limited. The failure to diversify was a basic limit to port growth. 
In future, port competition would not be so much to establish new ports as to 
maintain existing trades. 
The appointment of Harbour Boards: The achievement of local port control 
in unfavourable circumstances 
When the efforts of the Brisbane Chamber of Commerce to establish a 
Harbour Board for the port of Brisbane had faffed in 1875 nothing more was 
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heard of the matter for ten years. Then in 1886 the issue was again raised for 
public consideration when W. V. Brown, the member for Townsville, moved 
a motion to set up "harbour trustees" for the ports.'* The movement caused 
only passing interest and was rejected on the grounds that the ports would be 
unable to raise sufficient revenue to make local trusts possible. However, James 
Dickson, the Opposition leader, in his statement opposing the motion clearly 
formulated the special problems posed in administering the Queensland ports: 
Considering the numerous ports which we have on our coast line, I consider 
the disadvantages to them of Harbour Trusts would outweigh their ad-
vantages in this colony . . . If we had one large central port through which 
the whole of our trade could be delivered, then [there would be] very good 
ground for advocating a Harbour Trust; and it should be at once estab-
lished, because a large revenue would be derived on account of all ports of 
the colony having it as a central outlet . . . but here every port has its 
respective strip of back country, and that back country does not at the 
present time furnish to any one of our ports that immense trade which 
converges into the ports of Port Jackson, Hobson's Bay, and Port Adelaide. 
We are differently situated from our sister colonies in that respect, and at 
the present time, with the exception of Brisbane, and possibly Townsville, 
I do not think there are any other ports in the colony of sufficient dimen-
sions . . . to claim the advantages of a Harbour Trust.'® 
This prediction proved to be fairly accurate. The main regional ports of 
Townsville and Rockhampton appointed Harbour Boards, as did the smaller 
ports of Bundaberg and Mackay, while Brisbane did not in the period. In 
substance, Dickson had been correct. Special administrative provision had to 
be made for the place of the smaller ports in the new framework of port adminis-
tration adopted in the nineties. In 1892 the smaller ports had been included with 
the larger in the Harbour Dues Act. Passed in conjunction with the 1892 
general Harbour Boards Act and intended to provide funds for the appointment 
of Boards, the Dues Act had adversely affected some of the smaller ports. 
Therefore in 1895 an amendment was made to release them from the workings 
of the Act at their request.'® Further substantiation for Dickson's warnings was 
that neither Maryborough nor Cairns, which had both expressed desires for 
Harbour Boards, could manage to form them." 
Until the Harbour Boards were appointed the ports remained under the 
control of the Treasury Department. This was exercised through the Ports and 
Harbours Department and the Harbours and Rivers Department. The Ports 
and Harbours Department had supervised Queensland port navigation since 
1859. Under the Chief Postmaster, the Department was concerned chiefly with 
coastal lighting and keeping port sailing directions up to date. It provided 
lighthouse keepers, portmasters, and pilots for the ports. The Harbours and 
Rivers Department was responsible for physical port improvement. Its principal 
officer was the Harbours and Rivers Engineer. Though the functions of the two 
bodies were separate, they worked together in practice. In 1894, because of the 
depression, the two were amalgamated to form the Marine Department. 
However, the change was basically a financial expedient. After 1900 the two 
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authorities would be separated again. These formal changes had little relevance 
to the devolution of port administration to the local level. The more important 
points of contact between the Marine Board and the new Harbour Boards will 
be discussed presently. 
The Harbour Board legislation of the nineties: A depression-induced response 
Despite the moves towards local port control made in the preceding period. 
Harbour Boards were only set up for some of the ports after 1885 and were the 
direct result of the pressures of the depression on government funds. After 
Brown's unsuccessful attempt in 1886 little more was heard of Harbour Trusts 
in parhament for the next five years. Once again, the difficulty was the likelihood 
of insufficient revenue for the Trusts. Additionally, in Brisbane and Townsviffe 
much of the wharfage was in private hands. Still the idea continued to circulate. 
In 1891 a protest was made about the cessation of dredging in the Fitzroy. 
"Probably", Rockhampton's member said, "we shall hear something about 
Harbour Trusts. Of course they are very well . . .", but again there was a lack 
of revenue. To this criticism Mcllwraith added a quiet "Hear, hear".'® His 
aside was an important one. It was Mcllwraith who next year introduced the Bill 
that laid down the general principles for the establishment of the Queensland 
Harbour Boards. 
The immediate reason for the introduction of the foundation Harbour 
Boards Biff of 1892 was more the pressing fiscal impositions of the depression 
than any intention to extend the principles of local government to port adminis-
tration. The apphcation of local government principles to port management 
only received secondary emphasis. Mcllwraith was quite blunt about the Bill's 
purpose in relation to the financial needs of the time. "If a Biff of this sort did 
not soon pass," he warned, "all the dredging in the colony would cease, because 
there were no funds to carry it on."'" The Bill's reception in the press agrees 
with this interpretation. 
As in 1886, the question of the adequacy of revenue for port trusts was 
raised by the critics of the 1892 Bill. "If the government is sincere in wishing it to 
become operative at an early date," Dickson stated, "they wiff have to consider 
the absolute necessity of providing funds for the Boards with which to com-
mence operation."®" Opposition on these grounds proved well founded and 
Mcllwraith, in search of a solution, moved the additional Harbour Dues Bill 
later in 1892 as an attempt to solve the revenue problem for the Trusts. Again 
he openly declared his intentions: "I anticipated . . . that some mild coercion, 
such as contained in this Bill, would be necessary to induce the local authorities 
interested to make a commencement under the Harbour Boards Bill."®! 
Dickson, supporting the Dues Biff, still considered it unfortunate that some of 
the smaller ports would suffer from the Bill—much as he had forecast in 1886— 
but agreed about its necessity. "Unless there is some scheme of taxation," he 
acknowledged, "the Harbour Boards Biff will be a dead letter."®" The members 
for Mackay, Bowen, and Gladstone opposed the Dues Bill but it was carried. 
Apart from the objections to the Bill based on the hkely shortage of port 
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revenue for the Harbour Boards, there was a general unanimity amongst the 
legislators concerning the principles of the Bill and their desirabihty. Some, 
such as Robert Philp, went so far as to say that Harbour Boards should have 
been appointed years previously.®" Widespread dissatisfaction existed with the 
state of the ports as well as an uncertainty as to how they could be best improved. 
Again Mcllwraith was straightforward about the situation: "The management 
by the central government of the harbours of Queensland has not been a 
success . . . the money expended has not been well spent and that is due to the 
system under which the government have spent the money."®* In fact, the most 
noticeable feature of the 1892 debate was the sense of uncertainty that prevailed 
about how port improvement should proceed. Philp's first comment in sup-
porting the Bill was that Boards should have been set up before, yet he con-
cluded that local Boards probably would not have done much better.®® 
The Harbour Boards Bill came into effect on 1 January 1893 but almost 
another three years passed before Boards were appointed. Although the financial 
difficulties of the time explain this delay, there was the possibihty that Brisbane's 
opposition to regional port control had acted as a further obstacle. However, 
the available evidence is against such an interpretation. In 1895 the Brisbane 
Courier commented absent-mindedly that the delay was "a reflection on the 
self-governing capacity of our people"!®® The ports normally occupied a very 
small place in public affairs. "The public does not display great interest in the 
establishment of a Harbour Board for Rockhampton", the Morning Bulletin 
wrote in 1895, "for the proposal has been before it so long."®' This casual 
comment reinforces the view that Brisbane was not responsible for the delay. 
When Harbour Board Bills were passed for Rockhampton, Townsville, and 
Bundaberg, they were barely noticed in the Brisbane press.®® 
The essential features of the Harbour Board Bills were these. Board mem-
bers were to be elected and appointed. The former were to be elected by ship-
owners, merchants, local municipalities, and divisional boards; the latter were 
to be appointed by the government. In 1892 Mcllwraith had stated flatly that 
the basic defect of the whole system of port development had been that local 
supervision had not been exercised.®" This was now remedied. Although the 
new Bills did not encroach on the rights of private wharfowners the Boards 
were given wide-ranging powers in connection with port improvements and 
foreshore leases. The Boards were subject to technical supervision from the 
Marine Board but the principle of local control was genuinely applied by the 
legislation. Three sources of port revenue were provided: from Harbour and 
Improvement Dues—the latter being specially introduced; revenue from rents 
of land under Harbour Board control; and from the proceeds of Harbour Board 
loans. Dues on coastal lights had been abolished in 1882 as part of McIIwraith's 
Torres Strait scheme, but dues on local port lights were to be retained by the 
government."" 
In 1892 and in 1895 the main points at issue were where the new Boards' 
revenue would come from and how the Boards would be constituted. In 1895 
especially, when the Biffs for each Board were passed, the question of representa-
tion was uppermost. There had been very httle discussion about the practical 
The regional victors emerge 119 
scope of the Boards or what their purpose was to be. To some extent, such 
discussion was unnecessary. The Boards' functions were fairly self-evident. 
They were to assume almost complete control of their ports. It was generally 
agreed that local control would be a better means of port management than 
centralized port supervision. The degree of financial independence granted to 
the Boards was quite large enough at the time for them to pursue long-range 
improvement programmes. If any unusuaffy expensive harbour project was 
called for the Boards could borrow from Consohdated Revenue, subject to 
parliamentary approval and the provisions of the Local Works Loan Acts. 
These arrangements seemed to be sensible and moderate and the general 
principles of the Harbour Boards Acts met with little criticism. Now Enghsh 
port methods must be considered as a means of assessing Queensland's port 
administration. 
English port administration: The danger of uncritical colonial adaptation 
In the development of English port administration the port of Liverpool 
played a vital pioneering role. Until the eighteenth century the town Council 
had a major part in the port's growth. Moves then began to limit the Council's 
participation in the port and to replace it with a body more directly representa-
tive of port interests. It was felt that the Corporation was putting port dues to 
the use of the town rather than using them to improve the port. Changes in the 
constitution of the Dock Committee therefore reduced Council influence in 
1825 and 1851. After a series of inquiries, the hmitation of the Council's port 
activities culminated in the formation of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board 
in 1857. The Board consisted of twenty-eight members—twenty-four elected by 
dock ratepayers, four by the Mersey Conservancy Commissioners—and had to 
pay £1,500,000 ($3,000,000) compensation to the Council for wharfage rights."! 
Liverpool's difficulties were not unique to the port and other English ports 
used Liverpool's solution of appointing a Harbour Trust to uphold the interests 
of the port against those of the town, with local modifications. As Sidney Webb 
later wrote of Liverpool's early port troubles in relation to the most desirable 
methods of port administration: 
The actual users of a port are the shipowners and merchants . . . whilst the 
interests involved are those of the consumers of imported goods all over 
the kingdom, and the producers for export. The Municipal Corporation . . . 
represented none of these interests, and, by reason of its legal right to devote 
the proceeds of its petty customs duties for its own advantage, was even 
pecuniarly biassed against them all. This divergence of interests would not 
have been remedied by substituting the elected representatives of the 
inhabitants of the port town for a select body of them . . . the conflict was 
between the town of Liverpool, however represented, and the consumers of 
imported goods. The elected Town Council of Liverpool after 1835, no less 
than its co-opted predecessor, tended naturally to consider the port as a 
revenue producing service for the benefit of the town . . . the utmost possible 
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development of a harbour demands a certain large-mindedness and long 
views, and a familiarity with the currents of trade and contemporary changes 
in the method of transit . . . no pubhc authority, other than the National 
government, ought to have the power of levying . . . any larger revenue 
than is needed and expended for the actual maintenance of the port in the 
highest state of efficiency. The reform that was needed in the management 
of the Liverpool dock revenues was not the substitution, for the self-elect 
Corporation, of the representatives of the Liverpool rate-payers, but the 
establishment of a body so far representative of the consumers as to have 
no interest other than of the greatest possible efficiency of the port and the 
lowest possible tariff of dues."" 
When in 1850 the Tyne Improvement Commissioners were appointed to guide 
the growth of the port of Newcastle, the composition of the authority was aimed 
at representing port users and interests. Similarly, the Clyde Trust was set up 
in Glasgow in 1858 as a port authority along the same lines as the English 
Trusts."" 
The port of London also followed the Liverpudlian example, if much later 
than Newcastle or Glasgow. As in Liverpool, till the end of the eighteenth 
century the London Corporation had played a major role in the port. Private 
enterprise, in the form of the West India Dock Coy. and others, also had an 
important part in the port's expansion. But dissension developed between the 
Corporation and port users. The port managed well enough to the middle of 
the nineteenth century, then it became embattled. After 1857 the improvement 
of the river channel had been undertaken by the Thames Conservancy Board, 
but the division of function proved costly: in 1887 parts of the river afforded 
only 18 feet (5.49 m). "The Port of London", Cullen quoted from the Times, 
"is under chaotic control and is losing its hold on the trade of the country.""* 
At last, in 1900, a Royal Commission examined the port's difficulties and the 
Port of London Authority was subsequently appointed, organized along similar 
lines to the Liverpool port authority."® 
After commencing operations in 1908 it was generally agreed that the 
P.L.A. worked well. Disagreement continued, however, over the equity of 
representation on the Authority given to different interests."® This was usuaffy 
the most contentious point in the appointment of the port authorities. There 
could be no fixed rule as to the proportion of representation that interests should 
receive on the English Boards as representation—to be successful—had to vary 
with different local port needs. That port users should always be represented 
on the port authorities seemed axiomatic, yet in the Australian colonies it was 
not. A new port authority was set up for Sydney at the time the P.L.A. was being 
fashioned and the Sydney Harbour Trust's constitution, unhke the Enghsh port 
charters, was not representative of port users."' 
In Queensland as sharp a variation from English precedent would not be 
made. However, as Liverpool's port authority and the town council had clashed, 
so would the Council and Harbour Board clash in Rockhampton and, to a lesser 
degree, in Townsville, during the changeover of port authority. More seriously, 
the workings of the colonial port authorities would later break down in several 
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ways and injure port development. This did not occur in England. The difference 
was the result of the divergent experience of a colonial as against an established 
society. 
In Queensland, ports had been set up at the same time as the coastal towns 
they were part of; in England the ports had taken hundreds of years to develop. 
In the port-towns of the Mother Country there had grown up a sense of separa-
tion between those concerned with the port and those more involved with the 
town. No such valuable sense of division could be felt in the Queensland port-
towns and colonial regionalism would often influence the port authorities for 
the worse. It was in the centres of regional opposition to centralized government 
in the colony—Rockhampton and Townsville—that the interests of the town 
would be most frequently placed over those of the port. 
The main regional ports and the new Harbour Board legislation 
Rockhampton and Townsville: Jealousy of local port rights and intra-port 
policy disagreements. Some of the problems which arose in the early workings 
of the new Harbour Boards in the major regional ports were only short-run. 
These concerned the handing over of port authority from the town Councffs to 
the Harbour Boards and some sharp assertions by the new Boards of their 
rights against excessive governmental interference in their port's affairs. A more 
long-term and serious difficulty was the presence of basic disagreements within 
the Boards on intra-port developmental policies. 
Before 1885 the Rockhampton Council had met with a number of diffi-
culties in administering the port. Disputes had taken place between the Council 
and the government and between the Council and Rockhampton's hinterland 
producers. When the Harbour Board was being set up some of the ill-feeling of 
these earlier disputes carried over into the new port discussions. The Council 
had its own definite ideas about how the Harbour Board should be appointed— 
it should elect the Board."® The Morning Bulletin opposed this proposal of the 
Council. It conflicted, the paper correctly argued, with the ideal of a Harbour 
Board as a representative body of port users and interests. What added fuel to 
the dispute's flames was the Council's excessive demands for compensation in 
transferring their wharfage rights to the Board. Feelings grew heated and the 
protests made years before over the divergent interests of Rockhampton as a 
town and as a port were again repeated. 
"Much the greater portion of the revenue of the new Board", a Bulletin 
correspondent pointed out, "has been and will be paid by the western business 
people, selectors, graziers and station owners.""" Other western papers were less 
polite in rebuking the Rockhampton Council. "The Council of Rockhampton", 
claimed the Clermont Telegraph, "is one of the most selfish corporate bodies 
to be found on this side of the equator. For thirty years or more it has been 
receiving enormous sums of money for wharfage dues and spending a large 
proportion thereof—not in improving the shipping accommodation of the port, 
but in the betterment of the public streets."!"" Rockhampton's frequent claims 
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to be the sole spokesman for the cause of Central Queensland separation had 
been as regularly disputed by Central Western residents. The wharfage issue in 
the nineties was one more instance of intra-regional disagreement. "After 
reading in the Rockhampton papers the report of proceedings in the Council on 
the subject of Harbour Dues", the Longreach Standard decided, "the people of 
Central Queensland may breathe a devout thanksgiving that Separation was 
strangled before it reached maturity."!"! 
Finally, the government affowed six months as a mediating period for the 
Board and the Council to come to terms but stffl agreement did not result. 
Therefore, as had been provided in the Board's Act, arbitration took place and 
the Council was awarded the sum of £45,000 ($90,000) instead of £100,000 
($200,000). The Council resented this result. "The juxtaposition of two Local 
Authorities", it warned the Treasurer, "must inevitably bring them into coffision 
on various points."!"" Townsville had mistakenly not anticipated the same 
difficulties with its town council and provision for arbitration on any wharfage 
disagreement had not been included in the Townsville Board's Bill. The Towns-
ville Council did not have extensive wharfage rights, but what it had it tena-
ciously held on to. The amount asked in compensation was again unreasonable 
and an amendment to the Townsville Harbour Board Act was necessary to allow 
for arbitration.!"" 
Both of the new Boards had clashes with their town councffs. Both also 
were jealous of their new port rights. The Townsville Board met with some 
difficulty in becoming operative, it was claimed, because of the administrative 
obstacles placed in the Board's path by the government.!"* jjj ^ like manner, in 
1897 the Rockhampton Harbour Board sharply warned the government about 
dredging at Broadmount. They were "strongly averse to any other body under-
taking work in the river placed under its control".!"® But the Boards' jealousy 
of their port rights could not bind them together strongly enough when different 
intra-port developmental policies were being decided. In Rockhampton the 
issue was between those who wished to deepen the river to the town wharves 
and those who stressed the advantages of a deep-water port. In Townsville the 
difference of intra-port opinion was over whether the Outer or Inner Harbour 
should be most rapidly developed. At the time the split in opinion in the Boards 
themselves ran deeper at Townsville, but a more serious conflict of interest 
would arise in Rockhampton, in which the Rockhampton Harbour Board's 
voice would be only one among others. 
Opposition to the development of Ross Creek in Townsviffe came from the 
Western members of the Board. In 1899 they opposed further Ross Creek 
improvement until the private wharves there had been taken over by the Board. 
As the Board's first chairman was associated with the town's Chamber of 
Commerce and was less sympathetic to Western proposals, intra-Board disputes 
on the matter were frequent. The Board's first annual report was quite open 
about the points of difference.!"® Where the shipping companies stood in the 
issue, however, was not as clear cut. In 1900 Howard Smith expressed dis-
appointment that Outer Harbour wharfage was not adequate. The outer jetty 
was equipped with a rail connection, yet shippers had to send their cargo directly 
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to the inner wharves.!"' The opposite viewpoint to Smith's was that the shipper's 
lighterage charge, included in the normal levy when cargo and passengers went 
to the inner wharves, was too lucrative for the companies to part with. "If the 
inner wharves are let to the shipping companies", one critic queried, "how does 
the Harbour Board hope to derive any revenue from the outer jetty wharves, 
and does the Board expect that the interstate companies—if they hold wharves 
in Ross Creek—will be induced to call at the jetty ?"!"® This kind of problem with 
the shipping companies would also arise in Mackay when that port's outer 
harbour was eventually built. 
Rockhampton's policy problem was similar to Townsville's in that it 
presented a choice between development at the town wharves or in deep water 
at Keppel Bay. But Harbour Board opinion was in this case more agreed on 
and favoured retaining the port at the town-site. One of the earliest Board 
statements stressed that the work necessary to render Rockhampton a deep sea 
port via river development was well within its capabilities and would be an 
accomphshed fact "within a very few years". Again, in 1897 the Board protested 
against improving the entrance cuttings to Broadmount until the rail-wharf 
linkages there had been completed, as the cuttings would not assist those vessels 
trading to the town.!"" 
In the light of the Board's attitude to the question of port placement, at 
least at this stage, it was plain that the Council's initial opposition to the Board 
had been misplaced. Yet in 1897 the Council still complained that the Board's 
constitution failed to provide adequate security that the deepening of the river to 
Rockhampton would remain a primary object.!!" Against the champions of the 
town as a portsite stood those western interests who were tired of the Fitzroy's 
problems. There seemed to be no end to these. In 1895 one protest about the 
Rockhampton Council's wharfage stand likened it disgustedly to the old 
traditions of the town, when parliamentary candidates had been called on to 
pledge themselves to oppose the connection of the Central railway with a deep-
water port. A speaker at one such meeting had been cheered for declaring: 
"If a deepwater connection was effected the Rockhampton people should see 
that a break in the gauge was made in order that all the goods should be handled 
in the town."!!! This was the degree of feeling aroused by the contest. The policy 
disagreement was to plague the Board for years to come. 
In both of the main regional outports which had appointed Harbour Boards, 
a move in the portsite was vitally necessary for the sake of the port's efficiency. 
As the new port authorities were meant to facilitate the solution of any port 
difficulty, the formation of Harbour Boards should have helped the ports of 
Rockhampton and Townsville to move to deep water. Not only did this not 
take place, but by 1900 the Board in Townsville was divided over the desirability 
of moving the portsite, and in Rockhampton the Board was unanimous that 
the port should remain where it was. 
Why a Brisbane Harbour Board was not appointed. "The presumption is", 
the Brisbane Courier wrote at the time of the 1892 Harbour Boards Bill, "that 
in the case of Brisbane, the dredges will be handed over together with the 
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frontage privileges at the disposal of the government, and a small sum."!!" 
Otherwise, very little was said about the application of the Bill to Brisbane for 
some years after its passage. Some had predicted that Brisbane would not 
appoint a trust, as it was the seat of government and could do better for itself 
without an authority. To this warning Mcllwraith had replied in apparent 
surprise that Brisbane would be one of the first to do so, yet his assumption was 
mistaken.!!" 
In 1896 the Rockhampton Morning Bulletin claimed that Brisbane had 
refused a Harbour Board unless the government provided all the funds for it. 
Under the 1892 Harbour Dues Act Brisbane's port expenses had been strictly 
accounted for, so Brisbane would not set up a Board, "for it thinks this would 
make permanent the rule that it must pay for the improvement and maintenance 
of its port and still cherishes the hope that while the rule may be apphed rigidly 
to the other ports, Brisbane will be exempted from it".!!* ^^g ^^Q failure to 
estabhsh a Brisbane Harbour Board, then, due to vested port interests unwilling 
to adopt a new form of organization under which they might have suffered? 
After 1895 Brisbane's port trade grew rapidly and the port failed to manage 
to cope with the change, so in 1900 the Brisbane Courier devoted a series of 
editorials to wharfage needs. The matter had been aggravated recently as 
shipping companies had increased their export wharfage charges. The paper 
criticized the increase, and also the Chamber of Commerce for failing to prevent 
it. "The whole of the industrial development of Queensland", the paper declared, 
"is more or less directly affected by the shipping facihties at its chief port."!!® 
At this point, John Leahy, an influential M.L.A., took up the question and 
condemned the port's shortcomings as regards entrance depths and wharfage 
accommodation. He urged that Brisbane should follow Sydney's recent example 
in appointing a trust: "Given state ownership of railways and what is practically 
state ownership of harbours and rivers, it is inevitable that the state should take 
possession of the final link between the two . . . the solution of the whole 
question is the resumption of the wharves."!!® His last point was very pertinent. 
With the exception of Council wharfage the Brisbane wharves were all privately 
owned. Robert Philp sympathized with Leahy's views on resumption but said 
the cost was preventative.!!' 
In 1900 the Marine Board also came out in favour of a Brisbane Harbour 
Board. Engineer Cullen's report on overseas ports had concluded with an 
account of the forms of port supervision in England, Europe, and America, with 
special reference to American federal-state relationships. It was beyond the 
terms of reference of his report to advocate the formation of a Brisbane trust 
but the implication was there.!!® Further, Almond, the Brisbane Portmaster, 
had emphasized the desirabihty of forming a port authority and the Marine 
Board had drawn up a comprehensive plan for the port.!!" 
These were the voices raised in favour of a Brisbane port authority. The 
most important source of opposition was the Brisbane Chamber of Commerce. 
The Brisbane Council was not very interested in the issue as the Chamber had 
played a much larger part in developing the port. After 1892 a Brisbane Harbour 
Board Bill circulated in official and business circles, but the Chamber of Com-
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merce's attitude was unenthusiastic.!"" In 1892 the Chamber's annual report 
stated that a bad harbour trust bill would be a great misfortune.!"' In 1896, 
feehng the pinch of the commercial depression, the body asked for a reduction 
in ports dues and for the port to be developed as a "national charge".!"" Finally, 
in 1899 it suggested that Brisbane should be treated as a national port after 
federation and be exempted from harbour dues. To this request the Rock-
hampton Morning Bulletin rephed with an impeccable regional logic: 
It is satisfactory to find the Chamber is willing that a Harbour Board 
should be constituted for Brisbane, but the determination to escape paying 
harbour dues is one which must be carefully watched. What Brisbane wants 
is that all harbour dues be abolished and at the same time that the work 
of river improvement be carried on by the government. The Brisbane River 
is a national work and the other rivers are local works. That is the idea 
which is sought to be given effect to . . . to support this it is stated that 
because there are no harbour dues, or very light dues, in Sydney, there 
must be equally light dues in Brisbane, otherwise the constitution of the 
Commonwealth will be infringed. If that is correct, then for the same 
reason there must be no harbour dues in Rockhampton. So far we would 
stand at the same level . . . but when it came to the improvement of the 
river, the Fitzroy would be very far from standing on the same level as 
Brisbane.!"" 
This evidence proves that the Chamber of Commerce was opposed to a 
Brisbane port trust. Businessmen were not keen on applying the principle to 
the port; instead, as the Rockhampton paper had charged, they hoped that 
federation might lead to an alternative method of port control which would 
reduce or eliminate harbour dues. It must be recalled that private interests had 
been more important in the port's historical development than the Council or 
the government, and that this could be traced back to the pre-1859 sale of most 
of the city waterfront.!"* jj^g town councils in Rockhampton and Townsville 
had played a much larger part in their port's development, and private wharf 
ownership was more extensive in Brisbane than in any of the outports or in any 
other Austrahan capital city port.!"® Some Brisbane businessmen also made an 
unfavourable comparison between the Brisbane Council and the prospective 
port trust. In 1900 one Chamber member, speaking of the government's delay 
in introducing the Brisbane Harbour Board Bill, declared that "its machinery 
resembles that of a municipal organisation, and if Brisbane municipal achieve-
ments are a sample of what we may expect, I should prefer to leave the work 
with the government".!"® 
The most important reason for the Chamber's opposition to a Brisbane 
trust was clearly brought out in 1901 when the Courier published a letter from 
A. J. Lamont, M.L.A. for South Brisbane. Lamont asked where the Board's 
revenue was to come from. 
On whom is the burden to fall ? If on the shipping then we may bid adieu . . . 
to our ever being able to secure the trade of North Queensland. At present 
the import dues on cargo amount to 4s. per ton . . . We want to get these 
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reduced, and the question arises: wiff the Harbour Board be able to do this, 
and if so, how ? Townsville people are already beginning to find out that 
a Harbour Board does not meet all their souls' desires.!"' 
This letter sums up the reason for the failure of the Brisbane Harbour Board 
campaign. Kidson and Philp had not turned a deaf ear to Rockhampton's and 
Townsviffe's protests that Brisbane had been treated too generously in the past. 
After 1900 a Brisbane Harbour Trust Account was prepared annually to show 
that work on the Brisbane river was being carried out only so far as the port's 
revenue financed it.!"® Given this decreased sympathy on the central govern-
ment's part for Brisbane, Lamont's letter was representative of a wider opinion 
held by the Brisbane trading community that what the port needed was not a 
coordinating authority, but the reduction of port charges to a minimum. Local 
merchants were not convinced that a Harbour Board would have worked to 
that end, so they opposed the Board and attempted to have Brisbane treated as a 
"national port"; the government would remain responsible for port develop-
ment and harbour dues would be kept to a minimum.!"" After 1901 public 
debate about the port shifted from questions of administration to the practi-
calities of port charges. 
The attempt to set up a Brisbane port trust had now swung fuff circle since 
the first moves in the seventies. Then opposition had come from the Marine 
Department and the Chamber of Commerce had favoured it—the position had 
now been reversed.!"" However, while we can directly attribute the failure of the 
nineties attempt to the Chamber's opposition, it is essential to see the issue in its 
wider context. Regional rivalry was the basis of Queensland's nineteenth-
century economic and political life. Though the Harbour Boards were set up 
because of the financial difficulties of the nineties, they were the culmination of 
a long-term move towards local port control that had been proceeding since 
1859. While the 1892 Harbour Boards enabhng act could have been applied to 
any Queensland port, Rockhampton and Townsville had set up trusts and 
Brisbane had not. The capital lacked the stimulus of a regional separatist 
movement to encourage it to follow suit. It was the contented centre of govern-
ment and had already succeeded in its own regional struggle to break away from 
Sydney, whereas Harbour Boards had been constituted in the main ports of the 
North and the Centre because those regions were trying to separate from the 
South. 
Opposition to a Brisbane port trust certainly came from private interests 
which feared resumption or increased harbour dues, but it owed as much to the 
greater sense of security which local business and local government could feel 
in Brisbane. A parallel between the appointment of the port authorities and the 
regional attitude to federation is helpful.!"! South Queensland was the only 
strongly anti-federal region in 1899. When seen against this background 
Brisbane's reluctance to appoint a port authority becomes part of a wider 
contemporary Southern reluctance to change the existing pattern of government. 
Given the South's economic primacy in the colony, and Brisbane's dominance 
in the South, Brisbane interests were unwilling to risk changing a situation which 
was working well enough. 
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Conclusion: Port administration to 1900 
Although there were certain provisions that required Board engineers to 
submit their plans to the Marine Board for approval, the new port authorities 
were practically independent in formulating their improvement pohcies. It was 
assumed that this was essential if the Boards were to be held accountable for 
their ports. However, the Boards had been set up almost as expedients to get 
around a financial crisis, and the relation between local port control and the 
wider principles of local government had not been carefully sorted out.!"" 
Questions of the Boards' desirable functions had been put to one side, while the 
Boards' sources of revenue and representation had dominated legislative 
attention. This was unfortunate. Making ports was as much a political matter 
as making raffways, but the right of government control was not provided for 
at the time. When it later became clear that the Boards would be battlefields for 
conflicting opiiuons about different port policies, the government could do very 
httle about it. 
Tffl the nineties local interests had unofficially exerted influence on the 
government to make port improvements. The government had responded to the 
degree that the port concerned was an important trading centre. The Marine 
Board could suggest possible improvement plans, but could not implement them 
without government approval. Now local influence had been institutionalized 
in port management, and control had passed out of the government's hands at a 
time when crucial internal changes in some of the ports had become necessary. 
English port administrative methods had been transferred to Queensland quite 
uncritically. In the colonial ports a balance of authority between local and 
central control would have been a better solution.!"" 
Conclusion: Regionalism and port administration 
To describe Queensland as decentralized in 1900 because of the situation 
of three major and several secondary ports on a coastline of over a thousand 
miles is misleading. In each region there was extreme centralization and the 
rail system accentuated this pattern. As the network had not yet linked the 
principal ports of the South and Centre, but had still been developed extensively, 
the ports attained their maximum effectiveness in the colony's transport system 
at this time. The extension of the coastal hne would break the horizontal pattern 
of trade and pull it towards the South. 
There were indications that the large number of ports would be reduced. 
The earliest criterion of a good port had been its facility of hinterland access. 
The physical adequacy of many of the first ports had frequently been of lesser 
importance, but by the eighties these port weaknesses were becoming more 
troublesome. Because of the more normal conditions of port growth, and be-
cause trends in the development of the shipping services favoured trade centra-
hzation, internal port efficiency was rapidly assuming great importance. 
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Yet the performance of the main ports had been unsatisfactory. Brisbane 
needed to improve its wharfage and handling facilities, and although the port's 
river improvement programme had been the best of any of the colony's river 
ports, it remained to be seen whether the port could be truly efficient v/ithout 
shifting its site to deeper water. Brisbane's chance of making this move 
depended on either the appointment of a Brisbane Harbour Board or on 
private interests in the port taking the lead. Here Rockhampton's example was 
unencouraging. Most of the wharfage there had been in Council hands and 
even so the shift downstream had not been made. Of the three major ports, 
Townsville seemed best off in 1900 provided that priority was given to the 
development of the Outer Harbour. A seaport with an almost completed artificial 
harbour, the port's main shortcoming was the protracted use of lighterage. 
The prospects for the secondary ports were not hopeful. Only those which 
had made internal rail connections had a chance of enduring growth and the 
three main raff lines ran, naturally enough, from the three main ports. The 
Northern outports depended on continued mineral and sugar production: if 
either fell away so many ports would not be required. Normanton was most 
vulnerable as it was dependent on Croydon's output. Mackay and Cairns were 
more secure. Both served richer hinterlands yet each still had physical port 
disadvantages to overcome. Those of Cairns were the lesser; the Pioneer River, 
in contrast, had won the battle between the town and the river and Mackay's 
future depended on the construction of an artificial harbour. Meanwhile, Bowen 
and Gladstone, the finest natural harbours on the coast, remained relatively 
unused. There was the chance that rail construction might improve their inland 
connection, but in Bowen's case the raff linkage had been made as Townsville 
had wished it. Finally, in the South, Maryborough and Bundaberg faced great 
problems in improving their rivers. 
Trade and shipping centralization, potential rail competition, economic 
recession, physical port deficiencies: it was in this context that the administrative 
definition of the ports' functions was so critical in 1900. The role of the new port 
authorities would be vitally important. The Harbour Boards were the result of a 
devolution of port authority to local control which had been under way since 
Queensland had separated from New South Wales. As Central and North 
Queensland wanted their separation from the South, the move to local port 
control reflected these wider rivalries. Yet while regionalism decisively influenced 
port administration, port control was not explicitly singled out as a grievance by 
the separatists. This was due to the nationalist blind spot which confused any 
thinking on the matter. The ports could not attract parhamentary attention 
until some definite arrangement had been made for their supervision. Only in 
the next period did the question of the Harbour Board franchises become a 
politically fruitful theme for radical politicians. Alternately, the ports could not 
be seen as an important colony-wide economic concern as they were so much a 
local matter. The parhamentary representative for a port knew the history of its 
problems in minute detail, but any wider sense of responsibility rarely emerged. 
As Sydney Webb had later written, efficient port administration required a 
certain large-mindedness and long views. But the Harbour Boards that had been 
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appointed were situated in towns that were steeped in the practices of regional 
opposition to central government and aggressive inter and intra-regional 
competition. The interests of the town and the port had been identified instead 
of separated by the Boards. Their built-in local allegiances prevented them from 
displaying that sense of broader concern with the colony-wide problems of port 
development. In both of the major regional outports to 1900 the Boards favoured 
retaining the portsite at points of lesser navigational advantage because they 
were closer to the town. Finally, there were indications that radical criticism of 
the Harbour Board franchises would also hinder port administration. 
THE ECONOMY 1900-1918 
The beginnings of the radical interlude 
So far the years 1860 to 1885 have been described as a time of flux and 
becoming and the years 1885 to 1900 as a time of consolidation. As straight-
forward a description of the period 1900-1918 cannot be made. It is divided here 
into three sub-periods: the uncertainty of three party politics on the federal and 
state level, accompanied by economic recovery from depression and drought tiU 
1909; greater optimism and return to two party pohtics matched by the re-
commencement of growth from 1909 to 1913/1914; and lastly the war years, 
more of an interruption than a stimulus to growth, tiff 1918. The shape of the 
economy in 1900 was to be the framework for economic change for the next 
fifty years. Some sectoral adjustments did take place but Queensland remained 
dependent on primary production. In a hke manner, pohtical change after 1900 
was a variation on a basic score already written, rather than a newly composed 
theme. The federal government strengthened its financial relations with the 
states, yet Queensland retained most of the initiatives for stimulating economic 
growth. Only tariff control passed directly to the Commonwealth, while wages 
policy came more under federal influence towards the end of the period. The 
emergence of the Country Party was of greater importance for the state at the 
time. Radical-labour energies adapted themselves to agrarian sentiment and 
Queensland Labor's economic policies became heavily ruralistic in emphasis.! 
The structure and timing of growth 
Warnings that federation would make it impossible for future intra-
Queensland separatist movements to succeed proved correct. T. J. Ryan moved 
an unsuccessful half-hearted motion for Central separation in the Assembly in 
1910, but the issue had been decided. Yet to conclude that there had been cor-
responding decline in regional consciousness would be mistaken. The triadic 
division of the state had become firmly fixed in the state's traditions by 1900." 
Regional economic change in the period emphasized the potential weaknesses of 
the outlying regions and the demand grew for decentralization—the panacea 
which was the direct descendant of separatism. Regionahsm's strength would 
remain and influence economic change and port administration. 
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Contin ued pastoral primacy 
The pastoral industry remained the state's foremost producing industry 
and expanded strongly. Pastoral activity continued to decline from 1896 to 1903, 
while recovery took place between 1903 and 1912. Allowing for the depths of 
depression that the industry had descended to, from 1903 to 1908 the industry 
mostly regained lost ground, but from 1908 to 1912 more positive expansion 
took place. Growth was halted in 1912, yet activity still ran at a high level despite 
drought until 1914. The next two years were bleak because of wartime dis-
location and drought. Recovery began in 1916 but drought again intervened 
two years later. 
The expansion of the meat export trade was the most notable structural 
change in the industry after 1900. Meat processing required expensive methods 
of treatment; therefore production was usually on a large scale. Because of this. 
Labor criticisms of the trade's monopoly aspects were frequent. These cul-
minated in a Royal Commission into the industry in 1913. Complaints about 
unsatisfactory slaughtering conditions had alarmed the pubhc and the Com-
mission had to consider whether pubhc abattoirs should be set up in Brisbane. 
Related concerns were whether the standard of Queensland's cattle had 
deteriorated, and whether the production and distribution sides of the industry 
were meeting pastorahsts' needs. 
The Commission's moderately toned majority report favoured the idea of a 
Brisbane abattoir and made several other mild criticisms of the industry. 
However, G. E. Bunning's minority Labor report agreed only about the need 
for a public abattoir; otherwise he put forward a careful and competent critique 
of the industry and directly attacked the trade's organization. His fellow Com-
missioners had concluded that there had been no serious decline in Queens-
land's cattle standards. If there had been a short-run decline, they considered 
this was due to the effects of the 1903 drought and because the growth of the 
dairying industry had led to careless cross-breeding. Bunning argued, however, 
that the standard prices offered by the producing companies gave pastoralists 
no incentive to improve breeding practices, and he considered the companies 
undercapitalized and outdated. Emphasizing these firms' links with British 
capital, he stressed the trade's need for non-seasonal markets and the un-
desirability of accepting Enghsh prices regardless of world prices. Leaving party 
political emphasis to one side, his criticisms reflected a thoughful appraisal of 
the industry from an Australian rather than an English viewpoint." 
Regional shares of sheep flocks changed httle from the preceding period. 
The Centre and the South accounted for most of the stock and experienced 
similar fluctuations, while after 1908 the Centre became dominant as a sheep-
raising area. Meanwhile development in the North was at a much lower rate but 
was also steadier. Regional figures for cattle stocks again pointed to the North's 
greater stability. The region took second place to the South but each region was 
an important carrying area. As in preceding years, variations in cattle numbers 
in the Centre were more marked than in the South. 
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Moderate agricultural success 
The preceding period had seen the failure of Queensland's agriculture. 
In 1900 its share of the Austrahan area under crop was a mere 4.8 per cent and 
the per capita share was .9 per cent against an Australian average of 2.4 per 
cent. By 1920 the state's position seemed to have barely improved, as the 
respective figures were then 5.1 per cent and 1.1 per cent/2.8 per cent. In fact, 
there had been an important change for the better.* The period was a tran-
sitional one of moderate prosperity during which substantial gains were made 
despite drought and the strains of war. This moderate achievement reawakened 
many agrarian hopes. Full governmental encouragement was given and many 
of the technical problems which had bedevilled farmers before 1900 were gradu-
ally resolved. Lastly, branch railway construction laid the foundations for rapid 
agricultural growth in the inter-war period. 
This moderate success was confined to South Queensland. Only a small 
amount of cultivation was carried on in the Centre, while in the North agri-
culture and sugar growing were almost synonymous. In 1920, of 150,900 
acres (61,064 ha) under crop in the North, 146,100 acres (59,128 ha) were under 
sugar.® Maize was the only other crop of any significance in the region. In the 
South, the importance of the Darhng Downs was basic. Variations in Downs 
acreage immediately meant variations for Queensland acreage figures. Expansion 
in the Wide Bay and Moreton districts did not closely foffow Downs patterns, 
but the same trends were observable. The experience of the southwest and 
Maranoa, however, was something apart; there the crops raised were principally 
wheat, maize, and green fodder. Wheat was the chief crop on the Downs and in 
the southwest and Maranoa, while maize was grown on the Downs and in the 
Wide Bay and Moreton districts. Lastly, the Downs and Moreton raised most 
of the state's green fodder—though after 1910 Wide Bay became an important 
producing area. These simple facts of crop composition meant a complete 
change for the better in the state's agriculture. The place of maize as a cash crop 
had at last been reduced and wheat production and fodder growing expanded. 
It was the growth of dairying which was the most basic structural change in the 
state's agriculture after 1900. Queensland became Australia's first cheese pro-
ducer and third butter manufacturer by 1920. Dairying was restricted to the 
southeast and central coastal regions. Between 1915 and 1920 the Wide Bay, 
Darling Downs and Moreton areas strengthened their position as the major 
dairying areas, while cheese production was especially the province of the 
Downs.® 
The expansion of the sugar industry and the decline of mining 
Sugar production underwent severe dislocation from the great drought, 
then rapidly recovered after 1902 until 1905. Cultivation stagnated between 
1905 and 1911 and expanded moderately till 1917. Expansion in the industry 
seems to have taken place only after 1911. The South's share of production was 
gradually reduced by the contraction of growing there and by Northern 
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expansion. Of the three main Northern producing areas, Mackay's share re-
mained relatively constant, while both Townsville and Cairns expanded pro-
duction. 
The industry had to cope with many difficulties in the period. After being 
shaken by the major drought of 1898-1903, production was again racked by 
droughts in 1914 and 1918. The North was also hit by cyclones in 1911, 1912, 
and 1918, as weff as by floods in 1917. Kanaka labour was withdrawn from the 
industry in these years, while frequent industrial disputes and wartime price 
controls completed the list of disadvantages which sugar growers had to cope 
with.' Yet in 1918 the industry seemed poised for expansion. The only moderate 
expansion of the industry had little connection with public estimations of its 
importance. "It is the chief industry in Queensland", Forgan Smith calmly 
asserted in 1918.® 
Such prestige was not commanded by the state's mining industry, and it 
was permitted to decline gradually. By 1920 gold mining in the North and South 
had decreased so much that only the Centre remained a producing region of any 
significance. After 1912 copper became more important as a mineral product 
and by 1918 coal production also surpassed gold. Total mineral production 
continued to rise from 1896 to 1906, with a slight decline in 1901. After 1906 
activity fell off till the end of the period; in that time there were three down-
swings of increasing severity, in 1907-1909, in 1913-1915, and in 1918-1919. 
Gold mining began to decline in the North after 1903. Of the principal mines, 
Croydon fell away after 1907, and production at the Hodgkinson ended after 
1912-1914. The output of Charters Towers also dwindled. In 1900 the Towers 
had been Queensland's second largest town, but whereas in that year the 
town's mines raised some 205,000 fine ozs, by 1906 this level had fallen to 
175,000. Five years later the mines were nearly exhausted. Production in the 
South meant production at Gympie, and there output also faded gradually, but 
more sharply between 1903 and 1906. Mt. Morgan alone remained an important 
gold mine in the state by 1920." Even so, through the period the Central mine 
redirected production towards copper. This move to base metal production 
would have to be made by the state's entire mining industry if it was to survive. 
Copper was the most valuable base metal raised. Between 1906 and 1916 coal 
production was also of some importance, and wartime shortages stimulated the 
industry. Base metal mining lacked the glamour of gold, but without it the 
decline of the state's mining industry would have been catastrophic. 
Manufacturing fails to diversify 
In 1920 when Bernays wrote, "our manufacturing industries are well nigh 
beneath contempt", he was expressing a prevalent attitude to manufacturing 
more than stating facts.!" The period actually saw the strongest expansion in 
manufacturing in the state's history. Rapid manufacturing growth took place 
between 1906 and 1914, and from 1919 to 1920. Yet, while Queensland's place 
in Australian manufacturing was favourably comparable with the other states 
in 1901, and was stiff so in 1911, it was not by 1921.!! 
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To explain this paradoxical result something must be said of the sectoral 
composition of the state's manufacturing industry. From 1900 to 1905 activity 
in food and drink, sugar, meat, and construction declined; in the next five years 
clothing, metals, sugar, and construction expanded. Meat, metals, and con-
struction continued to grow from 1910 to 1915 but stagnation foffowed, especi-
ally in meat and clothing. These trends stress the importance of the non-primary 
manufacturing sectors—clothing, metals, and construction, as weff as the 
primary processing industries dealing with meat and sugar—as areas of growth 
between 1905 and 1915. Whereas the 1890s depression had not greatly affected 
Queensland's total manufacturing output, it had harmed the non-primary 
sectors. The effects of the 1914-1918 war, in contrast, though not injuring non-
primary production any more than primary, caused a marked decline in overall 
activity. But if the war had not damaged non-primary manufacturing, neither 
had it increased the share of non-primary manufactures. Once again Queens-
land manufacturing had suffered from failing to extend activity away from 
primary processing.!" 
The economy 1900-1918: Rapid growth but little structural change 
The 1890s depression in Queensland had been at its worst between 1891 and 
1893. The next four years saw some signs of recovery, notably in construction 
and rail activity, while mining and the sugar industry began to re-expand. But 
from 1898 to 1903 drought had echpsed those signs of hope. The dark years 1898 
to 1902 were affeviated only by the success of mining, slight manufacturing 
growth, a brief upswing in construction in 1901, and the intake of some southern 
immigrants. After 1902 sugar and agriculture moved forwards, followed a year 
later by pastoral recovery. Mining continued to prosper, but construction did 
not pick up. 
However, by 1906 manufacturing began to expand, and two years later the 
pastoral industry was fully recovered and strongly forging ahead; in another 
two years construction activity followed suit. Expansion became general in the 
economy until 1914, although the sugar industry had stagnated between 1905 
and 1911 and mining dechned in 1913. The onset of war saw dechnes in pastoral, 
construction, and mining activity. Economic change between 1900 and 1920 
therefore fell into five phases: depression till 1902, slow recovery tiff 1908, rapid 
growth between 1908 and 1914, slump 1914-1917, recovery 1918-1920. The first 
three phases were fairly clearly defined, but the years from 1914 to 1920 were a 
mixture of recession and recovery. From 1897 to 1902 the Queensland economy 
had been under severe duress. In the next six years it was concerned mostly with 
making up lost ground. But the development of the economy after 1908 was 
striking. The expansion of the construction and pastoral industries, and the rail 
building programme in those years bore comparison only with the record 
achievements of the 1880s. 
While the period 1885-1900 in Queensland differed chiefly from the 
Australian economic experience by the recession of the mid-eighties, the period 
1900-1920 was distinguished by the severity of the difficulties set for the state's 
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economy by the great drought. Otherwise Queensland's periods of growth, 
1908-1913 and 1918-1920, were in step with the expansion of the Australian 
economy. The worst aspect of the state's economic performance was not so 
much that its absolute growth was inadequate, but that the structure of the 
economy was not diversified. The beginnings of diversification could be seen in 
the Austrahan economy via growth in the agricultural, manufacturing, and meat 
producing sectors. These sectors also expanded in the state's economy, but their 
growth was relatively much less. In 1920 the Queensland economy was still 
dominated by the pastoral industry, and manufacturing production was much 
less extensive than in the southern states. The Australian mining industry had 
declined after 1900 but in Queensland it maintained itself to 1911. This was of 
doubtful benefit to the state as it helped Queensland to stay set on its primary 
producing path. 
In short, the tendencies towards diversification that could be seen in the 
Commonwealth's economy by 1920 were not present in Queensland. By 1921 
Australian manufacturing employment nearly equalled combined employment 
in the agricultural and pastoral industries; in the same year Queensland manu-
facturing employment remained less than agricultural or pastoral employment 
taken separately.!" The description given of the state's manufacturing industry 
in the period, that is, rapid growth between 1908 and 1914 marred by failure to 
diversify, may be applied to the economy as a whole. Yet after the war prospects 
for growth in the 1920s seemed bright. Perhaps that decade would see changes 
in the structure of the economy as well as the continuation of rapid growth. 
In the preceding period the imbalance between the South and the other two 
regions of the state had been reduced. Economic change from 1900 to 1920, 
however, did not continue this trend. Much the same economic relation was 
maintained between the Centre and the South, but the North's position was 
weakened. The state's economy had not redirected production away from 
primary activity, yet there had been growth in the agricultural and manu-
facturing sectors. But both agricultural and manufacturing production remained 
largely the province of the South. The Centre fared better than the North. The 
region retained mining as an important producing industry and by 1920 pastoral 
production was more important in the Centre than it had ever been before. In 
the North the sugar industry had been maintained, again in the face of difficulty, 
and the pastoral industry was of value, but the North's mining industry had 
gradually declined. Some meat-processing establishments were also working in 
the North and in the Centre and the Centre did benefit slightly from the intro-
duction of dairying in its coastal districts. But all in all, the state's manufacturing 
and agricultural production was concentrated in the South and no new industry 
had arisen in the North to take the place of mining. The figures for regional 
population change demonstrate the effect of these economic developments on 
the North and the Centre. The population of the two regions was almost 
stationary between 1901 and 1911.!* 
The way that the economy was developing, therefore, was strengthening the 
tendencies towards centrahzation which had been implanted between 1860 and 
1885. The next fifteen years had reduced the economic imbalance between the 
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three regions, but between 1900 and 1920 the conditions for a recentralization of 
economic activity were again created. The already established centres of pro-
duction would be the beneficiaries of future growth. The construction of the 
state's rail transport system encouraged these tendencies after 1900. In 1902 the 
coastal line had reached Rockhampton; by 1924 it joined Cairns and Brisbane, 
and rail freighting policies encouraged trading concentration on the South. 
These economic developments placed the state's major outports in a vulnerable 
position and affected the smaller regional ports even more seriously. These 
effects only became clear, however, towards the end of the period. 
Public policies and economic change: The remnants of the trinity 
After 1900 the agrarian ideal was revived. But now agricultural settlement 
was seen less as the specific result of a broadly planned approach to economic 
development, than as something desirable in itself, to be achieved regardless of 
the condition of the economy as a whole. Queensland did not undertake assisted 
immigration programmes after 1900 on any scale comparable with that of earher 
efforts. Therefore only the state's rail building activity and treatment of the land 
industries are considered in the light of lingering agrarian preference. 
Railways: Revenue vs. development 
The period saw the greatest amount of continuous rail construction that 
had taken place in the state. From 1880 to 1900, 2,140 miles (3,444 km) of track 
had been laid, of which 1,500 miles (2,414 km) were built in the eighties. The 
next decade had seen a sharp decline in activity. Despite the handicaps of drought 
and war, expansion between 1900 and 1920 was more continuous: a total of 
2,970 mffes (4,678 km) was put down—1,100 (1,770 km) from 1900 to 1910, and 
1,870 (2,968 km) in the twenties. Kidston's period of government had been 
specially important for building. The session had seen the extension of the North 
Coast Line to Cairns and seven agricultural branch lines were authorized. The 
possibility of building a Great Western Line to link the three regional trunk 
lines in the west was also seriously mooted. As Bernays put it, this was "the 
biggest railway policy which Queensland had seen".!® 
Building remained almost entirely in the hands of the government. The 
construction of the Chillagoe hne by private enterprise had not heralded any 
change in the tradition of state construction. By 1914, of some 4,700 miles 
(7,564 km) of line in the state, 300 (483 km) had been privately buiff.!® The only 
innovation was the definition of benefited areas in 1906 to help meet con-
struction costs. Despite some success, the policy could not accurately define 
which areas benefited most, and a spate of criticism was levelled at the method. 
Where it could define the benefited areas, critics added, it could not be applied 
retrospectively. Basically it was little more than an adaption of the 1896 Local 
Guarantee Act, which had also had little success.!' The method's weaknesses 
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were the result of a basic division in the aims of rail building in the period. 
This division was between those who saw the railways as primarily a 
developmental agent of economic growth, and those who were more concerned 
with the revenue-earning abffity of the railways. It was very much a legacy of 
past problems. In the eighties colonists had still hoped that railways would work 
economic miracles; these aspirations had been replaced by more sober assess-
ments of railway earning capacity through the nineties. After 1900 an ambival-
ence of purpose perplexed construction as each consideration assumed primacy. 
No rigid division existed, but the advocates of developmental lines usually 
supported agricultural expansion and those stressing revenue needs aligned 
themselves with pastoral-commercial interests.!® The advocates of branch 
building were more successful in the period but this was to some extent a fore-
gone conclusion. Queensland's first major phase of raff building had laid down 
the basic trunk hues: these then required local branch additions and this was 
what was done after 1900. The policy ambivalence still caused controversy, 
however. It provided a conveniently confusing background for those who 
wished to build localistic and short-sighted branch lines. This was a major factor 
in the difficulties of some ports. 
Extremely wasteful branch construction took place in the hinterlands of the 
two Southern outports. The desirability of a Nanango to Brisbane line via 
Yarraman had been the subject of detailed enquiry as early as 1900. A Royal 
Commission had then recommended that the connection should not be made 
as it would take trade from Maryborough and Bundaberg, "the natural sea-
ports". But branch hne construction had continued in the region and, as a later 
Commission concluded, "the various extensions have culminated in four dead-
ends within a radius of twelve miles [19 km]".!" j ^ ^^g errors of this kind which 
gave substance to the complaint that railway making was purely a political 
matter."" An additional factor which tended to distract discussion on railways 
from the intent of building and added to the existing confusion of objectives, 
was the growing Labor insistence on minute regulation of working conditions 
for rail employees. In small matters of economic activity as well as large, the 
equation of moral and economic matters damaged enterprise."! 
J. B. Brigden later remarked that no one could be certain to what degree 
the railways were a developmental enterprise for Queensland, and to what degree 
they were a business concern."" This was precisely the problem. A developmental 
agency could in the long run expect to incur financial losses; a business concern 
could not. What made the revenue side of railway management so important 
was the value of rail revenue to the public funds: it made up between one-third 
and a half of Consolidated Revenue. A further difficulty was that until the 
major lines of the system were joined, economies of scale in the use of rolling 
stock and labour could not be achieved. By the end of the period the railway's 
difficulties had become extreme. "In a land of distances, as Queensland is," the 
Commissioner for Rail lectured politicians in 1920, 
with no inland waterways, charges must be kept as low as possible in order 
to assist development. Rates and fares have certainly been increased during 
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the past few years, but not to the extent that they have advanced in other 
states. On the other hand railway expenditure is increasing because of the 
increased cost of wages, fuel and stores . . . from a national standpoint the 
opening up of country for close settlement by new railways is desirable, but 
from the standpoint of railway management there can be no doubt that the 
construction of new lines has outpaced the growth of traffic."" 
The uncomfortable fact was that by 1914 Queensland had laid down more rail 
hne than any other Australian state, but had a ratio of line length to population 
higher only than Western Australia."* This was the insecure foundation on which 
Queensland would have to face the onslaught of competition from private road 
transport. 
The land industries: Agrarian hopes begin to be fulfilled 
Pastoral land legislation. When the 1902 pastoral relief act was passed, it was 
accurately remarked that some years before the government would have been 
called traitors to the country for bringing in similar legislation."® However, the 
drought was the inescapable reality of the time and most pastoralists chose to 
come under the act. No major change in principle took place in the state's land 
laws till Labor's advent, when a series of acts was passed to increase pastoral 
rents and to limit tenures."® Many of these attempts to raise rents continued to 
be shattered on the rock of Council opposition, but some progress was made."' 
Then, in 1916, freehold land tenure was abolished. This seemed to settle the 
tenure issue which had been so intensively debated to that time, but early in the 
next period there would be a dispute between the government and pastoral 
finance companies over the land laws. 
The greater complexities of the pastoral land laws passed after 1900 
reflected an increased political sensitivity to the differences in conditions that 
affected occupation in the state's vast area. The via media of grazing farms 
continued to grow steadily and was accompanied by an expansion in the 
number of grazing homesteads; by 1918 nearly six miffion acres (2,428,100 ha) 
were held under these tenures. In the period the government had turned its usual 
kindly hberal eye on pastoralists, much as Labor politicians would when the 
industry was ravaged by drought in the inter-war years—if not to quite the same 
generous degree. The state's most important producing industry could not be 
injured however much pastoralists came under pubhc opprobrium. This was just 
as well: the pastoralists were not well represented in the Assembly."® Later, 
when Forgan Smith declared that the government's duty was to foster primary 
production, the pastorahst somehow seemed to be left out of Smith's definition 
of what primary production included."" 
Agricultural land legislation. The main problem facing intending farmers in 
1900 was the shortage of suitable lands. Much of the Downs stiff remained in 
pastoral or homesteading hands. Accordingly, repurchase amendment acts were 
passed in 1897,1901, 1905, 1906, and 1913. The terms of agricultural repurchase 
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were continually changed to meet changing conditions, until in 1917 the principle 
of perpetual lease was introduced. The effect of these various acts fulfilled 
agrarian expectations—for the first time in Queensland's history intensive small-
scale cultivation was succeeding. By 1918 nearly £2,000,000 ($4,000,000) had 
been spent repurchasing land for closer settlement. Of this amount, £1,406,300 
($2,812,600) had been expended on repurchasing land on the Downs."" 
Otherwise, initiatives for improvements had to come from the farmers 
themselves. In preceding years complaints had been frequent about their failure 
to cooperate in the European fashion, by sharing local knowledge and spreading 
more methodical principles of cultivation. Some advances were made. In 1901 
a Chamber of Agriculture was formed with thirteen affiliated societies and 
greater rural cooperation was specially valuable in improving wheat growing 
methods—one of the weakest links in the agricultural chain. Further, an Agri-
cultural Bank was established in 1901 and its scope was extended when it 
proved useful to small selectors."! Towards the end of the period there was a 
spate of agricultural legislation: a Pure Seeds Act, a Stock Foods Act, and a 
Cooperative Agricultural Production Act, to name the more important. Finally, 
the wartime wheat marketing arrangements had impressed many with their 
serviceability, and the Wheat Board was retained after other wartime innovations 
were discarded."" It is usuaffy considered that the war acted as a stimulus to 
Australian manufacturing; in Queensland, the inffuence of wartime controls on 
agricultural production, marketing, and distribution was more noteworthy. 
The moderate prosperity of Queensland's agriculture during the period was 
part of an Austraha-wide turning to agriculture as an object of investment."" 
Another point favouring the industry was that the state was still youthful in 
relation to the southern states. Lands Department officials from time to time 
could approvingly note influxes of southern settler-farmers."* Perhaps more 
important than either of these causes of agriculture's better performance was the 
great amount of branch rail building. A plurality of causes contributed to the 
agricultural achievement, but the effect of the moderate advance on government 
policies was overwhelmingly monistic. Agriculture was given unqualified 
endorsement as a field of enterprise and few paused to query the specific ad-
vantages of agrarian development—it was taken more as a moral maxim. The 
moral and pohtical power of agrarianism was indicated by the defensive tone of 
the Secretary for Lands in passing the mildest words of restraint in 1906: 
"I suppose it will sound almost like heresy or unpatriotic to say so, but the fact 
is that we have in Queensland . . . a great deal smaller area fit for closer settle-
ment than a lot of people think.""® 
Agrarianism in 1918 
The trinity of hope had passed away by 1900, but some of its ideals 
remained. Assisted immigration was not again undertaken on any large scale; 
rail construction, however, attained a new high level of activity. As in the 
preceding period, rail building after 1900 was perplexed by an uncertainty of 
purpose. Those who argued that railways were for developmental purposes 
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more than for raising public revenue usually favoured agrarian settlement. 
Here was an important link with the earlier tenets of economic nationahsm. A 
more direct link was the treatment accorded to the land industries. The pastoral 
industry enjoyed a major boom after 1908, while agriculture grew only 
moderately; yet it was the latter which attracted public and political sympathy 
rather than the former. Agrarianism srill lingered on. The relevant question 
about its future in 1900 had been what relation would exist between the new 
labour radicalism and the older agrarianism. This is now considered. 
The politics of economic change: Radical-labour principles set limits to 
growth 
Labour radicalism and the liberal unanimity: Indirect limits to expansion 
While English and European society was preoccupied with the politics of 
confusion which led up to the first world war, the new Austrahan federal 
government was engaged in setting up economic institutions which embodied 
national aspirations and played an important part in Austrahan economic hfe. 
This was not materialistic parochialism, it was nation building. Till this time it 
had seemed that English hberalism would be most seriously challenged by the 
forces of the Left but now the Right added its pressures as well. The extremist 
class confrontation, until then common in Europe but rarer in England, also 
came near in Australia as the 1914-1918 war dragged on. The crisis in Australia, 
however, was only a pale reflection of the violent forces that had twisted Enghsh 
politics almost completely out of their liberal mould."® Basicaffy, Australian 
political life fared as weff as it did because labour radicalism was steeped in the 
liberal traditions. If labour had accepted the European revolutionary doctrines 
of class conflict and hostility to property, then the consensus would have been 
broken. But, as before 1900, labour's sociahsm had little in common with the 
European varieties of the creed. One comment about Wilham Kidston's pohtics 
in 1904 apphed equally well to Queensland Labor: "Of course the Premier 
advocates socialism until he has the opportunity to carry it into effect, and, as 
soon as he has that opportunity, he does not advocate it any longer.""' 
By 1900 Queensland had been governed by one Conservative government 
for twenty years. This was the view of the Maryborough Alert, a Labor journal, 
and it was only a slight exaggeration of the truth."® The Liberals had won office 
in 1903 but it was often very difficult to distinguish Liberals from Conservatives. 
Then, with the fusion of the two parties in 1909, divisions between the Labor 
and non-Labor parties became clearer and the fluidity of party fines—a charac-
teristic of Queensland politics for the preceding forty years—seemed to have 
ended."" The political discourse that took place in the state during the war years 
over such key issues as the legitimacy of industrial dissension in time of war, 
and the support for the war itself, was as vehement as had been heard to that 
time.*" The clash between the state and federal governments over waterside 
mffitancy in Queensland is considered in the discussion of the shipping history 
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of these years, and testifies to the intensity of political emotion which had been 
aroused. However, despite the alarming language used and despite the industrial 
unrest of the last years of the war, the liberal consensus was preserved. Hughes's 
wartime actions on the Right and the l.W.W. on the Left had brought the 
vitality of Australian liberalism to its lowest ebb. Yet the difficulties were at least 
capable of solution. It was doubtful if the parent country had been as fortunate. 
The cause of liberalism's greater success in Australia was its infusion with 
the nationalism of the federation period. The liberal agreement about the basic 
value of capitalist development within a democratic framework was strengthened 
by the labour-nationalist attitudes which agreed to leave democratic capitahsm 
intact but applied a permcative equalitarianism to the rules of the game. This 
was not a break in the Australian nationalist tradition. It was more its completion, 
for it was Labor that identified moral and economic issues most consistently 
and was in this sense the most truly Australian party. Consequently labour-
nationalist principles triumphed over liberalism and conservatism in the period. 
But the price of hberahsm's greater longevity in Australia was that the new blend 
of liberalism arrived at was less favourable to economic growth than previously. 
It would require a major historical investigation to properly substantiate this 
view, but it seems that the tariff and the arbitration system came to regulate 
enterprise—in the sense of undermining a competitive entrepreneurial climate 
of opinion.*! In 1914 G. S. Beeby had complained that arbitration's original 
purpose had been to prevent the sweating of labour, but that the system was now 
beginning to exceed its function and impede industrial efficiency by reducing 
labour's incentive to acquire skills.*" It became a frequent criticism in the period 
that Labor governments meant economic stagnation. This kind of complaint 
often was a standard political ploy but it was leveffed at Labor in Queensland 
with unusual insistency and emphasis.*" 
These remarks about the politics of the period do of course skim lightly 
over the surface of some complex issues. Assessment of the intent of the "new 
protection", for example, has varied. Greenwood considered it to be a skilful 
contrivance to bring the interests of workers and industrialists together, whereas 
Fitzpatrick dismissed it as a delusion. Comparable differences also appear in 
historical assessments of the intent and value of the arbitration system and the 
achievements of the federation period as a whole.** However, the relevance of 
these differences of opinion here is not the accuracy of the particular inter-
pretations advanced, but their point of departure. That is, they make different 
estimations of a common factor—the liberal basis of politics in the period. To 
the extent that liberahsm had broken down in Australia between 1914 and 1918, 
Greenwood's appreciation of the foundation period is mistaken; conversely, 
to the extent that liberalism had proved vigorous and creative in withstanding 
the pressures of extremism, Fitzpatrick's angle of vision is too narrow. The 
equalitarian labour-nationalist ideals had infused Australian liberalism to such 
a degree that both Labor and non-Labor parties were almost equally affected in 
their political attitudes to economic change. Limits to economic growth were 
therefore imposed by the influence of radical labour nationalism on Australian 
liberalism. In Queensland enterprise was limited in the same way, but still more 
directly. 
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Labour radicalism and agrarianism: Direct limits to expansion 
After a brief five days in office in 1899, Labor did not take the reins of 
government again in Queensland tffl 1915. Yet the years between had seen the 
passage of much Labor-influenced legislation and Labor had been the more or 
less permanent opposition party. Kidston left the Labor party in 1905 in dis-
agreement with the decision to terminate the coalition with Morgan's Liberals 
that had been made in 1903 to secure adult suffrage. He was premier in 1906 
and from 1908 to 1911. In the ministries formed between 1903 and 1915 the 
Liberals were usuaffy in the strongest position, but party lines were difficult to 
discern between Liberals and Nationalists. Denham, for example, was a member 
of each of Morgan's, Kidston's, and Philp's ministries. The fusion of Liberals 
and Nationalists in 1908 simplified political hfe; only the emergence of the 
Country party would change the shape of Queensland politics for decades to 
come. Queensland Labor, therefore, despite its very early victory, took a 
curiously long time after 1899 to re-achieve electoral success. Other Labor 
parties had formed lasting ministries at the Federal level and in New South 
Wales by 1910. To explain why the party did not enjoy earher success it is 
necessary to consider the question about the relation between agrarianism and 
labour radicahsm that awaited an answer in 1900: what relation would exist 
between the new labour radicalism and the original agrarianism?*® 
First of all, it was desirable that Labor should win at least some agrarian 
political support. Through the period both Labor and non-Labor parties saw 
the Queensland farming vote as one precondition of electoral success. Here, 
the basic criticism that non-Labor levelled was that a socialist government and 
land-owning classes were mutually exclusive. Socialists had "always proved 
themselves to be the enemies of men on the land", it was argued.*® Attempts to 
win support by campaigning against Labor along these lines met with varying 
success. In 1912 the electorate firmly rejected the Labor party after the Brisbane 
general strike had made anti-Labor warnings more meaningful than usual. "The 
identification of farming interests with Liberahsm was inevitable", explained 
the Brisbane Courier.'^'^ But previously Queensland farmers had been quite 
pragmatic in their political support and had not taken too much notice of 
Labor's rare doctrinal pronouncements, or of anti-Labor's more frequent 
condemnations of sociafist principle. 
In the nineties Labor representatives had at times been elected for farming 
constituencies, and some Darhng Downs farmers' meetings had agreed on 
resolutions which expressed sympathy for labour aims.*® Further, in 1903 
farming representatives and Liberals in parliament had joined with Labor to 
defeat Philp's government. In the 1907 elections some farmers' candidates stood 
independently from both Philp and Kidson, while in the 1912 election the 
country electorates had voted strongly against Labor.*" But if Queensland's 
farmers were not anti-Labor by nature, as was at times suggested,®" neither were 
they positively in favour of the Labor party. Rural wage awards were usually a 
sore point between farmers and Labor, as was the question of chffd labour 
which was so important to dairying families. On the other hand, in Queensland 
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the fiscal issue had not been a serious dividing hne between the two groups, as 
it had been in New South Wales.®! 
Yet, in a wider sense, labour radicalism had not been able to directly 
subsume the energies of the eariier agrarian radicahsm into its own appeal. It 
was not so much that the farming vote was electorally decisive—though it was 
important—as that Labor should absorb the nineteenth-century idealism about 
agrarian settlement so as to broaden its popular appeal. There were other 
reasons which are also part of the explanation of Labor's long wait to return 
to power between 1899 and 1915, such as the 1905 split when Kidston left the 
party, the adverse effects of the 1912 strike, and the time taken to evolve more 
effective union organization.®" But what was also extremely important, especiaffy 
for ffs implications on Labor's future economic policies, was that it was difficult 
for Labor to adjust itself to the demands of the agrarian movement because its 
own values were unsympathetic to the agrarian ideal. Not until 1913 did Labor 
effectively formulate a broader platform which appealed to agrarian sentiment. 
In that year, "Ryan, with Theodore, and other front bench politicians, had 
begun a campaign of advertising the Labour party as the true friend and ally of 
the farmer in his battle against monopolies and middlemen".®" In the same year 
the Australian Workers' Union came into existence and not long after electoral 
success followed. 
But the issue deserves a wider context. Modern European labour move-
ments usually had an urban base and were most well-organized in countries 
where industriahzation had proceeded rapidly. At some point a struggle between 
industrial and craft unionism in each labour movement was the norm. In this 
struggle, agrarian workers were ordinarily conservative and looked on the 
industrial unionism of their urban cousins with mingled distrust and dislike.®* 
It was a variation of this agrarian-urban hostility which perplexed Queensland 
radical politics. Queensland was fast becoming urbanized but the economy 
depended on primary production and was far from being industrialized. Hence 
the Queensland urban labour movement was not an industrial labour move-
ment in the more usual European way. To an extent, this difference was con-
ducive to harmonious relations between urban and rural labour. But, because of 
the conditions of the development of Austrahan nationahsm, the rural labour 
values which had nourished the movement were not sympathetic to agrarian 
life—they were more the values of the bush worker. As Bolton writes of the 
Northern sugar industry: "There was inevitably a latent antagonism between 
the mill-hand or the cane-cutter who was stiff an itinerant worker without 
property of his own, and the smaff farmer who was struggling to keep his status 
could not afford to be generous with wages or conditions, and was proud of his 
few, hard-won acres which the other lacked[5/c]."®® The key words here, in terms of 
the argument, are "itinerant" and "status". It was this ideological gap—to 
express the idea in the European way—between Queensland labour radicalism 
and agrarian radicalism which had to be bridged before Labor could win 
agrarian support. The party's own values made this bridge difficult to build.®® 
A parallel with the situation of Victorian labour adds to the logic of this 
reasoning. Victoria was the only Australian state where the Country party 
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managed to cooperate with the Labor party. This was possible in Victoria 
because of the existence of a viable agriculture based on wheat farming in the 
state, and because of the absence of pastoral holdings to the degree to which 
they were present in the economies of Queensland or New South Wales. Again, 
urban labour was strongest in Victoria, weaker in New South Wales, and weakest 
in Queensland. The labour myth formations had not impressed themselves as 
deeply on the Victorian Labor party. This was because bush workers, the group 
which had been most important in spreading the Australian Legend, had never 
been as important to the makeup of Victorian Labor as they were to the Queens-
land party.®' In this light, Ryan's leadership of Queensland Labor to eventual 
electoral success in 1915 was slightly misleading. Theodore's accession to the 
leadership in 1918 was more indicative of the path the party would tread. Ryan 
had kept his distance from the A.W.U.; Theodore was the leader of the country 
unions' organization.®® 
But gradually Queensland Labor learned from its mistakes through the 
period and by 1918 Labor's economic pohcies were meeting most agrarian 
demands. From the member for Croydon's opinion in 1904, that it was only 
through land settlement that the state could prosper, to Forgan Smith's ardent 
agrarianism of 1918—"We of the Labor party stand for primary production in 
all its aspects and in all its phases . . . we know that this question of primary 
production is the most important one in the world today"—ran a thread of 
Labor adaptation of sociahstic principle to agrarian practice.®" 
Conclusion: Laboiu- agrarianism and regionalism in 1918 
Despite the strains of war and of the great drought, Queensland had 
enjoyed a phase of economic growth in the period comparable with the develop-
ment of the 1880s. However, as the expansion of the eighties had not extended 
into non-primary producing industries, the growth of 1908-1913 had not stimu-
lated secondary production. Regionally, there were similar disadvantages. 
Despite overall growth, the North lost ground to the other regions while the 
South still retained the largest share of population and industry. The Centre had 
grown as rapidly as the South, but regional production had not diversified and 
could dechne as abruptly as production had in the North. After 1900 labour 
radicahsm gradually became labour agrarianism. There had been difficulties 
in the way of this, but by 1918 Labor was pledged to policies of agrarian en-
couragement. Before 1885 agricultural settlement had theoretically been the 
result to be achieved by a comprehensive approach to economic development. 
With the unformed condition of the economy at that time such a result seemed 
possible, and perhaps even reasonable. But in 1918, with the economy's heavy 
dependence on primary production, the continuing stress on agriculture defied 
reality. To this extent, the identification of moral and economic affairs triumphed 
over liberal pragmatism and hindered economic growth. 
The effects of these restrictions would be more apparent after 1918, but at 
The beginnings of the radical interlude 145 
least one result was clear already—port management was in a dismal position 
and plagued by regionalism. The influence of regionalism on the state as a 
whole was more diffuse. Although rarely given explicit discussion, regional 
inequality was an ever-present framework for economic policy formulation. It 
is likely that it limited criticism of the economy's sectoral imbalance. That is, 
whether secondary production should be encouraged or not was less important 
than how the existing mainstays of the regions—especially sugar in the North, 
and the pastoral industry in the Centre—could be encouraged. 
During the colony's first period of growth, development had been pursued 
through related land, immigration, and railway policies and had an agrarian 
goal. Economic progress had been made, but agrarian settlement had failed 
By 1900 the rural ideal was at its lowest ebb. However, in the two decades after 
1900 Queensland's agriculture had some moderate success and labour radicalism 
gradually became labour agrarianism. Agrarianism would hinder growth. 
9 SHIPPING SERVICES 1900-1918 The golden years of coastal shipping 
By the turn of the century Queenslanders had been presented with a fait 
accompli in the control of their maritime transport services. After 1900 change 
in the Queensland trade would usually be a product of change in the Austrahan 
shipping industry. Because of this, the question of the efficiency of the state's 
shipping services became bound up with the wider problems affecting the 
Austrahan trade. The foremost concern was the Navigation Act. The new 
Austrahan parliament met with much difficulty in formulating satisfactory 
shipping legislation and few parliamentary bills had the chequered career of the 
Act. Though introduced in 1904 it did not become law until 1912, after a series 
of lapses unparalleled in the fate of a major biff. The Act touched on most 
aspects of the Australian maritime industry and also involved Australian immi-
gration and defence, and British mercantile marine pohcies. Some areas of 
Anglo-Australian commercial relations in the industry were also affected. A 
related question was the desirabihty of establishing a Commonwealth shipping 
line. 
Discussion of these key maritime issues was stimulated and i-nfluenced by 
radical-labour criticism of the shipping services, and by the persistency of 
serious labour militancy in the industry. In this light, the years from 1900 to 
1909/1912 were years of critical inquiry, as nascent Australian Labor-Liberal 
nationalism learned to fashion its critical shafts. From 1909/1912 to 1914 these 
criticisms began to assume practical legislative form. Lastly, came the rude 
curtailment of nationalist claims after 1914 as a deeper allegiance called. Yet 
criticisms of the industry would be made again with fresh bitterness in the later 
years of the war. The rock on which so many criticisms of the industry were 
shattered was a familiar one—the uncertain dividing line between what was 
Australian and what was British. 
1900-1909/1912: Critical inquiry 
The shipping services 
The overseas service. The period saw the end of a long-run decline in world 
ocean freight rates. After the rise caused by the Boer war, freights continued to 
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decline till 1908. They rose steadily for the next four years, then rose sharply and 
skyrocketed with the outbreak of war. The Australian trade seems to have closely 
followed this pattern.! During the first decade of the century, therefore, ship-
owners in the Australian trade were faced with declining rates and increasing 
foreign competition. Conference arrangements did much to assist British owners 
in their competition with subsidized foreign shipping." The Australian conference 
was known officially as the Australian Association of Owners and Brokers, and 
unofficially as "Davis". The conference enforced allegiance by using a 10 per 
cent annual deferred rebate; it was this practice which was most objected to by 
radical critics." 
Much criticism of overseas conference freight charges stressed the danger 
of potential excess more than actual malpractice. Nevertheless, existing charges 
in some trades were frequently queried. The newly developed perishables trade 
in dairy produce and fruit was a case in point. For some time conditions for fruit 
carriage were unsatisfactory.* The interstate boats erred more grievously than 
the overseas liners, but only the Norddeutscher-Lloyd lines would accept a 
degree of responsibihty for overseas fruit shipments in the early years of the 
period. The struggle to ensure satisfactory butter shipments was as prolonged 
and involved overseas shipping to a greater degree. The remaining export trades 
were relatively large and well established and could usually fend for themselves.® 
Queensland perishables producers suffered from the same difficulties as 
their southern counterparts; otherwise the established export trades of meat and 
wool were adequately served.® The B.I.'s Torres Strait service, which had 
expired with the depression in 1895, was resuscitated with the change for the 
better in the state's economic fortunes in 1908. The new agreement included a 
freight rate equalization clause for cargoes to Northern ports. Amended in 1910, 
the agreement continued till 1916 when wartime difficulties ended the service for 
the period.' Still, Queensland did at times suffer because of its place as the last 
port of call by overseas boats trading from the south. Some overseas steamers 
were obliged to discharge their cargo for Brisbane at Sydney, then proceed to 
Brisbane for London bound cargo.® 
The coastal service. The fifteen years to 1900 had been very unsettled in the 
coastal trade. However, as the beginning of that period had seen the establish-
ment of a harmonious set of relationships in the Queensland coasting trade, the 
first years of the period 1900-1918 saw the Australian coastal trade organized. 
Despite the encroachments of railways the shipping industry retained much of 
its nineteenth-century prestige. Nevertheless, estimations of the shipping com-
panies' rightful place in the economy varied. In 1909 the Austrahan coastal 
service was described as the world's best, but radical-labour nationahsm took 
another viewpoint: "All the capitahstic papers throughout Australia are 
howling against what they caff the tyranny of the Federal government, yet a 
shipping ring that has practically a monopoly of the coastal trade is ten times 
more tyrannous and hardly a word is heard."" This complaint of the Mary-
borough Alert in 1902 was justified in that, though the companies' names were 
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household words, there was little public knowledge of their methods of operation 
or forms of organization. 
The companies in the Australian coastal conference were the Adelaide 
Steamship Coy. (A.S.C), the A.U.S.N., Howard Smiths, Huddart Parker, the 
Union Steamship Coy., the Melbourne Steamship Coy., and Mcllwraith 
McEacherns. In Queensland, trade was divided between the A.S.C, the 
A.U.S.N., and Howard Smiths.!" Externally, the companies presented two 
trading fronts: the Australian Steamship Owners Federation, which was con-
cerned with legislation affecting the industry and inter-company competition, 
and the Australian Steamship Companies, which dealt with labour. Internally, 
the most permanent alliances were between the A.U.S.N. and the A.S.C. and 
between Smiths, Huddarts, and Mcllwraiths. The overall association was 
referred to as "Collins". Collins sailed in calm profitable waters between 1902 and 
1911 but there were hurricanes at either end—depression and rate wars behind, 
and the threat of the Navigation and Industries Preservation Acts ahead.!! 
In Queensland it had been agreed that the A.S.C. would carry C.S.R. sugar, 
while the A.U.S.N. carried the Miffaquin crop. The sugar cargoes were the 
backbone of the A.S.C's trade in the state, but general cargo remained more 
important to A.U.S.N. manifests. Apart from its main coastal trunk service, 
the A.U.S.N. ran in the Brisbane outports trade, to Rockhampton, a Gladstone-
Townsville mail service, a Townsville rivers service, and in the Gulf trade. After 
1907 the railway carried interstate mails but intrastate mail carriage was still an 
important service, and was discharged in this period by the A.U.S.N. with 
relatively little friction. The Gulf trade remained a difficult one. The connection 
of Townsville and Cloncurry by rail in 1907 ended Normanton's provisioning 
trade to the mines and the port's only chance of survival seemed to be the 
extension of the Normanton-Croydon line to deep water, or the re-establishment 
of the town's meat works at the mouth of the Norman river.!" Some other 
Queensland ports, isolated because of the smallness of their trade rather than by 
their geographical position, complained of discriminatory shipping practices.!" 
Most dissatisfaction with the state's coastal service arose from the strict 
enforcement of the deferred rebate clause in all trading agreements. A dispute in 
the port of Maryborough was representative. Three of the town's most important 
business firms had tried to avoid using conference vessels and were penalized as 
a result. The two leading timber companies, Hyne and Wilson Hart, had 
attempted to ship their goods in their own vessels, while Walkers—the town's 
large foundry works—had received requests from northern clients for their goods 
to be shipped in Hyne's boats. Collins, however, informed Walkers that com-
pliance on their part would cost them their trade rebates. Resultantly Hyne's 
company was not permitted to sell coal in Bowen, buy cedar in Cairns, or ship 
for any Maryborough traders. Collins's enforcement of these restrictions was 
entirely verbal.!* 
The 1906 inquiries: The Commonwealth Line and the Navigation Act. Two 
careful examinations of the maritime industry were made in 1906. A first Royal 
Commission considered the overseas mail service, and a second the Navigation 
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Act. During the former inquiry there was some opinion that Austraha should not 
continue to rely entirely on private British companies for overseas communi-
cation. The Commonwealth, however, as a staunch supporter of the Empire, 
was concerned to preserve British naval strength. This restrained those who 
otherwise wished to see the mail subsidies to British companies discontinued.!® 
The Commission's findings, though cast in radical language, were a realistic 
hberal compromise: the existing subsidy arrangements were continued and the 
estabhshment of a Commonwealth Line in the future was recommended.!® But 
the matter did not end there. In 1905 W. G. Spence had asked for state-owned 
steamers. The sentiment of Deakin's reply, "Australia in general, and Western 
Australia in particular, seemed in the hands of firms, companies and com-
binations over which they had no control", still rankled among many Liberal 
and Labor supporters.!' 
The Commission into the Navigation Act extended the critical examination 
of the industry. A more far-reaching inquiry, it touched on most aspects of the 
Australian shipping trade. The desirability of fostering an Austrahan merchant 
marine was related to the increase in the employment of foreign labour on 
British boats and the implications of this for the Commonwealth's Immigration 
policy. The likely effects of enforcing the new arbitration employment laws on 
shipping in Australian waters deeply concerned British owners, and the issue 
implicitly queried the relations between Australian and British shipowners. 
The overseas companies presented a uniformly hostile front to the proposed 
Act. The proposed improvements in ships quarters would cost owners very 
dearly.!® jjj defence, they claimed that their services were of great importance 
to the success of the Australian coastal companies through providing feeder and 
coal contracts. Further, they claimed that no competition existed between the 
overseas and coastal companies for freight carriage. The coastal companies 
were less definite in their attitude to the Act. Only the Melbourne Steamship 
Coy. opposed the legislation outright, because the company was at that time at 
odds with its fellow members of A.S.O.F.!" A.S.O.F.'s official attitude to the 
question of the application of the Coastal Clauses of the Act was extremely 
reticent."" The important point at this stage was, were the Austrahan coastal 
companies in fact Australian-owned companies ? 
Many of the shares of the coastal companies were in British hands, though 
the M.S.C, Smiths, Huddart Parkers, and the A.S.C. were Austrafian-owned."! 
But questions as to the exact nature of financial control were in one sense 
irrelevant. The A.U.S.N. had allied itself with the B.L and was also associated 
with smaller coasting companies such as Burns, Philp, and the larger interstate 
companies—most directly with the A.S.C. The A.U.S.N.'s direct links with the 
B.L may not have been representative of the relations between the other Aus-
trahan coastal companies and the British overseas lines, yet to a greater or 
lesser degree most of the coastal companies had formed a series of agreements 
with British fines. The dividing line between what was Australian and what was 
British was generally uncertain in Australian society at that time: it was par-
ticularly elusive in the shipping world."" Some of the Australian coastal com-
panies were British-owned, while others had evolved loose but important agree-
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ments with the overseas companies. The reticence of the Austrahan companies 
to speak out openly against the proposed coastal clauses in 1906 was dictated 
more by A.S.O.F.'s different assessment of the pohtical situation than by any 
fear of the overseas companies, or a desire to damage their interests. The over-
seas and coastal companies were in fact at one in their desire to oppose the bill. 
The majority findings of the Commission fuffy reahzed the owners' fears. 
A number of sweeping changes in the standard of shipboard accommodation 
was recommended, as was the application of the Act's coastal clauses. This 
would exclude all non-Australian bottoms from the coastal trade. It was also 
suggested that the deferred rebate system be made illegal. Predictably, the 
minority findings neatly reversed many of the majority conclusions."" Com-
mission findings were one thing, and consequent legislation another, but most 
of the majority recommendations were eventually given legislative form. 
The stimulus of waterside labour militancy 
During these years of critical inquiry into the maritime industry an ever 
present stimulus was the restless, strained atmosphere of waterside industrial 
relations. Disputes over wages, hours, and working conditions were frequent, 
but the sorest point between employers and employees was the shipowners' 
claim to the right to employ non-union labour. In 1902 the first federal wharf 
labourers union was formed with a membership of two and a half thousand. 
Of these, some nine hundred were Queenslanders. Events would soon prove 
that the authority of the federal body was not recognized by many of its 
members. Conditions of employment varied greatly from port to port and each 
state had its own pohtical climate. The history of the role of the Federal Water-
side Workers' Federation in the industry would too often be the history of the 
weaknesses of the federal executive."* 
The rationale of the actions of Queensland waterside labour in the period 
was most meaningful within the state political context, and at times within the 
context of the state's regions. To begin with, Brisbane was the only Australian 
capital city port where wharfage was largely owned by private enterprise. More 
general political considerations were also relevant. Despite its early accession to 
parhamentary power in 1899, Queensland Labor then took a long time to adjust 
its potential strength to political reality. Another Labor ministry did not attain 
office until 1915. When electoral success was finally re-achieved the party had 
absorbed much of the agrarian ethos of the earlier radical movement and had 
more of a rural-craft character than an urban-industrial orientation. Queensland 
was urbanized, but not industrialized. Yet these facts were concealed by the 
liberalism that pervaded pohtical discourse. Between 1900 and 1910 sociahsm 
and communism were regarded as interchangeable terms in Queensland. As 
late as 1909 the Queensland Worker could argue that Labor's platform was that 
of the Communist Manifesto."® 
These considerations placed the Queensland W.W.F. unions in an 
anomalous position. Waterside labour unions were traditionally militant, but 
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the Queensland labour movement's sympathies were rural-craft. The waterside 
unions could therefore expect only limited support from the Labor party. 
Brisbane's position was made potentially more troublesome by the strength of 
private enterprise in the port. The actions of the Queensland waterside unions 
in general, and of the Brisbane W.W.F. in particular, would often be different 
from those of the W.W.F.'s in the other states and—by the moderate pohtical 
standards of liberalism—frequently marked by extremes. 
After the 1890 maritime strike and the near-strike of 1892, no other strike 
of any consequence took place on the Queensland wharves till 1912. However, 
there was a strike in 1901 over unionist rights in Brisbane which lasted only 
thirteen days. It did not trouble employers greatly and the Brisbane Courier 
tolerantly chided the strikers: "It is very much to be regretted that the wharf 
labourers of Brisbane should seek to dislocate the trade of the port simply 
because they object to freedom of contract. It is not as if there were any hopes of 
success in enforcing the demand that only union labour should be employed in 
loading and unloading steamers in Brisbane.""® The Brisbane Courier's un-
ruffled attitude, the failure of the strike, the lack of strikes on the Queensland 
waterfront between 1892 and 1912 when other Australian waterside labour 
unions were up in arms: these facts are themselves a basis for the view suggested 
of the place of the Queensland waterside unions. Moreover, when the Queens-
land W.W.F. did strike in 1912, two aspects of the dispute were significant. 
The strike was disapproved of by other Australian W.W.F.'s and the Brisbane 
W.W.F. struck only on the condition that the dispute should become a general 
strike. The picture of the state's waterfront between 1900 and 1912 was one of 
simmering discontent with rare glimpses of militancy, such as the 1901 strike in 
Brisbane, or the 1908 Townsville disturbances over the continuation of the 
"buff" system of job selection."' 
1909/1912-1914: Critical legislation and labour militancy 
The years of critical inquiry now began to bear fruit. In 1909 the Aus-
tralian parliament amended the Industries Preservation Act with the purpose 
in mind of proceeding against the rebate practices of the coastal companies. In 
the same year a British Royal Commission into shipping rings had recom-
mended that deferred rebates be made illegal and advocated a Board of Control 
for the industry."® Three years later the Navigation Act was passed in Australia. 
The effect of these events occupied the industry's attention till the outbreak of 
war in 1914, but the radical efforts met with little success. The government won 
the Coal Vend case it had launched against the coastal companies under the 
amended Industries Preservation Act, but the Vend's appeal to the Privy Council 
was upheld. The vital rebate issue had become part of a wider struggle to decide 
the place of the High Court in the Commonwealth's legal system."" The Navi-
gation Act met with no better fate. Passed in 1912, the Act was not proclaimed 
till 1913. The outbreak of war then caused the British government to request 
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that the Act be suspended during the war and the Australian government agreed. 
So by 1914 radical hopes of regulating the maritime industry had been dashed 
again. Yet there was little doubt that attempts at regulation would continue. 
Waterside militancy was a constant reminder. 
The 1912 Brisbane general strike began over a dispute about the rights of 
tramway employees. Support for the tramwaymen's cause spread to the miners 
and at that stage the Brisbane W.W.F. announced that they would add their 
support if the strike was declared general. Brisbane's decision was considered a 
serious tactical error by the federal W.W.F., which still gave some assistance to 
the strikers."" The W.W.F.'s also went out in sympathy in Rockhampton, 
Bowen, and Townsville—though each port differed from the others and from 
Brisbane in the manner and duration of its support. The timing of the strike was 
most unfortunate for Labor's electoral chances in the state. The Nationalist 
government swept the polls at the next election."! Nevertheless, the unions 
maintained their pressure on the shipping companies and the W.W.F.'s were a 
potent source of criticism. Radical efforts had apparently been wasted with the 
defeat of the Coal Vend Case and the suspension of the Navigation Act, but the 
criticisms of the industry re-emerged with fresh bitterness towards the end of 
the war. 
1914-1918: Patriotism, shipping rationalization, and the renewal of militancy 
In 1914 the P. & O. Coy. joined forces with the B.I. in one of the biggest 
shipping mergers in British history."" The immediate consequence for Queensland 
shipping was that in 1915 Macdonald Hamilton took over the managing agency 
for the A.U.S.N. from the B.I. & Q.A. The new arrangement would be detri-
mental to the fortunes of the A.U.S.N. in the long run. An early indication of 
this was the decision taken to purchase the E. & A. Coy. out of the A.U.S.N.'s 
funds. This left the company in a weakened financial position. Here the general 
uncertaintly as to what was Australian and what was British in the shipping 
industry focused damagingly on the A.U.S.N. "As managing agents for the 
A.U.S.N.," McKellar writes, "Macdonald Hamilton preferred to see the mail 
liners excluded from the coastal trade; as agents for the P. & O., and as the 
A.U.S.N. owned the E. & A. Coy. [Macdonald Hamilton] wished those vessels 
could participate.""" In 1914, however, this was still in the future. Until Hughes 
set up the Commonwealth Line in 1916, the rationalization of overseas services 
was left to the Imperial government. The coastal boats were organized through a 
Federal Shipping Board which had extensive powers in matters such as rate 
charges and routes. It drew criticism from both shipowners and Labor, but 
controversy in the industry was restrained in the first years of the war. It then 
gradually began again and centred round the functioning of the Commonwealth 
Line, the attempts to force-feed shipbuilding, and the propriety of waterside 
militancy in time of war."* It was this last factor which most involved the 
Queensland shipping services. 
By 1914 the lot of the waterside worker had been considerably improved but 
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the shipping companies were becoming less inclined to make concessions to the 
unions. The first major wartime confrontation on the Queensland waterfront 
was in 1917. The earlier defeat of the 1912 strike, the passage of a repressive 
Industrial Peace Act by the Conservative government, and the war, had 
minimized labour disputes in the state till that time. Several smaller clashes 
before 1917, however, should be mentioned. In mid-1916 the Townsville W.W.F. 
successfully protested about non-union labour working on John Burke boats; in 
September 1916 a Brisbane W.W.F. strike over the place of muster failed; and 
in Mackay a wages dispute also failed. Theoretically, the place of the Harbour 
Boards in these disputes was neutral. Practically, this was not always possible. 
At the time of the Mackay wages dispute in 1916 the Board telegrammed to the 
Prime Minister for federal assistance."® This was the state that industrial relations 
on the waterfront had reached. 
While not of great duration, and not extending outside Mackay and to a 
lesser extent Bowen, the 1917 dispute came dangerously near to personal 
confrontation between Ryan, the Queensland Premier, and Prime Minister 
Hughes. The conscription campaign provided an already sombre political state 
of affairs when the New South Wales strike of railwaymen, miners, and maritime 
workers involved the coastal shipping companies and threatened a national 
emergency."® The Mackay and Bowen W.W.F. began the protest in Queensland 
but found no followers. The Brisbane W.W.F. unloaded southern vessels that 
had been loaded by non-union labour, and the Townsville and Cairns unions 
continued working."' At Mackay the W.W.U. said it would load and unload 
cargo so long as it was not sugar, or other cargoes intended for Sydney. The 
situation quickly grew critical. Mackay was in darkness and food supplies were 
running low. The watersiders were willing to unload supplies for the town, but 
though Ryan's government had shipped a relief cargo to the port, the A.S.C. 
and the A.U.S.N. refused the use of lighters to unload the goods unless the 
lighters were manned by non-union labour. This the Mackay W.W.F. could 
not agree to."® The next move was made by the state government. Ryan 
attempted to break the deadlock by requisitioning all the coastal shipping in 
Queensland waters. The shipping companies' reply was that Ryan's proclama-
tion was invalid as only the Federal Deputy Controller of Shipping had the 
authority to issue such an order. Prime Minister Hughes supported the com-
panies and calmly declared that the Queensland government should provide a 
labour force for the lighters."" Ryan saw that the root of the trouble lay in the 
companies' involvement in the New South Wales strike, not in the North. Their 
determination to break the southern dispute made the fate of the Mackay sugar 
crop a secondary consideration.*" But this was little consolation to Queensland 
Labor. The tensions roused by the issue led to denunciations of the companies 
in terms of unprecedented bitterness, while the Labor charges brought forth 
counter-charges from opposition benches. It was in 1917 that Queensland came 
closest to breaking the liberal political mould.*' 
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Conclusion: Maximum e£Sciency 
The war ended and a verbal battle began. The critics of the shipping com-
panies levelled charges of profiteering and the waterside labour unions were 
accused of communist sympathies. Yet in the calmer moments there was some 
agreement that Australia had been fairly served during the war. Still, prices and 
costs had spiralled upwards in the last years of the struggle, and overseas and 
coastal shipping freight rates had followed. Coastal charges seem to have been 
relatively higher than overseas shipping freights, but the wage and cost 
differential between the two services made comparison difficult and usuaffy 
favoured the overseas trade.*" 
Queensland's coastal service reached its maximum level of efficiency in this 
period. The absence of rate wars and economic depressions, and the advantage 
of large-scale organization, were valuable assets. In addition, the coastal railway 
had not yet linked the Northern ports with Brisbane. The principal offsetting 
disadvantage was waterside militancy. Though not as extensive in Queensland 
as in the southern states, there were the two bitter clashes of 1912 and 1917, 
and in the last years of the war there had been greater public dissatisfaction with 
the coastal companies than at any time since the 1870s. Yet all in all the state's 
traders were well served by the shipping lines—the price paid for this was the 
rebate practices of the associated companies. 
The radical criticism which had given rise to the Navigation Act, and the 
prosecutions of the coastal companies under the amended Australian Industries 
Preservation Act, had been stilled by wartime patriotism but it began again in 
the last years of the war. The nationalist examination of the industry had 
produced a wider public realization of the links between Australian and British 
companies. In 1907, at the Imperial Conference on Merchant Shipping Legisla-
tion, Lloyd George had been able to refer to "colonial shipping" as being in its 
infancy without the Australian representatives, including W. M. Hughes, so 
much as blinking an eye.*" By 1918 the face of the Imperial world had changed. 
The Commonwealth Line had been established, and, though the Navigation Act 
had been suspended for the duration of the war, it had been passed. The critical 
examination of the relations between British and Australian shipping would 
now continue. 
10 THE PORTS 1900-1918 The testing period 
From 1859 to 1885 the Queensland ports had been developed pragmatically 
but they had been moving towards local control. After 1885 the depression made 
the government recognize the ports' need for supervision, and the principles of 
local control were fulfilled through the formation of Harbour Boards. The 
economy's recovery after 1906 placed new demands on the ports and their 
administrative policies were fully tested. Again, they were found wanting. By 
1918 the government, with the approval of some of the port authorities, was on 
the verge of recentralizing port control. 
The majority of the ports had been settled before the state's most important 
spurt of nineteenth-century growth in the eighties. Regional port competition 
had settled the main outlets, and the construction of railways branching inwards 
from these ensured that Brisbane, Rockhampton, and Townsville would be 
dominant for years to come. In the early 1900s the ports' effectiveness in the 
state's transport network reached its peak. After the coastal rail line linked 
Rockhampton and Brisbane and reached further north the ports would play a 
less important transport role. This disruption of established trading patterns 
would recur with the development of road and air transport. For the present, 
as a result of the rapid economic expansion between 1900 and 1918, the ports 
played a greater part than at any time previously. 
Long-run port growth still depended on the expansion of port hinterlands. 
The reassertion of Brisbane's trading dominance in the state was so marked 
because only the South managed to achieve economic diversification. Faced 
with the disadvantage of hinterlands not developing quickly enough, the major 
outports could not sufficiently overcome their immediate difficulties. The shift 
to deeper water was seriously delayed in both Townsville and Rockhampton by 
the shortcomings of the new port authorities. The excessive regionalism of the 
Harbour Boards' policies, and the radical criticism which further confused their 
workings, made it difficult for the ports to provide adequate services. The basic 
pattern of administration remained unchanged. Three new Boards were set up 
at Cairns, Bowen, and Gladstone, but Brisbane remained without a coordinating 
port authority. Control of certain coastal lights had passed to the Common-
wealth, but otherwise port affairs were left in the hands of the state government. 
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Brisbane: The end of the Brisbane Harbour Board campaign 
Physical improvements 
No significant changes were made in the general improvement plan that had 
been drawn up for the port in 1898 by the Marine Board. This saw the erection of 
a series of training walls, and the removal of some of the river points, as the best 
way to bring shipping up to the town wharves. In 1902 the question of a deep-
water outlet for the port was apparently resolved when Pinkenba Reach was 
developed. This was unfortunate: the Marine Board's principal engineer later 
admitted that Lytton Reach should have been improved instead.! Commercial 
wharfage took much longer to move down the river. The immediate development 
of Hamilton Reach for wharfage purposes was suggested in 1911 but did not 
take place in the period. The largest private wharf was established downstream 
by Dalgety's at Bulimba in 1906." Another Marine Board plan was realized in 
1912 when the Middle Channel was reopened as the port's principal entrance. 
Earlier attempts to have the South Channel improved by private interests had 
lapsed, but they lingered on in the form of a proposal by the Brisbane Chamber 
of Commerce in 1903 to develop the Channel. However, the South and North 
Channels were seen as increasingly unsafe by the Portmaster and so the Middle 
Channel was opened again." 
In 1900, 20 feet (6.10 m) at l.w. had been provided in the port, yet Bates and 
Cullen both considered the desirable future depth should not be less than 26 feet 
(7.92 m)—the depth of the Suez Canal at that time. Even in 1901 Brisbane's 
achievement was substantial. In that year the Cornwall, displacing 11,000 tons 
(11,177 tonnes), could safely make the South Brisbane wharves by using the tide. 
By 1906, 24 feet (7.32 m) l.w. had been secured to the town wharves.* In 1912 a 
14,000-ton (14,225 tonnes) vessel could reach the Bulimba wharves, and two 
years later the Portmaster could say: "The largest vessels visiting the Common-
wealth now enter the river and berth at our wharves without difficulty." By 1919 
26 feet (7.92 m) l.w. ran to New Farm and there was 24 feet (7.32 m) available 
from New Farm to the South Brisbane wharves.® Considering the disadvantages 
Brisbane had to overcome as a river port, the depths attained were an advance 
over its earlier capabilities. Yet compared with world port requirements they 
remained inadequate. Bates's calm assurance that the Suez Canal's depth of 
26 feet (7.92 m) would not increase in the foreseeable future was mistaken: its 
depth was 30 feet (9.14 m) in 1918. In addition, the Dominions Royal Com-
mission of that year placed Brisbane at the bottom of its list of Australian ports 
in assessing entrance depths.® 
Wharfage adequacy: Two opposing views 
In the preceding period the port's weakest physical point had been its 
wharfage limitations more than its inadequate entrance depths. Though opinions 
differed, this condition continued. "It is no unusual sight", the Portmaster wrote 
in 1909 at the time of the opening of the Pinkenba Railway wharf, "to see vessels 
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lying two abreast or waiting in midstream for their turn to occupy a wharf. . . 
there stiff remains room for great improvement in the wharfage facilities."' 
Public vexation with the port's wharfage capabihties had reached a peak at the 
turn of the century when the campaign for a Brisbane Harbour Board had 
possessed its greatest impetus. Press criticism of this aspect of the port's opera-
tions almost completely disappeared after the end of 1902, but criticism by the 
officials of the Marine and Harbours and Rivers Departments continued. 
In 1911 Cullen drew up a comprehensive reclamation scheme for the 
development of Hamilton Reach as a public wharfage area. "The existing accom-
modation", he warned, "is barely adequate for present requirements, and it is 
doubtful if the increased volume of shipping that is to be expected will be 
adequately provided for by private enterprise."® By reclaiming the area behind 
the Hamffton training wall, it was planned to establish a shipping basin for the 
largest vessels, with a lineal quayage of some 12,000 feet (3,658 m), and a 
further possible extension of 5,800 lineal feet (1,768 m). The cost would be high 
—£809,000 ($1,618,000)—and was mitigated only by Cullen's demonstration of 
ways to stagger the construction costs of the project over a period of years. 
Despite the cost, he thought it urgent that the plan should be proceeded with, 
and unfavourably contrasted the port of Brisbane's wharfage capacity with that 
of Sydney and Melbourne. In Brisbane the ratio of tonnage using the port to 
each foot (0.30 m) of avaffable berthage was 216 (219 tonnes), by far the 
highest, as against Sydney's ratio of 144 (146 tonnes) and Melbourne's 119 
(121 tonnes)." Notwithstanding Cullen's emphasis on the urgency of the pro-
posal, the scheme drew little response from the government. The pubhc interest 
in the ports that had been briefly re-aroused at the turn of the century, had 
quickly faded. In 1913 the Brisbane Courier, which in 1900 had championed the 
cause of port reform for Brisbane, could remark: "It is announced that the 
government will go on almost immediately with the Premier's ill-timed scheme 
for making an inner harbour basin at Hamilton, and equipping it with extensive 
wharfage facihties . . . these are undertakings of no urgent consequence . . . for 
some years ahead the port is fairly well equipped to meet whatever demands 
may be made upon it."!" ji,g jjg^t day the Premier announced that there would 
be no great expenditure on the Hamilton Lands scheme for many years.!! 
These divergent opinions about the adequacy of wharfage in the port must now 
be placed in the context of the moves to change the port's administration. 
Administrative transition: Concern for a harbour board becomes concern with 
the scale of port charges 
In 1900 wharfage in the port of Brisbane was inadequate and the debate 
about appointing a Brisbane Harbour Board was in full swing. A Harbour 
Board Bill for the port had existed on paper since 1892 and had been introduced 
to the House by Philp in 1900. It was not proceeded with, but in 1901 Cribb, the 
Treasurer, re-presented it.!" Once again the Act was not proceeded with. Its 
introduction gave at least paper validation to John Leahy's earlier promise that 
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an effective Harbour Board Bill would shortly be passed. This promise had been 
welcomed by the Brisbane Courier.^^ At this stage the paper strongly supported 
the Biff. "Rightly or wrongly", it wrote in March 1901, "Brisbane has gained a 
reputation of being a dangerous port . . . and its generally poor appliances for 
coaling and loading have not served to give it a more favourable reputation . . . 
numerous schemes have been drawn up for the improvement of the port, but 
only patchwork has been the result."!* 
However, as we have already estabhshed, Brisbane businessmen were not 
confident that a port trust would reduce harbour dues.!® Despite the widespread 
awareness of the pressures on Brisbane's port accommodation, the campaign for 
a port authority now lost its force and became a concern for reducing harbour 
dues. Although Brisbane had not been declared a "national port" after federa-
tion, as some had hoped, the Chamber of Commerce was still unenthusiastic 
about a Brisbane Harbour Board.!® What acted as a controversial and confusing 
transition between the Harbour Board campaign and the new emphasis on the 
scale of port dues was the 1902 scandal over the Lindon Bates dredges. These 
were massive machines which had been constructed for the state by an American 
who had a worldwide reputation for port improvement. 
On the advice of the Marine Department the government had commissioned 
two of Bates's mammoth dredges for the Brisbane River. The mistake made was 
that once a preliminary trial of the dredges had been successfully conducted in 
Europe, where engineers representing the Queensland government had been 
present, they were purchased without further trial. This proved unfortunate: in 
the Brisbane River the dredges could not work at the promised rate. A scandal 
followed and scathing condemnations were made of both Bates and the govern-
ment. What made the matter more distasteful to Brisbane's residents was that 
the Bates dredge purchased by the Rockhampton Harbour Board for the Fitzroy 
was working well.!' J^Q debacle over Bates's dredges acted as the final blow to 
the hopes of those who wished to set up a port authority for Brisbane. Fragments 
of the campaign would occasionally reappear. In 1902, when a Rockhampton 
parliamentarian asked his annual question of the Treasurer about the cost of 
improvements in the Brisbane River, the answer mentioned the cost of the 
Bates dredges. Kidston exclaimed: "And yet you wonder why we want a 
Harbour Board!"!® 3^^ j^^ g jsgyg jjaj been decided. The energies of those 
concerned with the port were now directed towards the question of the scale of 
port charges.!" 
The controversy over the scale of harbour dues in the port began soon after 
federation. The interstate commerce clause in the federal constitution was the 
source of the difficulties. To begin with, in 1902 the Brisbane Courier cast an 
envious eye on the trade of the Northern Rivers area of New South Wales that 
was bypassing Brisbane. The paper saw the efforts of New South Wales to retain 
the trade—by preventing dairy produce from being exported anywhere else in 
the state except Sydney, and in its reluctance to make the most direct rail con-
nection with Queensland—as doomed to eventual failure. When this failure 
occurred Brisbane's merchants would only be prevented from reaping the com-
mercial benefits by excessive harbour dues. The existing dues schedule had been 
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drawn up at a time when the likelihood of such a trade was remote."" 
Despite traders' protests the charges were maintained. Then, in 1904, 
Prime Minister Reid complained that Queensland's harbour dues discriminated 
on a locafity of origin basis and were therefore unconstitutional."! With this 
added pressure, hurried consultations took place between the state government 
and the Crown Law office. The result was the Harbour Dues Amendment Act 
of 1905. The debate on the Act revealed uncertainty amongst parliamentarians 
as to what they could do with their harbour charges and remain constitutional. 
Finally, Kidston decided that Harbour Board ports would retain the right to 
charge differential dues, but that these could differentiate only between classes 
of goods, not between their locality of origin."" The Courier quickly pointed out 
the concomitant of the amendment: "Whilst towns possessing a Harbour 
Board of their own wffl be placed in the position to levy any scale of Harbour 
Dues they may deem advisable, provided they levy the same charges all around, 
a distinct increase in rates will necessarily be the result in Brisbane.""" The 
prediction was correct. In non-Harbour Board ports, dues were fixed by schedule 
according to the 1893 Harbour Dues Act; Brisbane immediately felt the squeeze 
and local merchants quickly protested."* 
Two of the strongest protests came from the wool and sugar interests. John 
Leahy and a representative of Dalgety's deputized the Under Secretary of the 
Treasury to make their complaints. Despite regulative amendments made to the 
schedule after the 1905 amendment, port charges in Brisbane for wool coming 
from the North, which previously had been 2s. (20 cents), had risen to 3s. 
(30 cents), then to 3s. 6d. (35 cents), and thence to 5s. (50 cents). Continuation 
of such charges would "kiff the Central wool trade to Brisbane"."® Similarly, 
the C.S.R. Coy. warned that the new port charges would mean that their Sydney 
refinery would be preferred to the New Farm plant."® In the face of the traders' 
perturbation Kidston remained unruffled and early in 1906 another Dues 
Amendment Act was passed. This cleared up the point that non-Harbour Board 
ports had the right to vary their Harbour Dues. However, the scale of port dues 
to be imposed in Brisbane remained to be decided by regulation. 
Kidston invited examples of what the Brisbane Chamber of Commerce and 
other city trading interests considered reasonable dues, and eventually an 
arrangement was made which satisfied the merchants. But Kidston had first 
made them sweat. In early 1906, at a meeting of the Association of Merchants in 
Brisbane, he had said: "Amongst yourselves you must agree on a scheme for 
levying Harbour Dues. When you have done that, I will teff you how much 
money wiff be spent on the harbour.""' The dispute cannot be separated from 
the earlier campaign to appoint a Brisbane Harbour Board—in which Kidston 
had played a leading role. There had been a shift in the campaign's emphasis. It 
would not be justifiable, however, to see Kidston's use of the government's 
power in the issue as a method to make the trading community set up a Harbour 
Board against their wishes. What Kidston did make perfectly clear was that the 
port's businessmen would in future get the port improvements they were pre-
pared to pay for, and no more."® 
This was the end of the campaign within the port itself to set up a Harbour 
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Board. The port's chances of being administered by a coordinating authority 
would now depend on the wider debate about the adequacy of the Harbour 
Board system of administration. Some Labor members favoured the centraliza-
tion of port authority to solve the problems of the outports, and Brisbane could 
be included. It is now necessary to explain why the development of the outports 
so dissatisfied the government. 
Intra-Port rivalry (1) Broadmount vs. Port Alma vs. Rockhampton 
In 1895 Robert Philp, Minister for Railways and member for Townsville, 
put through the Rockhampton to Broadmount rail extension bill. The line had 
been constructed and it was hoped that the divisions in the town over the issue 
would be resolved. In fact, the line's completion seemed to act as a starting signal 
for the reappearance of aff the old rivalries. The question as to where the best 
port for Central Queensland was to be found was argued again at a new level of 
intensity. The result of the complicated campaigns for the alternative portsites 
was that in 1909 a Port Alma-Rockhampton rail link was authorized, to connect 
with the coastal Rockhampton-Gladstone line at Bajool, twenty miles south of 
Rockhampton. Thus two rail lines had been built to serve the one port. 
Two points must be made to place the following discussion of the issue in 
the context of the wider patterns of port development. Firstly, the question of 
Gladstone as a port for Central Queensland rarely came directly into the 
discussion. In 1909 the Daily Record had written: "As far as Rockhampton is 
concerned it matters little whether Gladstone or Port Alma is chosen. The local 
benefit would be immaterial.""" But though fear of Gladstone as a rival port may 
constantly have been an underiying source of concern for Rockhampton's 
residents, it was not raised as a bargaining counter by the rival port factions 
during the great port debate. Infighting completely occupied the people of the 
town of Rockhampton and the port users of the port of Rockhampton—a 
necessary distinction. 
Secondly, the argument between 1900 and 1909 was usually cast in terms of 
the relative values of Broadmount and Port Alma as deep-water ports. What was 
left unsaid, but not forgotten, was that most Rockhampton people wanted the 
port to be retained at the town-site itself. What seemed to be a two-way contest 
was in reahty a triangular trial of strength. The pro-Broadmount paper, the 
Daily Record, tacitly admitted this by criticizing Port Alma on the grounds that 
the railway would only succeed at the expense of the river trade."" On the other 
hand. Port Alma's supporters were quite frank about the primacy of the river: 
"If this question were settled," they argued, "the whole energy of the Board 
could then be devoted to the river scheme.""! The position most Rockhampton-
ites eventually came to was a preference for Port Alma or Broadmount to be 
developed alongside or after, never before, the river. Given the townspeople's 
first preference for the town as a port, there then existed enough genuine 
uncertainty about the capabilities of Port Alma and Broadmount to make the 
division in public opinion quite genuine and subject to change."" 
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The fate of Broadmount 
In the first years of the period Broadmount had been opened. However, 
that part of the Rockhampton Harbour Board elected by the town was paying 
no more than lip service to making Broadmount a deep-water port. Intra-Board 
discussions at this time never raised questions of policy: the binding assumption 
was that the upper reaches of the river would be developed first."" The principal 
point at issue was which channel should be used as the port's entrance. The 
Chamber of Commerce, then more enthusiastic about Broadmount, recom-
mended the opening of the Middle Channel—this would serve Broadmount and 
the river. But Robert Archer, the Harbour Board's Chairman, favoured the 
South Channel which served Port Alma and the river."* In 1903, when Marine 
Board Engineer Cullen expressed himself pro the Middle Channel, the Chamber 
renewed its demands for the use of the channel or, alternatively, rail connection 
with Port Alma."® The patterns of affiance were beginning to emerge. The 
Harbour Board, influenced by some local trading interests and western 
pastoralists, was looking for a deep-water port; town interests had a greater say 
in the Chamber of Commerce. 
In 1905 the Morning Bulletin sympathetically recorded the Board's efforts 
to that time: 
Through many disappointments . . . the Board has held doggedly on to its 
policy of deepening the river and so bringing all the shipping right up to 
the river wharves. Apart from the work of founding the Board, there was 
a long time occupied in planning the scheme . . . when these difficulties 
were overcome the drought had started and the government . . . the old 
Continuous government, which had been uniformly hostile to Rock-
hampton, refused payment of the loan . . . there was nothing for the Board 
to do but stop . . . [then with Kidston's advent to power] . . . the question 
of the river entrance was settled by abandoning the wretched Middle 
Channel . . . but resolving to keep it open till the other was improved."® 
So the first port round had been won by the supporters of the town and Port 
Alma schemes—but their victory involved what proved to be a costly com-
promise. It became clear that the Board needed every penny to develop the 
river. Later the Board admitted that the cost of maintaining the Middle Channel 
had contributed to their alarming financial difficulties."' But what was most 
significant about this confrontation between the supporters of Port Alma and 
Broadmount was not the light that it shed on the Board's later financial 
difficulties. Rather, it makes it possible to decide exactly what the people of 
Rockhampton had in mind when they appointed their Harbour Board. In 
Britain the conflicting interests of towns and ports had called for the appoint-
ment of Harbour Boards which could uphold the interests of the port against 
the interests of the town. There can be no doubt that this fundamental principle 
of Harbour Board administration was ignored by the Rockhampton Board 
from its beginnings. In 1905 the Morning Bulletin wrote: 
The Board, it must never be forgotten, was established in order to deepen 
the river and so bring the shipping of the port up to the town wharves. 
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The government had undertaken this duty for thirty years and had failed 
miserably to carry it out . . . if the same energy and perseverance . . . 
[displayed by the government in developing the Brisbane River] . . . had 
been shown in deepening the Fitzroy a Harbour Board would never have 
been thought of . . . it is worth recalling at this time why the Board was 
formed. The people of Rockhampton did not ask for a Board to establish 
a harbour at Broadmount or at Port Alma but at Rockhampton, nor did 
they surrender their wharfage revenue, which yielded them such a handsome 
sum annually to be spent somewhere in Keppel Bay, but to be spent on 
their own river in order to bring the shipping of their port to their own 
town."® 
The paper could hardly have made the place of the Harbour Board more clear. 
The move to Port Alma 
As opposition to the river scheme strengthened in the next few years, the 
split in the Board's ranks widened. The division in Rockhampton over the 
portsite issue was heightened by a growing tendency for the matter to be seen in 
political terms. In 1906 the first amendment was made to the Harbour Board's 
Act to increase the Board's borrowing powers. Labor, however, opposed the 
amendment without changing the Board's franchise to allow equal proportional 
representation. The Board's franchise, it was argued, was the earliest in the state 
and was excessively conservative: franchise readjustment was a necessary step 
before the Board's financial responsibihty should be increased. This was part 
of a wide argument which Labor was engaged in with the government over the 
desirability of changing the Local Government franchise. By distracting 
politicians from the regional realities of port affairs it added to the ports' 
difficulties. This was the widest and most disruptive effect of the intrusion of 
politics into port development. A particular additional effect in Rockhampton 
was that Labor members opposed the extension to Port Alma—although the 
matter was usually discussed in non-party terms."" Yet the wider political 
involvement was more harmful to the general administration of the ports. 
Labor's opposition to Port Alma owed more to the weight of local political 
allegiances than to the franchise question: Labor was strongest in the town of 
Rockhampton and the town favoured Broadmount. These local preferences 
must now be considered. 
To 1909 the Lake's Creek Company was completely dissatisfied with the 
Board's policy of river development. The company's influence had been decisive 
in influencing the government to extend the rail connection to Broadmount. 
According to the Commissioner for Raffways, Lake's Creek had made a verbal 
agreement with the preceding Commissioner that their traffic would be sent 
through Broadmount if the linkage was built. The extension was made but the 
agreement lapsed as another preliminary agreement had been broken. The Rail 
Commissioner had arranged with the B.I. Coy.—the shippers carrying Lake's 
Creek meat—that their vessels would use Broadmount if the channel was kept 
at a depth of 20 feet (6.10 m) l.w. This depth was not provided and the B.I.'s 
steamers rarely called.*" Consequently, as the Harbour Board was responsible 
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for the channel. Lake's Creek and the Board were at odds when the shift to 
Port Alma was discussed. "You may rest assured", the Chairman of the meat 
works warned the Board in 1907, "that the C.Q.M.E. will not raff its goods to 
Port Alma. The moment . . . this thing is gone through, I shall put our own 
steamers on the river."*! Fortunately this disharmony was resolved the next 
year when the company made an agreement with the railways, the Board, and 
the shipping companies which guaranteed maximum rates on the Creek's 
meat.*" A key clause in the agreement was the Harbour Board's undertaking 
"to make use of the facihties for carriage . . . afforded by the railways in 
preference to those afforded by any system of lighterage or other system of 
water borne carriage".*" 
By the beginning of 1909 the Harbour Board had come round to the view 
that a deep-water port at Port Alma was necessary. This did not mean that the 
Board would give up improving the Fitzroy River, but some members had 
realized the magnitude of the problems that faced river ports as a result of the 
increasing size of shipping. Those who held this view were supported by the 
Mt. Morgan Council and Company, and by Lake's Creek. The Daily Record 
told its readers that Western interests were not concerned with the portsite issue, 
but this was not true. The Morning Bulletin could quibble over whether Mt. 
Morgan was a more important source of Harbour Dues to the port than the 
pastoralists, but it was a weff-known fact that it had been the demands of the 
western pastoralists which had initiated the move towards deep water. Mt. 
Morgan's support for Port Alma as Central Queensland's deep-water port was 
important in 1909 but pastoral insistence was equally so. The pastoralists wanted 
a deep-water port—they were indifferent whether it was Port Alma or Broad-
mount. When it came to the point it was Lake's Creek's influence which won 
pastoral support for Port Alma in 1909.** The Rockhampton Chamber of 
Commerce and the Town Council, on the other hand, were now unanimous in 
their opposition to Port Alma, as were the Councils of North Rockhampton 
and the Livingstone Shire.*® 
This was the preference of local interests. Their separate campaigns were 
now focused on another government inquiry into the capabffities of Broadmount 
and Port Alma. Attempting to be objective, the Committee's conclusions 
favoured the marine advantages of Port Alma and the shore approaches of 
Broadmount. As the Peak Downs Telegram summed up: "At Broadmount there 
seems to be not enough water, while at Port Alma there is a serious want of dry 
land."*® Broadmount's port problem remained its approach channel. As well as 
being shallow, 17 feet (5.18 m) at l.w., it was crooked. The navigational 
difficulties of the channel were cited as the reason shipping had stopped using 
Broadmount.*' The reverse difficulty existed at Port Alma. There the berthage 
and navigational facilities were excellent, but the wharf did not connect with the 
shore and the land surrounding was a dismal terrain of mud flats.*® With this 
report, and the Commissioner for Railway's recommendations of 1908 and 1909 
that the Bajool-Port Alma link should be made, yet another select committee 
was convened to advise Kidston's government.*" 
At last results were imminent. In October 1909, enjoying the last balmy days 
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of an Indian summer, the Rockhampton Morning Bulletin confidently wrote: 
"At one time the river scheme met with a good deal of opposition . . . but the 
success has been so marked and the assurance of sixteen feet at low water right 
to town, thus enabhng all the meat boats to come up to Lakes Creek, is now 
given so confidently, that all opposition and doubt has disappeared. Con-
troversy so far as it touches the river is now over."®" A month later the Com-
mittee's report shattered the paper's complacency by deciding that the Port 
Alma connection should be made. Despite the Morning Bulletin's assurances, 
the verdict was not very surprising; three of the Committee's members had 
belonged to Kidston's party and Kidston himself favoured the line.®! The more 
striking feature about the Committee was that every witness had freely spoken 
of competition between Port Alma and Broadmount, but the subject of either 
port's relation to the development of the river was not raised. Either the question 
was sacrosanct because of the local sensibilities of the people of Rockhampton, 
or unthinkable because existing commercial practices could not be adapted to a 
Bay trade. Certainly both had something to do with it.®" 
The Committee's conclusion was only a few days old when public protest 
meetings began in Rockhampton. At the opening of the parhamentary debate 
on the extension, an irate telegram from Rockhampton's Mayor to the Leader 
of the Labor Opposition was read. Complaining about the lack of necessity for 
the line, the wire requested the government "to immediately amend the Rock-
hampton Harbour Board Act by abolishing the electoral power of the so-called 
payers of dues, and placing the whole of the electoral power in the hands of the 
ratepayers".®" Putting the matter this way touched the Labor members' radical 
hearts and a protracted struggle was waged until Kidston finally pushed the bill 
through. Earlier claims that the Board was nothing more than a minion of the 
commercial payers of dues were repeated, and the larger dues payers were 
carefully fisted.®* When the controversy subsided, one statement in particular 
remained memorable. "It was a curious fact", Robert Philp had said, "that the 
hon. members for Gladstone had opposed the Bill . . . if they took the line thirty 
six miles (57.94 km) southward of Rockhampton . . . the time would come when 
Gladstone, with hardly any expense for harbour dues, would be able to easily 
beat Port Alma."®® 
The next year, when another amendment was made to the Rockhampton 
Harbour Board's Act to further increase the Board's borrowing powers, the 
Treasurer's bland statement about the ends to which the Board would devote 
the extra money seemed to completely ignore the earher controversy. "The 
object of the Board", he remarked, "is to extend the town wharves . . . to finish 
dredging Satellite Island Point and a gap in the training wall, to add six feet 
[1.83 m] to the training wall of Shoal Island; and complete the dredgings in the 
river cuttings to sixteen feet [4.88 m]."®® As already emphasized, the Board 
favoured developing Port Alma instead of Broadmount, but this did not mean 
that the river scheme was to be given up. On the contrary, it was taken up with 
renewed zest. In 1914 the Board stated that its ultimate aim remained the same, 
"that is, to obtain a clear passage to town for overseas steamers".®' In that year 
there were spots in the river where only 8 feet (2.44 m) was available at l.w. 
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Port Alma was connected with Bajool in 1912, but it was the shortage of 
shipping caused by the war that reduced the lighterage trade to the Bay, rather 
than the completion of the Port Alma linkage. However, the wartime shipping 
shortage and the worst flood in the Fitzroy's history brought most of the 
overseas and interstate vessels to Port Alma by the end of the war.®® The shift 
to deep water had at last been made in Rockhampton. 
Intra-port rivalry (2) The Outer vs. the Inner Harbour in Townsville 
In 1900 Townsville's future depended on whether the port's lighterage costs 
could be reduced by developing the Outer Harbour; a third to a fifth of Rock-
hampton cargoes were lightered at that time, while lighterage in Townsville 
accounted for over half the port's trade.®" The Outer Harbour scheme was 
almost completed but, as most private wharfage was in Ross Creek, difficulties 
in shifting the portsite were imminent. The different geographic situations of 
Rockhampton and Townsville ensured that ambivalences in Townsville's 
policies could not have as harmful long-term effects on the port as they had on 
the Central port. Yet, though the Outer Harbour was eventually successful, 
town influences caused the Harbour Board to spend too much time on the 
Inner Harbour. Another difference from Rockhampton's experience was the 
greater importance of the interstate shipping companies in Townsville's move to 
deep water. Two of the three major companies, the A.U.S.N. and Howard 
Smith, had wharfage in the Inner Harbour, while the A.S.C. had not. In the 
campaign between those who favoured the Outer or the Inner Harbour, the 
A.S.C's situation in the Outer Harbour was an inducement for traders to use 
the Harbour Board wharfage there. 
77?^  role of the shipping companies 
Until an arrangement between the Townsville Harbour Board and the 
shipping companies was arrived at about the changeover to the use of the Outer 
Harbour, relations between the two were severely strained. The period began 
inauspiciously with a plague scare which caused the companies to raise their 
freight charges to the port by 20 per cent.®" The plague scare passed but the 
differences between the Board and the companies continued. In the same year, 
port users claimed that goods consigned to be landed on the Harbour Board's 
Eastern Breakwater wharf were being lightered to the town wharves. In reply, 
the companies argued that the Board was preventing their vessels from using the 
Breakwater jetty. This the Board stoutly denied.®! 
The eariy difficulries came to a head in May 1904 when the A.S.C's wharf 
lease was due for renewal. The company was the most important of those 
engaged in the port's coastal shipping trade, but this did not automatically mean 
that A.S.C. cargoes would be landed at the Board's Outer Harbour wharves. 
This depended on the consigner's wishes. To an extent, therefore, the interests 
of the A.S.C. and the Townsviffe Harbour Board were identical, as the A.S.C. 
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pointed out to the Board, "inasmuch as it pays us better to land cargo at the 
Jetty than to lighter it ashore".®" What the A.S.C. wanted from the Board was a 
more liberal wharfage lease. Without the company's assistance in the matter, 
the Board faced the possibility that the inner wharves would cater for most port 
trade while the Board's Outer Harbour wharfage languished. The problem was 
the amount of concession that the Harbour Board could make to the A.S.C. 
The Board was prepared to exempt 10 per cent of the A.S.C's general cargo and 
a portion of the A.S.C's coal supplies to the Townsville Gas company from 
harbour charges, but the A.S.C. wanted more generous terms.®" Despite the 
importance of the agreement, a stalemate was reached and the Board had to 
cast round for another solution to its wharfage problems. 
Fortunately this was found by 1905. The Board adjusted its wharfage and 
harbour charges so that the total cost of using the Board's wharf was less than 
private wharfage charges. The solution was timely. As was later explained, 
in consequence of borrowing large sums the Board could not raise sufficient 
revenue to meet their interests and redemption, because of certain wharves 
belonging to private firms . . . they brought deep water almost up to the 
private wharves, and though the charge [at the Board's wharf was equal to 
the charges at the private wharves] they saw that the revenue was passing 
them by—going to the private wharves—and the owners of those wharves 
were not helping the Board except on a very smaff scale.®* 
The difficulty was surmounted and the port's lighterage bill declined, but this 
did not guarantee that Outer Harbour development would be given complete 
preference over Inner. 
The year 1905 was also the one in which the state's harbour charges were 
being adjusted to fit in with the new provisions of the Commonwealth. The 
Townsville Board tried to increase its revenue via the new dues scales but was 
opposed in this by the shipping companies. A sub-committee of the TownsviUe 
Chamber of Commerce calculated that almost one-fourth of the port's sugar 
trade went to Cairns as a result of the companies' partial boycott of the port. 
In defence, the Board claimed that their charge was a moderate one in relation 
to the total sugar freight bill, and that the charge did not fall on producers but on 
the A.S.C®® Some town interests opposed the removal of the levy but Board 
members were relieved when subsequent alterations by the state government to 
the Harbour Dues Act rendered the charge illegal.®® If such a strained atmos-
phere had not already existed between the Board and the shipping companies 
from the earlier disputes, the clash over port charges might have been avoided 
altogether. 
The Inner Harbour lives on 
After settling these disputes with the shipping companies the Harbour 
Board continued to develop the Inner Harbour as well as the Outer.®' The 
Townsville Daily Bulletin was a firm supporter of the Inner Harbour scheme. 
In 1907 the paper wrote knowledgeably, "lost time by large steamers discharging 
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and loading at the existing Townsvffle wharves is the effect of the attempt to 
handle the trade of a progressive port over a jetty. This is why it is always better 
to bring the sea into the land where that is not done by nature with a river than 
to carry the land out into the sea by a jetty. Congestion of traffic on a jetty is 
inevitable."®® As the decade progressed it became clearer that this mistaken 
opinion represented an important minority view in the town—the Inner Harbour 
scheme was diverting energies which were needed elsewhere. In 1911 complaints 
were made about the adequacy of port depths. These were justified; the Platypus 
Channel's depth was then 15 feet (4.58 m), no better than it had been in 1900. 
Concern grew and a campaign against the Inner Harbour scheme began.®" The 
Board was still improving the Inner Harbour in 1912, but construction was then 
started on a ferro-concrete pier in the Outer Harbour. This was the turning point. 
By 1918 the pier was completed and the Outer Harbour could offer more ade-
quate accommodation than at any time previously. 
Nevertheless, the port had been handicapped for most of the period. Port 
trade had increased rapidly after 1909 but so had complaints about wharfage 
inefficiency. Berthage in the Outer Harbour was frequently congested and in 
addition the entrance channel was unreliable.'" To ensure better conditions the 
shipping companies demanded leases of Harbour Board wharfage which was 
under construction. The Board was unwilling to meet these demands. At most, 
priority of berthing was conceded to regular port users. At times the demands of 
the companies were pointedly brusque. "It is unnecessary to enlarge on the great 
value of direct communication with the U.K. and Europe", the Federal and 
Shire line lectured the Board, "beyond reminding you that if the development of 
such trade is to be catered for by large modern ocean carriers, it is essential that 
adequate wharfage accommodation be available to ensure reasonable despatch 
in the discharge of cargo."'! Unless their application for wharfage leases was 
granted, the company concluded, the Argyllshire class of steamers would have 
to omit the port from their regular schedule. 
The Townsville Harbour Board could not afford to ignore such com-
munications. It continued to refuse leases but promised wharfage improvements 
as soon as possible." Also the Board's basic developmental port plan, based on 
Cullen's 1911 recommendations, was varied at times to meet the shipping com-
panies' needs.'" By 1920 the wharves comprised a timber quay wharf at the 
Eastern Breakwater some two thousand feet (610 m) long and a reinforced 
concrete pier five hundred feet (152 m) long capable of accommodating a vessel 
on each side. Rail lines ran onto the wharves and cargo could be loaded directly 
into trucks from steamers' slings.'* 
1918: The Townsville Harbour Board fights for its existence 
The price of these improvements had been high. The Board's critics argued 
that the cost of improvements was more than the port advantages gained, but 
these criticisms were greeted with hostility by the Townsville Board. In 1919 
Chairman Ackers presented the Board's case through the Daily Bulletin. 
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"After many years of strenuous fighting by the Townsvffle Chamber of Com-
merce," he wrote, "an act of parliament was passed, and a Harbour Board for 
Townsviffe created in the year 1896, mainly through the energy and zeal of Sir 
Robert Philp . . . the Board took over in 1897." Since then the Board had 
reduced the port's annual lighterage bill from £25,000 ($50,000) to zero and 
increased the Board's revenue from £10,000 ($20,000) in 1896 to a pre-war 
figure of £60,000 ($120,000). Harbour dues had also been reduced. "And now 
what do we see?" Ackers asked in horror. "Brisbane, no doubt jealous of our 
success, has so worked the oracle that the present government has brought in a 
bill to dissolve Harbour Boards." Ackers spoke of Griffith's inducement of the 
separatists to give up their cause by promising decentralizing measures. This 
"Covenant", as Ackers described it, had been faithfully observed by govern-
ments until recently Labor's rail policies had begun to ignore the pact—"and 
now the management of the Harbour is to go".'® 
But, as one local critic replied, the Board's policies had not been as flawless 
as the Chairman made out. Ackers himself had supported the Board's first 
engineer in favouring the development of the Inner Harbour. The fiscal diffi-
culties the Board had met with were aggravated by the expense of developing two 
harbour schemes instead of one; "it was madness to try and make the Inner 
Harbour before the Outer was complete."'® The port's lighterage problems had 
been solved by 1905; yet an ambivalent developmental pohcy had hindered the 
port till 1912. The failure of the Rockhampton Harbour Board to clearly separate 
the port's interests from those of the town had been reproduced in Townsville. 
Townsville's dilemma had been on a smaller scale; yet it had serious conse-
quences for the port. 
The outports: Uneven achievements 
The main regional ports of Rockhampton and Townsville had to move to 
deep water through the period. Similarly, many of the outports found it neces-
sary to move their portsites. Their success in doing so varied. Bundaberg re-
mained where it was and stiff placed its hopes on river improvement. In contrast, 
Maryborough shifted its portsite to Urangan in Hervey Bay, and Mackay 
campaigned successfully for an artificial Outer Harbour. Yet the success of each 
port was marred: the Mackay scheme was vetoed after construction had begun, 
and Maryborough's move was too late to stimulate the port's declining trade. 
Of the remaining outports which did not have to shift to deep water, only Cairns 
managed to develop satisfactorily. Gladstone and Bowen remained relatively 
unused. 
Maryborough and Bundaberg: Maryborough moves to deep water 
Considering that Brisbane was the only Queensland port which had 
managed to successfully maintain a port at the head of its river, the prospects of 
the two Southern outports Maryborough and Bundaberg were not hopeful. 
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Their trade levels steadily declined and their entrance depths remained inade-
quate. Maryborough's l.w. depth was 10 feet (3.05 m) in 1900 and 1\ feet 
(7.29 m) by 1919; in Bundaberg depths rose slightly from 7 to 8 | feet (2.13 to 
2.59 m) in the same period. Both ports undertook dredging programmes and 
Bundaberg built training walls in the Burnett River, but neither improved its 
physical capacity." 
In Maryborough the energies of the local Harbour Board of Advice were 
running at a low ebb.'® But towards 1918, when the question of branch line 
extension in the Maryborough hinterland was being decided, the Board pro-
duced a last-minute effort and shifted the portsite to deep water at Urangan. 
The new site was the most favourable in the Bay; in 1911 Cullen had reported 
that it was the only part of Hervey Bay suited to be a deep-water port. Two bars, 
with respective depths of 19 and 18 feet (5.79 and 5.49 m) l.w., led up to the 
Point where the extension of a long T-head jetty could make 24-26 feet (7.32-
7.92 m) l.w. available.'" With this change in position high hopes were held for 
Maryborough's future. For Maryborough's or Bundaberg's port success, how-
ever, two requirements were necessary: branch railways had to open up the 
agricultural land in the hinterlands for closer settlement, and the move to deep 
water had to be made. Of the two ports, Maryborough was in the better position 
by the end of the period. But despite prospects of moderate prosperity the port 
coud not expect to become an important outlet for the trade of Southern Queens-
land. Bundaberg had apparently even less to hope for.®" 
Gladstone and Bowen: Continued stagnation 
As early as 1903 the Gladstone Chamber of Commerce had requested a 
Harbour Board for the port, yet this had not taken place till 1913.®! The port's 
trade had increased steadily in the intervening ten years and a meatworks had 
been established in the town. Gladstone's magnificent natural harbour meant 
that port dues could be light and, when appointed, the Gladstone Harbour 
Board ensured that port charges were kept to a minimum.®" In contrast with the 
amendments to the Acts of the other Harbour Boards in the period, the Harbour 
Board legislation for Gladstone went through quickly and quietly. That Glad-
stone's early request for a Harbour Board was not met more speedily was due, 
not to any discrimination, but to growing doubts in governmental circles that 
Harbour Boards were the best form of port administration. If the port's trade 
levels had been higher and local bodies had still asked for a Harbour Board, it 
would have been granted. The Gladstone Board was modelled on the lines of the 
Cairns port authority, which was the most democratically constituted Board to 
that time. The only cause for complaint was that the long-standing Labor 
demand for equal franchise representation was not met.®" 
A year after the Gladstone Board was constituted, the Bowen Harbour 
Board was appointed. This was a welcome sign of life from Bowen's port 
community. The energies of the town had flared up to fight Philp over the rail 
issue in 1900 but had then died away. The Royal Commission into the matter 
had favoured Bowen's rail proposals; this called for intense Bowen pressure to 
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induce the government to act on the Commission's findings. As the Port Denison 
Times realized, "if Bowen hesitates to utilise this golden opportunity she is 
lost".®* In the next few months the Times, recently amalgamated with the 
Bowen Advocate, a Labor journal, pressed the cause of the extension on Philp's 
government with new democratic fervour—but to no avaff. As it became clear 
that the connection would not be made in Bowen's favour, the paper's indig-
nation knew no bounds. Philp became a political arch-demon to the paper, a 
demon associated with "a scandalous trading monopoly, which though not in 
possession of a safe harbour, nevertheless aided by the influence of the premier, 
is prepared to continue to dispute the recognized validity of a national pro-
position ; to utilise without further delay this harbour as a magnificent natural 
outlet for the congested trade of North Queensland".®® But the paper was wasting 
its words. The link was made as Townsville wished. 
It was fitting that the Gladstone and Bowen Harbour Boards had been 
formed at the same time; each port had a great deal of sympathy for the other's 
problems. "Premier Morgan is astonished", cuffed the Times from the Gladstone 
Observer in 1905, "that two of the finest ports in Queensland were not made the 
starting points of their respective railways westwards."®® As with the Gladstone 
Harbour Board's Bill, the Bowen Harbour Board Act produced little dis-
cussion.®' Despite the hopes of the new Board, there was even less prospect in 
1918 than there had been in 1900 of that part of the Northern hinterland already 
served by Townsville being served by Bowen. At the time of the Bowen rail 
Royal Commission Philp had estimated that it would cost two to three hundred 
thousand pounds (four to six hundred thousand dollars) to make Bowen's 
shipping facilities equal to Townsville's.®® By 1918 the cost would have been even 
more prohibitive. Again, as with Gladstone, this result was the more disap-
pointing because Bowen's navigational capabilities remained so much better 
than Townsville's. The depths in the port altered only slightly in the period. 
In 1900 there was 17-20 feet (5.18-6.10 m) l.w. available at the jetty; by 1914 the 
berthage depths had been increased by a couple of feet (0.61 m) and were 
considered sufficient for the volume of trade passing through the port.®" 
Mackay: The failure of the first outer harbour scheme 
In 1900 Mackay's future had been quite bright. The port's trade was 
dependent on sugar production and the hinterland was limited by mountain 
ranges, but trade was brisk. The port's physical limitations remained the worst 
drawback. "It is a sort of negative place, our river," a local correspondent 
described the Pioneer in 1915, 
only a shallow channel of water remains at low tide and there are big 
patches of sand . . . the tenders at the wharves and some of the river craft 
are aground, long stretches of foul-smelling mud along the town bank are 
exposed . . . above the bridge is a mud-encrusted worm-eaten wooden 
barricade, erected presumably to prevent the erosion of the roadway, and 
further down the river are wharves looking for all the world as if they had 
received a visit from the modern Huns, and now in the last stage of decay."" 
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This description was factual, if exaggerated. Luckily, no large-scale improve-
ments had been attempted in the port to 1898 when a cyclone had opened up a 
new and shorter approach to the river—the Ehne Channel. Since then the 
Mackay Harbour Board had worked away, dredging and buff ding training walls, 
without much success. 
As a result, larger vessels called at Flat Top Island, where 23 feet (7.01 m) 
of water was available. This meant that almost aff cargo had to be hghtered to 
the town wharves. This was a costly process and often an inconvenient one for 
passengers. The need for an artificial harbour close to the town, or a complete 
shift of the portsite, was necessary. In 1907 Cullen put forward a plan for an 
artificial harbour in the shelter of Flat Top Island; it would cost £234,000 
($468,000), provide a l.w. depth of 24 feet (7.32 m), and have rail links with the 
town."! With this in mind, the Mackay Harbour Board requested an increase in 
its borrowing powers from the permitted maximum of £50,000 ($100,000) to 
£250,000 ($500,000). Such a request could not be readily agreed to by the 
government. Instead, Kidston devised a compromise: the Board was to increase 
its port revenue by raising its harbour dues; then the loan would be granted."" 
With this incentive the Mackay Harbour Board renewed its efforts and in 
1911 a comprehensive inquiry was made into the possible improvements. 
Several schemes had been suggested as well as Cullen's and after due con-
sideration the committee adopted a plan which was a composite of these. It 
provided for the construction of two breakwaters and a jetty for berthage pro-
jecting from Flat Top Island between the breakwaters, as Coode had outfined, 
and the construction of a reinforced concrete viaduct connecting the Island with 
the mainland, as proposed by Cullen."" 
To be successful the scheme needed the cooperation of the shipping 
companies. They had to agree to discontinue their lighterage trade and to use 
the wharfage in the artificial harbour—wharfage in the Pioneer River was 
almost aff privately owned."* At that time the cost of shipping a ton of general 
cargo from Brisbane to Townsville was 17s. ($1.70). To Mackay, two hundred 
mffes closer, the charge was 20s. ($2). This difference of 3s. (30 cents), the 
Mackay Harbour Board plaimed, would go towards the cost of the artificial 
harbour. Mackay's producing interests agreed with the plan: the question was 
whether the shipping companies would."® The situation was simffar to that faced 
by the Townsville port authorities earlier in the period, but no confrontation 
developed. 
The success of the scheme seemed imminent when in 1912 a local poll 
validated the Board's acceptance of the 1911 scheme, and when the government 
granted the loan in 1913. Yet, although construction began on Mackay's 
artificial harbour in 1913, the work was not completed."® The govermnent 
halted construction, "the reason given being that the foundations of a part of 
the Viaduct were not sufficiently stable to support the structure"."' After their 
lengthy and hard-fought campaign for the project, the suspension created a 
furore amongst the people of Mackay. Perhaps it was as well that the blame for 
the faffure of the project never found a definite place to lodge."® The Viaduct 
scandal continued to affect the port for some time. In 1916 part of the Board 
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wished to revert to developing the river; Mackay's ratepayers, however, refused 
by poff to sanction the necessary loan. A general distrust of further expenditure 
in the immediate portsite area existed and agitation had begun for the establish-
ment of a deep-water port at Port Newry, north of Mackay. Finally, as if there 
had not been enough excitement already in Mackay, in 1918 a cyclone reduced 
the river to the same state it had been in thirty years before."" 
Cairns: The most democratically appointed harbour board 
The future of Cairns in 1900 had been as bright as Mackay's, but Mackay's 
disappointments were not repeated in Cairns. The main obstacle to the port's 
expansion had been the shallowness of the Trinity Inlet's bar—10 feet (3.05 m) 
l.w. in 1900.!"" p^^ ^]^^i (^ jjne the residents of Cairns were concentrating on 
appointing a Harbour Board to improve the port. However, their efforts met 
with opposition from within Cairns and from the government. The government 
was looking askance at the Harbour Board method of port management. 
Additionally, some sections of the Cairns community opposed the formation 
of a Board. The Cairns Morning Post led local opposition, arguing that a Board 
would increase harbour dues for the port.!"! ^ provisional Board had existed 
since 1899, but because of this opposition the Harbour Board was not established 
till 1905. This local resistance was explicable mainly in terms of private interests 
who did not wish their wharfage rights to be interfered with: wharfage control 
had been a controversial question for some years.!"" 
When the Board was set up it was the most democratically constituted port 
authority in the state. It was elected solely by ratepayers and the payers of dues 
had no representation.!"" The Board was accepted by the Morning Post and the 
Cairns Chamber of Commerce only reluctantly, although it had been specially 
provided for in the Board's Act that private wharfage could not be resumed 
before the expiry of leases.!"* The Post, still discontented, found another 
feature of the legislation to complain about: "the management of the port is to 
be handed completely to the country districts . . . the people of Cairns have not 
had the slightest suspicion of what they were asking for when they demanded a 
Harbour Board."!"® jj^ jg port's most urgent need was quickly dealt with by the 
new Board when in 1906 the bar channel was cut to 16 feet (4.88 m). It was 
maintained at that depth for most of the period.!"® ygt disagreement over 
private wharfage rights and the relative inffuence of town and country interests 
on the Harbour Board lingered on. 
In 1911 Board representation was amended to admit the shires of Chillagoe, 
Einasleigh, and Eacham—an amendment which the member for Cairns opposed. 
"The back country members", he argued, "could possibly sacrifice the harbour 
for the sake of getting cheap rates for their ore and timber." To which E. G. 
Theodore, then member for Woothakata, replied: "Cairns is merely the port 
which serves the back country."!"' J Q reconcile these viewpoints, the Treasurer 
simply stated that there should be no division of interests between a port and its 
hinterland and put the amendment through. Casual dismissal of such important 
differences of opinion as these was the rule in parliamentary treatment of the 
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ports. Yet the matter would be reconsidered when the likelihood of changing 
the Board system of administration arose. Whether or not Cairns was placed at 
a disadvantage because of the influence of its hinterland producers was part of 
the wider question about the relation between ports and their hinterlands, and 
ports and their towns. In its development otherwise. Cairns was successful. In 
1912 the Board recorded a triumph when the first overseas vessels were berthed 
at the wharves, while the regular employment of heavy dredge plant after that 
time ended the port's era of lighterage. Lastly, in the closing years of the period, 
with Labor's political power increasing, the Harbour Board moved closer 
towards resuming private wharfage.!"® 
The decline of the small northern ports 
The trade of the other Northern outports steadily dwindled. From year to 
year Lucinda and Mourilyan sent out small amounts of sugar which barely 
managed to maintain them; Thursday Island grew increasingly dependent on 
the pearling and fishing trade; Port Douglas, Cooktown, and Normanton 
gradually declined. Physical difficulties hampered the port of Normanton. In 
1907 there was 6 feet (1.83 m) at l.w. on the river bar; by 1911 this had declined 
to 3f feet (1.14 m).!"" Two-thirds of a wider channel had been cut through the 
bar in 1903, but the government lacked the funds to complete the remaining 
section. A local guarantee of £13,000 ($26,000) was required for the amount, 
but the Einasleigh shire refused to agree.!!" Port depths were much better at 
Cooktown and Port Douglas. The latter could manage 12 feet (3.66 m) in 1917, 
while Cooktown provided 16 feet (4.88 m) in 1908. But the ports' hinterland 
trade had died away.!!! Given the low trade levels of these smaller ports and the 
rising costs brought about by the increasing tonnage of vessels, there was little 
likelihood that small ports such as Normanton, Thursday Island, and Port 
Douglas would survive. With the centralization of trade taking place in the state 
it would even be difficult for ports such as Maryborough and Mackay to main-
tain their places. 
Port trade and rail connections 
What made it more important that the ports of Townsville and Rock-
hampton should move to deep water, that Brisbane should appoint a co-
ordinating port authority, and that the remaining Queensland ports should 
make themselves as efficient as possible, was the recovery of the state's economy 
after 1908. The ports did not satisfactorily meet these new trading demands. 
As the upswing of trade in the eighties had emphasized the need for the 
improvement of port administration, economic growth between 1908 and 1914 
made the re-examination of the question of port control unavoidable. 
Port trade: Centralization continues 
Because of statistical limitations the patterns of port trade cannot be 
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followed through the period as cleariy as to 1900. The share of the main regional 
ports in intra-regional trade, however, did not change radicaffy through the 
period. To 1909 Brisbane's share of Southern trade increased sfightly, Rock-
hampton maintained its port place in the Centre, and Townsville's dominance 
in the North was somewhat reduced. Inter-regionally, these same three ports 
continued to be the most important in the state. Brisbane's port primacy was 
never questioned, while Townsville remained a more important trading port than 
Rockhampton. Nevertheless, from 1905 to 1909 Rockhampton almost bridged 
the gap between the two ports, as regional economic change favoured the 
Centre more than the North. Till 1909, Queensland's second string of most 
important ports were Cairns and Bundaberg, in fourth and fifth place, while 
Maryborough and Mackay shared the sixth position. After 1909, the figures 
placed Gladstone and Bowen in the second trio, but the statistics are not 
reliable. It is certain that Cairns, Bundaberg, Maryborough, and Mackay 
remained more important trading ports to 1918.!!" 
The most significant feature of the statistics for port trade in these years 
was that trade centralization was continuing in the state. Before 1900 it had been 
notable how regional trade had centred usuaffy on one port, Brisbane in the 
South and Rockhampton in the Centre. Only the North had avoided the almost 
complete domination of port trade that resulted in the other two regions. This 
concentration of trade within the regions was no less marked after 1900; what 
was new was the tendency for the state's entire trade to be attracted towards 
Brisbane. In the five years to 1900 Brisbane's share of total port trade had been 
39 per cent; by 1909 it increased to 52 per cent. The extension of the coastal rail 
line assisted Brisbane in this. Cyclically, Southern port trade approximated 
changes in total port trade extremely closely—as closely as between 1859 and 
1885. As in preceding periods. Central port trade moved similarly to Southern, 
but with less marked ffuctuations. Northern port trade, which previously had 
been growing more independent of Southern variations, came back closer to the 
trade behaviour of the dominant region. Yet some autonomy was stffl preserved: 
the North's port trade suffered less from the great depression, and declined 
between 1907 and 1909 when Southern port trade was increasing. 
In all, the figures point to the reassertion of South Queensland's dominance 
of port trade. The steps that the North and Centre had taken in the preceding 
period to redress the economic lead of the South were now halted, and the con-
ditions for a recentralization of economic activity were re-created. The principal 
features of economic change were the continued vitality of the pastoral industry 
—bolstered by the expansion of the meat trade—the moderate progress of agri-
culture, the stagnation of the sugar industry, and the decline of mining. Each of 
these changes, with the exception of the mining decline, benefited the South to 
the greatest extent, and reversed the regional capabilities of the Centre and the 
North to sustain port expansion. In 1900 the Centre had been the state's most 
economically vulnerable region, but by 1918 the North's position had been 
seriously weakened. The government, in casting around for an alternative 
method of port administration, could not but be aware of the continuing 
centralization of trade on a few ports. Perhaps administrative centralization was 
necessary to match. 
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The near-completion of the rail-port network 
Queensland's first intensive phase of rail construction in the nineteenth 
century had concentrated on extending the three main regional trunk lines 
inland. The state's second intensive phase of building in this period brought the 
ports into a much closer trading relation. As well as the extension of the three 
trunk lines, the coastal railway was continued to the north, reaching Bowen in 
1923, Mackay in 1921, and Townsviffe in 1923. More characteristic of the rail 
programme undertaken in these years, however, was the government's emphasis 
on branch line building. The ports benefited from rail construction but there 
were also some disadvantages. The linkage of the main regional ports by the 
coastal line furthered the concentration of state port trade on Brisbane and 
intensified inter-port trading competition. Much of the branch line building was 
also carelessly planned and of doubtful value to more than one or two ports. 
Haphazard branch line construction. The worth of the branch lines to the 
ports varied. Branch line building in the South and the Centre furnished the 
most glaring examples of fines being built with little or no consideration for 
wider regional needs. In Central Queensland the worst duplication of branch 
services was the construction of the Port Alma and Broadmount fines from 
Rockhampton; the wastefulness of these connections was equalled by the other 
two Rockhampton coastal links to Yeppoon and to Emu Park. After the 
Yeppoon line was built, the Emu Park route was of little value, and the Broad-
mount line's justification vanished with the construction of the Port Alma 
connection.!!" 
In the South, it was the outports which suffered from the effects of rail 
connection causing new port competition as the coastal line gradually pulled 
their trade southwards to Brisbane. Branch line duphcation in South Queens-
land was more wasteful for the ports there than in the Centre. The Burnett 
trade was competed for by Brisbane, Maryborough, and Bundaberg, and the 
question of a rail linkage to Nanango—the regional focus of trading rivalry— 
had perplexed rail building in the area since 1900. By 1916 successive regional 
trade contests had produced a bizarre and expensive railway result: four branch 
fines around and at Nanango came to an unconnected dead-end within a radius 
of twelve miles (19.31 km). The argument about a Hughenden-Winton con-
nection had formed a confusing background for the decision over the Rock-
hampton-Broadmount railway in the nineties. Similarly, Maryborough's railway 
connection with deep water at Urangan was made whffe the town was pre-
occupied with the chaotic pattern of branch line building in its hinterland. When 
the connection with Urangan was eventually approved, the Nanango line was 
only eleven miles (17.70 km) from Yarraman—which meant linkage with 
Brisbane's trading routes. 
Bundaberg shared some of Maryborough's concern in the matter and had 
another worry as well: the possibility of branch line connection facilitating 
Gladstone's competition for hinteriand trade. One smaff victory for Bundaberg 
was the Goondoon to Kalliwa extension which linked the port to the Gin Gin 
central sugar mffl, but this was offset by the government's 1916 decision to 
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extend a branch line from Many Peaks to New Cannindah. The government 
chose to heed the advice of the Under Secretary for Lands, who maintained that 
the natural port for the Upper Burnett was Gladstone, rather than be influenced 
by the petitions of Bundaberg and Maryborough.!!* 
The beginnings of rail-port competition. The additions to the inland trunk 
lines in the South and Centre could only indirectly affect port trade contests.!!® 
Because of the existence of the Gulf ports, however, the extension of the 
Northern trunk line could involve the ports directly in trade competition. In 
fact, the grievance of the Gulf ports was that this did not happen—they were 
denied connection with the Great Northern trunk line. There had been some 
prospect of this in 1909 when the ghost of McIIwraith's earlier grand trans-
continental raffway had reappeared. Kidston's government was ambitiously 
considering a Great Western line to join the three main trunk lines from 
Brisbane, Rockhampton, and Townsville, in the west. What dismayed the Gulf 
ports was that the line's terminus was not the Gulf, but Camooweal. The ports 
protested and the government appointed an inquiry to determine which Gulf 
port, if any, should be joined with the Great Western line. A Cloncurry-
Burketown connection was recommended and a careful survey was made of the 
Gulf's economic and port capabilities, but neither the Cloncurry-Burketown line 
nor the Great Western was ever built.!!® 
The beginnings of rail-port competition could be seen with the extension of 
the coastal line. It affirmed Brisbane's dominance in South Queensland and 
assisted the port in seeking trade further north. In 1903 the line reached Rock-
hampton, which reacted by persuading the government to set rail freights so as 
to keep the most profitable traffic for the port. Even with this safeguard, by the 
end of the period Rockhampton was becoming concerned with the line's effects. 
In 1916 the Harbour Board laid the blame for its financial difficulties directly at 
the door of the coastal line.!!' Although Townsviffe joined with Rockhampton 
in protesting about the long haulage rates, there was little prospect of any change 
in policy. With the war and the shortage of shipping the diversion of port trade 
to rail carriage increased. 
Despite growing port protests, the possibility that the government's pro-
gramme of rail building might harm tne ports was barely considered. The 
completion of the coastal line had been a project of long standing; it seemed to 
be the next logical step to join together the state's three interior trunk lines. In 
the 1970s it might be argued that it should never have been carried out as it 
competed with established shipping services—as well as road transport at a later 
date. But at the time there seemed to be good reasons for the linkage. The 
government was extremely dependent on the railways as a source of public 
revenue, and the Commissioner for Railways could demonstrate the greatly 
increased capital return that would result from the economies of running one 
continuous rail system rather than four. In 1909 the figures were: 
Capital cost Interest 
1890—four separate lines £11,656,000 £1/10/9 
($23,312,000) ($3.08) 
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1900—linked into two separate railways £15,217,900 £2/13/4 
($30,435,800) ($5.33) 
1910—aff four combined £19,020,900 £4/1/3 
($38,041,800) ($8.12) 
"I do not wish it to be inferred that this progressive result is due altogether to 
the linking up," the Commissioner cautioned, "because other conditions have 
contributed, but undoubtedly a great part of it is."!!® Further, some of the first 
sections of the coastal line had been constructed by local authorities themselves. 
Therefore the coastal line was not, as claimed later,!!" a government plot to steal 
the ports' trade. After 1903 Rockhampton had quickly reacted to the coastal 
line by persuading the government to alter the haulage rates so as to retain the 
wool and other high-density, high-profit traffic for the ports. Until the war this 
compromise worked well enough. What was then decisive in taking trade from 
the ports was the war and postwar shipping shortage.!"" 
Brisbane had been the port which had benefited most from rail construction 
in the period. Otherwise, branch rail building had been haphazard and wasteful, 
while the extension of the coastal line threatened to centralize port trade in 
Brisbane. Apart from the economic gains of joining the trunk lines, what also 
prevented a realization of the dangers of rail building to the ports was the 
incessant rivalry for branch lines, and the practical problems of choosing the 
most suitable routes. In the midst of the confusion of rail construction it was 
simply assumed that rail building would provide unqualified economic benefits. 
"It will be readily acknowledged", reasoned the Rail Commissioner in 1909, 
referring to the extension of the coastal line from Rockhampton to Cairns, 
"that the opening of Queensland's rich coastal lands by means of railways wffl 
give a great impetus to the sugar, agricultural, dairying, fruit, timber, mining 
and meat export industries . . . and that to obtain the full advantages of this 
development it is essential that the various short lines already existing should 
be linked up."!"! jj^g emphasis was on the development of the economy and to 
this extent the railways were a more beneficial transport media than the ports. 
Where their interests clashed the railways had greater rights. The Commissioner 
did not state this, and neither did politicians, but such a clear statement was not 
made because the rail-port contest was just beginning. Also, as usual, port affairs 
remained a relatively secondary concern. The few times that the rights of the 
ports were upheld were the result of particular port grievances. So the Port 
Denison Times complained in 1903: 
What is the use of building railways between ports which have already 
exceffent water communication ? In a country like this with the minimum 
of navigable rivers and a maximum of back country, the motif of our rail-
way construction should be the development of the interior. The stupendous 
folly of connecting ports like Maryborough, Bundaberg, Gladstone, and 
Rockhampton, or Bowen and Townsville by railway, while the back 
country of each of these centres is languishing for want of rail communica-
tion, is appalling.!"" 
But the paper's motives for reasoning this way were questionable. It would have 
argued exactly the opposite if Bowen's rail connection with Charters Towers 
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could be granted as a result. The matter was left till the next period. By that time 
a more serious transport issue was absorbing political attention. In the inter-war 
rail-road competition the ports would usually be little more than pawns in a 
bigger game. 
The neglect of port administration 
If there had been hardly any attempt to relate port and raffway needs, there 
was as httle effort to ensure that the Harbour Boards would be successful. There 
were few administrative changes made between 1900 and 1918 and most of the 
amendments to the existing Harbour Board Acts were straightforward. The non-
Harbour Board ports remained under the supervision of the Marine Depart-
ment, and after 1901 the earlier distinction between the Harbours and Rivers 
Department and the Ports and Harbours Department was reintroduced. Prac-
tically, however, the tasks of the two sections remained the same. The Harbours 
and Rivers Department controlled physical port improvement; the Ports and 
Harbours Department was responsible for assessing the ports' navigational 
capabilities. Otherwise, new Harbour Boards were appointed for Cairns, 
Gladstone, and Bowen, in 1905, 1913, and 1914. As already pointed out, these 
new authorities were set up quickly and no discussion about the principles of 
port control took place. 
The amendments to the original Harbour Board Acts had the same negative 
result as far as administration was concerned. They were made specificaffy to 
increase the Boards' borrowing powers, or to clarify some legal or technical 
points. Through the whole period the only aspect of port administration which 
aroused political attention was the question of Board representation and 
franchise reform. The function and scope of the administrative system in all 
other respects was ignored almost entirely. The relation of the ports to the other 
organs of local government in the state was not considered, and neither overseas 
nor other Australian methods of port control were examined as a possible guide. 
The intrusion of politics 
In 1906 and 1910 amendments came before parliament to raise the borrow-
ing power of the Rockhampton Harbour Board. Anything to do with the port of 
Rockhampton was politically controversial and the amendments were no 
exception. Both were used by Labor politicians as vehicles for strong protests 
about the property franchise of local authorities in the state. With the existing 
Harbour Boards franchise the larger property holders, whether ratepayers or 
payers of dues, had three votes as against the usual one. This general radical 
complaint, about Harbour Board and local authority franchises, was added to in 
Rockhampton's case by local dissatisfaction that representation of dues payers 
was larger than the representation of ratepayers on the Board. As the oldest of 
the Harbour Boards, the constitution of the Rockhampton Board was the most 
conservative, and the Labor democrats were outspoken in their criticism of the 
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franchise. "They have a condition of things in Rockhampton, so far as the 
election of the Harbour Board is concerned," one Labor parliamentarian 
charged, "which reminds one of the state of things which existed in England 
before the Reform Biff of 1832."!"" 
The 1906 amendment, in particular, was used by Labor as a vehicle for 
complaint about the Harbour Board franchises. Members for the other Queens-
land ports tended to support these criticisms. Bundaberg's representative argued 
that there were only thirty-four names on the Bundaberg Harbour Board's 
voters' roffs and that eleven of these had three votes each.!"* jj^g jggyg raised a 
degree of pohtical hostility that was unusual in port pohtics. In the past, there 
had been enmity enough in cases of port rivalry where a government decision 
over, say, a railway connection could be of vital importance. But port politics 
were usually matter-of-fact and absorbed vwth the details of the question. With 
this issue the ports were brought into the sphere of political principle. Some 
radicals even managed to link the agitation against the Boards' franchise with 
the maintenance of the White Australia pohcy. There were several Chinese 
who were payers of dues in Rockhampton. This made the issue at the next 
election clear: "The Premier and the Chows versus the White Europeans of 
Rockhampton."!"® 
In 1910 Labor did not dispute the amendment as intensively, but Ryan 
again registered a protest. "It is a standing disgrace", he said, "that a Board 
elected on such a franchise should be entrusted with the power of spending so 
much money."!"® In 1914, with the party's increasing political strength, radical 
demands began to be met. The constitution of the Rockhampton Board was 
revised; it was to be elected in future by local ratepayers and by the surrounding 
local government areas entirely. This met all of Labor's complaints except one. 
However, as long as Labor could not control the Legislative Council the three 
to one local government franchise favouring large property holders could not 
be changed.!"' Finally, in 1915 the Board's borrowing powers were given, with 
little debate, a new ceifing of £400,000 ($800,000)—the previous increases had 
been from £150,000 ($300,000) to £250,000 ($500,000), and then to £300,000 
($600,000)—and two years later a minor corrective amendment was made. 
Neither of these opportunities was used by Labor to protest against the 
Harbour Board and local government franchise. Until the Council had been 
dealt with, the franchises could not be changed. Therefore the old complaints 
were not again levelled. 
Similar amendments were also made to the Townsviffe Harbour Board's 
Act. In 1910 the Board's maximum indebtedness was increased from £250,000 
($500,000) to £350,000 ($700,000). At the time, complaints had been made about 
the ilhberahty of the Board's franchise. But on the Townsville Board the payers 
of dues balanced the ratepayers, while the Chamber of Commerce and a 
government appointee had votes as well. Consequently, the Board's constitution 
did not loom as large in Labor's sights as did Rockhampton's. Even so, in 1916 
Labor made the changes for Townsville that it had for Rockhampton in 1914; 
this, one member claimed, brought into force the franchise "that the people of 
Townsviffe have been wanting for years".!"® 
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Finance and port charges 
The pattern of port indebtedness did not change greatly, as expenditure 
remained concentrated on the three main ports. Yet there were two differences 
from the preceding period. The least important was that expenditure on the port 
of Cairns rose quite rapidly. The port's outlays were for wharfage construction 
and resumption, and the government's wiffingness to supply funds was a measure 
of the growing importance of the far northern port. More importantly, as 
Harbour Boards now existed for many of the ports, they were responsible for 
their own debts. Because of this extended responsibility, it was most serious to 
note the growing indebtedness of the Boards. The ports' critics were quick to 
point to this. Before discussing its imphcations for port administration, how-
ever, another question must be answered, namely, how port indebtedness 
affected the general level of port charges. 
This issue has already been considered for the port of Brisbane. Generally, 
except for a year or two when Brisbane's merchants felt the pinch of Kidston's 
new charges, trading interests in the port received satisfaction. As a rule, the 
more important the interest the more equable treatment it was given in the 
general dues schedule. However, Brisbane did not possess a Harbour Board, 
and the question about the relation of port indebtedness to port charges is not 
relevant for the state's main port. For the main outports it was relevant and 
also easier to answer, as more information exists about port charges and costs 
for Rockhampton and Townsville than for Brisbane. By 1918 both Rock-
hampton and Townsville had dispensed with the extensive use of lighterage. 
But as Townsville achieved this in the first years of the period and Rockhampton 
did not do so until 1914, the Central port was on the average the more costly. 
The estimate of the Commissioner for Railways of their average charges in 1907 
put Rockhampton's at Is. 8d. (17 cents) per ton (1.02 tonnes) for general cargo, 
and Townsville's at 2s. 8d. (27 cents).!"" jj^g average level of dues was a matter 
of controversy between the ports, yet the total dues were much less than the cost 
of lighterage in the ports. Therefore, even if Rockhampton's dues were less than 
Townsville's, the costs of the Central port were stiff higher in toto, because of 
the port's prolonged use of lighterage. 
As the indebtedness of the Harbour Board ports increased, most of them 
had to raise their harbour charges to meet their interest commitments to the 
Treasury. In 1910, for example, the Rockhampton Board made Lake's Creek pay 
another £1,000 ($2,000) p.a. in dues by halving the port's wharfage dues and 
doubhng its harbour dues. This was a piece of financial juggling, much as the 
Townsville Harbour Board's methods of inducing the shipping companies to 
use its Outer Harbour wharfage had been in the early 1900s. Yet under the 
circumstances, the Townsviffe Board's ploy had been justified—Rockhampton's 
was not. Its attempt was an expedient rather than a solution to its long-term 
financial problems, which perplexed other ports as weff as Rockhampton. 
Where this solution lay was difficult to see. When some of the parliamentary 
discussions of the Harbour Boards' franchises raised the question of who should 
pay for a port's development, no clear answer was given. For example, in 1911 
a Labor member claimed that harbour revenue should be obtained from 
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taxation of the landed property immediately adjacent to the port. But, as the 
member for Cairns pointed out, this contradicted Labor's other claim that all 
ratepayers in the port hinterland should vote in the election of the Harbour 
Boards. If the interests immediately concerned with the port were to pay the 
total cost for port improvement, then only they had a right to elect the Boards.!"" 
The answer was a fair one. As this and the few other brief considerations of the 
question reveal, equating economic and pohtical responsibility for port develop-
ment was a difficult matter. The only thing that was quite clear was the growing 
financial problems of the ports. 
A solution?: The abolition of the harbour boards 
The solution seemed to be to dispose of the Harbour Boards. As at the time 
the Boards had been appointed widespread dissatisfaction existed with the way 
ports were being developed, by 1918 disquiet was being felt about the adequacy 
of the Boards themselves. In that year Ryan and Theodore took turns to 
introduce a bill to abolish the Boards and place them under centralized adminis-
tration.!"! So Leahy's 1903 train of thought, that the ports should be treated as a 
national charge, was continued by others at the end of the period. But a more 
definite and drastic conclusion was reached. "Ports, like railways", Forgan 
Smith stated in 1917, "are a national concern, and should be controlled by the 
state. It is no more right that the people living in a Harbour Board district 
should have to pay the whole of the cost of improving the harbour than that 
other people . . . in a given area should be called upon to bear the whole cost of 
a railway."!"" jjjg clearest calls for centralization of port control were made by 
Labor parliamentarians, yet it would be mistaken to see the move towards 
Board abolition solely as a result of Labor's ideological preference for state 
control. Opposition to the Board system went back to the beginning of the period 
and was not always voiced by Labor members.!"" It is difficult to be certain about 
how much principle there was in Labor's proposal to centralize port adminis-
tration. A more important factor in Labor's attitude may have been the realiza-
tion that since a Brisbane Harbour Board had not been appointed, and since the 
Harbour Board franchises could not be further liberalized until the Legislative 
Councff was leashed, then central control would bring Brisbane under the 
government's jurisdiction as well as the outer Harbour Board ports. Ryan 
spoke explicitly in these terms in 1911.!"* 
The reactions of the Harbour Boards to the proposals for port centralization 
varied according to the amount of success that the individual Board's had had 
with their ports, and to the strength of regional feeling. The main outports were 
strongly opposed but some of the other ports were not too greatly disturbed. 
Mackay's reaction was quite favourable.!"® Yet Townsville strenuously opposed 
the centralists and so did Rockhampton. "Whffe we may approve of the scheme 
in theory", the Rockhampton Harbour Board replied, "we are of the opinion 
that in practice it will mean a reversion to the evils of the system in vogue before 
the establishment of Harbour Boards and we do not think that the present 
system has been carried out in the spirit in which the 1892 Act was drawn up."!"® 
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And there the matter rested in 1918. The centrahsts' measures were not put 
through, but there seemed a good chance that they would be in the near future. 
Labouring under growing financial burdens and the strains of wartime dis-
location, the ports' resistance could not be very effective. The crux of the ports' 
administrative difficulties was that more attention had been paid to the politically 
controversial aspects of the Harbour Boards' affairs than to the principles of 
port administration. In the inter-war years the ports would pay a heavy price 
for this shortsightedness. What could have been a period of transition as the 
Harbour Boards were adjusted to meet the needs of the ports was instead a time 
of neglect in which the ports were developed to suit the Boards. Concern with 
port administration on a more than local level had been minimal. 
Conclusion: Port administration by 1918 
That port administration had been found wanting was almost a foregone 
conclusion considering the neglect from which it suffered. The only special 
feature which distinguished the amending Acts or the new Board Acts was that 
through some of them generahzed political values had been applied indis-
criminately to port management. The controversy over Board representation 
had helped to reduce discussion about the appropriateness of the Board system 
itself as a means of port administration. After the failure to appoint a Brisbane 
Harbour Board, port users became more concerned with the scale of port 
charges. There had also been more attention paid in Rockhampton and Towns-
ville to port developmental policies and to port charges than to the propriety of 
the Boards being the centre of intra-port clashes. 
Together, the emphasis on the politics of port administration, and the 
concentration on the practicalities of development, hmited discussion about the 
principles of administration. Towards the end of the period, when the strain of 
war and rail competition brought out the ports' difficulties, the question of 
administration had been tardily recalled. From the extreme of a system based on 
local responsibility that had been created by a Conservative government, the 
ports' critics had shifted to considering complete centralization—apparently in 
the best Labor tradition—as the only step left to take. 
In reforming port administration the government could have looked in two 
directions for guidance. Either the Harbour Boards' relations with other forms 
of local government could have been reassessed, or the overseas and other 
Australian methods of port control could have been studied. There had been an 
intensive inquiry into state local government in 1896, but it had not included the 
Boards. As neither public nor private authorities they were left to one side. As 
for overseas experience. Marine Board Engineer Cullen had personally inspected 
some of the largest world ports in 1900. In his tour report Cuffen had leaned 
towards a Brisbane Harbour Trust and to better port control generally, but he 
had been more concerned reaffy with technical procedures than with port 
administration.!"' 
The Queensland system was derived directly from English methods which 
were suited to a community with strong traditions of local self-government. Yet 
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each country had a distinctive way of dealing with port development based on 
its own geography and history. In the United States and South Africa quite 
different methods had been found suitable. The American pattern of port 
control was based on local intra-state authorities working closely with a power-
ful and efficient body of Federal Engineers. Further, the South African response 
had been to unify rail and port control, with more emphasis on centralized 
supervision than was the case in the United States or England. Port control was 
a compficated affair which had to be designed for local needs. New South Wales 
and Victoria, for example, had quite different types of port authority. The 
Melbourne Harbour Trust had been appointed in 1876 after some years of effort 
and was representative of shipowners, traders, and local authorities. The Sydney 
Harbour Trust was set up in 1900 as a direct response to a plague scare and was 
a comparatively centralized body not representative of port users.!"® 
This is not to say that a representative port trust was necessarily a better 
means of port control than a centralized authority. Whether it was, depended on 
the port itself and on the port's place in the wider economic and pohtical unit. 
However, despite the unavoidable complexities of evolving an efficient means of 
port administration, political debate about the question in Queensland had been 
dangerously general. Port control had been given to the Harbour Boards much 
too casually, yet it was uncertain whether recentralization would improve the 
ports' situation. A balance of control would have been better, but debate about 
port administration was never informed enough to raise this as a possibility. 
Conclusion: The ports found wanting 
The economy had more than recovered the ground it had lost during the 
nineties depression and the turn of the century drought, yet the regional in-
equalities had not been significantly reduced. As a result, even the larger out-
ports had little hope of matching Brisbane's growth and the secondary ports had 
to struggle to maintain themselves. The tendencies towards the centralization of 
port trade were added to by the extension of the coastal rail line north. The 
second serious external demand on the ports was the increasing size of shipping. 
The ports' response to these new pressures was only half-adequate. Of the 
main ports, Brisbane and Townsville had done best but each had its short-
comings. Brisbane's depths were satisfactory but port wharfage left much to be 
desired and a port authority had not been set up. Townsville's Outer Harbour 
depths compared favourably with Brisbane's, excepting the entrance channel, 
and hghterage had been eliminated, yet the Harbour Board had pursued an 
ambivalent pohcy in developing the Inner Harbour as weff as the Outer. Towns-
ville's wharfage in 1918 was also something of a question mark. It was new and 
well equipped, yet because of unsettled wartime conditions it was uncertain 
whether it would be adequate for future needs. 
Rockhampton's performance had been depressing. The port's lighterage 
burden had been lifted only towards the end of the period and some still wished 
to see the town reaches of the river improved before Port Alma—statements of 
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the Harbour Board to the contrary. Rockhampton's difficulties were also added 
to in two new ways. The extension of the coastal line had joined Rockhampton 
and Brisbane, so much Central trade was being puffed South. Secondly, the level 
of indebtedness of the Harbour Board was becoming alarming. It had com-
mitted itself financially to the government as no other port authority had without 
making a success of its improvement programme. 
The development of the secondary ports had been a general failure. Neither 
Mackay nor Bundaberg had moved to deep water. Mackay had tried to do so 
but its efforts had been dogged by misfortune; Bundaberg had not tried and still 
hoped that the improvement of the Burnett River would suffice. Maryborough 
had moved to deep water at Urangan but only at the end of the period. It 
remained to be seen whether Maryborough's port trade could be restimulated. 
Lastly, the fine natural ports of Gladstone and Bowen remained relatively 
unused. This bleak result in the development of the smaller ports was brightened 
only by the success of Cairns. The port's handicaps had been fewer to start with. 
It had not had to shift to deep water and its hinterland was usually non-
competitive with its main intra-regional port rival. Of aff the larger ports it was 
furthest from the coastal line and the port's new and democraticaffy appointed 
Harbour Board had carried out a vigorous policy providing for future expansion. 
In sum: the clearest port success belonged to Cairns and the development 
of Brisbane and Townsville had been a qualified success. The record of Rock-
hampton and most of the secondary ports, however, was a bad contrast. For 
many ports the problem had often been the financial restrictions faced by their 
port authorities. Harbour improvement was a costly process and the state often 
could not spare the necessary money. Port authorities in England and America 
had been more fortunate. There the needs of the major ports were rarely 
neglected.!"" But this was an unavoidable handicap for the state, whereas 
devising a sound system of port administration had been a real possibility. Yet 
port administration had been neglected. The direct adaptation of English 
practices to Queensland needs had been misguided. The English Harbour Board 
system could not work in Queensland because there was no traditional body of 
shipowners, shipbuilders, or traders which could have been expected to uphold 
the port's interest as against the town's. The elements of regional rivalry had 
been built into the Board system, instead of being provided against. 
However, the destructive effects of regionalism on port administration 
tended to be concealed after 1900 by controversy about the Harbour Board 
franchises. The nationalist identification of moral and economic matters sent 
up a smoke-screen in front of the ports' real problems, while the effects of 
regionalism and the potentially destructive influence of rail-port competition 
were neglected by politicians. Pubhc attention was given to the ports only on 
matters of practical or local grievance and on the pofitically fruitful theme of 
the injustice of the Board franchise. 
How these facts influenced the ports in their move to deep water depended 
on their particular location and their own background of local rivalries. The 
almost tragic story of the port of Rockhampton's development brought out the 
worst of the situation. Facing three alternative portsites, Rockhampton vacil-
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lated endlessly and the Harbour Board became a player in the dispute rather 
than a referee. The same could be said of the other Boards, except that they were 
more fortunate as their sites were geographically decided. As Townsville's 
experience showed, where any room for doubt existed over the port's situation 
the split between the town and the port began again. In the inter-war years the 
government would have to wrestle with the ports' difficulties amidst economic 
depression and rail-road competition. It was a gloomy prospect. 
11 THE ECONOMY 1918-1939 The zenith of the radical interlude 
After 1918 Australia's long period of isolation from the cares of the outside 
world began to draw to a close. For Europe the nineteenth century was ter-
minated by the first world war, but as clear a definition was not made for 
Australia. Lulled by Imperial tunes and an equally deceptive sense of geographic 
isolation between the wars, Australia remained half-in and half-out of the new 
century. These were the years of Hitler, Franco, and democratic confusion. 
Political derangement was matched by economic chaos. Postwar reconstruction 
concealed the malfunctioning of the international market until the depression 
sent nationalistic tariff barriers soaring upwards in desperation. It was an 
achievement that Australian liberalism came through these years intact, if not 
completely unscathed.! 
In many ways Australia remained preoccupied with her own problems. 
The federal government extended its powers during the war and readjusted 
fiscal relations with the states in the inter-war years to meet its growing obliga-
tions. A federal Country Party emerged and postwar agricultural settlement 
schemes were championed for returned soldiers. An insistent current of industrial 
unrest also ran through the politics of the time, and the basic objectives of 
Arbitration and the Tariff were queried until the depression sharply divided the 
twenties from the thirties. The labour movement then became more concerned 
with unemployment than with mihtancy. These wider events often intruded into 
Queensland's affairs. To some degree, intrastate regional rivalries were reduced 
by an enforced attention to the claims of federalism and the state was more 
unified. Yet regionahsm survived and helped to prevent a necessary reappraisal 
of the state's economy. Queensland's economic pohcies remained uncompro-
misingly agrarian and the rise of the state's Country Party contributed to their 
appeal. 
The structure and timing of growth 
Pastoral recovery maintained 
The pastoral industry in the inter-war years maintained its recovery after 
the turn of the century depression. Allowing for the importance of the drought 
of 1895-1902 and for wartime dislocation and drought in 1916-1918, inter-war 
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growth continued at a high level. From 1918 to 1921 pastoral activity had de-
clined because of drought; expansion then followed till 1925, based on increased 
wool and meat exports. After that time, the industry fell away badly for the next 
six years until recovery began between 1931 and 1934/1935. This broadened into 
expansion until 1942. Finally, drought and war reduced activity until 1945. The 
performance of the industry after 1900 showed that the expansion of the 1880s 
had placed the industry's physical capacity at a level around which change could 
oscUlate." 
Meat producers had battled through a period of low beef prices in the 
twenties to be faced with depression-inspired tariff walls in Continental markets 
in the thirties. Britain had become more important as a consumer." The industry 
had also gone through an unsettling phase of ownership changes. In 1914 the 
preserving works in South Queensland had been the A.M.A., the Q.M.E., John 
Cooke, Borthwicks, Birt &. Coy., and Baynes Bros., while in the Centre there 
were works at Gladstone and Rockhampton. In the North, Bergl's were estab-
lished at Bowen, the A.M.E. and the Q.M.E. were at Townsville, Birt & Coy. 
were at Burdekin and Biboohra, and there was also a plant at Torrens Creek. 
Between 1925 and 1931 four of the Southern works had closed down, as had 
two in the North. Swift's Brisbane plant had been purchased by the state 
government to become a public abattoir, Bergl's Bowen plant had been pur-
chased by Borthwick's, and their Gladstone works by Swifts. So by 1945 the 
number of works had been reduced from thirteen to seven.* The industry's 
fortunes were in many ways mirrored by developments at the C.Q.M.E. in 
Rockhampton, one of the state's largest companies. Between 1901 and 1924 
the works had been owned solely by Nelson Bros., but hard times came after the 
war and the mid-twenties saw negotiations under way for new management. 
The company was then taken over by Angliss and Coy. before passing on to 
Vestey's. This was the standard pattern for firms in the inter-war trade: postwar 
stress followed by a change in ownership.® 
Leadership in regional shares of sheep numbers again alternated between 
the South and Centre, with the South displacing the Centre for primacy after 
1925. Northern sheep numbers were much less than those of the other regions 
but the North's cattle stocks exceeded the South's and varied less than the 
Centre's. Southern and Northern centres were the most important cattle pro-
cessing plants. The North overtook and passed the other regions after 1934— 
the same year in which chiffed meat became an important article of export—but 
the South dominated mutton processing. Both the North and Centre com-
plained that Southern interests prevented the development of their meat trades.® 
These differences of opinion, price and marketing problems, and the difficulty 
of seasonality which caused over-capacity and excessive overhead costs, were 
substantial obstacles to the industry's growth. They were only partly overcome 
by the elimination of firms by competition and amalgamation, and the negotia-
tion of preferential Imperial agreements.' Yet in all, the state's pastoral industry 
had done weff considering the difficulties of the time. 
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Agricultural growth 
What distracted Queenslanders from the creditable achievement of the 
pastoral industry was the expansion of agricultural production. By 1945 it 
seemed that the state's agrarian promise had at last begun to be realized. Queens-
land's share of the Australian acreage under crop had risen from 5.1 per cent 
in 1920 to 8.9 per cent, and the per capita ratios for those employed in Queens-
land and Australian cultivation had improved from 1.1/2.8 to 1.7/2.7. There had 
also been an increase in total state agricultural employment as against an 
Australian decrease. Only in one familiar direction did the agrarian achievement 
remain unchanged. Excluding sugar, the South accounted for over 90 per cent 
of the total state area under crop.® 
Apart from the continued regional imbalance the improvements concealed 
some other anomalies. After 1929 progress had been rapid but in the twenties 
growth had been very slow. However, the composition of agriculture had 
changed for the better. In 1920 there was little wheat growing in the state, 
despite expansion between 1915 and 1920; by 1939 wheat was grown on a large 
scale and there had been a decrease in maize cultivation. The expansion of the 
thirties owed much to the development of the Darhng Downs as a wheat-growing 
region, but the lack of change in the composition of production in the other 
Southern agricultural districts was striking. Only Wide Bay managed to progress 
noticeably." 
Dairying expanded quickly and consistently in the face of low price levels. 
The South dominated production and the Downs became a major dairying 
centre. Otherwise, activity was concentrated in the Moreton and Wide Bay 
districts. The industry had progressed, but some spoke with restraint about the 
future. The potential development of margarine as an alternative to butter was 
imminent and the industry's productivity was low. These warnings were 
justified. The state's phase of dairying expansion had begun after a forty-year 
upswing in the Australian industry had already ended in 1920.!" 
77?^  sugar industry expands: Mining continues to decline 
The period saw the most sustained growth of the sugar industry to that 
time. Expansion was rapid between 1920 and 1931, till drought and depression 
set the industry back sharply. Production then rose strongly from 1934 to 1939, 
but wartime difficulties again lowered production. The industry's success in the 
twenties had been won in spite of low cane and sugar yields. North Queensland 
remained the foremost producing region but the South's output was still con-
siderable. Southern productivity was behind Northern, but closer proximity to 
markets and production centres was an off-setting advantage. In the North, the 
richness of the far north as a producing area was marked, although increased 
production in the Townsville and Mackay regions after 1930 made their com-
bined output equal to that of the far north's.!! 
When the stagnation of the state's total mineral production between 1921 
and 1931 was brought to the attention of Queenslanders by the depression, it 
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was belatedly realized that the industry had been allowed to decline. However, 
the frequently voiced hopes for new gold discoveries to boost the economy were 
escapist. Gold production did rise again, yet only the extensive development of 
the state's vast base metal deposits remained an economic possibility. The 
catastrophic fall in total mineral production between 1920 and 1921 was the 
result of a decline in world copper prices. Thereafter, till 1931, coal was the most 
valuable mineral raised. By 1933 gold and base metal production had reasserted 
their old primacy over coal mining, and the industry managed again to con-
tribute towards Queensland's recovery after a depression.!" 
Coal mining was mostly carried on in the South—though the Collinsville 
fields behind Bowen were a valuable Northern asset. Of the Southern fields, 
Ipswich was by far the most important. The Centre remained the major gold-
producing region, but activity at Mt. Morgan was sporadic; production declined 
rapidly there after 1925 and recovered only slightly till 1937. Gympie consistently 
produced small amounts of gold. In the North, the most valuable fields were 
Charters Towers and the Cape: production there gradually grew between 1931 
and 1937 with the reworking of older deposits. Copper came principally from the 
Cloncurry mines and to a lesser degree from Mt. Morgan. 
Manufacturing grows in the wrong direction 
The absolute growth of the state's manufacturing industry in the period was 
quite satisfactory and activity was strongest in the thirties. There was an upswing 
in production from 1923 to 1925, where output was maintained till 1928; after 
slumping between 1929 and 1931, activity expanded rapidly once more between 
1931 and 1938. But the sectoral performance of manufacturing was unsatis-
factory. In the preceding phase of growth from 1906 to 1914 it had been hopeful 
to note the extent to which the metals, clothing, construction, meat, and sugar 
sectors had contributed to expansion. However, after 1920 only metals and 
construction were growth initiators, while the performance of textiles was 
particularly disappointing. There was some progress from 1920 to 1933, but 
numbers employed in textile production changed little from 1933 to 1947; 
similarly, the meat and sugar sectors stagnated. The place of clothing, meat, and 
sugar, as growth-initiating sectors, had been taken by the food and miscel-
laneous sectors, which were areas of much lower potential productivity.!" 
Regionally, manufacturing remained centralized in the South. Brisbane's 
share of Southern production was as marked as was the South's share of state 
manufacturing, but some other Southern towns—notably Ipswich and Too-
woomba—did attract some industry. The same could not be said for Central 
Queensland, where Rockhampton accounted for most of the region's manu-
facturing. In the North, Townsville, Cairns, and to a lesser degree Mackay 
shared regional manufacturing activity. 
The economy 1918-1939: Restrained growth, primary dependence, and 
regional imbalance 
Between 1885 and 1918 there had been two major spurts of growth—in the 
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eighties and from 1908 to 191':!—and a major economic depression. The years 
1920-1945 saw another depression from 1928 to 1931, but no period of economic 
growth comparable to those before 1918. Growth was spaced in two phases, 
1921-1925/1926 and 1934/1935-1939. But even taken together, these phases did 
not bear comparison with the eariier upswings. Postwar recovery lasted from 
1918 to 1920. Moderate growth then followed from 1921 to 1925/1926, when 
recession set in until 1929. The thirties depression in Queensland was brought on 
by drought as much as by external economic difficulties. The pastoral industry 
fell first into depression after 1926, to be followed by declines in rail and con-
struction activity after 1926, and in manufacturing in 1929. The only bright spot 
at that time was agriculture. Mining recovery began after 1931, but this was 
counterbalanced by depression in the sugar industry from 1931 to 1934; then, 
between 1935 and 1939 recovery broadened into expansion. The first three years 
of the war unsettled the state's economy but did not seriously dislocate it as the 
first war had. After 1942, however, drought and war retarded growth. Hence, 
expansion in the twenties was hmited to 1921-1925/1926, and relied less on 
agricultural growth than did the second expansionary phase of the thirties. The 
leading growth sectors were pastoral, construction, sugar, and, less importantly, 
manufacturing. From 1934/1935 to 1939 agriculture and mining replaced con-
struction as growth sectors. Rail outlays had been important in the first phase, 
but not in the second. 
It would seem best to see the expansion from 1921 to 1925/1926 as a con-
tinuation of the development after 1908 which had been interrupted in 1914. 
In the twenties the state's economy had to readjust itself to keep up with 
structural changes in the Australian economy. That this did not take place partly 
explains the more agrarian nature of the next growth phase, 1934/1935-1939, 
and also the lesser short-run effects of the thirties depression on Queensland. 
The depression's effects on primary production could be partly counteracted by 
increasing the level of output, and increased primary activity characterized the 
economy in the thirties. Austrahan manufacturing diversified in the twenties, 
but Queensland's industry did not. The involvement with the wider economy 
came at a bad time for Queensland and contributed to the state's missing out on 
manufacturing diversification.!* 
Between 1900 and 1918 the North had declined in relation to the South, 
while the Centre maintained itself. After 1918 the fortunes of the outlying 
regions were reversed. The Centre's rate of population growth fell behind that of 
the other regions in the twenties, and in the thirties the Centre's population 
actually decreased. The North, on the other hand, grew quickly in the twenties 
and continued to do so in the thirties, if less rapidly.!® 
The North owed its recovery to the expansion of its pastoral industry, to 
the success of sugar growing, and to the growth of mining. The Centre's mineral 
industry had fallen away and pastoral production remained the region's only 
important producing activity. Considering the eighty years from 1860 to 1939, 
it was notable that of Queensland's four periods of development, in only one— 
from 1885 to 1900—had both the outlying regions improved their position in 
relation to the South. From 1900 to 1918 the Centre had grown as rapidly as the 
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South, and from 1918 to 1939 the North's economy recovered and continued to 
grow; but the South always remained the most important region. Of the sectors 
contributing to growth after 1918, only the pastoral industry was common to 
each region, and manufacturing and agriculture remained concentrated in the 
South. In sum, the general regional economic imbalance was not as bad as the 
sectoral regional inequalities. Long-term growth prospects for the Centre and 
the North remained restricted within the framework of primary production. 
The South's continued dominance and the lack of non-primary industry in 
the other regions encouraged the centralization of trade in the South. This was 
the inescapable difficulty faced by the outports through the period. Trade 
centralization was strengthened by the workings of the coastal railway, and the 
through freight rate policies of a government perplexed by private road transport 
competition with the pubhc railways. In reaction to these pressures the ports fell 
into anarchic trade competition for dwindling cargoes: regionalism lived on. 
Agrarianism remained just as important a reality in the state. However, where 
regionahsm flourished unobtrusively, its specific effects concealed by the pohtical 
nebula of decentralization, agrarianism was discussed endlessly and openly 
promoted. The concentration on agrarianism also concealed many of the harm-
ful effects of regionahsm. 
Public policies and economic change: The agrarians supreme 
Contrasts in governmental favour (1) The land industries 
Pastoral legislation. In the last years of the war the usually clear liberal 
atmosphere of Queensland's politics had grown murky. Class hostility centred 
round Labor's proposal to efiminate the surety, which had been made in 1906 as 
a drought-relief measure, that pastoral rents would not be raised by more than 
50 per cent when periodically reassessed. The amending act was rejected four 
times by the Legislative Council until its passage in 1920. Philp and other leading 
Conservatives formed a deputation to lobby against the act and other Labor 
measures in London. Either because of the deputation, or because of the distrust 
of the government's socialistic appearance, the 1920 state loan which was 
floated in London was not subscribed to.!® SQ pastoralists faced an irate Labor 
government, as well as some proof of the success of agrarian claims. This 
augured badly for the legislative treatment of the industry. Through most of the 
twenties Labor's attitude did not encourage pastoral investment. The 1920 clash, 
traditional radical-labour distrust of the pastoralist, and the increased demand 
for smaff agricultural holdings after the war, reinforced the government's anti-
pastoral stance. In the early twenties this was plain enough, but after 1925 
falling wool prices and drought created a situation wherein Labor attitudes to 
pastoral occupation had to be reconsidered. The state's foremost producing 
industry could not be seriously hindered. 
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In 1927 a large number of pastoral leases came up for renewal. Tenure 
debates revolved around Labor's desire for non-alienation and perpetual lease, 
as against Nationalist-Conservative demands for freehold rights. In the early 
twenties Labor had enforced this policy, but before the 1927 leases were renewed 
the Land Administration Board issued a report that criticized the government's 
tenure and rental policies.!' By that time Labor's toleration for labour mihtancy 
in the state had been stretched to its fimits. Faced with continuous industrial 
strife on one side, and Nationahst financial hostility on the other, McCormack's 
party could not ignore the needs of pastoralists. The report was accepted and 
many of Labor's pastoral policies were reversed; the same more sympathetic 
treatment benefited the meat industry as well as wool growers.!® The liberal 
unanimity had been again restored by force of econonoic circumstances. The 
question of pastoral relief and leases should be kept free of party politics, the 
Brisbane Courier had warned in 1927: "This is too big a matter to be involved 
in party politics." To this Labor gave practical assent.!" 
Agricultural legislation. No such encouragement was necessary to induce 
the government to be sohcitous towards agriculturists. After 1918 Queensland 
Labor constructed a careful and cohesive agricultural policy."" This was done so 
successfully that the Country party's political fortunes ran at a persistently low 
ebb. Country party supporters frequently criticized Labor for steafing agrarian 
ideas from the party. This was only partly fair; because of the historical con-
ditions of the rise of Labor in the state. Labor was as much a genuine heir of the 
nineteenth-century agrarian tradition as the Country party. 
An integral part of Labor's agrarian policies was the postwar large-scale 
settlement schemes. Detailed plans were drawn up in the twenties for settlements 
in the Dawson Valley and the Upper Burnett, and a less specific scheme for 
Northern Queensland. Of these, the Dawson Valley scheme came closest to 
reahzation. Intended as a cultivation area for cotton, rice, tobacco, and dairying, 
and with medium-sized wool properties, the state government pushed hard for 
Federal support. However, the Development and Migration Commission con-
sidered that insufficient preparatory surveys had been made and vetoed the 
project."! Strictures such as these had little effect on the state's policies. With 
the onset of the depression agriculture was accorded greater status as a simple 
and natural basis of economic activity, and, by 1938, 30,000 acres (12,141 ha) 
had been opened up around Townsville and Cooktown for dairying and 
tobacco growing."" 
More successful, and more unique to Queensland in their complexity of 
application, was the web of primary producers' organizations set up in the 
twenties. Two wartime pools which had served as models for the postwar years 
were the wheat and cheese pools. The wheat pool's workings had been specially 
noteworthy. Dealing with a non-perishable and easily handled product, and a 
small quantity of grain compared with southern production, the pool was 
accepted so well by those involved that it was continued after the war. Organizing 
other primary producers was more difficult. Labor began with legislation that 
stressed the principle of local, as against commodity, organization. Small 
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associations of primary producers elected district councils, which in turn elected 
a Council of Agriculture that worked with the Department of Agriculture and 
Stock. Pooling legislation was being passed at the same time and these separate 
threads had then to be drawn together. 
The debate which arose from the movement towards agricultural organiza-
tion was most concerned with whether organization on a district or a com-
modity basis was preferable, not with the desirabihty of organization in itself— 
this was agreed on. Some Country party members strongly criticized Labor's 
original choice of district organization. In 1925 legislation shaped by the new 
Secretary of Agriculture, Forgan Smith, changed organization to a commodity 
basis."" What proved to be a more serious limitation to the arrangements of the 
twenties was that the federal constitution did not permit interstate tariff barriers. 
Southern agricultural produce could be dumped on the Queensland market. 
This, and declining prices, made the workings of these pioneer methods of 
agricultural organization difficult and indicated the need for federal legislation."* 
The government was also closely connected with the development of par-
ticular crops. As well as stressing the importance of wheat, crop expansion plans 
centred round peanut, banana, and tobacco growing. In the early twenties 
cotton was backed briefly, but drought in 1926 and declining prices ended hopes 
in this direction. With wheat, peanuts, tobacco, and bananas the common policy 
was subsidization or, when possible, protection—the example of the sugar 
industry was not lost on small farmers."® Of these crops only wheat was suc-
cessful ; nevertheless, the cooperation between the government and farmers had 
been valuable. 
Considering the concern Labor showed for agriculture, the relative in-
difference with which they viewed the pastoral industry was striking. Labor poli-
ticians usually thought that where social ideals clashed with economic realities 
the latter should adapt to the former. "If we were only considering the wool 
industry," McCormack said in 1927, 
a good case could be made for the keeping of the big areas for the more 
profitable workings of the industry—I do not deny that. In that respect, the 
State loses by closer settlement. It could be worked more profitably as a 
big sheep undertaking than it can be by small selectors. But would anybody 
teff me that progress lies in that direction? . . . we have a duty to the 
country—a duty to all sections of the public, who tell us they are willing 
and anxious to develop that land in smaller areas; and the duty of a govern-
ment is to give them that opportunity."® 
Certainly there were few in the party who would teff their leader any differently. 
No Labor politician took a stand on the issue of primary as against secondary 
production and the leaders of the party, especially Forgan Smith, upheld the 
agrarian ideal with a moral fervour."' In 1929 the British Economic Mission 
argued that further expansion of the Australian primary industries would be 
most unwise; yet in the thirties Queensland renewed agricultural production 
on a wider scale than before."® 
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Contrasts in governmental favour (2) Manufacturing, etc. 
Queenslanders remained unimpressed with the importance of manufacturing 
development. As labour attitudes suffused Austrahan nationahsm and generally 
slowed the country's rate of economic growth, the most thoroughly Labor state 
in the inter-war period completely ignored its manufacturing sector. The 
twenties were a time of important Austrahan industrial growth in which 
Queensland failed to share. Between 1911 and 1921 factory employment in the 
state declined while it was increasing in New South Wales and Victoria. In the 
same period South Australian factory employment had fallen, but the twenties 
saw a marked variation in the Queensland and South Austrahan industrial 
performances. In that decade factory employment grew only shghtly in New 
South Wales and declined slightly in Victoria. The South Austrahan factory 
employment ratio increased only from 62 to 63, but the Queensland ratio— 
which had already fallen from 61 to 56 between 1911 and 1921—feff to 48 in 
1929. After the thirties the Queensland figure had risen only to 54, half the 
Victorian level. But the more reasonable comparison was with South Aus-
tralia's achievement. In 1901 the South Australian factory employment ratio had 
been equal to Queensland's: by 1939 it was 73 as against Queensland's 54."" 
Some Queenslanders were becoming aware of the seriousness of the retarda-
tion of manufacturing. In a 1936 study aimed at assessing the employment 
absorption potential of the state's industries, J. R. Jay critically assessed manu-
facturing prospects. He warned that the state's long-run rate of population 
growth had reached an upper turning point in 1925, and that future economic 
growth would take place at a much slower rate. Again, in 1945 Colin Clark 
argued that long-run trends in the Australian economy had affected Queens-
land's manufacturingindustry unfavourably."" More particular objections to the 
state's manufacturing climate frequently concerned the rate of company taxation 
and the level of wages. Nationalist complaints about taxation brought httle 
response from Labor, but strictures about wage levels brought a standard reply: 
labour conditions were more important than the level of profits. "The average 
income of Queensland labour per head is the highest in Australia", Forgan 
Smith argued in 1938 when South Australian policies were pointed out to him. 
"We have the highest wage system, the best conditions of labour, and the lowest 
unemployment.""! Whereas South Australian labour conditions were much less 
attractive. 
The root problem was the government's patronage of primary production. 
The goals of agrarian development and decentralization almost entirely en-
meshed Labor's economic thought. As one urban Nationalist justly complained, 
"it appears to be the desire of the Government to bring about the fullest en-
couragement and development of our rural industries and at the same time 
prevent the aggregation of large populations in the cities and towns"."" The 
state's producing industries seem to have been examined and treated by the 
government in accordance with two principles: how closely they were con-
nected with agrarian production, and how important they were to the economy 
as a whole. But only the agrarian criterion was consistently applied. Because the 
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sugar industry was a form of agricultural production, the state government 
supported its negotiations with the federal government for a guaranteed price. 
The industry benefited from the same minute organizational scrutiny which was 
applied to agricultural production generally in the period."" In contrast, the 
mining industry remained an unwanted child. The most important inter-war 
event for the industry was when Moore's non-Labor government encouraged 
the American Smelting and Refining Coy. to move into Mt. Isa in 1931. Labor 
continued to assist the industry in the thirties, but it was a tardy recognition of 
needs that had been evident for years, as with the treatment of the pastoral 
industry in the twenties."* 
The belated support for the mining and pastoral industries proved that 
Queensland's Labor politicians could not completely ignore economic realities. 
This was exemplified in the treatment of the state's railways. Branch rail con-
struction in 1908-1914 and in the first half of the twenties had greatly stimulated 
Queensland's agriculture, and in this way it seemed that the state's nineteenth-
century investment in rail construction was at last paying off. But the develop-
ment of private road transport threatened to eliminate these benefits. Road 
haulage seemed ideal for agriculturists, but the new medium was grudgingly 
accepted by politicians. The difficulty was that railway income remained the 
government's major source of public revenue and the railways were an important 
source of employment opportunities. Here moral priorities had to give way to 
economic practicalities. There was enough evidence that road haulage had come 
to stay but the problem was not faced up to in the period—in the same way as 
the problems of the economy's dependence on primary industry were avoided. 
Sooner or later there would have to be a balancing of moral aims and economic 
means, but the thirties were more concerned with the effects of the depression, 
and the forties brought the war. The contradictions in the state's economic 
policies would have to be resolved at a better time."® 
The politics of economic change: Limits to the liberal unanimity 
The most severe tests of the liberal unanimity were made after 1918 as 
political violence encroached on the British liberal tradition in Australia. After 
1859 the trinity of hope had been gradually displaced in Queensland until what 
remained was an agrarianism which discouraged criticism of the structure of the 
economy. Analogously, by 1939 the original British liberal unanimity had 
become an Australian liberalism, which discouraged political and institutional 
change outside the society's existing traditions. 
Federal-state relations: Manufacturing and arbitration 
The state's involvement with the Australian economy and with federalism 
continued to limit economic growth. In his pessimisticaffy realistic report on 
Queensland's secondary industry, J. R. Jay had predicted that future Australian 
manufacturing growth would concentrate in those areas where it was already 
196 THE ECONOMY 1918-1939 
well estabhshed, namely, in New South Wales and Victoria. It was impossible 
to protect Queensland's smaller manufacturing industries against southern 
competition due to the limitations of the federal constitution. The federal-state 
fiscal arrangements made in 1928 and 1939 closed any loopholes that the smaller 
states could attempt to squeeze through to develop their secondary industry 
sectors. This cheerless conclusion was brightened only by Jay's suggestion that 
the dehberate protection of particular Queensland industries, such as sugar, 
might produce at least the possibility of eventual secondary and tertiary 
expansion."® 
As in many ways Queensland still retained the initiatives for controffing its 
own economic growth, it was doubly ironic that the state's adaption of the 
arbitration system to suit its own needs further discouraged enterprise. The 
acceptance of the Arbitration Court acted as a brake on conditionless economic 
development for the Commonwealth, and in Queensland's political climate— 
which was so much more favourable to Labor in the inter-war years—the system 
acted as an additional restraint on expansion. The state Arbitration Court was 
lauded by Queensland Labor and many unions preferred to remain under its 
jurisdiction rather than come under Commonwealth Court rulings. It was in this 
context that Larcombe, a leading Labor spokesman of the period, described the 
years 1915 to 1929 as the golden age of the Queensland worker. Wages in 
Queensland had risen from 53s. 5d. ($5.34) to 101s. 2d. ($10.13) between 1914 
and 1928, while working hours had fallen from 48.6 to 44 per week."' These 
claims were truthful enough: Queensland wage earners occupied the most 
favourable position in Austraha from their point of view, but from an employer's 
standpoint Queensland labour was the highest priced of any state. 
During and after the depression the Federal Court managed to widen its 
jurisdiction, but Queensland remained committed to state arbitration."® With 
arbitration's greater political success in the state it was the more noteworthy 
that a plan to alter the method of wage determination within the limits of the 
system—rather than from without, as Bruce attempted in 1929—was advanced 
by labour itself. In 1925 a union-financed commission argued that wages should 
vary with industry productivity. Further, the industry's capacity to pay should 
be established in statistical terms, and the Court should not be left with the 
indeterminate concept of a minimum wage. Significantly, therefore, the sug-
gestion for a revision of the wages system that would shift wage determination 
closer to measurable standards of efficiency came from labour in the state where 
the fruits of state arbitration had been most fully reaped."" 
The commission's report was an overdue reminder that economic insti-
tutions were not sacrosanct and had to be adaptive, but the flaws in the system 
were left as they were. The suggestion was not acted on and, as arbitration had 
been so widely applied in Queensland, equalitarian labour principles continued 
to restrict enterprise. So, to the state's failure to face up to the imphcations of 
rail-road competition, and to put agricultural growth in a broader perspective, 
was added its reluctance to reform the arbitration system.*" 
The zenith of the radical interlude 197 
Labor's choice between agrarianism and radicalism 
With its isolation and pacifism towards the external world, and its sympathy 
for Austrahan labour mihtancy, federal Labor alienated many possible sup-
porters after 1918. The party also still suffered from the effects of the con-
scription split. Labor remained more representative of the insularity of the native 
Australian character, and its fragmentation in the period was representative of 
the society's confusion. The electorate's political indifference in the twenties and 
the fear of external threats in the thirties benefited the non-Labor parties; they 
had a longer tradition of political organization and had constructed at least the 
semblance of an external policy.*! In Queensland the pattern was reversed: 
Labor remained in power and the Nationalist-Country parties failed. Queensland 
labour did not have to concern itself with foreign policy and it had merged its 
radicalism with the earlier agrarianism. 
Consider the inter-war pohtics of the other states. The Country party was 
successful after 1920 in New South Wales and Victoria. The Victorian party 
had begun as a farmers' movement and then broadened to include graziers and 
townsmen; radicalism in the party had been substantial. In contrast, in the New 
South Wales Country party it was slight. Consequently, an alliance could be 
formed between the Victorian Labor and Country parties, but in New South 
Wales it could not.*" Unlike Victoria, where wheat farmers had been a radical 
influence, Queensland lacked a wheat industry in 1920 and had an important 
pastoral industry. Queensland agrarian politics were also influenced by the sugar 
industry, which did not exist in Victoria and was not very important in New 
South Wales. 
The Queensland Country party was based on these interests. The Primary 
Producers' Union, the main electoral Country party organization, was a 
federation of the United Graziers' Association, the Queensland Farmers' Union, 
and the United Cane Growers' Association. While the U.G.A. was opposed to 
any association between the Labor and Country parties, the Q.F.U. and the 
U.C.G.A. were more amenable. Dissatisfied with this state of affairs, the U.G.A. 
withdrew its financial backing from the Country party in 1922.*" The party had 
also lost the support of its agrarian radicals early in the twenties. These factors 
meant electoral failure for the Country party. Because of the circumstances of its 
growth, Queensland Labor could champion the agrarian cause as legitimately 
as the Country party could itself.** 
Queensland Labor's option for agrarianism automatically limited the 
support it would be prepared to offer to labour militancy. The industrial unrest 
of the twenties created tensions in the party which led to its defeat and the 
accession to power of the Moore government. Yet Labor was fortunate to have 
been defeated at that time: the Nationalist-Country party government inherited 
the problems of the depression and could not handle them any better than could 
the federal Labor government. Queensland Labor was quickly returned and, as 
the mffitancy of the twenties did not continue to split the party. Labor's agrarian 
inclinations were given full reign. This is in essence what happened in the state's 
inter-war politics, but this outline requires additional detail. 
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Through the twenties the Queensland labour unions—led by the Railways 
unions and followed more cautiously by the Pubhc Service unions—made 
continuous demands for wage and hour concessions. A confrontation developed 
between Labor's parhamentary party, backed by the Australian Workers' 
Union, against the combined weight of the Austrahan Railways Union, the 
Public Service unions, and other labour activists. The power of the militants 
was considerable. In 1926 A.R.U. action had been decisive in restoring wage 
cuts made by the state Arbitration Court during the 1920 recession. The parha-
mentary party had the advantage of having leaders of stature such as 
McCormack and Theodore to fight the militants, but dissension grew. Just 
before Labor lost office McCormack despaired of the industrial situation in the 
state.*® 
When mihtancy had run its course Forgan Smith came to power. If one man 
represented the nature of Queensland Labor in the inter-war years it was Smith. 
He had been fortunate in the twenties as he had never had a personal con-
frontation with the mihtants. As a liberal leader he was steeped in the traditions 
of parliamentary democracy and unshakeably opposed to militant union action. 
His old-world outlook, his combination of ideahsm and reaction which was so 
characteristic of the Labor party, his refigious agrarianism and his great personal 
ability made him the sea into which aff Labor rivulets ran in the thirties.*® 
Even without Smith's patronage agrarianism would have been enshrined in 
state policies, but his own values were almost identical with the agrarian ideals. 
He repeatedly emphasized the moral worth of agricultural settlement and pro-
duction. In drafting a clause for a bill concerning compulsory agricultural 
pooling, dealing with the threat of intimidation in particular, Smith couched the 
relevant clause so that it referred to "temporal or spiritual intimidation".*' 
The slip into teleology was not unusual for him. Neither was it unusual that it 
should be made in an agrarian matter. 
Forgan Smith's agrarianism and the absence of labour militancy in the 
thirties made the party and its leader overwhelmingly attractive to Queensland's 
electors. Yet there were some indications that Labor's appeal was approaching 
its zenith. Queensland Labor's longest period of government had also seen the 
most severe tests made of the liberal tradition. Labor had withstood these tests, 
but it had lost much of its capacity for internal criticism and change. Intra-party 
conflicts and external pressures obscured the need for change in the party's 
economic pohcies. Its agrarian priorities, its neglect of manufacturing industry, 
and its emotional attachment to arbitration weighed the party down. Australian 
nationalism required moral and economic affairs to be equated, not for one to 
be placed above the other. 
Conclusion: Agrarianism, regionalism, and liberalism in 1939 
The performance of the economy between 1918 and 1939 differed from that 
of the preceding period principally as the overaff rate of development was much 
slower. More importantly the direction of growth remained the same. The 
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economy remained dependent on primary industry and most attention was given 
to the encouragement of agriculture. South Queensland was still the state's most 
important region, and the structural regional imbalance between the South and 
the two outlying regions was as notable as was the South's absolute economic 
primacy. South Queensland monopolized manufacturing and agriculture, the 
two sectors of the economy which had developed most rapidly since 1900, as 
well as the original producing industries. 
While contemporary pohtics were concerned with socialism and state 
enterprises, federal-state relations, the depression, and the rights of labour, 
economic pohcies were decided by agrarian ideals and regional realities. That 
the emphasis on agrarianism would have to be reduced and that the regional 
inequalities would have to be lessened was becoming urgent by the thirties. The 
revision of pohcies towards the pastoral and mining industries and the enforced 
attention to the phght of the state's railways were some indication that a re-
evaluation of Queensland's position was taking place. But the expansion of 
agriculture and the neglect of manufacturing showed that agrarian principles 
still held sway. As for regional readjustment, the vague formulas of decentraliza-
tion led to no basic change. The stress on decentralization seemed to most 
benefit the established industries and to discourage regional diversification. 
As economic growth was slowed by agrarianism, Queensland's development 
was checked by its involvement with the institutions of federalism. The equali-
tarianism of the Arbitration system and the ideahsm which characterized 
agrarianism revealed that these economic policies were moral attempts to control 
the environment, as the trinity of hope had been between 1859 and 1885. The 
difference in 1939 was that agrarianism was no longer part of a wider attempt to 
develop the state but an ideal which blurred the judgment of economic policy 
makers. The most valuable counterbalancing achievement was that the liberal 
unanimity had been retained. There had been more of an extremist note to 
Queensland's politics in these years than previously, yet instead of producing 
such a potential revolutionary as J. T. Lang, state politics had produced Forgan 
Smith and E. G. Theodore. Queenslanders had made a choice between economic 
advance and social cohesion and preferred the latter. 
12 SHIPPING SERVICES 1918-1939 Shipping chaos, labour militancy, and the depression 
The war had accelerated the rationalization of shipping services and the 
Queensland trade became more involved with the Australian coastal companies 
in the inter-war years. The level of efficiency achieved between 1900 and 1918 
was now sharply reduced. Postwar dislocation and waterside labour militancy 
upset the trade in the twenties and the depression and railroad competition 
spoiled the thirties. The workings of the Navigation Act and the Common-
wealth Line were at first clouded in controversy, yet critical inquiry into the 
industry was halted when the depression showed that shipowners were in serious 
difficulties. The trade was approaching a general settlement. On the waterfront 
this was marked by the 1928 strike and the Transport Workers Act; in the over-
seas trade, the amendment of the Industries Preservation Act in 1930 to allow 
combination, and the formation of the Australian Overseas Traders' Association 
was as significant. Lastly, the Commonwealth Line was sold in 1928 and the 
Tariff Board's 1929 report recommended that the Navigation Act's coastal 
clauses should remain in force. 
The shipping services to 1930 
The overseas service and the Commonwealth Line 
In 1918 critics of the services had two new advantages: the Commonwealth 
Line had been set up and the Navigation Act had been passed. The inter-war 
trading conditions for the overseas companies were also not encouraging. There 
was a rapid over-tonnaging of the world's shipping trade in the twenties, fol-
lowed by a decade of enforced austerity. There was one more serious difficulty. 
Federal inquiries found that the companies had come out of the war on a sound 
financial basis, but it later emerged that they had been left with a fleet of aging 
vessels and faced rising replacement costs.! 
Into these troubled waters sailed the Commonwealth Line. A wartime 
enterprise, the fleet's future in 1918 was uncertain. Between 1916 and 1919 the 
Line had paid for itself and earned a profit as well. It also seems to have reduced 
the charges of the British companies in the Australian trade. By 1921, however, 
profits had fallen and would soon become losses." The subject of the Line's 
commercial feasibility was one where political allegiance decided opinion, but 
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its early profits and later losses were in step with the general fluctuations of the 
world shipping market. External influences apart, its efficiency was impeded by 
domestic factors. The Line's labour expenses were high relative to other overseas 
carriers, and labour costs were also a problem for the struggling Australian 
shipbuilding industry which supphed the Line's vessels." The Line was troubled 
by labour militancy as well. The public came to view the Line as a source of 
labour troubles, rather than as an object of militancy. What to many had been 
the Australian Commonwealth Line and something to be proud of, became the 
"barnacle fleet", to be disposed of. Finally, the advent of the Bruce-Page 
government in 1923 sealed the Line's fate.* 
Had the Fleet reduced overseas freight charges? Diametrically opposed 
claims were made but the Bruce-Page ministry were content with the propriety 
of their decision.® The terms of sale, they emphasized, included a proviso that the 
purchasing companies would not raise freight rates without previously con-
sulting with a representative body of exporters and government officials.® 
Apart from the different estimations of the worth of private and public enter-
prise, the most notable point of departure between the federal political parties 
in their treatment of the Line was their differing assessment of what constituted 
the Australian national interest. Labor tended more to distinguish what was 
Australian from what was English.' 
The Line was disposed of but the overseas companies' difficulties continued. 
To meet these a better organization of those involved in the trade was called 
for.® The result was A.O.T.A., a body of shippers and exporters working with 
shipowners to negotiate freight contracts and carriage conditions. Complaints 
by overseas owners about Australian port costs were common in the late 
twenties, but at least the Queensland ports were not following the Victorian 
example of applying port revenue directly to normal state outlays. Nevertheless, 
A.I.T.A. was important for the state's overseas services, as it remained the most 
inffuential organization in the overseas trade." 
To formally sanction A.O.T.A. the Industries Preservation Act was 
amended by Scullin's government in 1930. The wheel of radical-nationalist 
criticism had now turned full circle. As one shipowner remarked, it was 
interesting to note that the amendment had been passed by Scullin's party, as 
the change had brought out little debate and less opposition.!" Once again, 
Australian liberal society had closed its ranks as economic danger threatened. 
As Labor faced the facts at the end of the twenties, there was a realization of the 
degree to which legislation could restrain economic power under democratic 
conditions. The fundamental liberal right of property was acknowledged by 
radicals in their dealings with the overseas companies.!! 
The coastal services and the Navigation Act 
In 1920 a federal committee found that the shipping companies had served 
the coastal trade fairly and well during the war.!" gy^ ^^ y ^^^^ j^^ gjj. condition 
was much less sound than it had been in 1914. Much trade had been lost to land 
transport, especially the lucrative passenger trade. In addition, the companies 
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were affected by the same difficulties that hampered the overseas lines—labour 
militancy, and the generally unsettled maritime conditions—with the exception 
of competition from the Commonwealth Line which was normally excluded 
from coastal trading. What obscured their plight was that most of them had 
other commercial interests, the profits from which offset their shipping losses. 
But this practice could not be followed indefinitely. 
The question of freight charges remained controversial. After a rate increase 
in 1914, there had been further increases with government approval of 10 per 
cent in 1919, and 20 per cent in 1920. In all, these amounted to a 40 per cent 
increase in postwar freights over prewar levels.!" However, these increases were 
in line with the higher level of wartime prices. Commonwealth supervision, 
competition from other transport media and from Patrick's independent ships, 
the strength of large established shippers—all of these factors limited freight 
rises. 
It should be pointed out that differentials in the intra-state trade had to 
take into account many considerations as well as distance. A small port like 
Bowen bore the same rates as Townsville, which was further north. Also, in 
Bowen's case, the higher charges meant that the port paid the same amount per 
ton (1.02 tonnes) to ship cargo to Townsville as Brisbane paid to ship to Sydney, 
Charges to Mackay were even higher than to Bowen. It cost 35s. ($3.50) to ship 
a ton (1.02 tonnes) of general cargo to Mackay from Brisbane, and 30s. ($3) to 
ship the same lot to Bowen or Townsville.!* For this, the hopeless condition of 
the Pioneer River was to blame. The expense of lighterage persisted until the 
opening of the Outer Harbour in 1939. In this way, local conditions influenced 
freight charges. In many cases it remained more economic for Northern ports 
to ship directly to Sydney rather than to Brisbane, as the greater efficiency of 
the Sydney market offset the longer distance. 
While general criticisms of coastal rate levels were frequent, specific com-
plaints were not. However, during the 1923 Commission on the Navigation Act, 
the Country party representatives did make some detailed complaints. In the 
Queensland trade they singled out as extortionate charges in the cement, maize, 
wheat, fruit and vegetables, and timber trades.!® They also condemned the 
handling facilities for the fruit and vegetable trade, and the inflexibility of the 
permit system which meat shippers could invoke to allow overseas vessels to 
run in the interstate trade at congested periods. But their fellow Commissioners 
disagreed. The majority report more convincingly argued that discrepancies in 
the timber and cement trades had existed for years and were the product of the 
industries' structure. The other charges were also reasonably accounted for.!® 
All in all, coastal rate increases during and after the war were moderate. The 
manager of the A.U.S.N. favoured a small increase in 1923, but it was not 
introduced until 1925, and rates did not change again till 1930. 
Nevertheless, controversy about coastal charges continued and was some-
times associated with concern for the welfare of the companies. Some saw the 
Navigation Act as responsible for their difficulties.!' After a wartime suspension 
the Act had been promulgated in 1921. The coastal companies had then urged 
the application of the coastal clauses of the Act, in contrast with their earlier 
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opposition.!® jhey had changed their attitude because the measure had become 
law, and because their position had deteriorated in the intervening years. The 
clauses would protect the companies from foreign traders competing in the 
coastal trade. Those who were critical of the coastal companies now also 
criticized the coastal clauses as encouraging higher coastal freights. The com-
panies being protected, it was urged, were in fact British companies and not 
Australian.!" 
The issue was a most complex one and the coastal clauses were different 
things to different interests. For example, the majority findings of the 1923 
Commission were made by Labor men, yet they included a reversal of normal 
Labor opinion on the question of opposition to monopolies. While opposed in 
principle to monopolistic business organization. Labor was even more firmly 
against any action which would threaten the White Australia policy. If the 
clauses were repealed, then foreign labour would be used in overseas vessels 
competing in Australian waters. Therefore Labor's usual attitude of opposition 
to the companies was replaced by a non-doctrinaire examination of their 
economic circumstances and the result was a report sympathetic to the com-
panies."" 
Despite the government's decision to retain the clauses, the Act remained 
controversial. The terminal inquiry into the Act was a 1929 Tariff Board report 
which found that coastal rates had increased less than overseas and favourably 
compared Australian coastal charges with overseas levels."! No complaints 
were made about the Queensland companies' services by meat shippers, while 
the passenger service was also deemed adequate. General cargo rates on the 
Brisbane-Sydney run had risen by 63 per cent from 1912 to 1928, but the 
Australian increase had been 59 per cent; the small differential was reasonable 
considering the geographical handicaps of the Queensland trade. The govern-
ment accepted the report and reaffirmed its decision not to repeal the coastal 
clauses."" 
In retrospect, the coastal companies' difficulties were not the product of 
any one major faulty judgment, so much as they were due to a number of set-
backs which had not appeared serious at the time. From 1918 to 1921 there had 
been an acute shortage of coastal shipping. Coastal rates had been regulated, but 
overseas freights had risen sharply. During this time the Australian companies 
had done little more than cover costs. Government control had been given up 
in 1920; then the next year the Navigation Act had been proclaimed. Coming 
at that time it prevented much previously sea-borne trade from returning to the 
companies. With these handicaps, they had to face the commercial vicissitudes 
of the inter-war years and labour militancy. The result was that the coastal 
shipping industry fell into a state of near chaos."" 
Queensland was very vulnerable to these changes. An additional difficulty 
for state coastal shippers was the completion of the rail hne from Brisbane to 
Cairns in 1924, while the local Labor government remained unsympathetic to 
the problems of the companies. In particular, the A.U.S.N.'s place seemed 
much less assured in 1920. Unlike the other Austrahan coastal companies, it 
lacked the commercial assets of non-mercantile interests. Policy divisions had 
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also weakened its financial structure. Lastly, the activity of some small traders 
further threatened the larger companies. William Collin continued to carry the 
Bundaberg sugar crop, and John Burke's line gradually extended out of Moreton 
Bay to cut into the A.U.S.N.'s trade."* 
Waterside labour militancy to 1930 
To 1920: The conditions for militancy 
The twelve years 1917-1928 were years of continuous industrial unrest and 
the waterfront had more than its share of disputes. In Queensland the 1920 
elections had returned Labor with a reduced majority, the government's loan 
was rejected in London, the Legislative Council was abolished, and legislation 
was passed for unemployment and workers' compensation. These were daring 
years for Queensland. Suffering from the growing mihtancy of state unionism, 
exclusion from the London loan market, and estrangement from Hughes's 
federal government, Queensland Labor was in an uncomfortable position. A 
sense of desperation, even persecution, entered into many Labor statements 
about the maritime industry at this time."® 
It has been argued that waterside disputes in the state, particularly in 
Brisbane, were marked by greater extremism and regional variation from the 
actions of the federal Committee of Management of the Waterside Workers' 
Federation. The political situation in the state favoured W.W.F. extremism. 
The embattled Labor government—more rural-craft than urban-industrial in 
character—faced a financial embargo, extreme Nationalist opposition, and 
increased demands for better conditions by the large public service unions backed 
by the militant transport unions. On occasions different tactics on the part of 
the Queensland Waterside Workers' Unions would be approved by the federal 
leadership, but not usually. In 1920 the Committee of Management agreed that 
state Arbitration was more desirable for the Queensland W.W.U.'s than federal 
awards, but in 1928 the decision of the Brisbane W.W.U. to strike was taken 
against a federal ruling. This militancy met with only limited sympathy from the 
state Labor government."® 
The 1917 dispute had left the Northern W.W.U.'s very sensitive to any 
action by the associated companies which could be construed as discriminatory 
or provocative. Then, in 1919, the seamen's strike cut the North off from 
regular shipping communication. As conditions of maritime employment were 
largely a federal matter, Queensland Labor saw the dispute as one between the 
Commonwealth and the strikers which was unreasonably penahzing the North. 
Small-scale riots took place in Townsville over a meatworkers dispute at the 
time of the strike, and the bitterness of 1917 was rekindled again in the North."' 
A related Northern grievance was the fate of the Allinga. The ship had been 
purchased by the state government to assist the Mt. Elliot company in develop-
ing the Cloncurry copper fields, but in 1916 when the company broke its 
contract the Allinga could not get into the well-regulated coastal trade."® The 
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North was traditionally sensitive to any worsening in its shipping communica-
tions, and Northern waterside mihtancy would match the extremism of the 
Brisbane W.W.U. 
Strikes 1920-1925 and the rotary system of waterside employment 
In their effects on the maritime industry, the strikes of 1920/1921 and 1925 
deserve to be ranked with those of 1890 and 1917. The 1920/1921 strike was a 
severe setback to the coastal industry and the 1925 dispute played an important 
part in the federal election of that year. The latter strike decisively soured 
maritime industrial relations, and in Queensland additional unrest arose in the 
Northern ports over rotary employment. The immediate cause of the 1920/1921 
strike was the claims of the coastal stewards for an eight-hour day."" Beginning 
in December 1920, their strike lasted almost six weeks, tied up most coastal 
vessels, and added to the general postwar dislocation of commerce. A rail strike 
in Western Australia added to the industrial confusion and the Commonwealth 
Line was used to supply Cairns with food. When the stewards decided to finish 
their strike in January, the companies refused to recommence trading without a 
guarantee by the seamen's union of labour continuity, and the disposal of job 
control methods. So the dispute extended and lasted almost another two months. 
The unions claimed that the companies had declared an illegal lockout; the 
companies replied that the prolongation of the dispute was the result of the 
seamen's failure to undertake necessary employment responsibilities. After the 
brief scare of a general strike, the dispute finally ended in February 1921 in a 
compromise."" 
The 1925 strike began with the action of British seamen. Support for the 
strikers by the Australian waterside unions varied: the seamen's unions were 
more prepared to offer assistance than the W.W.U.'s, while the W.W.U. 
claimed that it was bearing the economic brunt of the strike more than the 
strikers themselves. The Brisbane W.W.U., however, had stepped into the 
breach and supported the strike, while the Brisbane Seamen's Union claimed to 
have supphed more valuable support than any other union."! jjjg dosest to a 
direct confrontation with authority in Queensland was in the Northern ports, 
and in Gladstone where the question of support for the seamen was hnked with 
the separate question of the introduction of rotary waterside employment. 
The rotary scheme was favoured by some unions as a method of equalizing 
employment. It was best suited to small seasonal ports and had been rejected by 
ballot by the W.W.U.'s in Brisbane, Townsville, and Maryborough. Conditions 
varied in those ports that favoured the scheme; what was common was their 
disagreement about how it should be used. This dispute was affecting the 
Northern sugar ports at the same time that the British seamen's strike spread to 
Queensland. In Gladstone, support for the seamen's cause created an ugly 
situation. A refrigerated vessel had just been loaded in the port when the strike 
was called. Gladstone's railwaymen refused to coal the ship, which threatened 
the workings of the ship's freezing plant. As the ship's coal stocks dwindled, 
angry meat producers confronted unionists on the wharf. Meanwhile in the 
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North disagreement was also coming to a head. "While different sections of the 
W.W.F. are struggling with each other," the Brisbane Courier scolded the 
Northern unions, "the sugar growers and other producers . . . are being brought 
closer and closer to ruin.""" What the paper did not say was that the coastal 
companies were opposing the use of the rotary system, and so adding to the 
trouble within the unions. 
The affected hinterland producers, however, were not concerned with the 
details of the conflict—in Gladstone, or in Bowen and Cairns. The Bowen 
Chamber of Commerce urgently telegrammed Earle Page for assistance, while 
Gladstone producers threatened to intervene if the stranded ship was not 
coaled."" As a partial solution was found to the Gladstone dispute, the centre of 
tension shifted to the North, and the iff-feeling aroused by the seamen's strike 
carried over into what could have been a separate issue. When the farmers finally 
loaded their cargoes themselves, the Brisbane Courier reported their action as a 
triumph for constitutionalism and headlined the "rout of the communists"."* 
But if the Northern sugar cargoes had been moved for the season, the 
question of rotary employment still remained unsolved. A government inquiry 
into the matter found that seemingly unbridgeable areas of disagreement 
between watersiders and employers had arisen. "In most ports", the inquiry's 
chairman summed up, "a condition of open hostihty exists between waterside 
workers and their employers.""® The community's tolerance for industrial 
dissent was almost spent. In state politics the Labor government, supported by 
the A.W.U., was moving to stabilize labour relations—which in Queensland 
meant hmiting the power of the A.R.U. Similarly, the Federal government had 
won the 1925 election on a platform in which industrial peace loomed large. 
The next few years would see Bruce's ill-fated attempts to regulate the workings 
of the Arbitration system."® In the maritime industry, however, the terminal 
dispute was the 1928 strike. 
The 1928 denouement 
A federal Arbitration award for the industry began the strike. The federal 
C.O.M. decided against directly disputing the award but Brisbane and other 
Queensland waterside unions went on strike. The details of the award did not 
concern the state's W.W.U.'s so much as that they were being brought forcibly 
under federal Arbitration jurisdiction. They were well content with state 
Arbitration and wished to retain its advantages."' In the first days of the strike 
intra-state and interstate union differences quickly appeared. After stopping 
work, Townsville, Cairns, Rockhampton, and Sydney resumed; Melbourne 
apphed the strike only to overseas vessels, while Brisbane remained out."® At 
that point a federal W.W.F. conference voted 48/22 to end the stoppage, though 
the North Queensland unions, among others, had disagreed. The employers' 
opposition to the strike then intensified. Volunteer labour was successfully used 
on the Brisbane wharves and the federal government passed the Transport 
Workers Act which licensed watersiders. The Act followed Bruce's warnings that 
continued militancy would lead to prosecutions under the Crimes Act, so union 
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opposition to the award was extended to the Transport Workers Act, which was 
dubbed the "dog collar Act". Finaffy, the federal Arbitration awards were 
suspended in Brisbane, Adelaide, Fremantle, and other ports."" 
In the short run this opposition gave fresh determination to the strikers. A 
Queensland W.W.F. conference reaffirmed the justice of the strike, repudiated 
the "Beeby Award", as the award had been named after its originator, and the 
Transport Workers Act. But solidarity proved more ideal than real. Support did 
not come from the other state transport unions as the A.R.U., the carters, and 
storemen refused to join in. This was a serious drawback to the strikers' chances 
of success. It resulted chiefly because of the lack of agreement between the state 
and federal W.W.U.'s about the propriety of the strike. The other transport 
unions thought the Queensland watersiders should put their own house in order 
before caffing on others for assistance.*" 
As prospects worsened, fragmentation of the union ranks increased and 
extremism spread. In Brisbane, the branch was racked by a series of bitter 
personal clashes and breakaways. Syndicahst and Communist elements appeared 
and a Militant Minority Movement issued a regular news-sheet that was violently 
anti-moderate. Conditions in Cairns varied as the rotary dispute carried over 
into the other questions, but the end result was the same disruption.*! -pjjg strike 
failed miserably and the conditions of Beeby's award and the Transport Workers 
Act were retained. So militancy had been tried and found wanting for the 
period. The result was specially unfortunate for the Brisbane union: by late 
1929 less than a third of the strikers had been re-employed and a regular supply 
of non-union labour was used on the wharves. In the North the unions had 
fared almost as badly. During the 1925 strike farmers had directly intervened 
only at Bowen; in 1928 they loaded their own sugar at every Northern port 
from Mackay up.*" 
After 1930 
Waterfront militancy in the fifteen years after 1930 followed a subdued 
course, as it had between 1900 and 1909/1912. It was a pot that would not boil 
until the mid-forties. The presence of organized volunteer labour on the wharves 
was the main problem facing the waterside unions after 1928. A brief period of 
federal Labour government attempted to alter the Transport Workers Act to 
restore union preference and exclude volunteers, but the companies were in a 
strong position as employers after 1928 and were unwilling to budge very much 
on the issue.*" In 1933 Judge Beeby took the matter as close to resolution as it 
would come till 1940. He declared that owners were under no obligation to 
volunteers, and that as the unions had agreed to admit the original volunteers the 
position should be left as it was. No waterfront disputes of any consequence took 
place till 1935 when there was a brief seamen's strike. Some minor disputes took 
place in the Queensland ports after 1935, but these were of a purely local 
nature.** 
Nevertheless, discontent simmered at many ports after 1928, especiaffy in 
Brisbane. Employer attitudes to the W.W.U.'s in the post-depression years, in 
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reaction to the turmoil of the twenties, were usually unsympathetic and assertive. 
The removal of the umbrella of state Arbitration from the waterfront cast the 
Queensland waterside workers on hard times. In 1930 Forgan Smith strongly 
criticized employers in the port of Brisbane for their policy of preferring non-
unionists, and Moore's government for supporting the policy. Again, when 
Austrahan waterfront pay rates rose in 1932, they were reduced in Queensland, 
In the same year appeals by the federal W.W.U. for the re-employment of 
many original unionists on the Brisbane wharves, who had been dismissed since 
1928, were rejected. Finally, in 1942 during an inquiry into waterfront unrest, 
Brisbane port employers stated their complete satisfaction with the existing 
labour arrangements in the port. Significantly, the Commission chose to dis-
regard this submission and placed Brisbane under the new mode of operation 
then devised.*® 
Controversy and inquiry into the shipping services in the thirties were also 
sharply limited. In the overseas trade, as there had been little discussion about 
the amendment of the Industries Preservation Act in 1930, there was little 
comment on the formation of A.O.T.A. J. B. Brigden, the ex-Bureau of Industry 
economist who had examined the position of the Queensland ports in the 
thirties, favoured the reorganization of the trade. He approved of the economies 
the overseas lines would reap by the benefits of large-scale organization, and of 
the elimination of uncertainty from the trade. The benefits of price competition, 
he believed, would become the benefits of service competition.*® There was httle 
public discussion of the new arrangement in the following years but some dis-
agreed with this favourable appraisal. In late 1931, with wool freights rising, one 
critic declared the Association a farce: "We meet and are told by the shipowners 
what the rates of freight and what other conditions are and that is the end of 
it."*' 
But, for better or worse, the pattern of overseas shipping services had been 
decided till the war. The community seemed prepared to accept Brigden's view 
that what was good for the shipowners was in the long run good for the shippers. 
The pressure of events, such as the depression, had contributed much to this 
conclusion. Many had turned away from the expansive Liberal-Labor hopes of 
the Commonwealth's first decades. A more moderate view was taken of the 
efficacy of government legislation in affecting something as large as the world 
shipping trade. As Brigden had written: "Economic limits to their power are 
much more effective than any legislative expedients."*® 
For the coastal companies the thirties were most difficult. The depression's 
effect was immediate—in 1930, 65 per cent of the associated companies' tonnage 
was inactive during the Queensland sugar season. There were variations in 
freight rates in the decade but they were within depression-defined fimits and did 
not rise markedly till the war.*" However, if the general level of freights did not 
change greatly, neither did the structure of the charges. Queenslanders could 
stffl justifiably complain that the state's outlying ports were best served by 
trading through Sydney rather than Brisbane. After 1935 the companies' trading 
seasons improved but war ended normal conditions and the companies were 
again called on to help in the national emergency. The respite from industrial 
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strife after 1928 seemed to have come too late for shipowners. Public interest in 
the companies waned in the thirties, at just the time when an appraisal of their 
conditions was necessary. Instead, they were left to their own devices to cope 
with the depression. In 1945 it would be realized that the companies' position, 
which had been apparently so strong in 1914, had become tenuous. 
Conclusion: Shipping chaos 
The period had been more unfavourable for the shipping industry than any 
other. It began and ended with wars, and in the twenties labour mihtancy had 
racked the services. In the thirties militancy subsided but rail and road com-
petition replaced it as a source of trouble. The effect of these conditions on the 
Queensland coastal companies was almost overwhelming. Even in 1920 a 
federal Committee had warned that, through wartime losses and high postwar 
replacement costs, the companies' position was a dangerous one. Waterside 
militancy, the depression, and the competition of other transport media, showed 
the point of the warning. 
With the growing realization that the Australian companies were in 
extreme difficulties, and that the degree to which the federal government could 
compete with the overseas companies was limited, nationalist criticism of the 
industry waned. Yet many of the issues raised in the twenties would re-emerge 
in the forties. One of these was the question of Australian-British relations. The 
claims of the minority members of the 1923-1924 Royal Commission into the 
Navigation Act, that the Australian companies were owned and controlled by 
British shipping companies, were too extreme. But where the dividing line 
between them actually lay was in doubt. The resurrection of the Commonwealth 
Line during the 1939-1945 war would make the concerns of the postwar decades 
similar to those of 1900s and the twenties. 
The principal cause of waterfront disputes was what had been unsuccessfully 
fought for in Queensland in 1890 and 1912—the recognition of unionist rights. 
The bitterness of the state disputes owed much to local conditions. The political 
context, the tradition of regional differences, and the strength of private owner-
ship in the state's first port—these features produced extremism and regional 
disobedience to federal W.W.F. decisions. Waterfront resolutions often meant 
nothing as minorities refused to acknowledge majorities, and the liberal 
unanimity had been seriously threatened in state politics. Coming at the time 
that it had, labour militancy greatly weakened the shipowners' position. 
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In 1926 the first fiscal restraints were placed on the state's nascent road 
transport industry. Four years later, when the financial effects of road com-
petition on the railways became more clear, the original surcharge was raised 
some 400 per cent. The following battle between the road and rail networks was 
a major issue in state politics and finance between the wars. One of its few 
benefits was that the position of the state's ports sometimes came up for public 
reconsideration. This was a pleasant change. After the first decade of the 
century the press and parliament had lost interest in the ports. An earlier remark 
of Kidston's about the place of the Harbour Boards in the overall pohtical 
context—"There are a great many more matters to be dealt with than the 
constitution of Harbour Boards"!—also applied to port development. 
There were three port inquiries in the period: an Australia-wide survey by 
an English expert in 1928, and two state inquiries in 1930-1931 and 1937. The 
first of the state commissions concentrated on rail-port competition with special 
reference to the Rail Commissioner's desire to extend long haulage rates to wool. 
The second, and least valuable, inquiry was a general survey of the state's 
transport system that paid most attention to rail-road rivalry. There was still 
one aspect of port affairs which was neglected. The question of reforming port 
administration was let slide. J. B. Brigden's inquiry, the most systematic of the 
three, did not concern itself with the ports' administrative needs. The Harbour 
Board system was not improved and its difficulties increased. 
Brisbane: A better port but piecemeal administrative coordination 
Shortage of information hampers assessment of the port of Brisbane's 
performance in the inter-war years; yet it seems clear that the port led the way in 
improvement throughout the state. Whereas previously the port's entrance 
depths compared more favourably with world standards than did its wharfage 
facihties, by the end of the twenties the wharfage situation was being remedied. 
This improvement was not due to better administrative supervision, but the 
needs of the depression had forced a period of cooperation between the Marine 
Board and the recently formed Bureau of Industry. Some of the state's depression 
relief works directly benefited Brisbane. 
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Physical improvement and wharfage construction 
The port's entrance channels continued to vary. The straight approach 
dredged through the natural Middle Channel in the preceding period gradually 
silted and shifted northwards till in 1934 the North Eastern Channel was re-
adopted—this had been the most frequently used channel before 1900." In 1918 
the l.w. depth from the Bay to New Farm was 26 feet (7.92 m), and from there 
to the town wharves 24 feet (7.32 m). This was a real achievement and it was no 
cause for criticism that the same depths existed in 1930. Further improvements 
had also been made. Much of the river had been deepened to 30 feet (9.14 m) 
by 1935 and 28 feet (8.53 m) had been cleared at the Lytton Rocks. These ad-
vances were made mostly after 1930 when the Marine Department cooperated 
in an improvement programme with the Bureau of Industry. By 1937 30 feet 
(9.14 m) l.w. was available to vessels from the Bay to Pinkenba, and 28 feet 
(8.53 m) from Pinkenba to New Farm. The Rocks' depth, however, remained at 
28 feet (8.53 m). Wartime demands then disrupted improvements and in 1945 
the town reaches afforded only some 181- feet (5.64 m). But this depth was 
restored to 24 feet (7.32 m) the following year." 
The first change for the better in Brisbane's wharfage equipment was the 
development of the Hamilton area. This had originally been proposed by Cullen 
in 1910. Work on the scheme had not begun till after the war, but by then the 
land had been resumed. In 1923 a reinforced concrete Cold Stores wharf with 
rail connections was opened and by 1924 expenditure on the project totalled 
£276,000 ($552,000)*. Following the much earlier placing of the railway wharf 
at Pinkenba, the establishment of the Cold Stores wharf was a major break-
through in shifting the portsite downstream. There had been some opposition 
to the Hamilton scheme, but the move had been made. After this initial success 
there was an interval of some years when little progress was made. "It is felt", 
the Courier remarked in 1923, "that in wharf frontage and in . . . the depth of 
the river, this city is dropping behind."® As importantly, between 1923 and 1927 
the portmaster persistently complained of the inadequate berthage facilities in 
the river. 
Despite this dissatisfaction, few attempts were made to relate the port's 
unsatisfactory condition to its administrative needs. The campaign to appoint a 
Brisbane Harbour Board had passed well away and there were no efforts to 
revive it. In 1923, however, the Daily Mail directly linked the port's wharfage 
problems to the lack of a coordinating authority—a subject not seriously raised 
in Brisbane for almost fifteen years. Recalling Cullen's 1910 warnings that the 
port's wharfage requirements would not be adequately provided for by private 
enterprise, the paper pointed out: 
the first step to meet the altered conditions, as the tendency in recent years 
has been to provide accommodation for overseas ships in the lower reaches 
of the Brisbane river, would be the formation of a Harbour Trust, the 
members of which should be live men in the trading community. The 
argument is used, however, that it would be useless to form a Trust unless 
the whole of the wharves in the port were brought under its jurisdiction. 
Such a procedure would cost the ratepayers a great deal of money.® 
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Here was a suggestion that private wharfage interests were hindering the port's 
development. The difficulties of Townsville and Rockhampton in this regard 
were not entirely without parallel in Brisbane. 
This wharfage inadequacy seems to have lasted through most of the 
twenties. Then, in 1931, the Brisbane Courier, with the berthing of the 
Strathnaver which displaced 22,000 tons (22,353 tonnes), could speak in 
laudatory and quite uncritical terms of the river.' Yet, while an improvement 
was made in the port's wharfage capability, it was after 1931; the Brisbane 
Courier's praise was unjustified. Estimates of wharfage in the port vary, but 
between 1909 and 1928 wharfage grew at an average of 220 feet (67.06 m) p.a., 
while between 1928 and 1937 it expanded by more than double that amount, 
some 500 feet (152.40 m) annually.® Wharfage construction between 1933 and 
1936 was of particular importance. In those years the Brisbane Stevedoring and 
Wool Dumping Coy. moved into the Hamilton area, and the central wharves at 
Kangaroo Point were expanded as part of the government's public rehef pro-
gramme. 
Brisbane Stevedoring had been formed in South Brisbane in 1900. They 
moved to a New Farm wharf in Bufimba Reach in 1911, where by 1927 they had 
1,100 feet (335.28 m) of wharfage. Finally, the company extended to Hamilton, 
leasing their site from the government. By 1937 they had laid down 1,100 feet 
(335.28 m) of wharfage there." The improvement of the central wharves, in 
contrast, was done by pubhc enterprise. In 1935, after the area's wharfage had 
been resumed, the Kangaroo Point wharves were realigned and thoroughly 
overhauled by the Harbours and Marines Department. The project had a number 
of unusual features. The work was done by the Department in collaboration 
withthe Bureau of Industry, as part of a wider government scheme involving the 
construction of the Story Bridge and flood prevention works in the Upper 
Brisbane River. The scheme's cost was over two miffion pounds (four miffion 
dollars) and had been undertaken by Forgan Smith's government to counter the 
effects of the depression on the state. A number of Petrie Bight wharves were 
resumed. Kangaroo Point was cut regularly—as Lyndon Bates's earher plan had 
envisaged—and the central wharves were realigned and overhauled. To 1939 
the work had cost £300,000 ($600,000). The larger part of the new wharfage was 
leased to Howard Smiths.!" This unusual contribution to the port by public 
enterprise and the expansion of Brisbane Stevedoring improved the port's 
wharfage capability. It gave some substance to the Brisbane Courier's premature 
claim that all was well in Brisbane. 
Nevertheless, the failure for some administrative provision to be made for 
the port was a bad one. In 1928 Sir George Buchanan, the author of the fullest 
discussion of the developmental problems of the Australian ports, was favour-
ably impressed with the interest shown by those with whom he had come in 
contact while working on his report. He made one exception: "Information 
relating to the port of Brisbane and its administration generally is scanty."!! 
Though Buchanan approved of the port of Brisbane during his inquiry, he only 
did so indirectly. He criticized the ports of Sydney and Melbourne for badly 
equipped wharfage facilities, but did not apply this stricture to Brisbane, and 
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spoke favourably of the Hamilton project. The state commission of 1937 
explicitly favoured the port. But how much weight should be given to either of 
these verdicts is doubtful. Buchanan spent less time in examining Brisbane than 
he spent on some of the state's other ports, as did the 1937 Commissioners.!" 
Considering the evidence available, it seems that the port had solved its wharfage 
problems by the mid-thirties, but the efficiency of the port's wharfage equipment 
remained questionable. 
With these improvements in Brisbane's port depths and wharfage, it was 
the more striking that both inquiries had recommended the creation of a co-
ordinating port authority. Some had disagreed with this view. In 1937 E. C. 
Fison, the engineer who had succeeded Cullen as the Harbours and Marine 
Department's principal engineer, had not thought a Trust necessary for the port. 
But the Commissioners had contrasted the evidence of an ex-vice-chairman of 
the Sydney Harbour Trust about the advantages of port coordination, and 
favoured the appointment of a Brisbane Harbour Board.!" In the event, neither 
recommendation was acted on. Buchanan's report—as well as being part of a 
federal report which the state could ignore if it wished—was followed by the 
onset of depression; the 1937 Commissioner's conclusions were followed by the 
war. 
Brisbane and the Southern ports 
Brisbane's port success owed much to the completion of the coastal rail line 
which linked Cairns and Brisbane in 1923. The railway department's application 
of long haulage rates to traffic had begun to seriously affect Rockhampton's 
trade before 1918, and as the twenties progressed Brisbane became the com-
mercial and economic centre of the state. This success was won although another 
hoped for extension, the Brisbane to Sydney coastal line, had not eventuated till 
1936. By that time road haulage had appeared as another way of ensuring that 
northern New South Wales trade would remain based on Sydney rather than 
shift to Brisbane. Yet the port's situation in 1939 was stronger in South Queens-
land and the state as a whole than in any preceding period. 
The South Queensland outports remained in a minor position. Of the two, 
Maryborough was the worse off by 1939. The Urangan Jetty had been con-
structed as Maryborough's deep-water outlet, but the hoped for recovery of 
trade had not followed. In 1928 Buchanan said that little further expenditure 
should be made on the port, except perhaps to maintain it as a small coastal 
outlet; three years later Brigden saw the maintenance of the river as a slight 
economic benefit, but considered the preservation of Urangan questionable. 
The depths available in the Mary River were poor: 7 feet (2.13 m) l.w. in 1922, 
and 6 feet (1.83 m) in 1937. To the inquiry in the latter year the Maryborough 
Chamber of Commerce submitted a request for a Harbour Board, but it was a 
half-hearted overture and was denied. By that time the Urangan Point Jetty was 
recognized to be a white elephant.!* The port of Bundaberg fared better than its 
cousin. Buchanan had recommended Bundaberg and Maryborough for limited 
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development only, but J. B. Brigden's inquiry distinguished between the position 
of the two ports—Bundaberg's financial situation was satisfactory if not im-
pressive. The Burnett was a slight improvement on the Mary as a river. It 
offered 9 feet (2.74 m) l.w. in 1922 and 8^ feet (2.59 m) in 1937 and dredging had 
not been necessary between 1930 and 1937. River improvement was stiff carried 
on and the port's small but rich sugar trade continued to justify Bundaberg's 
maintenance.!® 
Brisbane's intra and inter-regional port dominance in 1939, therefore, was 
more marked than it had ever been except for Queensland's first years. Its 
success made the anomaly of its geographical position in the state infuriating for 
North and Central Queensland. As Buchanan perceived: 
Brisbane, due to the fact that it is the capital of Queensland, and that the 
leading merchants, shippers, importers and markets are concentrated there, 
has taken nearly all the shipping trade of the state. Geographically, it had 
not the right to do so, especially as there are good railway connections from 
the outer ports to the interior. A recent article in a Rockhampton paper 
described the situation as one of "Seven hungry ports and one ravenous 
railway", and attributes the lack of shipping at the ports entirely to the 
desire of the railway to carry goods to Brisbane, even at uneconomic rates. 
There is a good deal of truth in this assertion . . . this state of affairs cannot 
continue indefinitely if the claims of the outer ports to further development 
are not overlooked.!® 
Buchanan and the 1937 Commissioners both advocated the appointment of a 
coordinating authority for the port of Brisbane, but it seemed that the port's 
trading interests were content with the existing situation. Brisbane remained 
without a Harbour Board.!' 
Rockhampton: Intra-port disagreement continues while inter-port rivalry 
develops with Gladstone 
The problems of the Central ports in the twenties 
Through the twenties the Rockhampton Harbour Board grappled with the 
problems of rail competition while the Board's finances were constantly criticized 
by the member for Port Curtis. But this was no more than his traditional duty. 
Before 1930 Gladstone and Rockhampton were preoccupied with their own 
problems and unaware of the confrontation about to develop between them. 
In the first inter-war decade, Rockhampton's concern was more the competition 
of other established ports through the expanding rail network and the con-
tinuation of intra-port disagreement over the site of Rockhampton's deep-water 
port. Gladstone's difficulties were those of a small port struggling to attract 
industry. 
Wartime dislocation had been Rockhampton's first port problem. In 1915 
the port had exported 111,400 bales of wool, by 1919, 25,000 bales; meanwhile, 
the railways' share of the trade had risen from 22,600 bales to 81,000.!® The port 
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regained much of the wool trade after 1919 but the effects of the war on the 
port's finances were not as readily remedied. At the root of Rockhampton's 
inter-war financial difficulties was the continued ambivalence of purpose which 
marred the port's plans for physical improvement. The decision taken to build 
the Port Alma railway had not ended the community's division of port energies. 
Trade continued to be carried on mostly at the town wharves and in the twenties 
voices were again raised in favour of Broadmount as a deep-water port. This 
alternative had already been examined in the minutest detail. Because of the 
existence of an established port at Port Alma, the advocates of Broadmount 
could not mount their campaign as intensively as before. Nevertheless, at times 
they included the majority of the Harbour Board and the town's parha-
mentarians. The fresh agitation culminated in 1923 in a deputation to the 
Treasurer seeking a loan to develop Broadmount. "There was no desire to 
abandon Port Alma as far as the Board was concerned," the Rockhampton 
Morning Bulletin cautiously explained, "but it did wish to have the wharf at 
Broadmount made available to relieve congestion at Port Alma and because it 
was a cheaper and more convenient port for the Lakes Creek works to ship 
from, and it was also cheaper for general purposes and there was a chance that 
labour might become resident there while it would not at Port Alma."!" 
What stimulated the port discussion at this time was that in 1917 an 
eight-year-old agreement about the use of Port Alma between the shipping 
companies, the railways, and the Board, had expired. Rail freights were in-
creased on the route and the interstate shipping companies replied by boy-
cotting the port. Their ban was soon lifted but dissatisfaction with rail charges 
to Port Alma remained."" Broadmount seemed to be a way out of these diffi-
culties. The case of the pro-Broadmount deputation, however, did not impress 
the Treasurer as much as did his own financial plight. "In one breath you ask 
me for £45,000 [$90,000]," he told them, "and in another you ask me to remit 
an indebtedness of over half a million . . . the matter is so grave that I want 
you to understand that Government money lent to any local authority in future 
must be paid up.""! His stricture was moderated by a promise of further 
investigation of the matter, but the campaign for a deep-water port at Broad-
mount had been made finally unsuccessful—as far as the government were 
concerned—by the financial difficulties of the Rockhampton Harbour Board. 
The government's growing concern for the financial condition of the ports 
was matched by the ports' concern with the pressures of railway competition on 
port trade. Here Rockhampton was seriously affected. In 1924 the shipping 
companies reduced their wool freights from Rockhampton to the south, while 
rail rates for wool were jointly increased from Rockhampton to Brisbane."" 
This was a concession to the ports made only as a result of governmental 
direction to the Rail Commissioner. Five years later the Commissioner, feeling 
the pinch of road competition, reasserted his claims and announced that hence-
forth long haulage rates would apply to wool as well as to other commodities. 
This brought an immediate reaction from the shipping companies and the ports; 
once more, under government pressure, railways' policy was changed to suit 
the ports and the rates were withdrawn. 
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The question was, for how long could this accommodation of the ports be 
possible, considering the growing difficulties of the railways. The ports were not 
unaware of the Rail Commissioner's troubles, but naturally placed their own 
first. "There is no doubt of the Commissioner's ability to compete with 
shipping", the Rockhampton Harbour Board admitted, "he has done it for 
some years and the tax payer has paid for his success . . . the stabihsation of 
employment in the railways is a laudable ambition within reasonable limits. So 
is the stabihsation of employment on the waterfront and in the shipping 
industry.""" At a Harbour Boards' conference earlier in 1929, Rockhampton, 
Gladstone, Bundaberg, and Townsville had condemned the long haulage rates 
and the government's rail policies. Tapering rates, the ports argued, should be 
applied only between the point of loading and the first terminal port."* So by 
1930 the Central ports especially were feeling the strain of the railways' rate 
system. The wool trade had been retained by governmental decree, but how long 
would the government be able to support the ports against the railways ? 
The first years of the twenties had been extremely trying for those concerned 
with Gladstone's development. Commercial overtures from the Vacuum Oil 
Company and the Blair Athol Coal Company in 1920 had come to nothing. 
Disappointments continued with the persistence of what the Gladstone 
Harbour Board felt was shipping freight rate discrimination against the port. 
This would be a bitterly recurrent issue between the Board and the shipping 
companies."® The port's hopes were so dampened in 1922 that the possibility of 
port nationalization was considered by the Board as one alternative to its 
difficulties. But the next year Gladstone's fortunes took a welcome turn for the 
better. A wool dump was set up and seemed to act as a turning point."® Other 
avenues of development at last began to open up. The Shell Oil Company 
decided to estabhsh a bulk terminal in Gladstone in 1925. Reclamation began 
in that year and the project was completed by 1929. At the end of the decade the 
Board had extended its wharf at Auckland Point, equipped it with large sheds 
for the wool dump and an electric crane. Rockhampton, however, seemed to 
have won Central Queensland's coal export trade. The Blair Athol Company, 
after being rebuffed at Gladstone, had their proposals accepted by Rock-
hampton."' 
Buchanan's assessment of Gladstone's prospects was brief but to the point. 
He concluded: "Of aff the ports in Queensland, Gladstone stands out as the one 
that could be developed and maintained as a deep sea port at the least cost.""® 
His opinion of the port of Rockhampton was much less favourable. Realizing 
that any intensive development of Port Alma depended on the abandonment of 
the efforts to improve the Fitzroy, he favoured a comprehensive survey of the 
port and an estimate of the cost for making Rockhampton a deep-water port by 
developing the river."" In one sense his conclusion was naive—given the history 
of the port to that time, and the number of estimates of successfully improving 
the Fitzroy which had proved mistaken. Yet in another sense Buchanan's con-
clusion was sound enough. He knew that an established port had important 
commercial advantages because trading connections already existed. An 
announcement on the government's part that Gladstone would henceforth be 
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the port for Central Queensland would have little effect on the existing flow of 
trade unless backed by some economic action. So Gladstone and Rockhampton 
entered the thirties with sharply dissimilar prospects. Both ports would have 
their share of difficulties in the next decade and would come to grips with each 
other in a harmful and wasteful way. To begin with, the effect of rail com-
petition on the ports is considered via J. B. Brigden's 1930 inquiry. 
A prelude to the thirties: J. B. Brigden's inquiry into rail-port competition 
The immediate reason for Brigden's inquiry was the attempts of the Com-
missioner of Railways to apply long haulage rates to wool. Brigden was in-
structed to assess the economic relations between the ports and the state railways, 
and to consider the desirability of permitting the Commissioner to apply long 
haulage rates to wool cargoes. The rate issue chiefly affected Rockhampton, 
Gladstone, and Townsville, but was taken by Brigden as a means of generally 
surveying the position of the state's ports. His capability as an economist and 
his experience with the Bureau of Industry produced a methodical and illumina-
ting study. 
Brigden stressed the importance of pastoral and gold production in the 
ports' growth. That Gladstone and Bowen had been passed over for nearer 
locations was not harmful at the time because of the smaller size of ships. 
Townsville and Rockhampton had become the chief regional commercial centres 
and their inland rail lines had counterbalanced their natural disabilities as ports. 
By the turn of the century trade with the southern states was more valuable than 
trade between the three regions of Queensland. As the coastal line was gradually 
extended, the strategic role of the main ports reached its maximum just before 
their connection. The coastal line reached Rockhampton in 1903, and next year 
penalty rail freights were levied on high grade traffic by-passing the town. 
The coastal railway therefore grew as extensions from the ports, until it 
became a through line, and no longer limited in its opportunities for traffic. As 
for the subsequent rail-port competition, given a stage pohcy of development by 
railways nothing else could have happened. The war brought a serious shipping 
shortage, and stress on the strategic importance of completing the coastal rail 
line. And so the present state of affairs had been arrived at, with the railways 
struggling to compete with the expanding road transport industry."" 
Brigden's analysis of port growth led him to two particular questions: 
whether the policy of tapering rates was justifiable, and whether wool shipments 
in particular should be exempted to retain them for the ports. Most of the coastal 
trade went from the south to the north. In that direction the railways could 
usually compete on more than equal terms with the shipping companies. Com-
parison was difficult, but Brigden estimated that a ton of general cargo carried 
from Brisbane to Rockhampton by rail cost 35s. 4d. ($3.53), as against 52s. 2d. 
($5.22) by sea. Although Queensland's long distance rates placed the state's rail 
network at a great revenue disadvantage, he thought that they had created a 
Queensland market to an extent not previously achieved."! 
The indirect benefits of the tapering rail rates to the state therefore seemed 
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substantial. Yet whether or not the rates actually paid was difficult to say—as 
difficult, Brigden pointed out, as questions involving rail freighting pohcies 
usually were. Recognizing this, he still favoured the continuation of the existing 
long haulage schedules: "given the coastal railway and its interest and main-
tenance cost as an established fact, the rates are both payable to the Railway 
and advantageous to Queensland producers, and to disturb things generally 
would be to do damage to both without achieving any comparable benefits to the 
ports or the port cities"."" There remained the question of the wool rates in 
particular. The railways, under governmental direction, were charging 71s. 3d. 
($7.12) and 126s. 3d. ($12.62) per bale of greasy wool carried from Rock-
hampton and Townsville respectively to Brisbane; the shipping companies were 
carrying for 52s. 2d. ($5.22) and 77s. ($7.70). The difference between the rail and 
sea charges had been smaller until a recent reduction in shipping freight rates. 
Brigden suggested that the differential between the two charges should be 
reduced. Otherwise he saw no reason important enough to take the wool trade 
from the ports. He realized that such a change would be a heavy blow to the 
ports, above all to the port of Rockhampton."" 
Historically, then, because of the wartime shipping shortage and postwar 
shortages and waterfront militancy the railways had been able to take a great 
amount of trade from the ports. A rate schedule had been devised as a com-
promise which kept the most valuable trade for the ports, but the railways had 
themselves since been injured by the rise of road competition. In Brigden's view 
an important advantage of the coastal fine was that it had created a Queensland 
market, rather than a Northern, Central, or Southern market, and had stimu-
lated the state-wide economy. This was the essence of the case for the long 
haulage rates and for the ports retaining the wool trade. In the absence of 
any government body to coordinate transport development in the state, 
Brigden's discussion was the only inter-war expert examination of port and 
railway needs."* 
Brigden's main conclusions found favour with the port authorities, but his 
specific comments on Gladstone and Rockhampton were received less well by 
the Rockhampton Harbour Board. He had considered the capital expenditure 
on the Fitzroy's improvements as one reason why the port should not be 
deprived of the Central wool trade. On the other hand, he pointed to the 
precarious condition of the port's finances. For the last five years the port had 
cost the state £22,000 ($44,000) a year in unpaid interest. "Either Gladstone or 
Port Alma is required," he concluded, "but not both. And if one is to scrapped, 
there can be no question as to which it should be . . . the advisabihty of abandon-
ing Port Alma merits serious consideration.""® 
Fratricidal conflict through the thirties 
During the thirties the conflict between the two Central ports became 
open. As their contest reached ominous proportions, Rockhampton remained 
firmly fixed on the horns of its port dilemma. The improvement of the Fitzroy 
was continued with as well as the development of Port Alma, and some still 
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favoured Broadmount as a deep-water port. For Gladstone, the beginning of 
the decade was marred by a serious dispute with the shipping companies. The 
companies, the Gladstone Harbour Board claimed, were discriminating against 
Gladstone in favour of Rockhampton. The conflict between the two Central 
ports became so serious at this time that the 1937 transport commission 
specifically discussed "the Rockhampton-Gladstone controversy". By then the 
balance of Central Queensland's port trade had swung towards Gladstone. 
In spite of warnings to the contrary, the Fitzroy scheme was continued with. 
In 1935 one outspoken complaint against the improvement of the river was 
registered by F. M. Rhodes, an associate editor of the Rockhampton Morning 
Bulletin and one of Australia's few maritime historians. "I have to blush", 
Rhodes confessed, 
to say I was a member of the Harbour Board. The same Board borrowed 
the other day £10,000 [$20,000] for bank protection up the river—to 
prevent worthless land from falling into the river. Then they borrowed 
another £10,000 [$20,000] for a training wall. They have been building a 
training wall for thirty years. The depth of the river has decreased by three 
feet [0.91 m] in the last thirty years . . . during the revival of the meat trade 
the Board has simply stood and shuddered beneath its overdraft."® 
This blunt accusation touched on the Rockhampton Harbour Board's sorest 
points—their increasing financial indebtedness and the failure of the river 
scheme. In 1922, 9 feet (2.74 m) l.w. was available in the river; in 1937 and 1946 
this depth had been increased only by 2 feet (0.61 m). Meantime, some still spoke 
of the possible development of Broadmount."' One of the port's reactions to its 
difficulties was to become more vehement about the damaging effect of the 
coastal railway on Rockhampton's port trade. "On the untested assumption 
that trade would spring up as facihties for handling it were provided," the 
Bulletin complained in 1935, 
successive Queensland governments applied themselves to building a rail-
way parallel to the coast in order to rob the ports . . . having linked the 
several ports, the sponsors of the coast line set about finding justification 
for its existence . . . the discovery was made that the coast railway was 
intended to develop the state. It was a clumsy excuse, the state along the 
coast from Bundaberg to a little south of Mackay offering little prospect of 
ever paying for any more costly means of transport than a good dray road 
. . . [then competition between rail, road, and sea transport began in 
earnest] . . . while this was going forward the Government was demanding 
that Harbour Boards, with or without trade, pay their interest charges 
which had their origin in money spent under Government supervision in 
developing their ports."® 
The note of desperation in the paper's charges against the government's railway 
and port policies was an indication of the extent of Rockhampton's concern for 
its port's difficulties. Indeed, they were beginning to appear insurmountable. 
Meanwhile by granting generous rebates to shippers Gladstone was trying 
to lure the vital Central wool trade to its port. In 1930 the Townsville Daily 
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Bulletin had noted with amusement that Gladstone had won the Corona 
property's wool trade by rebating 4s. 6d. (45 cents) per ton on the chp, but 
receiving only 2s. (20 cents) per ton in harbour dues. "Gladstone, though handi-
capped by 117 miles (185 km) of extra railage, beat us for the Corona business", 
chortled the Daily Bulletin. "As the old cock crows the young cock learns. But 
the cockerel never learnt that 4s. 6d. [45 cents] rebate from us.""" However, 
Townsville could afford to be amused by Gladstone's competition; Rock-
hampton could not. Evidence about the rebate campaign between the two 
Central ports in the early thirties is scarce, but the result was that while Glad-
stone won some success the port could not afford to continue the campaign. 
It was a debtor port as well as Rockhampton, if for a much smaller amount, and 
the strain of the rebate struggle was too great. 
In 1932, overtaxed by its efforts to win the wool trade, Gladstone attempted 
to raise its wool dumping charges. O.S.R.A.'s reply was to stop using the port 
as a wool dump and to request a reduction in port charges. The subsequent 
dispute between the Board and the companies drew a sharp line on Gladstone's 
prospects of expansion. Immediately between O.S.R.A. and the Board, the 
wider issue involved was Gladstone's competition with Rockhampton for wool 
cargoes. The clash was aggravated by the depression and the tradition of failure 
that dogged Gladstone's campaign to be acknowledged as Central Queensland's 
best port. 
O.S.R.A.'s demand that Gladstone should reduce its port charges was part 
of an Australia-wide request. However, to the Board at that time, it was an 
impossible demand. When O.S.R.A. renewed its request, the Board's refusal 
testified to Gladstone's acute sense of isolation: 
The Gladstone Harbour Board is anxious in every way to make Glad 
stone the most attractive and economical port for all ships, . . . we wish to 
stress this, as for many years this Board has been handicapped by the port 
having to fight, almost literally, for bare existence. Your Association has 
requested that we reduce our wool dumping charges . . . we will be extremely 
pleased to do so, immediately you will meet us and reduce your freights 
from Gladstone . . . With the present organisation of the Wool industry 
there is only a certain quantity of wool which is directly shipped overseas 
from central Queensland; the division of these shipments between Glad-
stone and Port Alma is due to two factors, viz.:— 
[a] Discriminatory rail rates against Gladstone 
[b] Preferential shipping costs against Gladstone . . . 
Whilst your Association is prepared to incur loading costs for your ships at 
Port Alma, probably over 4s. [40 cents] per ton in excess of Gladstone 
costs, . . . you are not justified in asking us to reduce our wool dumping 
charges.*" 
When O.S.R.A. replied it blandly stated that it could not be involved in any 
question bearing on competition between the ports.*! The Board wrote a final 
angry letter in return, but it was ineffective in producing any change.*" Despite 
the port's rising trade levels in the thirties, in 1937 sections of the Harbour 
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Board were so discouraged with their situation that some sympathy existed for 
state port control.*" 
The prospects of the Central ports in 1939 
Unhke Brigden's inquiry, the 1937 Commission added httle to the under-
standing of the ports' difficulties. Its conclusions were that the rebate feud should 
not be renewed and that continuous mileage railway rates should apply to wool 
going to Port Alma or Gladstone—the Gladstone Harbour Board had justi-
fiably complained of unfair treatment in the latter matter. Finally, recognizing 
that port indebtedness had got out of hand, the Commissioners suggested that 
interest arrears be cancelled for both Boards.** The rebate campaign was not 
revived and eventually the government carried out the Commission's other 
recommendations. But government assistance to the Central ports was long 
overdue. 
The fortunes of the Central ports had reached their lowest ebb. While 
Rockhampton had not been as racked by intra-port feuds over alternative deep-
water portsites as in preceding years. Port Alma remained undeveloped. Through 
the two inter-war decades double the amount of cargo landed at Port Alma was 
usually landed at the town wharves. Equally seriously, the ports' finances had 
fallen into a very bad condition. Each of the three inter-war port inquiries spoke 
against the continued development of Rockhampton as a deep-water port. In 
contrast, by 1939 Gladstone was in a much better position than at the beginning 
of the period. After the dispute between the Gladstone Harbour Board and the 
shipping companies the port's trade level had gradually increased. In its 
endeavours to win trade, however, the Board had become financiaffy over-
extended and the port was over-equipped for the trade passing through it. The 
war would transform Gladstone's fortunes, boosting its tffl then gradual success, 
while adding to Rockhampton's difficulties. The use of Port Alma was harmed 
more by the second war than by the first: between 1916 and 1918 some 77,000 
tons (78,236 tonnes) of cargo had been handled there, between 1942 and 1944 
only 15,000 tons (15,241 tonnes) passed through Port Alma.*® But this reversal 
of port circumstances in Central Queensland had happened only after an 
immensely expensive intra-regional contest. 
Townsville: Steady progress bolsters Townsville's case for continued local 
control 
As the coastal railway did not reach Townsville until 1923 the effect of the 
war on the port was much less harmful than it was on Rockhampton. In com-
parison with the troubles of the Central ports, Townsville's development was 
unremarkable. Steady progress was made with physical port improvement and 
the Harbour Board's fiscal indebtedness to the government was gradually 
reduced. The improvements made were basically continuations of earlier 
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schemes. No new major works were undertaken as at Mackay or Bowen. 
Further, the rail-port connections that did affect Townsville benefited the port. 
Yet expansion was not entirely trouble-free. At times port users criticized the 
port's depths and wharfage equipment. Equally seriously, the Townsville 
Harbour Board had to assert their independence against the centralism which 
was becoming stronger in government thought about the ports. The Board's 
reply to critics of the port's administration was to emphasize the importance of 
Townsville as a decentralizing influence in the state's economic life. 
Physical improvements and wharfage adequacy: Qualified success 
A limit appeared to have been reached in improving the port's entrance 
depths. In 1922 the Platypus Channel afforded 22 feet (6.71 m) l.w. and the same 
depth still existed in 1945, though wartime difficulties had once reduced l.w. to 
\9\ feet (5.94 m). The port remained a tidal port for larger vessels but as the 
ridal rise was from 8 to 12 feet (2.44 to 3.66 m) this was usually satisfactory. 
Meanwhile the depths at the Outer Harbour berths were steadily increased from 
25 to 30 feet (7.62 to 9.14 m).*® Some complaints about the port's physical 
adequacy were made by overseas shipowners. This dissatisfaction reached a 
peak during the war. In 1941 O.S.R.A. pressed the Treasurer to ensure that the 
Townsville Board would increase the depth of the Platypus Channel to 25 feet 
(7.62 m) l.w., and cited a report of Fison's made four years earlier which called 
for this improvement. The Board countered that shipping had not been seriously 
inconvenienced. But the time had passed when maintaining port depths was 
sufficient provision for trading needs.*' 
Otherwise the port's equipment was steadily improved. In 1927 Outer 
Harbour wharfage amounted to 2,800 feet (853.44 m). This was made up of 
1,800 feet (548.64 m) of timber wharfage at the Eastern Breakwater, and a 
500-foot( 152.40 m) concrete pier, both sides of which could be used by shipping. 
A 650-foot (198.12 m) extension to the wharfage was completed in 1929 and in 
the same year the Shell and Vacuum Companies established bulk oil terminals 
on the south side of Magazine Island with pipe connections to pier berths. By 
1935 a 400-foot (121.92 m) retaining wall had been built to reclaim land in front 
of the port's pilot station, and in 1936 a £15,000 ($30,000) zinc concentrates 
storage depot was constructed inside the reclaimed area. Finally, by 1939 the 
port's four Harbour Board wharves provided 4,200 feet (128.02 m) of wharfage, 
apart from 660 feet (201.16 m) of privately owned footage.*® Townsville's 
amount of lineal footage sufficed for the port's trade, but the handling equipment 
on the port wharves was inadequate. "Townsville is suffering from congestion", 
the Chairman of Mt. Isa mines complained in 1936, "due to the large volume of 
Mt. Isa traffic for the handling of which modern facffities are lacking. There is 
only one crane to serve for the loading of wool, sugar, meat and other cargo as 
well as bunker coal, lead bulhon, and zinc concentrates."*" In response to these 
criticisms the Board ordered another twenty-ton (20.32 tonnes) crane for the 
Eastern Breakwater in the same year. But their responsibility to cater for the 
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mine's needs was not one-sided. At that rime the Mt. Isa company was having 
difficulties in working economicaffy. The Board wished to assist the company, 
but required in return a guarantee of the company's continuity of trade through 
the port. The problem was a difficult one and similar in kind to those faced by 
the Cairns Harbour Board when the question of wharfage expansion was at 
stake. It remained a troublesome point. In 1938 a special report called for by 
the Board found that port congestion still existed.®" 
Townsville's rail-port connections: The extension of the Northern trunk line 
More protected by distance from the dangers of Southern rail competition 
than Rockhampton, Townsville's principal railway concern was over the west-
ward extension of the Northern trunk line. The port had to ensure that the 
trunk line would funnel the Mt. Isa trade to the east coast, rather than to the 
Gulf ports. Large-scale production did not begin at Mt. Isa until after the war, 
but work at the mine even in the thirties ensured Townsville of a brisk port trade. 
With the advantage of its estabhshed trading and political connections Towns-
viffe had little difficulty in holding on to the Mt. Isa trade. The second major 
extension of the period was the joining of the Central and Northern trunk lines 
by the Longreach-V/inton route. From this, Rockhampton unsuccessfully hoped 
for a port alliance with Townsville to combat Brisbane's competition by the 
coastal line. 
In 1934 the Mt. Isa company had guaranteed the government £200,000 
($400,000) of the total cost of the extension from the western terminus at 
Duchess to Mt. Isa, the total cost being £450,000 ($900,000). The possibility of 
making a Gulf-Mt. Isa rail linkage was barely considered.®! There were three 
alternative routes: towards Cloncurry, the Duchess hne, and a branch to 
Kajabi—the latter was closest to the Gulf. After investigation, a Royal Com-
mission concluded that a hne to Cloncurry would have to traverse excessively 
rough terrain. This left the choice between Kajabi or Duchess as a terminus—or, 
in port terms, a choice between the Gulf or Townsville. The Gulf's supporters 
were vocal but few in number. "I have read most of the reports of the different 
Commissions and engineers", one Kajabi storekeeper argued for the Gulf, "and 
aff agree that it is rather difficult to get a port on the Gulf. Still, that does not 
get away from the fact that till the nineties Townsviffe was a lightering port, or 
the fact that Mackay is still a lightering port up to the present day."®" This was 
a reasonable argument. But as far as the Mt. Isa company were concerned, using 
the Gulf was out of the question. A quick transport connection with an estab-
lished port was needed to develop the mine.®" Further, as the company's Chair-
man later pointed out, after the decision had been made to use the tonnage of the 
Australian Shipping Conference the choice of Townsville was axiomatic. There 
general cargo could be supphed for backloading the Conference vessels—a 
service the undeveloped ports of the Gulf could not offer for years to come.®* 
Another factor favouring Townsville was the possibility of Commonwealth 
competition developing for North Queensland's trade via a port in the Northern 
Territory. An advantage the state already held here was that much of the 
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Territory's trade flowed eastwards. It was an additional advantage of the 
Dajarra-Mt. Isa hnkage that the line would assist the state to retain this trade.®® 
So the fate of the Gulf ports was sealed. 
The second rail connection that directly involved Townsviffe was the 
linkage of the Northern and Central trunk lines by the Longreach-Winton 
extension in 1928. Rockhampton had already fought a hard but unsuccessful 
campaign against the Hughenden-Winton line, which brought the Northern 
trunk downwards towards Central Queensland. Thirty years later, Rockhampton 
saw in the Longreach-Winton linkage the possibility of a Rockhampton-
Townsville affiance against Southern influence and against the long haulage rail 
rates. After calculating the detrimental effects the line would have on the 
Winton to Brisbane wool trade, the Rockhampton Bulletin predicted that, 
"Rockhampton may get a new ally in her fight against the set poficy of starving 
expensively developed ports, using bankrupt railways to do i t . . . Townsville's 
danger is not so much the amount of trade she may lose to Rockhampton as it is 
a question of how much trade both Rockhampton and Townsville stand to lose 
to Brisbane."®® But such an affiance did not eventuate. Townsville had not been 
affected as seriously as Rockhampton had by the threatened revenue loss if the 
raffways extended their long haulage rates to wool. Nevertheless, Brigden's 
decision against the railways in the matter was welcomed by the Townsville 
Harbour Board. 
Townsville and the port inquiries 
Townsville's position in 1939 was a good deal stronger than it had been in 
1918. Because of this, Buchanan's critical comments on the port were received 
coldly by the Townsville Harbour Board. Buchanan placed the port of Towns-
ville in the same category as the ports of Bowen, Bundaberg, and Mackay. He 
thought they should only be developed further as coastal ports, and that Cairns 
should be the overseas port for the North. To this finding the piqued Townsville 
Daily Bulletin replied, accurately enough, that Townsville could afford "to 
disregard Sir George's eccentric report, which hke others of its kind, wiff dis-
appear into a pigeon hole and be for ever forgotten".®' J. B. Brigden's inquiry 
had been more specialized than Buchanan's, and Brigden did not criticize 
Townsvffle. He stated that though both Townsviffe and Cairns were expensive 
ports to dredge, they were essential to their districts and in satisfactory financial 
positions.®® 
In arguing its case to Brigden's inquiry the Townsville port authorities had 
made much of the value of the ports as decentrahzing agents, as previously 
Chairman Ackers had justified Townsville's port position in similar terms. 
"Queensland has reached its present stage of successful development", a 
Townsville deputation argued, 
by reason of the policy which has been followed of decentralisation, its 
establishment of ports at intervals on its long coastline, with the con-
struction of railway lines therefrom to the interior, for the conveyance of 
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goods and passengers to and from the seaboard. This policy, the methods 
now being adopted by the railway department is calculated to defeat, 
inasmuch as the result will be the concentration of population at Brisbane, 
with the centralisation of shipping trade at that port. Unlike Sydney, 
Brisbane has no geographical qualifications to be a centre of distribution, 
and its position at the south-eastern extremity of the coastline is against any 
prospect of its functioning successfuffy in that capacity.®" 
Townsville's complaint matched Rockhampton's unease. To some extent, these 
protests of Rockhampton and Townsville against the centralization of port 
trade were remnants of the nineteenth-century separatist movements. But the 
inter-war development of the economy with its regional inequities, and the 
increase in the size of ships trading to the Queensland ports, made the 
centralization of trade a matter the ports could have little control over. 
The other Northern ports 
Mackay: The eventual success of the Outer Harbour scheme 
In 1919 the port of Mackay's prospects were at their lowest point. The year 
before, a cyclone had demolished the Outer Harbour works which remained 
from the abortive efforts to build the Harbour four years previously. The port's 
fortunes showed little improvement in the next decade, and with the possibihty 
of Bowen being opened up as a major port in the twenties dissension began 
again in Mackay's port community. Some favoured the improvement of the 
river, some a deep-water port at Port Newry, and others still supported the 
Outer Harbour scheme. Even the use of Sarina Inlet and Dalrymple Bay had 
been suggested. As this disagreement grew, Mackay's Harbour Board Chairman 
pointed to the effects that intra-port conflict had had on Rockhampton. The 
moral was drawn and the closure of port ranks was urged. However, another 
river training wall had been begun in 1921 and a year later a public poll favoured 
the Board's proposal to spend £20,000 ($40,000) more to complete the work. 
By 1927 it was evident that the wall had failed. In the same year Mackay's 
lighterage costs were £128,000 ($256,000). Buchanan, at this time, stated the 
unpleasant truth: "It is quite possible to improve the port of Mackay, but at an 
immense capital cost, and probably permanent heavy maintenance charges."®" 
In 1927 the Board estimated the cost of an Outer Harbour at £565,000 
($1,130,000), an estimate which Cullen raised to £630,000 ($1,260,000). Approval 
of the project during the depression years, however, was impossible, and 
Mackay's hopes fell. In 1929 the Mackay Mercury admitted that the Harbour 
Board was groping in the dark, "the same way as its predecessors did for many 
years''.®^ The verdict of Brigden's inquiry was even less encouraging than 
Buchanan's. The Bureau of Industry had already reported against the project 
and Brigden reiterated his opposition in 1930. The new training wall had slightly 
improved the river but its entrance depths were still inadequate. Another matter 
that worried those who supported the Outer Harbour was that the shipping 
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companies might not agree to use it—at least on the Mackay Board's terms. 
However, chinks of light at last appeared to be breaking through Mackay's port 
gloom. Estimates of the work's cost had risen to £759,000 ($1,518,000) in 1932, 
but the Board hinted in that year that only "a little patience and tact" were 
necessary to produce the government's agreement. The government unofficiaffy 
agreed to build the Outer Harbour if a poll of the Mackay ratepayers proved 
their support for the project. Therefore, when the ratepayers supported the 
Outer Harbour by 10,500 votes against 1,500 in 1933, the scheme's success was 
assured.®" 
The construction of Mackay's Outer Harbour was fraught with the same 
elements of sensationalism which had accompanied the failure of the first 
scheme in 1914. Claims of corruption were made about the terms of the contract, 
and the successful contractor eventually had his work taken over and completed 
by the Mackay Board. Parliamentary opposition to the scheme as such, how-
ever, was small. It had been restricted to those who objected to the expansion of 
the port at a time when rail and road competition had already placed the finances 
of the Queensland ports in danger. Forgan Smith's claims, that the plan had 
been investigated more thoroughly than any other previous public work, bore 
an alarming resemblance to Robert Philp's assertions about the groundwork for 
the Broadmount-Rockhampton railway in 1895. But fortunately the Mackay 
project did not suffer a similar fate. Perhaps the fact that Smith was member for 
Mackay, whereas Philp had been member for Townsville, had something to do 
with this.®" 
The cost of the Outer Harbour, as originally calculated, had been £1,100,000 
($2,200,000), as against the contractor's price of £785,000 ($1,570,000), which 
proved to be unrealistically low. The method of financing the project was similar 
to that which had been devised for the first Outer Harbour scheme. In paying 
for the Harbour, the lighterage charges of the shipping companies played a 
crucial role. This was the point of greatest concern for the Board. There had 
been little public knowledge of the scale of lighterage charges in the port and it 
was uncertain whether the companies would fall in readily with the undertaking. 
The Mackay Board was well aware of the difficulties the Townsville Harbour 
Board encountered in inducing the shipping companies to use the Board's Outer 
Harbour wharfage. Comparing the scale of port dues drawn up to meet the 
financial needs of the project with the older port dues, Arthur Fadden remarked: 
"Lighterage charges have at times been reduced . . . but such reductions have 
synchronised with periods of increased agitation for Outer Harbour facilities."®* 
To illustrate the advantage of the Outer Harbour, Fadden cited one impressive 
example of the potential savings. In 1933 Mackay had exported 117,000 tons 
(118,880 tonnes) of sugar at a cost of £100,900 ($201,800); with the new charges, 
the same quantity of sugar would only cost £38,000 ($76,000) to export, after 
the project's capital cost had been covered. Savings on lighterage would come 
to £50,000 ($100,000) annually.®® 
The project's construction years were marred by difficulties with the original 
contractor, but finally in 1939 Forgan Smith sailed into the Outer Harbour to 
declare it open. Lightering to the port ended in the same year and the shipping 
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companies cooperated in the new financial arrangements. The entrance and 
berthage depths of the Outer Harbour compared most favourably with the 
depths of the larger Queensland ports; there was 30 feet (9.14 m) l.w. in the 
entrance, and 33 feet (10.06 m) l.w. at the berths. The strains of war brought the 
Outer Harbour's entrance and berthage depths down to 25 and 28 feet (7.62 
and 8.53 m) l.w. respectively by 1945, but Mackay's port future at last seemed 
guaranteed.®® 
Cairns: A success story 
After the Cairns Harbour Board had won its protracted struggle to bring 
all the port's wharfage under its control in 1915, the development of Cairns was 
relatively free from controversy. In a period of such difficulty for the Queensland 
ports. Cairns could not escape entirely unscathed, but all in all its development 
was praiseworthy. Port competition with Townsville, while an ever present 
possibility in the calculations of the Cairns Harbour Board, never assumed the 
fratricidal proportions of the Rockhampton-Gladstone contest and was usually 
good-humoured. 
Over the ten years after 1918 the Cairns wharves were completely re-
equipped and almost rebuilt. By 1929 a new 400-foot (121.92 m) reinforced 
concrete wharf had been added to the existing wharfage. Most of the improve-
ments had been made after 1925 when an £80,000 ($160,000) loan had been 
granted to the Board for wharfage extension. The need for wharfage improve-
ment was urgent by that time as complaints about inadequate accommodation 
for overseas vessels had become frequent. The port's 1,500 feet (457.20 m) of 
wharfage was usually taken up by the interstate vessels alone, and this amount of 
lineal berthage compared unfavourably with Townsville's 3,500 feet (1066.8 m). 
However, with the improvements after 1925 the Cairns wharves were among the 
best in the state. Great care had been taken to ensure adequate room for 
loading, handhng, and storage. The cost of the work, however, had been 
high.®' 
Towards the end of the period, the addition of an electric sugar conveyor 
realized an early plan of the Board's for mechanical sugar handling. In its deal-
ings with the sugar industry the Cairns Board had to cope with a difficulty that 
had also worried the Northern ports of Mackay and Townsville. This was the 
need to ensure that the benefits of port improvements would not be cancelled 
out by competition from private companies with the Board—the shipping 
companies in Townsville and Mackay—or by the withdrawal of support by 
established port users—Mt. Isa in Townsville, and the sugar millers in Cairns. 
The matter was well handled in Cairns, yet because of earlier confficts in the 
port and because of the cost of the improvements, the Cairns Board retained 
complete control of all berthage.®® 
Well before 1939 the Harbour Board's policies had borne fruit. In 1928 
Buchanan saw Cairns as the future port for North Queensland rather than 
Townsville or Bowen. Cairns was less of a natural harbour than Bowen, but 
much better than Townsville. Trade at Bowen had fallen away badly and 
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equipping the port with installations for a large overseas trade would be very 
costly, Buchanan reasoned. The entrance depth at Cairns for most of the period 
was 22 feet (6.71 m) l.w.—the same as the depth of Townsville's Platypus 
Channel—and was maintained in the port's 5^-mile-long (8.85 km) entrance 
channel. In the Trinity Inlet deep water was available at the berthages. Also, by 
1937 the shipping companies' sugar-handling charges had been reduced from 
5s. 8d. (57 cents) to Is. 4d. (13 cents) per ton (1.02 tonnes) and the harbour dues 
on sugar had also been reduced.®" The port's successes were not entirely un-
qualified. Cairns's intermittent efforts to win the Tully sugar trade from Towns-
ville had failed. As well, from the early thirties railway competition had begun 
to bite into the port's timber trade. "Though the Board has gone to the irre-
ducible minimum in the reduction of charges," the Harbour Board's Annual 
Report stated in 1933, "the costs of handhng are still a factor mihtating against 
transport by sea."'" Lastly, the Board complained that O.S.R.A. was not sending 
enough ships to carry the port's timber.'! But, overall, the development of Cairns 
had proceeded satisfactorily and well. 
Bowen gambles and loses 
Bowen wagered heavily on E. G. Theodore's plan to set up an iron and steel 
works in the town based on Collinsville coal. To provide facilities for the pros-
pective coal trade the Bowen Harbour Board had three alternatives. To build a 
pier to the southwest of the existing pier, some 500 feet (152.4 m) by 80 feet 
(24.38 m), which would cost £80,000 ($160,000); to build a jetty at Mt. Bramston 
to cost £141,000 ($282,000); or lastly, to construct a viaduct to Stone Island 
with piers, which would cost £237,000 ($474,000). Settling for the least costiy 
project, in 1920 the Bowen Harbour Board was granted a loan of £109,000 
($218,000) to begin work. The extra funds were for dredging expenses and to 
add an electric wool-transporter to the pier. Already, by 1919, £9,600 ($19,200) 
had been spent on dredging the existing berthages to 27 feet (8.23 m) l.w.'" 
In 1926 the work was complete but unforeseen difficulties had arisen during 
construction. The project's estimated cost of £109,000 ($218,000) was exactly 
half the Board's final outiay of £218,000 ($436,000). The Board had set aside 
annual amounts in a sinking fund to repay the government, but with the 
greater costs of construction the Board fell behind in its repayments. Bowen 
became another of the state's debtor ports at a time of general dissatisfaction 
with the condition of port finances.'" What affected Bowen so grievously in the 
long term, however, was not so much the extra construction costs of the pier and 
the Board's financial difficulties—quite serious enough in themselves—but the 
fact that the coal trade had failed to develop. An annual export of 300,000 tons 
(304,820 tonnes) had been hoped for. In practice it amounted to 10,000 tons 
(10,161 tonnes). The immediate result of the miscarriage of Bowen's plans was 
that for many years after 1926 no further improvements were made to the port. 
When another sizeable loan was granted to the Bowen Board in 1934 for 
dredging, it was long overdue; the port's entrance channel had not been dredged 
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since 1912. Depths of 20 feet (6.10 m) l.w. in the channel and 21 feet (6.40 m) in 
the swinging basin were then restored and remained the same till 1945.'* 
As the prospects of a wider trade faded with the failure of the coal export 
scheme Bowen had to lower its port sights. The government's right to land 
goods without paying harbour dues, for example, was contested by the Bowen 
Harbour Board. This issue was important not only to Bowen but to the other 
ports in the state where financial pressures made it necessary to seek revenue 
wherever possible.'® Rail competition was also cutting into Bowen's trade, and 
the three port inquiries of the period had not seen much prospect of the port 
recovering. The 1937 Commission could only suggest that some of the capital 
costs of the coal project to the port be written off.'® 
The prospects of the Northern ports in 1939 
In the period Townsvffle and Cairns had been successfully developed while 
Bowen and Mackay had not. Bowen had gambled on the possibility of develop-
ing a coal export trade and had lost. Mackay's loss had not been as final in the 
end, as the Outer Harbour had been built at last. Unhke Townsville's Outer 
Harbour, Mackay's artificial harbour was not at its river's mouth. Comparable 
disputes over developmental priorities within Mackay's port community could 
not arise. Mackay's indebtedness to the government, however, had been in-
creased because of the construction of the Outer Harbour. Equally, the port 
success of Cairns had committed its Board's finances to the government. The 
geography of the North favoured the maintenance of several important second-
ary ports. As Brigden pointed out, the hinterlands of Cairns and Mackay were 
relatively non-competitive with those served by Townsville and Bowen. Towns-
vffle's and Bowen's competition was more akin to the great port struggle in 
Central Queensland, but the rivalry of the two Northern ports had really been 
fought out in the preceding period. Some valid parallels can still be drawn for 
the inter-regional port competition between the rival Central and Northern 
ports in the inter-war years. In an effort to win the trade of the Centre, Glad-
stone had become over-equipped and financially over-extended; Bowen had 
made a similar mistake, only its degree of financial commitment was much 
larger than Gladstone's. Another important difference was that Townsville, 
unhke Rockhampton, managed to reduce its level of financial indebtedness. 
Further, the physical development of Townsville was successful compared with 
Rockhampton's failures, and the coastal railway did not take as much of 
Townsville's trade. These achievements of Townsville and the shortcomings of 
Bowen meant that Townsville easily managed to retain its intra-regional 
supremacy over its rival. 
Hence the prospects of Townsville, Cairns, and Mackay in 1939 were quite 
bright—as bright as the prospects of any of the Queensland outports could be 
at a time when the transport revolution was making smaller non-specialized 
ports an economic impossibility. The other small Northern ports had faded 
away. Only Thursday Island and a few small sugar ports managed to maintain 
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themselves. Mourilyan and Innisfail, two sugar outlets between Cairns and 
Townsville, had attempted to set up Harbour Boards. The opinion of the 1937 
Commission, however, was that another port between the two larger Northern 
ports was not economically warranted." As the state's transport system was 
evolving, it only seemed a matter of time until this same verdict would apply to 
most of the Northern ports. 
Port trade and the railways: The facts of centralization 
The economic troubles of the inter-war years were as serious as those which 
had hampered the ports between 1885 and 1900, perhaps even more so. Wartime 
dislocation began and ended the two decades, the middle years of which were 
punctuated by the thirties depression. This much is generally certain. When it 
comes to considering in detail the changes in port trade through the period, 
however, the statistical limitation to doing so is almost preventive after 1919. 
It can still be ascertained that the inter-war years saw a zenith reached in the 
centralization of port trade in the state. As 1939 approaches, the designation of 
three Queenslands, and the emphasis on the three main regional ports which 
has formed the basis of this study, becomes a less valuable guide to the ports' 
development and their relation with the economy. The period saw the cul-
mination of the dominance of the three major ports. Confronted with the facts 
of trade centralization, the port authorities and the political representatives of 
non-urban areas argued that the state rail network should foster decentralization 
of trade, rather than pull it towards Brisbane. 
The apotheosis of trade centralization 
In the ranking of the three most important state ports the traditionally 
dominant regional ports retained their places, but Rockhampton barely managed 
to do so.'® Between 1920 and 1939 Rockhampton was still the third most 
important Queensland port after Brisbane and Townsville, but on a five-yearly 
basis; after 1925 the port fell to fourth and fifth position. In terms of the 
dominance of the three traditionally important ports, Rockhampton's fall from 
trading grace was compensated for by the centralization of port trade on 
Brisbane. That port now accounted for 100 per cent of its region's trade—the 
outports of Maryborough and Bundaberg being relatively too small to register 
as trading ports. Further, Brisbane's share of state port trade at 76 per cent was 
the highest it had ever been. 
The second three most important ports were Cairns, Gladstone, and 
Mackay, in that order. These were the same as in the preceding period except 
that Gladstone had replaced Bundaberg as Queensland's fifth port. That 
Mackay and Cairns could succeed while Townsville still retained its primacy in 
the North was a result of the greater success of North Queensland's development. 
Expansion of the region's pastoral, sugar, and mining industries in the thirties 
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had provided the base for this port expansion. Conversely, Central Queens-
land's economy had not fared weff and Rockhampton and Gladstone were 
competing for a trade which was not markedly growing. The economic im-
balance between the regions was also the explanation for Brisbane's port suc-
cess, as the South retained its economic primacy. 
The displacement of Rockhampton from its position of importance was 
the most striking feature of inter-war port trade. Central Queensland's port 
fortunes were brighter, however, in that the trend in the regional shares of port 
trade was for the Centre and North's share to increase, while the South's share 
of total trade—which had been 83 per cent in 1920-1924—was steadily de-
creasing. By 1935-1939 it had been reduced to 70 per cent. This trend was 
similar to the experience of the three regions between 1860 and 1885. The early 
dominance of the South had been followed by a readjustment of port trade in 
favour of the North and Centre; it remained to be seen whether a similar 
redressal of economic strength could be achieved after 1939 through the 
expansion of the ports of Cairns, Mackay, and Gladstone, and the preservation 
of Townsviffe and Rockhampton as large regional ports. 
In sum, it seemed that the years of trade centralization in Queensland had 
culminated in Brisbane's port monopoly of its own region and in its large share 
of the state's total port trade. Rockhampton's monopoly of the Centre's port 
trade had been broken, and Mackay and Cairns had developed as important 
ports alongside Townsville in the North. Perhaps the original regional frame-
work of economic development had now been shattered, and the ports were on 
the way to achieving more viable trading relations with their regional hinter-
lands. 
The railways and decentralization 
The specific effects of rail competition with the ports in the period has 
already been discussed in the context of the ports' general development. What 
calls for additional attention is the general reaction of politicians and port 
authorities in the thirties to the centralization of port trade and its relation to 
the railways. The specific nineteenth-century regional grievances which had 
given rise to the movements for regional separatism had become in the twentieth 
century a repetitive general insistence on the virtues of decentrahzation. The 
protest of the Chairman of the Townsville Harbour Board in 1918 against 
moves to centralize port administration has been mentioned. But debate about 
decentralization in the state's economic affairs was usually on a painfully general 
plane. "Referring to my question . . . in regard to decentralisation," the member 
for Rockhampton asked the Premier in 1930, "and the answer thereto, in the 
interests of my electors and those deeply interested in central Queensland, will 
the Premier kindly explain what he means by the statement—'There is no 
present intention to alter the practices that have existed for several decades'?" 
To which the Premier replied: "The Hon. Member should himself know what 
practices have existed."'" Generality of statement, however, did not mean lack 
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of genuine belief. The idea of decentralization could draw freely on the separatist 
and regional traditions of North and Central Queensland. 
For the ports it could be a strong line of defence against criticism. To 
Brigden's inquiry the Townsville and Rockhampton Chambers of Commerce 
claimed that the government's railway policy encouraged trade centralization, 
whereas the policy of decentralization "was not only a permanent necessity for 
an area the size of Queensland, but . . . cities had been developed with the 
assurance that such a policy was intended to be permanent and . . . all govern-
ments had supported it hitherto".®" Brigden accepted much of this reasoning. 
In arguing that the ports should retain the wool trade, he considered that the 
social and economic benefits to the ports would outweigh the losses to the rail-
ways. This was a reaffirmation of the government's commitment to policies of 
regional economic development.®! The dilemma, Brigden saw, was that the Rail 
Commissioner was justified in attempting to win the wool trade from the ports 
from a business point of view; but, in the state's economy as a whole, the 
damage to the ports that would follow would perhaps hinder overall growth. 
"The difficulty is", Brigden concluded, "that no one in Queensland wants the 
railways to be run on strictly business lines. The position is very ambiguous."®" 
What Brigden, Buchanan, and the 1937 commissioners agreed on, was the need 
for a coordinating authority to regulate the ports' relation with the govern-
ment's railway policies. But while various transport acts defined the relations of 
rail and road transport in Queensland, an interrelated transport network 
including the ports was not considered. 
Port administration and finance: Regionalism triumphant 
In 1918 there was a general awareness that the Harbour Board method of 
port administration had proved unsatisfactory. Various remedies were being 
considered, most notably, centralization of administrative control. Yet, despite 
the centrahzation of port trade and the continued difficulties of the ports after 
1918, no fundamental change was made in the principle of port administration. 
Why this did not take place, with Labor's successive electoral victories and their 
preference for centralized economic measures, is the basic puzzle of the history 
of inter-war port administration. 
The lack of administrative provision for the port of Brisbane 
Apart from the recommendations of Buchanan and the 1937 commissioners, 
the administration of the port of Brisbane was virtually ignored. The most 
valuable physical improvement to the port after 1918 had been brought about 
in a quite unusual manner, when the Harbours and Marine Department and the 
Bureau of Industry cooperated to improve the central wharves. The project had 
been undertaken first of all as a public relief project to counteract the effects of 
the depression on the state. Valuable as it was in itself as an improvement to the 
The ports near defeat 233 
port's physical capacity, it had not been the result of any wider concern for the 
port's administrative needs. The Treasury's policy of developing alternative 
public wharfage sites in the river and moving wharfage downstream was not 
formulated in connection with any broader conception. 
The campaign for a Brisbane Harbour Board had reached its peak in 1902. 
The issue had then been taken up by Labor as one of the general centralizing 
policies that the party favoured—not in terms of the appointment of a Brisbane 
Harbour Board as such, but of the state control of the Queensland ports in toto. 
So the original agitation for a coordinating authority for Brisbane had been 
channelled into the wider question of centralized government control of all the 
ports. In 1925 when one parliamentary member inquired aboui the possibility 
of appointing a Brisbane Harbour Trust, he was told that the government had 
been considering the need for amending the port administrative system in 
general for some time.®" Another factor which continued to work against the 
establishment of a Brisbane Harbour Board was the strength of private wharfage 
interests; in 1923 the Daily Mail had argued that the main problem for a Bris-
bane port authority would be the excessive cost of purchasing private wharfage 
in the port.®* But the whole question of port administration, let alone that of 
Brisbane's needs, had been pushed from parliamentary attention. 
Port finances and port charges 
If pohticians could afford to ignore the administrative needs of the ports, 
they could not turn as blind an eye to the ports' financial condition. By 1945 
port indebtedness came to some two million pounds (four million dollars). 
For some years it had been frankly recognized by the Auditor-General that there 
was no prospect of the most heavily indebted ports meeting their commitments, 
with the exception of Brisbane.®® After an inquiry made by the Coordinator-
General of Public Works into port finances in 1944, £425,300 ($850,600) in 
interest and redemption was written off Rockhampton's debt, and £160,800 
($321,600) off Bowen's.®® The need for such an adjustment had been felt for 
years. In 1928 Buchanan had emphasized that the time had come for the state 
to decide whether further advances to the ports would be justified—even granted 
that port investment could not always be assessed in simple profit and loss 
terms. "The hard fact", he explained, 
is that Queensland is a comparatively poor state, and cannot afford to 
finance non-paying concerns year after year; indeed the volume of state 
trade and the stage of development reached do not justify such finance. 
The ports have been established however . . . so the position now is that 
the state, as port administrator, has sunk over a million pounds [two 
million dollars] in seven small ports, and expects some return on the money 
so sunk. On the other hand, as railway administrator, the state, by its 
policy of tapering rates, is depriving some, if not all, of the ports, of trade 
that ought to accrue to them naturally. In consequence of these con-
flicting policies, the ports are not paying their way.®' 
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This summation of Buchanan's was correct, but cold comfort for those involved. 
The question of the relation between the ports' financial difficulties and the 
level of port charges must await further investigation. The available evidence 
indicates that Queensland's port charges were below those of the other Aus-
tralian states, but this conclusion cannot be emphasized as the evidence is in-
adequate. Gladstone's dispute with O.S.R.A. over the scale of port charges has 
already been discussed. With the onset of the depression in 1928 O.S.R.A. had 
circularized all Australian port authorities, stressing the need for reductions in 
port charges. But O.S.R.A.'s inclusion of Queensland in its blanket criticism of 
Australian port charges may have been unreasonable. In the same year, 
Buchanan had also criticized the practice of several Australian states of treating 
port revenue as a source of public revenue; he too considered that the level of 
Australian port charges was well above overseas rates.®® Unfortunately, how-
ever, Buchanan's comparison of charges was not detailed on a port by port 
basis. 
It is still clear that Brisbane's port charges were the lowest of the Australian 
capital city ports. Whether Queensland's level of port costs was higher overall 
than that of other states is uncertain. The state was not following the practice of 
Victoria and South Australia in using port revenue to supplement general 
revenue. A second inquiry into Australian port charges in 1930 bore out 
Buchanan's findings about Queensland. Brisbane's charges were the lowest of 
any Austrahan capital city port. The principal weakness of both estimations 
was that they did not include cargo handling charges. Therefore, their con-
clusions did not necessarily mean that Brisbane was a cheap or efficient port for 
shipping.®" The relation between port finances and charges must await further 
study. What is clear at this point is that the government had postponed 
remedying the ports' financial weaknesses tiff the end of the period. 
The administrative changes between the wars 
As interest in port finance had been aroused in the years of the first war, to 
lie quiescent in the twenties and reawaken with the depression, interest in port 
administration followed the same path. In 1919 the Harbour Boards were given 
temporary borrowing accommodation; three years later. Labor's aim of extend-
ing the one-man one-vote franchise to local government elections was realized. 
The latter change gave democratic sanction to the fragmentary and destructively 
competitive policies the ports were following. At that time and six years later in 
1928, when another minor amending port bill was passed, scepticism was voiced 
about the Harbour Boards' abilities to meet their financial obligations."" Such 
a brief result of a decade of administrative change seems to belie the emphasis 
so far given to the likelihood of a fundamental readjustment of the port adminis-
trative system. It also questions the importance of the connection between 
Labor's desire to centralize port administration, and its dissatisfaction with the 
earlier failures to appoint a Brisbane Harbour Board and to reform the Harbour 
Board franchise. Yet this was the full extent of critical comment about the ports 
till the depression returned the government's attention to their situation. 
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In the mid-thirties overtures to the centralization of port control were made 
again by the government. As in 1918 the Harbour Boards expressed their 
opposition to this measure, but the financial pressures of the time provided a 
sombre background to the ports' difficulties. Agreement that the ports' situation 
had to be dealt with cut across party lines. In 1935 when the rising arrears of 
certain Harbour Boards were causing much concern, both Moore and Forgan 
Smith agreed that centralized port administration might be the only solution."! 
However, the government took no action, the state's economic position slowly 
improved, and in 1937 Forgan Smith expressed himself more in favour of an 
eradication of the ports' debts than of central port administration. The 1937 
transport commissioners decided the same thing. Except for recommending a 
coordinating authority for Brisbane, the commission suggested no change in the 
existing system of port administration subject to some form of central control 
being imposed on port expenditures."" Thus the administrative framework had 
barely survived. How it managed to do so and why the discussion of the ports' 
needs was so slight must now be considered. 
The framework for lassitude: The government tacitly sanctions port losses 
Part of the reason why no fundamental change was made in port adminis-
tration after 1918 was undoubtedly the wider concerns which occupied Labor's 
attention. The Conservative government had also had many other more urgent 
matters to deal with before the ports in the 1890s. In 1918 Labor had tended to 
place port affairs in the context of a generally centralized administrative 
approach to the economy. But the party's unrewarding involvement with state 
enterprises in the twenties and the depression, followed by rail-road competition 
in the thirties, stiffed discussion about the ports' administrative needs. Their 
financial difficulties had only been considered under the pressure of the thirties 
depression, much as the original Harbour Boards owed their legislative origin 
to the troubles of the nineties. 
But there is another explanation as well of the government's failure to help 
the ports—a more subtle reason, and probably at least as effective as the more 
obvious constraints which prevented the government from dealing with port 
administration. It was a concomitant of the way in which port administration 
had evolved in Queensland that regionalism was built into the Harbour Board 
system. But this had only been possible because regionalism was already the 
basis of Queensland's political economy. While political arguments raged over 
agrarianism and other matters of political principle, the amoral realities of 
regionalism were guiding the development of the economy. It was the same with 
the ports. Only instead of political concern with agrarianism, there had been a 
series of attempts to reform the un-democratic Harbour Board franchises. The 
regional determinants of the Harbour Boards' unsatisfactory policies were 
ignored, while politicians argued about the franchise question. This neglect of 
the Boards' more fundamental problems was only possible because regionalism 
in port affairs, as in the development of the economy, cut across the usual 
political dividing lines. 
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Successive Queensland governments, of whatever political complexion, had 
tacitly accepted responsibility for the Harbour Boards' ever increasing financial 
difficulties. The submission of the Townsville Harbour Board in 1936, that the 
government's original acceptance of fiscal defaults by the Boards had amounted 
to an admission of responsibility for a share of the debt, was correct. "Where 
cases of default have occurred", the Board argued, "and the government has 
taken no action, the government has condoned the default and impressed the 
seal of its sanction of such default by advancing further loan monies to bodies 
who were already unable to meet their existing commitments.""" But whffe it 
was true that the Queensland government had accepted the responsibility for 
the Harbour Boards' fiscal shortcomings, it had not gone on to accept respon-
sibility for the correct administration of the Harbour Board system. Admittedly, 
the point of Harbour Board administration was that the Boards should usually 
function independently of government control, but the ports' difficulties were so 
serious that a complete readjustment of their administration was necessary. 
This was prevented by the nature of the Board system. Such a readjustment 
would almost certainly centralize port administration, and so run against years 
of established government practices in dealing with the ports. So the sad position 
had been reached, as one parliamentarian put it in 1934, where "almost every 
Harbour Board in Queensland is heavily in debt and unable to meet its financial 
responsibilities, and no government, irrespective of their politics, are game 
enough to call in the bailiff and take possession of harbour facilities when a 
Harbour Board fails to honour its obligations"."* 
The politics of regionalism had triumphed. Their destructive workings had 
been concealed by discussions over democratic rights and the Harbour Board 
franchise, and by neglect. In 1922 Labor had finally abolished the Legislative 
Council and reformed the Local Government and Harbour Board franchises, 
but the party did not act on its earlier plans to centralize or otherwise reform 
port administration. The other concerns of the time were very great. Equaffy, 
Labor did not dare to disrupt a port administrative system for which it was as 
historically responsible as the non-Labor parties. It is not possible to say which 
was more important. The only thing completely clear was the shortcomings of 
the existing port administrative system. The destructive rivalry of Gladstone and 
Rockhampton in Central Queensland had created such animosity between the 
Harbour Boards concerned that when the 1937 commissioners proposed to 
reduce Rockhampton's and Gladstone's debts, the Gladstone Harbour Board 
angrily rejected the suggestion: 
The proposal of reducing debts to a capacity to pay would have a very 
serious effect on the Central Queensland port question. It would mean that, 
as this Board is now practically in a paying position, Gladstone would 
receive little or no benefit; whereas the Rockhampton Harbour Board 
would be relieved of an immense amount of its unproductive debt, which 
would again place it in a position to economically compete with Gladstone 
for the Central Queensland trade . . . the whole proposal is fraught with 
danger to Gladstone."® 
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This was the dismal point to which inter-port relations had been brought under 
the Harbour Board system. 
The condition of port administration was realized to be so unsatisfactory 
that appointing another Harbour Board for Brisbane was not considered by the 
government. Again, the financial problems of the time did not favour such a 
step. Perhaps the decision to redevelop the Central wharves in Brisbane as one 
of the large-scale rehef projects during the depression owed something to 
Labor's earlier plans for the port."® In any event, regionalism had exacted its 
price of Brisbane, as much as it had handicapped the growth of Rockhampton 
and Townsville. The port of Brisbane, considered as the trading centre of South 
Queensland, had benefited from winning successive inter-regional economic 
battles between 1859 and 1939. It had prevented the separation of North and 
Central Queensland and had attracted much of the state's trade to itself. But in 
an important way it had lost the war: the port remained without a coordinating 
authority. Every inter-war inquiry into the port had concluded that this was a 
serious deficiency."' 
Conclusion: The ports near defeat 
In 1939 Brisbane and Townsville shared the honours for the best per-
formance of the larger Queensland ports through the inter-war years. Brisbane's 
physical development had been most satisfactory, and the port's share of state 
trade had reached an unprecedentedly high level, but no coordinating authority 
had been appointed. Townsville's physical progress had not been as pleasing, 
but the port's trade levels had been maintained despite the expansion of other 
Northern ports, and the Harbour Board had steadily reduced its fiscal indebted-
ness. In Brisbane's case the coastal railway had been a vital element in increasing 
its trade. Townsville had lost some business to the coastal line, but the extensions 
to its own trunk line had excluded the Gulf ports as potential rivals for the 
Mt. Isa trade, and had linked the Northern and Central trunk lines without 
losing trade to the Centre. 
Against the port successes of Townsville and Brisbane stood Rock-
hampton's failure. The bulk of the port's trade was still carried on over the 
town wharves, notwithstanding the development of Port Alma as a deep-water 
port. Rockhampton had shared neither in Brisbane's success as a trading port, 
nor in Townsville's financial and administrative progress. The railways, which 
had made Brisbane's port fortune, and had helped Townsville more than they 
had hindered her, had greatly reduced Rockhampton's trade. Most seriously, 
whereas Brisbane had managed to practically eliminate her intra-regional 
rivals, and Townsville had managed to expand on a scale comparable with her 
competitors, the trade of Central Queensland had been insufficient to allow 
Gladstone and Rockhampton to grow together, and Gladstone had eventually 
won out. 
As the traditional pattern of three-port dominance in the state had been 
broken, the outports benefited. Gladstone's level of port trade increased steadily 
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through the thirties, while Cairns progressed through both decades. These had 
been the most successful outports, and by 1939 Mackay had joined them as 
another re-invigorated outport because the Outer Harbour had at last been 
built. But if three of the outports had succeeded, the rest had fallen by the 
wayside. The trade levels of Bowen, Maryborough, and Bundaberg had sunk 
to a very low point, and those smaller original ports such as Port Douglas, the 
Gulf ports, and Broadsound were commercially extinct. Simffarly, Rock-
hampton and Gladstone were now equally important ports in the Centre, and 
the trading position of Cairns and Mackay together was more comparable with 
Townsville's than at any previous time, but the price for this had been Brisbane's 
winning a 100 per cent share of Southern port trade, and attaining a very high 
share of total state port trade. 
Struggling with the need for internal readjustment to a new pattern of trade, 
unfavourable economic conditions, and deteriorating shipping services, the 
ports' administrative shortcomings had added to their difficulties. The Harbour 
Boards' mounting financial indebtedness had been tacitly sanctioned by the 
government, yet responsibility for the Boards themselves had not been assumed. 
Regionalism had continued to disrupt port affairs at a time when cooperative 
devices had been essential. The radical concern for reforming the Board fran-
chises had subsided with Labor's alteration in 1922, but Labor had not gone on 
from there to alter the basis of the Board system, or to appoint a Brisbane port 
trust. Labor would not change a method of port administration for which it was 
historically as responsible as the non-Labor parties. At least now that the 
original portsite question had been resolved, there was some prospect that the 
strengths of Harbour Board administration would make themselves felt. 
In 1939 Queensland had succeeded to a much greater extent than New 
South Wales or Victoria in establishing a series of outports. There were seven 
possible overseas ports—Brisbane, Port Alma, Gladstone, Mackay, Bowen, 
Townsville, and Cairns. To 1918 such an array of ports had been beneficial to 
the state in solving its transport problems; after that time, the greater number of 
ports was more of a problem in itself. In the long run the ports could only be as 
prosperous as their hinterlands, and, because Queensland's economic develop-
ment had slackened, financial criteria had to be imposed on port development. 
An equally serious handicap was the unregulated competition between transport 
media in the thirties. Whichever way the rail and road contest resulted, sea 
carriage would be left with a decreased share of the available trade. This fact, 
and the technological revolution occurring in the size of ocean carriers, made it 
unlikely that more than two or three overseas ports would be necessary for 
Queensland. It was ironical that the ports' difficulties had become so serious at 
a time when the more important ports had attained an unprecedentedly high 
level of port efficiency. 
14 CONCLUSION 
The development of the ports, their shipping services, and the economy in 
Queensland between 1859 and 1939 has been interpreted in this book as a study 
in the emergence of Australian economic nationalism. The pioneering emphasis 
on material progress had won rapid early growth for Queenslanders, but the 
reassertion of the moral side of economic life came to restrain enterprise. Labor 
agrarianism encouraged concentration on primary production when the 
economy was already unbalanced; excessive attention to local details and the 
intrusion of sweeping political principles had hindered port development; 
lastly, labour mffitancy and nationalist criticism had plagued the shipping 
services. 
Port establishment had reflected the regional economic rivalries that were 
the basis of Queensland's growth, while the conditions of port settlement had 
two vital consequences. Inland access was the first criterion of port success and 
the foundation of ports and towns at the same time prevented a distinction 
being maintained between the interests of the two. The first factor meant that 
many physically inferior ports were preferred over navigationally better rivals. 
The second meant that the port authorities had no tradition of local port 
independence to draw on—this was a precarious basis for future local port 
control. As the foundation period ended, trade centralization set in and ships 
grew larger. This foreshadowed a reduction in the number of ports and added 
to the disadvantages of some of the original portsites. 
Between 1885 and 1900 the regional port victors emerged and the depression 
forced the government to set up a port administrative system. Although the 
Harbour Boards were the culmination of a steady move towards local port 
control, defining the responsibility for port development had been neglected 
until the depression. However, the pressures of the time on public finance 
resulted in the government's being primarily concerned with making the ports 
financially self-sufficient, regardless of their policies. Unfortunately the appoint-
ment of the Harbour Boards was more of a negative than a positive act: there 
was no wider discussion of the proper conditions of port supervision, while the 
different conditions of port growth in Queensland were ignored in adapting 
English methods to colonial needs. In the English ports a sense of distinction 
between the interests of towns and their ports had developed over hundreds of 
years; in Queensland, ports were little more than extensions of their towns. 
240 CONCLUSION 
The special importance of regionalism at the time of the appointment of the 
port authorities must be emphasized, as regionalism was more important in 
Queensland's history than in any of the other Australian states. Geography was 
the basis for this difference. Unlike Western Australia, Queensland had a fertile 
coastline extending to the north and an interior which was less harsh and 
barren; Queensland also had a coasthne more than twice as long as that of 
New South Wales and the state was never dominated by Brisbane as Sydney 
dominated New South Wales. Because of these initial geographical differences, 
a pattern of different regional political behaviour was established in the early 
years after separation. During the remainder of the nineteenth century these 
differences were accentuated, notably by the construction of trunk rail lines 
from Townsville and Rockhampton, and a shorter line from Cairns. Until the 
twentieth-century communications revolution effectively covered Queensland's 
great distances there were three Queenslands. The colony's nineteenth-century 
political life had rested on a solid regional base. While the ports had been 
important enough to have had their administrative foundations laid on this 
base in the 1890s, they had not been sufficiently important to make the govern-
ment reform port administration when they had fallen on hard times after 
1918. 
The parallel between the appointment of port authorities and Queensland's 
attitude to federation is illuminating. South Queensland was strongly anti-
federalist; the Centre was pro-federalist with the exception of Rockhampton, 
and the North was strongly pro-federation, including Townsville. Economics and 
nationalism were important factors in the different preferences of the three 
regions, but what was decisive was regionalism. The federation decisions were 
made according to a calculation of regional interest. Townsville's commercial 
links were more with Sydney than Brisbane, while Brisbane's and Rock-
hampton's cooperation went only as far as their mutual opposition to federation. 
Rockhampton feared Brisbane competition as much as Brisbane feared Sydney's 
commercial rivalry. Accordingly, Rockhampton opposed federation because it 
put regional separation first. In doing so the town was at odds with its hinter-
land, but intra-regional hostility had been a special feature of Central Queens-
land's development and had come out in the difference of opinion over the place-
ment of a deep-water port. The reluctance of Brisbane to appoint a port 
authority, when put against this wider background, becomes part of a general 
Southern reluctance to change the existing pattern of government either on a 
local or inter-colonial basis. It was in keeping with the logic of the regional 
separation campaigns that Rockhampton and Townsvffle had appointed 
Harbour Boards in 1895 while Brisbane had not. Brisbane was already at the 
contented centre of government, so the stimulus for change was lacking. 
The difficulties of the new Boards could be seen in their earliest workings, 
but the period between 1900 and 1918 was the real testing time for port adminis-
tration. The results were disturbingly bad. The ports' common difficulties were 
swamped in a torrent of detailed local disagreement, the shift to deep water was 
delayed in the major outports, and the campaign to appoint a Brisbane port 
trust failed. Additionally, the Harbour Board franchises were subjected to 
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radical labour criticism which clouded the real issues. Instead of redefining the 
principles of port administration the government concerned itself with the 
Boards' political constitution. The excessive attention granted to local port 
issues was the result of a careless over-emphasis on relatively trivial practical 
details; conversely, the misplaced efforts at Harbour Board franchise reform 
came at a time when most of the Boards were in difficulties regardless of their 
political composition, and showed too great a concern for political principles. 
The many weaknesses which had shown up in port affairs before 1918, 
however, had not prevented the ports from expanding rapidly after 1900. It was 
after 1918, when the favourable external conditions for port growth had been 
reversed, that the shortcomings of the port administrative system became 
glaringly obvious. The coastal rail line joined Brisbane and Cairns and trade 
centralization reached its peak, yet port needs were still not reconsidered; at 
best, the most serious problems, such as finance, had been postponed. These 
difficulties tormented the ports of Central Queensland especially. There the 
policies of the Rockhampton Harbour Board had been practically fruitless, 
while Gladstone had emerged as a strong and relentless competitor. Their 
contest was of unprecedented bitterness and duration and it came at a time 
when the ports needed to cooperate to retain what sea-borne trade they could. 
Any commercial crumbs dropped during inter-port fights were snapped up by 
land transport. 
The physical development of the more successful ports in the inter-war 
period was very satisfactory, but the sickly condition of the economy and the 
shipping trade offset this improvement. Political principles did not intrude again 
into port affairs, but legislative attention was still denied to port administration, 
while the Boards' growing financial deficits were tacitly sanctioned by govern-
ments that could find no other solution. The ports' only compensation in 1939 
was that trade centralization had gone as far as it could and that the portsite 
dilemma was resolved. For all its flaws, the Harbour Board system was a 
valuable extension of local government principles. It had survived not only 
because of institutional inertia, but because it was a useful via media between 
public and private enterprise. It could now go on to better things. 
Putting the external conditions of port well-being to one side, as beyond the 
port authorities' control, one must conclude that the ports' worst enemy had 
been unrestrained regionalism. After 1859, regional separation had influenced 
the form of port administration too greatly. Port interests had not been pro-
tected by separating them from town influence. After federation, the cause of 
separation was replaced by decentralization, but this was too general a move-
ment to involve the ports. In any case, by 1900 the ports' trouble was not that 
their administration had been insufficiently decentralized—quite the contrary. 
The Boards had been left too much to their own devices. Instead of acting as 
adjudicators of intra-port quarrels they had often upheld the towns' interests 
against the ports'. 
What alternative had the Queensland governments had in their dealings 
with the Harbour Boards? In 1928 Sir George Buchanan had drawn up a list of 
"port principles". Two of his points were particularly relevant to the ad minis-
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trative troubles of the Queensland ports. He considered that the Australian 
ports' degree of self-government should be increased, and he was certain that 
representation on port trusts should be determined by interest rather than 
political representation.! Considering the history of the Queensland ports to 
1939 in this light, his recommendation that the port authorities should have a 
real degree of autonomy was sound, but his conclusion that port authority 
representation should be determined by economic interest was mistaken. 
The trouble in Queensland was not that the Harbour Boards had too little 
independence, but too much. Brisbane's position was exceptional—it was the 
only major state port without a port authority. It is then necessary to distinguish 
the factors over which the Boards had control and ask whether the Boards had 
worked satisfactorily. They had certainly got off to a bad start: the need to 
move their ports' sites to deeper water had been an expensive handicap for many 
ports and Rockhampton had not managed to overcome it. In this vital question, 
the malfunctioning of the Harbour Boards had added to the ports' difficulties 
rather than alleviating them. But in the majority of the ports the Harbour Board 
system could work well. By 1939 Cairns, Townsville, Mackay, and Gladstone 
could be counted as relatively successful Harbour Board ports. 
The problem of government-Board relations also implicitly raised the wider 
political question as to what balance should exist between local and central 
government. A central problem of port administration was how the Boards 
could follow independent developmental policies and yet remain subject to 
central government control. In reality, the ports did not work in a vacuum 
where administrative efficiency was their only concern. Their well-being 
depended on external economic influences over which the Boards could have 
little power. This could be the strongest argument against local port control: 
if the ports did not have sufficient resources to weather bad economic times, 
then they were unjustified in maintaining their administrative independence. 
Yet, even by this harsher standard, it seemed that the successful Harbour Boards 
ports could stand on their own feet by 1939. Perhaps if there had been some 
intermediary body between the government and the Boards it might have 
smoothed the way for the ports. The Harbours and Marine Department had 
fulfilled this function only on a technical level. Either the Pubhc Works or 
Railways Department or the Bureau of Industry might have beneficially co-
operated with the Boards in policy formation. However it was done practically, 
the Harbour Boards and the government needed an administrative go-between 
to coordinate the most important matters of policy and finance. 
Buchanan's second point about the determination of Board representation 
was less valid. It was true that Labor's campaign to reform the Harbour Board 
franchise had harmed the ports by confusing the issue and concealing the 
harmful effect of regionahsm in port affairs. More specifically, the strengthening 
of the rights of the town against the port in Rockhampton's case had aggravated 
the situation. Yet in Gladstone, Cairns, and Bowen, which had Boards more 
democratically appointed than the original Boards, and in the Boards where the 
franchise was liberalized, the representation of trading interests had caused no 
harm. Whether franchise representation on interest lines was harmful depended 
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on a port's particular situation. The problem was, how could political principles 
be adjusted to particular needs ? If a blanket answer was unavoidable, as it had 
been to 1939, it was that political and economic interests should be balanced on 
the port authorities, without one being asserted over the other." 
More broadly, the failure of Queenslanders to come to terms with port 
administration was part of their wider failure to deal with local government. 
The fragmentation of port control in the Harbour Board system was paralleled 
in the development of local government. Queensland's local authorities were 
often too smaff to cope with their regional needs and the formation of the 
Greater Brisbane Council in 1924 was an innovative remedial measure against 
the excessive devolution of authority." However, Greater Brisbane had no 
counterpart in port administration in Brisbane or Queensland. Centrahzation 
was not the answer to the ports' difficulties, any more than the opposite solution 
had been, where each port was its own master. 
The lack of success Queenslanders had with ports was therefore part of a 
wider Austrahan inability to cope with local government. But then, why did 
local government fare so badly in Australia ? Perhaps most importantly because 
it was historicaffy a concession from heavily centralized state governments. In 
Austraha, in contrast with the situation in America, states came before towns. 
But additionaffy, if the experience of the Queensland Harbour Boards is a 
legitimate example, then the special character of Australian nationalism was a 
basic hindrance to successful local government. 
The Queensland port authorities' difficulty was regionalism taken to 
excess, which became destructive localism without any wide sense of respon-
sibihty, but nationahsm had misdirected political attention away from the root 
difficulty. The franchise debate was initiated by Labor because the inequalities 
of the Board franchises were akin to those of the local government electoral 
franchise. In this way, concentration on the wider demands of pohtics was 
carried over to smaller economic matters and confused them. This was the effect 
on the ports of the frame of mind which equated moral and economic affairs: 
sweeping pohtical principles combined with a concentration on unimportant 
local details to wreak havoc in port administration. 
Radical nationalism had also retarded economic growth. During Queens-
land's foundation years economic expansion was given pride of place, but after 
that time the moral side of economic progress was reasserted, and the economy 
was affected. This was not of course the only source of Queensland's difficulties, 
yet, to the extent that Queenslanders controlled their own economic lives, 
radical nationalist values had come to retard growth. This was exemplified by 
the agrarian policies pursued in the inter-war years when the economy was 
already over-dependent on primary production. The descent into agrarianism 
had been marked along the way by the government's decreasing capacity for 
pragmatism, as weff as by the tendency for force to be readily used in labour 
disputes. Labour militancy was also the clearest nationalist restriction on the 
shipping services. As well, there were the radical criticisms embodied in the 
Navigation Act, the prosecutions under the Industries Preservation Act, and 
the establishment of the Commonwealth Line. Although the state's shipping 
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services had reached their peak of efficiency between 1900 and 1918, after that 
time the shipping industry accompanied the economy into decline. Yet there 
was one hopeful difference: liberal pragmatism had been restored on the 
waterfront by the end of the twenties. Labour militancy had been limited and the 
Industries Preservation Act and the Navigation Act were turned to the 
industry's advantage. 
Was this the beginning of a revival of liberal pragmatism in the state's 
economic affairs? This question brings us into the present and the answer is a 
qualified yes. A national shipping line has been re-established, and, although 
waterfront militancy has been a major feature of postwar Australian life, 
industrial relations on the docks now seem to be better based.* In the state's 
economy, since 1939 the political parties have reduced their emphasis on 
agrarian policies. Queensland's manufacturing industry is still undeveloped 
compared with that of New South Wales, Victoria, or even South Australia, but 
at least this is now regarded as a fault rather than a virtue.® Lastly, in the 1950s 
the long overdue reform of port administration was proceeded with by both 
political parties. Legitimate criticism can still be made of the Queensland ports— 
especially the continued lack of a port authority for Brisbane—but their 
administrative basis has now been reconstructed.® 
In the 1970s Queensland is at times described disparagingly as a backward 
and conservative state. Sometimes such criticism is well founded, sometimes it is 
a cliche based on nothing stronger than traditional interstate hostility. Queens-
land's politics have always been middle-of-the-road conservative with potentially 
extreme right and left wings. However, between 1859 and 1939 Queenslanders 
had consistently identified moral and economic progress—more consistently, 
possibly, than any of the other Australian states. It has been argued that the 
identification was the most distinctive feature of Australian nationalism. 
Oddly enough, this feature of Austrahan behaviour had been noted by Elton 
Mayo in 1919. Mayo was then a young lecturer at Queensland University in 
psychology and ethics. Later he was to become internationally known as a 
founder of the social psychology of industrial societies. In a now forgotten brief 
work he wrote: 
In Australia . . . industrial grievances have been generalised into a pohtical 
party issue . . . the fact that economic problems require economic solutions 
is disregarded; the political and economic activities are hopelessly con-
fused . . . Every economic difficulty is immediately generalised as a pofitical 
issue, the public takes sides, and thereafter public discussion implies em-
phasis of one aspect and suppression of other, equally vital, aspects of the 
problem . . . the politician does not attend to the real difficulty; he 
endeavours rather to create and accentuate public feeling upon the issue.' 
It is this interpretation which has been independently arrived at and elaborated 
in the present book. 
This sense of national purpose was thoroughly pragmatic: it was an 
intuitive balancing of the ethical and practical sides of economic development. 
When one side became more important than the other for too long a time, a 
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reversal became necessary. This study has highlighted the initial concentration 
on material development, the subsequent radical re-emphasis on the morality 
of progress, and the growing disillusion with radical nationalism by 1939. 
Labor was not opposed to economic growth per se, it is emphasized, but it 
cared much more about the social costs of growth. 
The Australian equation of moral and material progress was a departure 
from the English way, where ethics balanced economic interest, but was not 
usually equated directly with it. In America, de Riencourt has written, the basis 
of civilization is that the rights of the individual and efficient economic develop-
ment are held paramount.® Australian nationalism has come to a similar con-
clusion but not an identical one. The rights of the individual have been upheld, 
but through an emphasis on collectivity and government intervention, rather 
than by rugged state-free individualism; the rate of Australian economic 
growth has been slower, but wealth has been more evenly distributed. Australians 
have subconsciously maintained a balance between the ethical and technical 
aspects of economic progress. 
Queensland's conservatism, therefore, should not be seen as something 
unique in Australia, but rather as representative of a broader Australian con-
servatism. The national ideal has been worked out with special force in the 
northern state. After 1900 economic development was retarded in Queensland 
by an over-emphasis on agrarianism, but at least the intention to create a just 
and equal society was typically Australian. This was, and is, quite distinct from 
the American ideal of a free and equal society. The trouble for the banana-
landers was that justice was a virtue that was not conducive to rapid economic 
growth. 

POSTSCRIPT 
The ports since 1939* 
The major ports 
Brisbane 
At the outbreak of the war the Story Bridge was almost completed. When 
it was opened in 1940 the same labour force was used to construct a shipbuilding 
site adjacent to the Bridge which was leased subsequently to Evans Deakin and 
Company, a Brisbane firm which had won some wartime naval contracts. Co-
operation between private and public enterprise would be essential for Bris-
bane's postwar growth and the foundation of Evans Deakin shipbuilding was 
a hopeful beginning.! yj^ g second world war focussed Federal attention on the 
port of Brisbane more directly than had the first. A great deal of work was 
undertaken by the Allied Works Council in the war's early years to suit the port 
to the Navy's needs. Over one million pounds (two million dollars) was expended 
on berthage at Hamilton downstream from the Cold Stores wharf. This forced 
development of the area, which the shipping companies and stevedoring firms 
had not previously favoured, was a major benefit for the future. After 1945 
Hamilton would become the heart of Brisbane's wharfage. The next most im-
portant wartime addition was the new Cairncross dry dock built on the south 
bank of Hamilton Reach at a cost of £1,250,000 ($2,500,000), and the facilities 
at the South Brisbane dry dock were added to." 
But the war had some drawbacks for Brisbane as well. Harbour dues were 
not increased during the war—in fact, they were not raised between 1937 and 
1951—and no charge was made on munitions or war equipment, a source of 
revenue which was most valuable to some of the state's ports. Physically, 
normal maintenance dredging of the commercial wharfage was held in abeyance. 
As late as 1949 O.S.R.A. was complaining of inadequate port depths. Lastly, in 
1940 perpetual leases were granted to A.C.F. and Shirleys Fertilizers and to 
Shell Oil at Pinkenba. As the port was moving downstream, the government 
had a chance to re-establish control over private wharfowners in the lower 
reaches of the river. By granting perpetual leases in 1940, however, a precedent 
* This postscript does not carry forward the historical interpretation which has been advanced 
in the preceding chapters. It is no more than a factual summary of recent developments in 
the ports. 
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was set which made private control of port wharfage again possible in future. 
What was so surprising was that this 1940 decision was made by Forgan 
Smith—one of the state's leading Labor figures." 
The first stage of the port's postwar development began in 1949 with the 
appointment of the Hamffton Lands Committee. This body was appointed to 
control the Hamilton area's use for commercial and industrial purposes. The 
government had purchased the Navy wharves and cranes at D, E, and F berths 
there in 1947 and was converting them to commercial usage as part of a wider 
policy of turning war installations into peacetime industrial plant. The Com-
mittee usually consisted of six officers and was chaired by Coordinator-General 
Kemp. The heads of the Land Administration Board, the Harbours and Marine, 
Railways, and Secondary Industry Departments were present, and the Brisbane 
City Council was also represented at many meetings. In its first phase of activity, 
from 1949 to 1952, private interests were also present on occasions.* 
The Committee's jurisdiction covered the whole of the port from Hamffton 
downstream, but its immediate concern was the Hamilton area. One of the site's 
drawbacks was that it adjoined the water frontage of the Royal Queensland 
Golf Club: this left insufficient space for a wet docks system, which Engineer 
Cullen had earlier suggested was desirable for the port. A second disadvantage 
was the nearness of the aerodrome, as civil aviation regulations restricted 
building heights in the area. Both these snags were dealt with quickly. Harbour 
and Marine Chief Engineer, E. C. Fison, advised that another wet docks site 
was available downstream, while the aviation regulations were adjusted to 
allow for the site's special needs.® 
Some applications had been made for wharfage sites at Hamilton before 
the Committee had been convened. The most important had been lodged by 
B.H.P. and it was resubmitted to the Committee on its formation. The Com-
mittee's procedure in processing applications was to pass them to the City 
Council and the Department of Secondary Industry for screening. Of the 
established wharf owners at Hamilton—Bretts, the Cold Stores, and Brisbane 
Stevedoring and Wool Dumping—only Brisbane Stevedoring had applied for 
wharfage extension. After B.H.P.'s approach, Ampol, Shell, Dalgetys, and 
later the State Wheat Board followed on. Smaller industries also applied. Yet 
before any leases were granted the Committee had considered whether space 
needed to be reserved for coal loading. Because Brisbane's coal needs were 
already met by Ipswich and potentially Gladstone, it was considered sufficient 
to set an area of Gibson Island aside for future possible coal imports.® 
In planning the area the Committee had a definite policy towards private 
enterprise in the port. As it was appointed by a Labor government as a planning 
agency it was unlikely to favour completely free enterprise. In April 1950 a 
member of the Land Administration Board had suggested that the time was 
opportune for more orderly planning of Brisbane's wharfage development, 
while in 1956 the Treasurer had suggested that the government should own and 
control all wharfage via the Committee. The Committee had clearly stated its 
own view in 1950: "Eventually all wharves should be owned and operated by 
the Government." Yet its attitude was not inflexible. There was a recognition of 
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the need for cooperation with private companies and wharfowners in the port. 
Any other approach would have been destructive, as private enterprise remained 
more important in Brisbane than in any other state port.' 
The early promise of the Hamilton Lands was not realized to the degree 
hoped for, largely because of external economic conditions and waterside 
disputes. B.H.P. did establish their wharf and Brisbane Stevedoring extended 
theirs, while some smaller traders also began operations, but the majority of the 
approved applicants did not take up or develop their leases. Nevertheless, the 
Committee's activities had brought about a real advance between 1949 and 
1952. E berth, which B.H.P. had leased, was the most mechanized wharf in 
Queensland. It served as a general cargo wharf, a steel wharf, and as a tanker 
berth. The two six-ton (6.1 tonnes) electric cranes on the wharf were the first 
quayside travelling cranes in Brisbane. From a centre such as this, port expansion 
could spread.® 
For the rest of the fifties the port did httle more than mark time. By 1955 
Brisbane Stevedoring had completed a 700-foot (213.36 m) addition to the 
Hamilton wharf, which now had a frontage of 1,800 feet (548.64 m)." Shell had 
expanded at Pinkenba and Vacuum Oil had been established at Colmslie, though 
Queensland remained the only mainland Australian state without an oil refinery. 
Brisbane's sole benefit from bulk handling—the most important technological 
port change in the fifties—was the State Wheat Board's terminal built at 
Pinkenba in 1958. In the interim, between 1952 and 1960, the Hamilton Lands 
Committee was practically defunct.!" 
When expansion recommenced in the early sixties the administrative 
practices of the fifties were too cumbersome. The Committee had become 
unwieldly and there was a lack of policy coordination.!! It had been inactive for 
almost ten years and was not responsible for the port's fresh growth. The 
agency could only be justified by expanding its function to make it a full port 
authority. This may have been Labor's original intention, but in 1957 a Liberal-
Country Party government came to power. As the Committee was in difficulties, 
and as no expansion of its functions was favoured, it was abolished in 1963 and 
responsibility for developing the port's industrial lands passed to the Co-
ordinator-General's Department.!" 
If the administration of the port had become a littie topheavy, then so had 
the port's layout. In 1962 there were thirty berths available: there was no 
berthage congestion, indeed there was only a 30 per cent annual average usage 
of these. For some time previously Harbours and Marine had indicated that the 
port was overcapitalized in this direction. Whether the berths were specialized 
enough—two-thirds were for general cargo—and how well they were equipped 
was another question.!" The need for cargo handling and shipping speciahzation 
would become urgent in the sixties. 
The first phase of growth resulted from the expansion of the major oil 
companies in Brisbane. There were already oil terminals in the port, but 
Amoco's and Ampol's decision to set up oil refineries at the mouth of the river, 
following the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the state, was a break-
through for Brisbane and Queensland. The new government had stressed the 
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importance of manufacturing development since its inception and the relation 
between industrial land usage and port needs now would be systematically 
considered for the first time. 
The government had already cooperated with Evans Deakin in improving 
the port's facilities. Now the oil companies were assisted on a much larger scale. 
The Harbours and Marine Department reclaimed five hundred acres (202.34 ha) 
of land at Bulwer Island and Lytton for Amoco and Ampol, while they pro-
vided plant and equipment. Other oil companies also made major port instal-
lations, but the expansion of the industry was not entirely trouble-free. Phiffips 
had come into the port at Pinkenba in 1962 on the understanding that their 
special wharfage leases would be eventually converted to perpetual lease. By 
1966 the company had spent millions of dollars on terminal and distribution 
expenses, but the government tried to prevent them assuming freehold tenure 
on the grounds that wharf lands should not be alienated. Finally the government 
had to accede to Phillips's request. There had already been a degree of ministerial 
commitment made to the company on the point in 1962. The matter was not 
settled, however, tffl 1967.!* 
Brisbane's second stage of port growth in the sixties depended on con-
tainerization. The method was introduced to the port with alacrity. The world's 
first container services were begun by an American company in 1957. By 1966 
the Australian National Line had decided to establish a roll-on roll-off terminal 
at Newstead, and Brisbane Stevedoring had committed themselves to setting up 
container berths at Hamilton. By 1969 the A.N.L.'s site was completed and 
equipped with a 5-acre (2.02 ha) storage area, road access, a 25-ton (25.4 tonnes) 
travelling crane, and a berth depth of 30 feet (9.14 m). Brisbane Stevedoring's 
decision had involved them in a complete modernization of their berths. Ten 
acres (4.04 ha) of land to the rear of the wharves were allocated for container 
use, and storage and packaging covered space of 80,000 square feet (7,432 sq m) 
was provided. The berths could deal with containers, unit loads, bulk minerals, 
and general cargo. A portainer 65-ton (66-tonnes) crane was available and a 
special innovation was the use of specially designed straddle container trucks. 
At the end of 1969, 28 J feet (8.69 m) was available in the river channels but the 
company had requested another 2 feet (0.61 m). The provisions made for non-
container trade were sensible, considering both the uncertain effects of con-
tainerization on Australian shipping, and the secondary position of Brisbane 
to the other major Australian ports.!® 
Containerization had not caused any serious differences of opinion between 
the companies concerned and the government. From time to time Brisbane 
Stevedoring urged the need for some particular improvement, but generally 
relations were good. In 1968 the company had complained about increased 
rentals. They pointed to the costly improvements they were making, and also 
argued that the original filling of their site by Harbours and Marine dredges 
had not been well chosen. This had involved Brisbane Wharves in partly 
refilling the land. Yet, in all, as the company's manager acknowledged at the 
opening of the terminal in 1969, there had been a beneficial partnership between 
public and private enterprise.!® 
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These were the outstanding changes of the decade. The other port traders 
remained important, but their economic function had remained basically un-
changed since pre-war days. Nearly all of them were connected with primary 
industry—Dalgetys (wool) at New Farm, the Cold Stores (dairying) and 
Bretts (wool) at Hamilton, Borthwicks (meat) at Parker Island, the Wheat and 
Fertilizer terminals at Pinkenba. Some of these trades had linkage effects with 
manufacturing—notably fertilizer production—but none had the potential for 
changing the industrial structure of the port and of Brisbane which oil refineries 
and containerization had. 
With containers, however, there was the chance that the high capital costs 
of the method might lead to higher freight rates for Queensland—given the 
state's relatively secondary trading importance and its isolation from the 
European-Australian shipping routes. Yet the Federal Department of Trade 
had reassured the government on this point, and a Committee on containeriza-
tion in 1966 concluded that the American and Far Eastern trade could be as 
important to Queensland as the European trade was to Western Australia. 
Brisbane had to offer adequate container facilities to attract such a trade, but 
one weakness was that the A.N.L. would not be permitted to engage in intrastate 
shipping. This would give southern producers an advantage over Brisbane in 
supplying the needs of the rest of the state. This had been a problem in the 
1860s as weff as the 1960s.!' 
The area in which the government's policy towards industrialization and 
port development was most tested was over wharfage leases. At the time of the 
Phiffips dispute the Harbours and Marine and Treasury Departments had felt 
that an important principle was at stake. If water frontages were alienated with-
out any conditional clauses, then it was possible that in future the site might not 
be used for port industries. As it became likely that Phillips's case would be 
upheld, port authorities became more concerned with the level of rents for 
harbour lands. The Director of the Harbours and Marine Department criticized 
the anomaly of renting valuable water frontages for 3 per cent of their un-
improved value. So two points were at issue: the disposal of water frontages to 
private enterprise and the proper level of rents for harbour industrial lands. The 
first was decided by force of circumstance. Phillips only had to hold the govern-
ment to their earlier assurance to win the argument. Additionally, it was true 
that their neighbours A.C.F. and Shirleys and Shell had been granted perpetual 
leases in 1940.!® 
The case for higher rentals on port land was developed after Phillips's con-
version. The Harbours and Marine Department was dissatisfied with con-
ducting expensive reclamations of land which was then rented out at a low rate. 
In 1968 an acre (0.40 ha) of Hamilton land with water frontage was worth 
$100,000; an acre (0.40 ha) of industrial land at Rocklea was worth $20,000, 
yet they bore the same rental. Further, with the extensive port works of the 
sixties, receipts from harbour dues and rentals were not keeping up with 
reclamation costs.!" The claim for increased port rentals was justifiable. Port 
authorities in Melbourne and Adelaide were charging 6 per cent and Sydney 
charged 7 per cent. Although the Department of Industrial Development con-
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sidered an increase would deter industrial growth. Cabinet approved of the new 
charges when Brisbane Wharves' lease was reviewed. Had Harbours and 
Marine been short-sighted in considering the port's long term needs? There was 
some interdepartmental criticism of this kind. The difficulty was that Harbours 
and Marine necessarily had to put their own financial needs first."" 
Brisbane's port administration changed hands several times in the decade. 
In 1963 the Hamilton Lands Committee had been abolished and its duties taken 
over by the Coordinator-General. Then in 1966 control of port lands passed to 
the Department of Industrial Development. Throughout these changes the 
Harbours and Marine Department remained in charge of port dredging and 
maintenance and was also responsible for the harbour industrial lands with 
water frontages. Treasurer Hiley's ideal for Brisbane's development was that 
industrial growth associated with maritime trades should be concentrated in the 
Hamilton Lands. His approach to the port's immediate needs was based on a 
long-term plan. In the future he saw a weir above Moggill regulating the river, 
providing irrigation and more scope for the sand and gravel supplies which the 
city's construction industries would need. Lytton Rocks would be deepened 
further and the port would spread to the south bank. Here Ampol's presence 
was a stimulus to other port users to settle there. The prospect of developing the 
Northern Rivers trade—an old Queensland commercial goal—was more likely 
to be realized from the southern river bank, as then New South Wales rail 
traffic could come directly to the wharves. Lastly, because of the port's move-
ment downstream, the Royal Queensland Golf Club's position might not have 
to be resumed."! 
The most pressing issue the Treasurer had to make up his mind about was 
wharfage control. A Liberal Treasurer would naturally be less enthusiastic 
about government ownership of wharfage, but to Hiley the matter was in-
separable from the larger question of encouraging investment by more attractive 
leasing conditions. Shorter leases may have been best until now, he argued in 
1964, as then the idea was that some day the state would take over all the private 
wharfage. But times had changed. "The present method is securing some 
magnificent improvements without charge upon public funds and I see no 
prospect that the State will find itself in the position where it would wish to 
divert millions of pounds [dollars] to acquire privately owned wharves.""" 
Harbours and Marine's policy of maintaining some wharves as an alternative to 
private wharfage was also reviewed, although the Railway Wharf at Pinkenba 
was reserved for public ownership. It was felt that a clause in new wharf leases 
compelling the lesee to offer wharf facilities to other commercial users—subject 
to prior commitments—was a better method of balancing the power of private 
ownership. Hffey's policies towards the conditions of new wharf construction, 
and about the handing over of control of waterfront lands to Harbours and 
Marine, were equally well thought out."" 
The other long-range views of the port's needs in the sixties were put 
forward by the Harbours and Marine Department, the Brisbane Development 
Association, and the Brisbane Town Plan. The B.D.A. was a private body of 
businessmen. In 1965 when its chairman was B. R. Baillie, the manager of 
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Brisbane Stevedoring, the B.D.A. suggested a developmental scheme based on 
the zoning of harbour industrial lands. Usually, however, the suggestions made 
by Harbours and Marine officials had been complementary to this approach. 
In 1962 Director Peel had already remarked on the disadvantage of continuing 
industrial growth on the southside Rocklea area. Without the provision of some 
alternative route to Hamffton, traffic between the two points was causing inner 
city congestion. Industrial development at Strathpine was preferable, or Rocklea 
might eventually have to be served by a small modern port at Cleveland Bay."* 
Four years later. Engineer Fison submitted a report on world port development 
with special reference to Brisbane. He agreed with the emphasis on the need to 
provide industrial land for port growth, while his suggestion for the traffic 
difficulty was the development of the south bank of the river. This would 
culminate in a wet docks system near the southern river mouth. A special 
benefit from this would be that Royal Queensland could retain its site; this was 
relevant to his last and most timely point—the urgency of improving the 
appearance of the river banks. Most recently, in 1971 the Brisbane Town Plan 
declared large areas of land adjacent to the port as Harbour Industrial Lands, 
although the exact dividing line between this and Industrial Land was a matter 
of some contention between the Harbours and Marine Department and the 
Department of Industrial Development."® 
Gladstone 
The pattern of Gladstone's trading growth after 1939 was broadly similar 
to Brisbane's: wartime dislocation and some improvement, preparation for 
growth in the rest of the forties and fifties, then progress at last in the sixties. 
With the war Gladstone and Rockhampton lost their wool trade to Brisbane and 
the raffways. Gladstone's regular trade was also seriously disrupted and, in 
contrast to the position in Brisbane, no large-scale capital improvements were 
made as recompense. Berthage dredging was suspended between 1940 and 1944 
as the Federal Port Equipment Committee placed Gladstone fairly low on their 
priority list. The main benefit of the war to the port was that it was used as an 
American defence base. The port harbour dues levied on war materials greatly 
strengthened Gladstone's financial position."® 
Immediately after the war the Gladstone Harbour Board continued to look 
energetically for business. The Auckland Point wharf was extended and the 
Board adopted a policy of Harbour Board ownership of all cargo-handling 
appliances on the wharves. In the late forties the prospect of a small but possibly 
valuable coal trade with the southern states developed, and in 1949 the Board 
used a £100,000 ($200,000) loan to install a coal-loading belt conveyor. Such an 
improvement was quite necessary to stimulate the trade as in 1950 50 per cent of 
Callide coal supplies was being raffed south. Gladstone's startling postwar 
growth can be traced back to this decision to provide facilities before the coal 
trade had developed. By 1952 a shipping trade journal could refer to Gladstone 
as one of the best mechanized ports in Australia. At the same time, the Board 
continued to reclaim land for the oil companies and Caltex moved into the port 
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in 1950. Although the new coal handling system was not fully completed till 
1955, coal exports increased and by 1953, for the first time in its history, the 
Board was unable to secure sufficient Treasury loans for its requirements. In the 
same year Gladstone was chosen as the Central Queensland storage and ship-
ment point for grain sorghum. The final achievement of the fifties was another 
extension of Auckland Point wharfage in 1957."' 
So far, so good. But the promise of the early fifties was not realized until 
the sixties. No amount of Harbour Board efficiency and enthusiasm could alter 
the external economic or industrial conditions. By 1960 a sense of anxiety had 
begun to slip into the Board's Annual Reports, but then some of the port's 
dreams began to come true. Brisbane's growth depended on off and containeriza-
tion ; Gladstone also benefited from the postwar growth of the oil industry, but 
coal and alumina would become even more important. Late in 1959 Thiess Bros., 
a Queensland company, had informed the Board of their negotiations with 
Japanese interests to make trial shipments of Kianga coal. These shipments 
commenced in the next year after the Board had outlaid £33,000 ($66,000) on a 
concrete coal stockpile and £50,000 ($100,000) to make a berthage depth of 
32 feet (9.75 m) available. When the shipments were approved, a £400,000 
($800,000) scheme to develop the trade was drawn up and the cost was shared 
by the Commonwealth, the State, and the Harbour Board. The seal of success 
came in 1962 with an alliance of American and Queensland capital in the 
Thiess-Peabody Coal Company, which won a seven-year contract to supply 
over three million tons (3,048,200 tonnes) of coal to Japan. Yet the importance 
of the coal trade had not put an end to the Board's efforts in other directions. 
With the extension of wheat and sorghum growing, agriculture had at last 
become economically feasible in Central Queensland and the Board did its best 
to encourage a port grain trade. 
Phase two of Gladstone's new expansion began in 1963. The Japanese firm 
of Mitsui had joined Thiess-Peabody, coal orders had been expanded again, and 
a rail link with the Moura coal fields was being considered. More importantly, 
Comalco had decided to use Gladstone as the site for an alumina plant that 
would be one of the world's largest. The plant would be to the south of Auckland 
Point at South Trees Island on a 164-acre (80.75 ha) site. After some difficult 
negotiations in 1961 the Harbour Board had purchased the Island. The Board 
had done every legitimate thing it could to attract the industry: they had agreed 
to bear the half-million pound ($1,000,000) cost of the company's wharf, for 
example. Another fillip in 1963 was the Australian Wheat Board's decision to 
make Gladstone the Central Queensland exporting centre. In the next few years 
Gladstone seemed to prove that port success leads to further success. In 1964 
Port Curtis Dairying Cooperative established a £100,000 ($200,000) cold store at 
Auckland Point and in 1967 Murphyores mineral sands was added to the list of 
port industries. Lastly, in 1968, Ampol joined Sheff, Caltex, Mobil, B.P., and 
Amoco in the port."® 
The third and most recent phase of Gladstone's growth came in 1969 with 
the decision to establish Queensland's largest power station in the town. A 
1,100-megawatt power house costing $200 million would be sited at the Clinton 
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Industrial Estate, a few miles to the northwest of Auckland Creek. The Harbour 
Board, the Department of Industrial Development, and the Gladstone Council 
agreed to share the $266,000 cost of building an access road and bridge to the 
site. A.C.F. and Shirleys Fertilizers also set up a plant at Auckland Point in 
1970. In the space of a decade Gladstone had become the nucleus of Central 
Queensland's secondary industry and a potential industrial giant. 
Installations for the coal and alumina industries had been provided without 
any serious delay. In 1965 the Moura railway was approved. It reduced the 
haulage distance from 170 to 112 miles (273.6 to 180.21 km) and cost $28 
million. Since then, Thiess-Peabody-Mitsui had moved from Auckland Point to 
Barney Point because greater port depths and a larger land area was available 
there. Yet this did not lead to the neglect of Auckland Point. Its facilities had 
even been expanded as the American Utah coal company was to use the site to 
load Blackwater coal for Japan. By 1970, 300,000 tons (304,820 tonnes) of coal 
could be stockpiled at the Point and the future aim was to be able to accom-
modate a 55,000-ton (55,883-tonnes) coal carrier, a 35,000-ton (35,562-tonnes) 
grain ship, and an oil tanker at once. 
The expansion of the alumina trade had been supervised by a special co-
ordinating sub-committee of the Harbour Board which had met regularly from 
1963 to 1967. Most attention had been paid to providing adequate water sup-
plies, as the project needed huge quantities for processing. In such matters as 
arranging harbour diies for the trade and in relation to special company 
dredging requirements, the arrangement had worked well. Queensland 
Alumina's outlays on the project were littie short of staggering: $115 miffion 
by 1967, another $45 mfflion in 1968, $53 million in 1970. By 1972 the plant 
would be the largest in the world and worth $333 miffion. Lastiy, a farsighted 
improvement which the Board had endorsed was the linking of Auckland Point 
and Barney Point by a causeway and the reclamation of the land between for 
future industrial use."" This was the realization of a plan originally drawn up 
in 1921. 
Recently a special report on Gladstone's future needs has been made by the 
Coordinator-General's Department. Suggested port improvements include 
increased specialized and general cargo wharves from Barney Point to South 
Trees, and another general cargo wharf between Auckland Point and Barney 
Point, as well as berthage in the Calliope River. If the report's predictions are 
accurate, Gladstone's local authorities and the Harbour Board will be called on 
for vastly increased outlays although their revenues wiff not be increased com-
mensurately."" 
While Gladstone grew, Rockhampton remained stationary. The war took 
trade away from Port Alma and by the early fifties nearly all the import trade 
had returned to the town wharves. Once more, the tired old arguments in favour 
of the river had been revived. In 1949 a local committee suggested that 
Thompson's Point could serve as a better deep-water portsite than Port Alma; 
in 1954, when £10,000 ($20,000) had been outlaid on improving Port Alma 
wharfage, the Harbour Board promised to get equal treatment for the town 
wharves. Road transport stffl held out an avenue of hope, as a Port Alma-
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Rockhampton road had been mooted since 1939. In 1956 the newly estabhshed 
Central Queensland Salt Industry, Lake's Creek, and Walter Reid offered to 
contribute to the road. At last there was a wider realization that Rockhampton 
absolutely had to have a deep-water outlet and that Port Alma was the best 
available. The Government had been on the verge of closing Port Alma in the 
mid-fifties, when the Councff had made a timely reversal of its traditional 
opposition to Port Alma and offered to guarantee the Harbour Board's future 
loan indebtedness."! The road was completed in 1958 at a cost of £250,000 
($500,000). 
The salt industry was one of the few new customers that the port had 
attracted. The construction of a cold stores plant at Port Alma in 1963 for the 
C.Q.M.E. and Fields was a useful addition, but it was still only an extension of 
an existing trade. As Gladstone's coal exports had boomed, the Rockhampton 
Harbour Board suggested that Port Alma should be the Central Queensland 
port for agricuffural produce, but this hope was transitory. Port Alma was not 
equipped for the bulk handling techniques essential for grain shipments. With 
its staple trades—meat, minerals, oil, and salt—Rockhampton was guaranteed 
stability but not growth. At long last, the maintenance of the town wharves was 
discontinued in 1964. Despite the port's lack of success, what was possibly the 
most progressive Harbour Board in Rockhampton's history had battied valiantly 
to improve the position. Led by Lake's Creek manager Mark Hinchliff, the 
Board had spent $10 million on renovating Port Alma wharfage by 1969. One 
container berth was available, one breast wharf, and a dolphin berth suited for 
conveyor loading of salt or grain. Rockhampton now had to wait and hope."" 
The postwar fortunes of the two Central ports were still bound up with 
each other. Gladstone's progress had not healed the wounds of old battles. It 
did not take too much to stir up the traditional envy and jealousy, as Hiley later 
described it, which had sullied Central Queensland's port history."" When a 
1959 inquiry into Rockhampton ports had recommended the development of 
Port Alma, the Gladstone Harbour Board had interpreted this pessimistically 
and pressed for another inquiry into Central ports to consider Gladstone's 
claims. What was at issue was Rockhampton's efforts to recover the Central 
oil trade. By declaring the Port Alma road private the Harbour Board hoped 
to exempt road transport from state taxes on oil carriage. This would lower oil 
road transport costs below oil rail charges from Gladstone to Rockhampton. 
It was possible that the oil companies at Gladstone would have to transfer to 
Port Alma. Finally, rail freight on oil between Gladstone and Rockhampton was 
adjusted to prevent such a waste of resources occurring. Nevertheless, Glad-
stone had been alarmed at the prospect of their hard-won success vanishing."* 
In contrast, the two ports had presented a united front on the desirability of 
restoring wool sales to Central Queensland. To do this, the raffway's tapering 
rate pohcies would have to be revoked and the wool houses would have to agree 
to decentralize their selling procedures: it was unlikely that either change would 
be made."® 
In 1959 the Gladstone Harbour Board's well-known Chairman, W. R. 
Golding, had acknowledged that incessant port rivalry had been a factor in 
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retarding the Centre's development. He suggested that Rockhampton and 
Gladstone might be grouped together as one port area. This was an unprece-
dented proposal which would have consolidated the revenues of the two Boards 
and merged the ports' activities. As Gladstone's success came shortly after, the 
suggestion remained little more than an interesting idea. It may have deserved a 
better fate. Later, in 1965, Engineer Fison compared Rockhampton to Mel-
bourne and Gladstone to Geelong: "Gladstone has elected to be an industrial 
centre . . . let Rockhampton be the Melbourne of Central Queensland." Despite 
Gladstone's industrial progress the port's hinterland was still not as rich in 
agricultural or pastoral production as Rockhampton's. The new beef roads of 
the sixties stimulated Central-western pastoralists, while Rockhampton re-
mained the regional population centre. Perhaps some form of inter-port co-
operation was the best answer. As Burrows, the member for Gladstone, had 
pointed out in 1959, "the abundance of ports has proved an economic burden 
on the state . . . to claim that two first class ports only thirty miles apart are 
justified is an absurdity"."® 
Whereas political controversy had previously come into Central Queensland 
port affairs through the antagonism of Rockhampton and Gladstone, now, 
because of the scale of Gladstone's growth, such controversy centred more on 
the means of Gladstone's development. Policy clashes arose over the private 
construction of the Moura railway and over the special leases which the govern-
ment granted to Gladstone's new port customers. Behind each question loomed 
wider matters of principle—the general attitude towards overseas investment 
and the rights and autonomy of harbour boards. 
There was some Labor opposition to the Moura line in 1962. The govern-
ment's attitude was expressed by Minister for Development Evans: "We have 
had enough to do with building railway lines . . . we have suffered too long in 
Queensland from unsuccessful enterprises. We want successful ones." Labor's 
spokesmen concerned themselves more with criticizing the labour conditions 
under which the line was being built, but they also argued that the government 
should have insisted on the new port users establishing secondary industries as 
offshoots of their main plants. The first Labor criticism was similar to the 
concern for railway working conditions which had helped to confuse rail con-
struction policy in the twenties; the limitations of the second approach had 
already been shown by Labor's lack of success with state industries. There 
were just as effective practical limits to what governments could do to influence 
the location of industry in the sixties."' 
The lease issue arose in 1967 when a bill was passed to grant Queensland 
Alumina a seventy-five-year lease. The Gladstone Harbour Board's attitude had 
completely changed from its earlier policy of Board wharfage ownership and 
management, but some thought the change was for the worse. Hanson, the 
Labor member for Port Curtis and an ex-Harbour Board member, still advocated 
the earlier method. The more serious difference of opinion that came out of the 
issue was whether the government, by dealing directly with the company, was 
downgrading the authority of the Harbour Board. The government also was 
accused of taking revenue that was rightly the Board's, while the Board was 
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charged with acting improperly as a real estate agent. The second criticism was 
well off the mark, as the Board had itself suggested the need for government 
intervention. The third objection was more relevant, but Treasurer Chalk's 
attitude was pragmatic. If the Board did so involve itself, it was with the ultimate 
object of developing the port, not of increasing its revenue. His approach to 
the question of Board autonomy was also ffexible. Allowance had to be made for 
the size and importance of the project to the state—doctrinaire political attitudes 
should not be allowed to hinder the industry. His attitude here was similar to 
Hiley's earlier views concerning Brisbane wharf ownership and rentals. Times 
had changed and the government's policy had to change with them."® 
Townsville 
Townsville's postwar development got under way earlier than Brisbane's 
or Gladstone's because of the changeover in the Northern ports to bulk loading 
for the sugar industry. Yet, in contrast with the other sugar ports, when the 
initial effects of bulk handling had been absorbed, the expansion of the Mt. Isa 
trade—stimulated by the reconstruction of the Northern trunk line—and the 
oil trade provided further impetus for Townsville's growth. What was less 
favourable about the port's postwar expansion was the danger of port con-
gestion. Unlike Brisbane and Gladstone, Townsville could not easily shift its 
site and the dimensions of the Outer Harbour threatened to be too small for 
new requirements. 
The war's effect on Townsville was much the same as it had been for Glad-
stone. The Harbour Board benefited from dues on war material but normal 
maintenance was seriously disrupted. The Commonwealth had constructed a 
dual purpose pier in the harbour for naval requirements but it was not suitable 
for postwar conversion to commercial use. After 1945 the Commonwealth was 
tardy in accepting the responsibility for demolishing the structure despite the 
Harbour Board's urgings, and this delayed the construction of new pier berths. 
The clash was a complicated affair which at times did little credit to either side. 
The dispute was not settled until 1957 and elements of Northern hostility to 
Southern political mismanagement had reappeared."" The pier was eventually 
demofished by early 1959. 
This delay was serious as the port's physical limitations had been highlighted 
by the war. Depths had fallen away badly and berthage accommodation was 
often inadequate. Although depths had been improved by the mid-fifties, com-
plaints about berthage were still being made. At a special conference between 
the Harbour Boards and O.S.R.A. in 1955 Townsville's shortcomings had been 
a central topic. The existing breakwaters were too narrow, an oil tanker berth 
was needed, and a new pier was necessary. The Townsville Board's relations 
with the shipping companies were rather strained. Wharf congestion often 
occurred, the Board argued, because the companies and local merchants did not 
shift their cargoes from the wharves quickly enough.*" Because of the port's 
limited handling space, however, the Board was sensitive to the advantages of 
mechanized cargo loading. It showed foresight in providing handling appliances 
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and had acted as agent for the Commonwealth Handling Equipment Pool after 
the war. By 1950 a port deputation had gone to South Australia to examine the 
best loading techniques for silver lead and zinc concentrates. It decided that the 
Board's two 20-ton (20.32-tonnes) electric cranes were already handling the 
material in Townsville as efficiently.*! 
In 1959 a special report had been made on Townsville by F. W. Tyderaan. 
Neither Brisbane nor Gladstone had the benefit of such an objective account of 
their port's postwar growth. The port's facilities had been made and added to 
without any overall plan, Tydeman pointed out. This made future expansion 
difficult. The concentration of berthage on the Eastern Breakwater had led to 
the position where congestion had resulted. He extended this criticism to the 
Outer Harbour—it was deficient in land area. Townsville had to have better 
entrance depths but the need to make port land available was more pressing. 
Berths should have had no less than 11 ^ acres (4.65 ha) of land behind; Towns-
ville's seven berths had an average of 3 acres (1.2 ha) each—only the sugar berth 
had adequate space. Additionally, a conveyor loader for Mt. Isa zinc concen-
trates was required as the existing cranes could not be used at the same time. 
Tydeman drew up a three-stage plan for improving the port which looked as far 
ahead as the year 2000. This degree of planning had not been undertaken by any 
previous port survey.*" 
Townsville's postwar breakthrough in meeting these port shortcomings 
began in 1957 with the Sugar Board's decision to set up a bulk sugar terminal. 
As the Sugar Board was bearing the plant's cost, and as Harbour Board finances 
remained sound, Townsville committed itself to expand wharfage by building a 
second concrete pier. The Sugar Board would operate the plant but the Harbour 
Board was to receive the sugar dues. The terminal, which has a capacity of 
150,000 tons (152,410 tonnes), was opened in 1959. The new Suter Pier—named 
after a member of the original Harbour Board—was opened in 1961. It had two 
berths and was equipped with road and rail access and a modern cargo transit 
shed. The Board's outlay on the two improvements approximated one million 
pounds (two million dollars). In the next few years a second bulk sugar store 
with a capacity of 140,000 tons (142,250 tonnes) was erected.*" 
The tremendous expansion of production at Mt. Isa mines then accelerated 
Townsville's port expansion. In 1961 Nicklin described the £30 million ($60 
million) project to rehabilitate the Western trunk line as the largest single railway 
undertaking in Queensland's history. Although th; financing of the line had been 
difficult—it had originally been suggested by Gair's government in 1956—the 
Commonwealth and state agreed to provide the funds. Mt. Isa mines re-
organized its stevedoring and transport representation in Townsville to expedite 
the new services, while the Harbour Board widened and extended the no. 1 
concrete pier and equipped it with a special overhead conveyor for loading zinc 
concentrates at a cost of $538,000.** The rail line was reconstructed by 1965 
and the pier improvements were ready by the following year. 
Several other improvements strengthened Townsville's position in the later 
sixties. One serious weakness was overcome in 1965 with the opening of the new 
no. 1 Tomlins berth for oil tankers. Bufft at a cost of $634,000, the berth was 
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immediately inside the port entrance and had pipelines to the land storage areas. 
Till then, whenever one of the no. 1 pier berths had been used for oil tankers, 
safety regulations had required that the opposite berth had to be vacant. 
Townsville, like Gladstone and Brisbane, also felt the need to provide harbour 
industrial lands by reclamation. Between 1967 and 1971, 170 valuable acres 
were reclaimed from the Ross River. Lastly, the most recent boost for the port 
came in 1969 when the Australian National Line established a sea-road terminal 
at a cost of $1,325,000 on a 5|-acre (2.23 ha) reclaimed site adjacent to the no. 2 
pier. By 1970 Townsvffle had ten berths, with berth depths ranging from 29 to 
32 feet (8.84 to 9.75 m) and 28 feet (8.53 m) in the Platypus Channel.*® The 
Harbour Board had also accepted Tydeman's report and approved of his 
specific proposals. This was an impressive record of achievement but, as 
Tydeman had concluded, port development programmes had to be flexible to 
be able to cope with new trading demands or unexpected setbacks. Townsville 
had its share of each in the sixties. Bulk sugar, the Mt. Isa trade, and the 
A.N.L. terminal was the good side, but a million dollars worth of damage was 
done to the new sugar terminal in 1963. Lastiy, in December 1971 cyclone 
Althea paid an unwelcome visit to Townsville and brought a miserable Christmas 
for the people and considerable damage to the port facilities. 
A major policy issue the Board was troubled with was the application of 
the new harbour industrial lands subdivision to the port. Again the question 
was to do with rentals for port land. The Harbour Board wished to increase 
rents for its Palmer Street tenants in the old Inner Harbour. A variety of local 
light industries were established in the street, but some of the tenants had no 
connection with port trade—one was a Buffaloes Lodge. The Harbour Board 
was determined to raise the rentals to a level suitable for harbour industrial land, 
although because of its situation the land had only limited usefulness for the 
port, while the tenants were as determined to fight the increases. The con-
troversy went on for more than five years after 1964. It was a complicated battle 
that involved some important principles of port administration. 
The tenants argued that the Harbour Board was abusing its powers by 
treating the leases as relating to valuable port land; they petitioned the govern-
ment to take the land from the Board and transfer it to the Lands Department. 
It seemed that some of the tenants who were not even remotely connected 
with the port's trade should never have been permitted to have waterfront leases 
in the first instance and that now the Board was forcing them out with higher 
rentals. At this time the Board was also formulating a comprehensive rental 
policy for the port. In 1967 it suggested a fourway division of port lands with 
rents ranging from 4 per cent to 7 per cent of the unimproved value. As part of 
this scheme, the Board agreed to lower its valuations of the Palmer Street land 
from 10 per cent to 7 per cent. The Harbours and Marine Department's pro-
posal for a simpler Board rental policy had been accepted by the Board as more 
practical, and the Palmer Street tenants had agreed to the new figure. 
Yet this was still not the last word. The Harbour Board held out for 7 per 
cent of the market value, rather than the unimproved value, so the matter 
dragged on for two more years with the tenants attempting to purchase the lands 
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freehold from the Lands Department. If the Board's attitude had been unreason-
able when the matter first arose—as they admitted themselves at a later date—by 
1969 a series of compromises had been made. The Board argued that the 
tenants' appeal to the government via the Lands Department touched on its 
statutory rights and that the government must uphold the principle of Harbour 
Board responsibility. Finally, however, the government upheld the Board's 
stand and the tenants acquiesced.*® 
The secondary ports 
None of the secondary ports positively benefited from the war. Larger out-
ports hke Mackay and Cairns fared best, while the effect on Bundaberg and, to a 
lesser degree, Bowen was almost entirely bad. A huge flood had destroyed 
Bundaberg's wharf sheds and sugar conveyors in 1942 and left a depth of 
3 | feet (1.07 m) in the river. This extra strain made the Bundaberg Harbour 
Board renew their efforts to move the port to deep water. Yet until this was 
realized in 1958 the port's trade levels fell away to zero. For Bowen the war was 
one more setback after so many others. Its only benefit had been a good wartime 
coal trade. The Harbour Board's plans to recondition the existing wharfage 
were shelved and not proceeded with till 1956.*' 
Mackay and Cairns had been in much stronger positions in 1939. The new 
Mackay Outer Harbour had the irregular demands of wartime traffic for its 
first customer. Operating delays would have arisen even in normal circumstances 
in so large a project, but war conditions were an extra difficulty. Some misunder-
standing of the new harbour tidal streams held up shipping and it was found 
necessary to open another general cargo wharf because of the increases in the 
sugar trade. In the same year, 1942, a visiting Federal sugar committee had 
criticized the port's handling methods, though without sufficient justification.*® 
While Cairns had benefited from dues on war material, the port suffered 
from initial dislocation. Depths had deteriorated and, more seriously, until the 
extension to no. 5 wharf was completed in 1942 there was a serious lack of 
handling and storage space for interstate cargoes. The Allied Works Council 
had constructed timber wharfage in Smith's Creek. It was the Board's intention 
to convert this and other war improvements to industrial use after the end of 
hostilities. This aim was defeated by the postwar slump and the lack of coastal 
shipping. The Board had shown special concern for the wartime treatment of 
the sugar industry. In 1943 it had emphasized the industry's crucial role in 
promoting inland settlement in the North.*" 
The trade of the outports depended on sugar and minerals. Bulk sugar 
handling was introduced first at Mackay in 1957, then at Bundaberg in 1958, 
Lucinda Point and Townsviffe in 1959, Mourilyan in 1960, and Cairns in 1964. 
The changeover was made smoothly and was facilitated by the Sugar Board's 
central role in the project. Modifications were made for each port's needs, yet 
the layout of the terminals remained the same. Minerals affected fewer ports 
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and involved a series of separate commercial initiatives by private enterprise. 
Weipa was developed as a bauxite port in the Gulf in 1958 and Hay Point, 
twelve miles (19.31 km) south of Mackay, as a coal port in 1970. 
The sugar terminal at Bundaberg assisted the port in moving to deep water. 
The shift had been planned as far back as 1911 by Engineer Cullen at a cost of 
£200,000 ($400,000). Construction finally began in 1956 and by the time the 
new terminal was completed in 1958 the cost came to £2 miffion ($4 million). 
Mobil set up an oil terminal in 1962 and next year the sugar storage capacity was 
increased from 50,000 to 100,000 tons (50,803 to 101,605 tonnes). A second 
sugar shed capable of holding 100,000 tons (101,605 tonnes) was added in 1965, 
making the total storage capacity for bulk sugar 200,000 tons (203,210 tonnes). 
The Australian Molasses Pool erected a 6,000-ton (6,096-tonnes) plant in 1963 
and a 10,000-ton (10,161-tonnes) tank in 1967. By 1970 the Bundaberg Harbour 
Board had spent $11 million on port facilities and bulk sugar and molasses 
terminals at the site of the present port. The new Port Bundaberg handled sugar, 
molasses, aqua ammonia, and bulk oil.®" 
Mackay's postwar expansion preceded Bundaberg's. Caltex oil had come 
to the port in 1955 and two years later £1,600,000 ($3,200,000) was spent on 
Australia's first bulk sugar terminal. By 1964 a second and a third sugar storage 
shed and a molasses terminal had been added, as well as an aqua ammonia 
store and a cold store for meat. Sheff had joined Caltex in 1967 and in 1969 the 
A.N.L. chose Mackay as a container port. The construction of Hay Point had 
also benefited Mackay as the materials had come in through the port.®! 
Even so, the choice of Hay Point was disappointing for Mackay. In 1967 
the American Utah Development Company made a feasibility study of the 
Goonyella coalfield, eighty miles (128.75 km) south of Collinsviffe, and decided 
to build a railway to the coast at Hay Point. Like Weipa, it was an owner-
operated concern, but there was no provision made for the government to 
purchase the facilities at a later time. The government had also agreed to make 
available funds of up to $2 million for the project. Mackay's reaction had been 
to suggest the development of a new port to the north of the Outer Harbour by 
building a breakwater from the North Breakwater to Slade Island. This was an 
ambitious proposal that would cost $4 | million. The Board realized that such a 
project would need a major port user, such as the coal trade, to assist in financing 
the scheme. The Utah Company considered the Board's plan but finally decided 
in favour of an open berth one mile (1.61 km) out to sea off Hay Point. This was 
the closest available site to where the Goonyella raffway descended Connor's 
range near the coast. Another factor in this decision was probably the desire of 
the Utah Company to retain control of the project. The size of their operations 
was large enough to enable them to conduct a single port user operation.®" 
Cairns was less fortunate than Mackay. Despite the early provision of some 
of the state's first concrete wharfage, there was not enough trade to go round. 
Both Townsville and Cairns had opposed the development of another sugar 
port at Mourilyan, but the site so well suited Tully growers that a bulk terminal 
was built there in 1960. Cairns's own terminal was operative by 1964 and the 
Harbour Board was pushing on with reclamation works for port use and to 
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beautify the waterfront. If Gladstone had Queensland's best natural harbour. 
Cairns probably had the most beautiful and the Board regulariy publicized the 
town's tourist attractions. 
Otherwise, development was tardy until the Board decided to spend $1 
million on dredging the entrance channel to 27 feet (8.23 m) l.w. in 1970. 
Depths had not been satisfactory in the port for some time previously. In 1969 
the Harbour Board expended $350,000 on container shipping facilities, and in 
1971 the state government outiaid $170,000 on a marine tourist terminal at 
Green Island. In the same year, the Board had begun enlarging its sugar 
terminal and commenced the construction of new wharfage in Smith's Creek 
for the half trade, which would cost $200,000. Cairns had set its sights on the far 
north in an attempt to recover a position which had become tenuous since the 
war. In the long run, there was the chance that Cairns might recapture 
Mourilyan's sugar trade, as Mourilyan would not be able to take bulk carriers 
with depths of 40 feet (12.19 m) or more.®" 
Hay Point and Weipa, like Mourilyan and Lucinda, were monoports that 
depended on one export. Whereas Hay Point had taken trade from Mackay, and 
Mourilyan competed with Cairns and Townsviffe, Weipa had almost the whole 
of the Gulf to itself. Because of the radical change brought about in port 
economics by bulk loading, containerization, and the new giant ocean carriers, 
the monoports were now the state's most successful secondary ports. Dependence 
on one export base had originally been a port's weakness—now it was more a 
strength. Where larger ports could reap the advantages of the new techniques 
and could also continue to cater for established trades—as in Brisbane and 
Townsviffe—or diversify their new trade—as in Gladstone—they became 
successful major ports. Outports like Mackay and Cairns had been caught 
between the two alternatives. Their struggle would result either in development 
in the one direction or faffing back in the other. At least they had a choice: 
Bowen had not. The decision of the Gladstone Harbour Board to risk pro-
viding ahead for the coal trade in the late forties had met with success. Bowen 
had taken a similar chance in the twenties but had lost out. By 1962 Hffey could 
say that Bowen had been one of the problems for every Queensland government 
for years past.®* 
The first postwar blow to Bowen had been the loss of the sugar trade. 
Exports had been tapering off since 1952. Then in 1958 Proserpine sugar was 
diverted to Mackay and the next year Inkerman's crop went to Townsville. 
More spectacular but ultimately less serious damage was done by cyclones in 
1957 and 1959. In the sixties, therefore, the port had to pin all its hopes on its 
interior mineral deposits. Early shipments of Collinsville coal to Japan had 
been rejected because of a high coal sulphur content. The company concerned, 
Daicon Collieries, had then installed a costly coal washing plant which failed to 
work properly. So Bowen's hopes were dashed again. At this time the Collins-
ville power station, which would provide electricity for Cairns, Townsville, and 
Mackay, was under construction. Bowen's growth possibilities were obviously 
linked with the coal trade. Industrial trouble also plagued the port at this time 
and caused Bowen's cup of sorrow to overflow: "If ever a port has suffered as 
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an innocent bystander because of industrial disputes, Bowen is the one .. . only 
the greatest efforts by all concerned can prevent the eventual loss of meat 
exports . . . then only major coal exports could prevent the closure of the port."®® 
This happened in 1967 when Borthwicks had to resort to road transport for 
their interstate meat cargoes. The port was not closed, but trade was at a stand-
still. 
This description of Bowen's ill fortune is not intended only as a sympathetic 
elegy. Bowen was a salutary example of a port with a naturally good harbour 
that had tried very hard and still failed. Other Queensland outports may yet do 
the same. Through the fifties the overwhelming disadvantages for the state's 
secondary ports had been the shortage of coastal shipping and widespread 
waterfront industrial unrest. These ports had then been given a new lease of life 
by bulk handling and specialized shipping techniques, but the price was that 
they became dependent on one commodity or company. Admittedly, it was 
ports like Bowen, that had missed out on this beneficial dependence, which 
criticized the dangers of the new era, but their criticism had some point to it. 
The effect of port rationalization, the Bowen Board predicted, "will be to reduce 
the overall earnings of the ports, reduce waterfront employment, and cause the 
state government considerable loss on its port facilities . . . if these new port 
improvements only serve to line the pockets of the shipping companies, then the 
whole exercise is out of balance".®® 
The remaining outports' attitudes to the matter varied with the degree of 
success already achieved in becoming dependent. Bowen was least fortunate and 
most hostile. Cairns had fared less well than Mackay and retained its earlier 
attitude that port users should pay the cost of any specialized installations—only 
at the end of the sixties did the Harbour Board venture to provide facilities 
ahead of trade. By 1961 the Mackay Harbour Board had paid for the Outer 
Harbour. But eight years later, by suggesting major port extension outside of 
the Harbour, they were openly looking for an important port user which could 
assist them to make the port capable of handling ships of 100,000 deadweight 
tons (101,605 tonnes). The port was eager to enter the coal export trade by 
building its Northern Harbour Extension to cater for the new super ships.®' 
Port administration 1939-1970 
In 1939 the Harbour Boards were still suffering from the effects of the 
thirties depression. During the war Labor had at last moved to reconsider the 
Boards' position, yet there was no real effort by any party to reform port 
administration until the fifties. Labor was preoccupied with reorganizing local 
authority works. In 1938 the Coordinator-General's Department was created 
to control all public works. In its first years it was only a planning organization 
but after 1940 it was also a constructing authority. One of Labor's aims in 
setting up the Department was to relate public works to unemployment relief. 
The Liberal-Country Party opposition endorsed the innovation but warned of 
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the dangers of centralization. There was no consideration of the new depart-
ment's role vis-a-vis the Harbour Boards. In 1941, when a Bill was passed to 
allow some private reclamation in Brisbane, there was little interest in the wider 
issues of port control.®® 
Lack of political interest was partly made up for by administrative 
initiative. A committee under the new Coordinator-General Kemp, with 
members from the Treasury, Harbours and Marine, and Auditor-General's 
Departments, had considered the Harbour Boards' situation in 1944. It recom-
mended a Queensland Harbour Trust to control Brisbane and other non-
Harbour Board ports, the writing off of interest arrears on Bowen's and Rock-
hampton's debts, and that Boards should cooperate more in developing their 
facilities. There should be government representation on each Board, a uniform 
method of Board election, and Board members should be paid. These improve-
ments were practical and desirable, but the only important result was the 
appointment of the Hamilton Lands Committee for Brisbane in 1949 and the 
writing off of interest arrears in the late forties. Otherwise, the Coordinator-
General's Department's concern for wider issues of economic policy decreased 
from year to year.®" 
Port administrative reform seemed to be back where it had started. Until 
the legislative changes of the fifties the non-Harbour Board ports were ad-
ministered by the Provisional Administration Board. The P.A.B. had been 
formed in 1932 as a response to Cullen's death and to depression needs. The 
Board was composed of Harbours and Marine officials and Treasury representa-
tives. As the Board's name implied, it was not a long-term arrangement, although 
it did remain active until 1961. It worked well enough, but its over-long tenure 
was another instance of the government's neglect of port administration. 
At length, the first of a series of legislative changes which would revitalize 
the Board system was introduced in 1951. Premier Gair brought down a Bill to 
affow Harbour Boards to act as stevedores and to increase the length of leases 
on town and non-harbour land. The first change was potentially valuable, but 
waterside industrial relations were too complex a matter to be solved by one 
piece of legislation and it had little effect. The need for new leasing conditions 
had arisen out of A.C.F. and Shirleys' proposal to establish a quarter of a 
million pound ($500,000) fertilizer plant at Cairns. The existing permissible lease 
did not encourage such large improvements. The introduction of this principle 
of commercial encouragement into Harbour Board operation contrasted 
favourably with Labor's earlier opposition to port authority concessions to 
private business. At last port reform seemed imminent.®" 
In 1952 it eventuated when Treasurer E. J. Walsh introduced an act to set 
up a Queensland Harbours Trust for Brisbane and the non-Harbour Board 
ports, and to move towards regulating the operations of the Harbour Boards. 
The administrative initiative behind the act came from the new Coordinator-
General's Department—particularly the 1944 committee—and from the 
Hamilton Lands Committee's activities in Brisbane. The Auditor-General 
E. A. Grosser had been a member of the 1944 inquiry and in 1950 he urged the 
unification of state port administration. The basis of his criticisms was the 
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Boards' budgetary shortcomings. He exempted Mackay, Townsvffle, and Cairns 
as financially sound ports, while Brisbane was paying its way, and Gladstone's 
prospects were encouraging; but Bundaberg, Bowen, and Rockhampton were 
in a desperate position.®! 
With the 1952 Act the choice was made in favour of centralization. 
Although it was a compromise which allowed the Boards to retain most of their 
rights, central port control seemed hkely in future. "It wiff be found over a 
period of years", Walsh explained, "that more and more ports will be taken 
under the control of the Harbour Trust in preference to increasing the number 
of Harbour Boards." However, the act did much to improve the existing system. 
The new Trust would represent commercial interests as well as the government. 
Several improvements were made concerning Board elections and financial 
practices which had been suggested by the 1944 committee. Another matter 
that had perplexed the Boards for years was whether the government should pay 
harbour dues on its imports. Under the new act the government was still 
exempt from dues on its own materials, but could no longer import materials 
for local authorities dues-free. Lastly, a series of smaller matters—the intro-
duction of the financial year, better borrowing arrangements, penalties for 
pollution—were dealt with. The act's obvious merits were appreciated by the 
opposition, but they criticized the drift towards administrative centrahzation. 
"This biff", the member for Cook warned, "seeks to enable Harbour Boards 
to be taken over one by one." Nicklin and Hiley saw the same danger.®" 
Although the act provided the machinery for appointing a Trust it was not 
used. In 1953 Walsh informed Gair that activities at Treasury-controlled ports 
had not increased enough to make it necessary. What decided the government 
not to appoint the Trust was the arrangements made for financing bulk handling 
in the sugar ports, which were brought into force by the 1955 Harbour Boards 
Amendment Act. Bulk handling would give Bundaberg a new lease of life, boost 
Mackay's trade, and eventually provide for the small Treasury ports of Lucinda 
and Mourffyan. The 1951 leasing amendment had been the first sign of a more 
sympathetic Labor attitude to private activity in the ports, but centralization 
still seemed hkely in 1952. Now the Sugar Board's agreement to meet Harbour 
Board interest and redemption payments on the new terminals bolstered the 
ports' trading position and made Labor less inclined to take over the Harbour 
Boards. As well as providing for bulk handling, the act was an important 
machinery measure and was the first major consolidating Board Act since 
1914.®" 
With his 1952 and 1955 Acts Treasurer Walsh had done a great deal 
towards setting the ports on their feet again. Forgan Smith's earlier willingness 
to grant private leases in the port of Brisbane in 1940 and Gair's extension of 
Board leases in 1951 were now reinforced. Walsh's acts were the last of Labor's 
series of post-1939 port reforms. They had ended on an admirable note. "Shorn 
of the usual party-political approach to such questions," Walsh said in 1955, 
"we have reached the stage when harbour development should be regarded from 
a national point of view."®* Of course, this did not mean that all was now well 
with the ports. The aim of controlling the Harbour Boards' autonomy had stiff 
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not been achieved. Labor's Harbour Trust would not regulate Board inde-
pendence—it would destroy it. 
Throughout 1955 shipowners made a series of complaints about port 
conditions, especially in Brisbane and Townsville. Also, since 1945 O.S.R.A. 
had requested representation on the Townsville Harbour Board and on Boards 
generally. As constituted, O.S.R.A. complained, the Boards represented shires 
hundreds of miles (kilometres) inland: port development consequently did not 
receive suitable attention. Some of the Harbour Boards replied that by par-
ticipating in Board elections in the usual way shipping nominees could be 
elected. To give shipowners any further rights would fundamentally change 
the administrative system. It was an ironic situation. Labor's long campaign to 
abolish plural voting in Harbour Board franchises had finally succeeded in 1922. 
Yet now it was a Labor government that suggested the need for direct shipping 
representation in port administration.®® As the Harbour Trust provisions of the 
1952 act were not implemented, however, the matter was left unresolved. 
Instead, in 1955, the Queensland Harbour Boards Association set up a special 
liason committee to meet with shipowners. As the Board system stood, the 
government had to be careful of undermining its authority, especially if it was 
not going to be centralized. These were trying years for the Boards and they 
were naturally defensive about their situation. At this stage Queensland elected 
a new government. 
Hiley had already shown a keen interest in port affairs. One of his first 
requests at the Treasury had been for a survey of the development of the Board 
system. This survey recognized that the present port authorities were very 
active, but that basic departures from the original Harbour Board acts had been 
made in 1905 and 1922. In 1905 the Cairns Harbour Board had been appointed 
without government representation and some of the other Boards had since 
been permitted to follow suit. In 1922 plural voting rights for payers of dues had 
been abolished. The effect of the two changes had been to leave the Harbour 
Boards virtually autonomous.®® This analysis was correct as far as it went. To 
fully understand the Boards' difficulties their origins needed to be considered, 
but the survey gave the Treasurer a sufficient background to his already con-
siderable working knowledge of the ports. In 1958 he introduced his reforms. 
Administratively, these changed the method of Harbour Board elections in a 
way designed to make the Boards more responsible to the government. 
Practically, the Boards were treated in a more business-hke fashion and were 
encouraged to respond in the same way. 
Harbour Boards would now be appointed by the elected local authorities 
rather than by direct election. One factor moving Hiley in this direction had 
been local authorities' complaints about the cost and difficuhies of separate 
Harbour Board elections. Another was the need to standardize Board com-
position. Before the 1958 change three out of the seven Boards had no govern-
ment representatives; after, each Board had two. Size was also standardized at 
seven members.®' Criticisms of political interference and special privilege would 
now be levelled at the Treasurer, but he had been careful to retain the Boards' 
independence from shipping companies. If granted, shipping representation 
268 POSTSCRIPT 
could lead to requests by waterside labour and other interests for equal treat-
ment. Opposition to the electoral changes arose immediately and continued 
over the next few years. The Townsville, Mackay, Cairns, and Bundaberg 
Boards, the Queensland Harbour Boards Association, the Queensland Local 
Government Association, and several shire and town councils registered their 
disapproval. Rockhampton and Bowen, however, were chastened by their 
financial distress and did not join in, while Gladstone adopted a wait and see 
policy.®® 
The basis of these complaints was the Harbour Boards' natural disappoint-
ment at having their independence regulated. It was left to Labor to underline 
the political implications of the change: the new electoral method was censured 
as retrograde and undemocratic. Yet while Labor criticized the government for 
reducing the people's electoral rights, their solution would also have restricted 
direct elections in the long run. "If the government took the bold step of 
appointing a trust," ex-Treasurer Walsh suggested in 1958, "there would not 
be very much complaint."®" Labor's complete port reform would have been a 
state-wide Trust that included Brisbane and possibly the financially weaker 
Board ports, but it still would have left the local system of Board elections 
unchanged. The possibility for excessive local port control would have still 
remained. In the event, it was the Liberal-Country party's solution that was 
applied. Harbour Board elections were reformed, but the idea of a wider trust 
was decided against. So while the Board system had been changed for the better, 
Brisbane remained uncontrolled. Yet the 1958 changes were very much for the 
long-term benefit of the ports. "Harbour Boards should be run upon business 
lines", Hiley argued at a 1958 meeting of the Boards, "and should not be 
dependent upon public popular votes . . . the change has produced better 
Boards than those which went out of office."'" 
Some Labor members who had already opposed the electoral changes now 
placed a pessimistic construction on the practical reforms, but the general Labor 
line did not. The complaint about trading monopolies would be raised again, 
but it would not be directly connected with the new method of Harbour Board 
election. A party which favoured centralized port administration could not very 
well make an issue of the need to preserve Harbour Board electoral rights. 
Equally, given Labor's preference for port centralization, if it wished to com-
plain about the monopolistic aspects of port development it would do its case 
no good to link it with the electoral question. These alternatives were probably 
not even considered. Port control was still a small political issue. However, 
Hiley had made his view of the worth of the Board system quite clear.'! Through 
the sixties, whenever Labor made complaints about the Board electoral method, 
his response was that they were working exceptionally well. "The ports of 
Queensland", he said in 1962, "are fortunate in having at the moment the best 
group of capable and experienced administrators they have ever had in the 
history of the state."'" Such a compliment had not been paid to the Boards in 
parliament before. 
Board election methods, and legal status and auditing procedures, were 
clarified in 1966, but there were no further administrative changes. However, 
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another improvement in the control of the non-Harbour Board ports had taken 
place in 1961. The Provisional Administration Board, originally set up during 
the thirties depression, was dispensed with and the Harbours and Marine 
Department was given more practical autonomy under its new Director, 
A. J. Peel. Seen in the context of the other changes in port administration, this 
was a valuable supplementary reform. Some of the state's most profitable 
monoports as well as Brisbane were under Harbours and Marine control. 
In 1962, 1966, and 1967 leasing conditions for harbour lands were again 
liberalized and resumption procedures were improved. Labor protested about 
the dangers of monopoly in each case, but especially when Queensland 
Alumina's Gladstone lease was concerned in 1967. The new act would allow the 
company to lease the land below the highwater mark at South Trees under its 
wharf for seventy-five years. Labor still tended to favour Harbour Board control 
of all port installations and criticized the new lease as much too generous. 
In defence. Treasurer Chalk took up Hiley's earlier approach towards private 
wharf-ownership in Brisbane and generalized it: times had changed and the 
scale of the new enterprises coming to Queensland had to be allowed for. 
The argument then shifted. As the government had made a direct agreement 
with Queensland Alumina this was downgrading the Gladstone Harbour Board's 
position. Labor argued. Here Chalk emphasized that the government had no 
desire to interfere with Board operations but, again, the radically enlarged scale 
of operations caffed for new methods. In effect, new conditions of port develop-
ment were assisting the government to regulate the dangers of excessive Harbour 
Board independence. For the first time, Queensland's ports could now grow 
because of outside injections of capital into specialized port facilities. Pre-
viously, ports had to wait patiently for the expansion of their hinterland. This 
was no longer absolutely necessary.'" 
Parliamentary discussions of the ports in the sixties did not include Bris-
bane. The only suggestions for administrative change in the port were depart-
mental. In 1964 Harbours and Marine Principal Engineer Fison suggested the 
need for a Brisbane port trust. In 1966, after a tour of the world's ports, he 
repeated his arguments. He remarked on the recent Rochdale Report into 
British ports which had advocated a national ports council. In Queensland, a 
simffar body could control the planning of all port works and dredging using the 
existing organization of the Harbours and Marine Department, while Brisbane 
should be a Harbour Trust without private wharves.'* 
The opinion of the Director of Harbours and Marine differed on some of 
these points. "The Rochdale Committee had to examine a situation where port 
development was outmoded". Peel warned, "and where inter-port competition 
was intense . . . the situation in Queensland is different with the possible 
exception of Brisbane. The general picture is one of new development, with 
inter-port competition practically non-existent." Yet he agreed with Fison that 
Brisbane did need better supervision. The port remained under the divided 
control of a multiplicity of authorities. Wharf land was controlled by the Lands 
Administration Commission; harbour industrial land by the Commission, the 
Coordinator-General, and the Brisbane City Council; wharves and stevedoring 
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by private companies; railways by the Raffways Department; roads by the 
Council, and channel development and maintenance by Harbours and Marine. 
Instead, Peel suggested a small planning committee representative of port 
interests which could guide Brisbane's development.'® But there was no govern-
ment reaction on the matter. 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
This appendix contains figures for port trade, rail-port mileage, port 
finances, and Queensland's regional population between 1859 and 1939. The 
port trade statistics are most accurate between 1873 and 1909 and are at their 
worst after 1918. In Table 2, the figures for 1860-1919 are more comparable and 
accurate than the 1940 estimate. The figures in Table 3 are the least satisfactory. 
The public accounts were singularly unhelpful for port finances. It should be 
noted that there are aggregative figures for investment in bridges and harbours 
from 1860 to 1900. (N. G. Butlin, Australian Domestic Investment and Foreign 
Borrowing 1861-1938/9 [Cambridge, 1962], pp. 358-60, 376-77, 381). Lastiy, 
the regional population figures are based largely on official estimates, but these 
are not always refiable. A fuller discussion of the statistics may be found in the 
author's doctoral thesis, pp. 603-643. 
Table la: Port Trade 1860-1884 
Share of the Three Main Ports in Total and Regional Port Trade 1860-1884 
{Quinquennial Average) 
(%) 
Brisbane 
Brisbane Rockhampton Townsville R'hampton 
T'ville 
S T C T N T T 
1860-64 
1865-69 
1870-74 
1875-79 
1880-84 
1860-84 
81 
81 
87 
90 
89 
88 
69 
58 
58 
56 
53 
57 
S — South 
91 
88 
86 
94 
98 
92 
C — Centre 
18 
19 
15 
13 
15 
16 
N — 
. 
41 
64 
34 
47 
45 
• North T 
3 
10 
8 
12 
8 
— Total 
87 
80 
83 
77 
80 
81 
The First Six Trading Ports 1860-1884 {Quinquennial Totals) 
1860-64 
Brisbane 
Rockhampton 
Maryborough 
Gladstone 
Bowen 
Mackay 
7,338 
1,891 
1.005 
181 
138 
14 
(£'000) 
1865-69 
Brisbane 
Rockhampton 
Maryborough 
Bowen 
Townsville 
Gladstone 
11,094 
3,670 
1,759 
524 
503 
290 
1870-74 
Brisbane 
Rockhampton 
Townsville 
Maryborough 
Cooktown 
Broadsound 
14,327 
3,722 
2,515 
2,187 
568 
411 
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The first Six Trading Ports 1860-1884 (Quinquennial Totals)—continued 
1875-79 
Brisbane 
Rockhampton 
Cooktown 
Townsville 
Maryborough 
Mackay 
1860-64 
1865-69 
1870-74 
1875-79 
1880-84 
1860-84 
18,632 
4,414 
3,717 
2,688 
2,002 
435 
Regional Port 
South 
83 
137 
165 
207 
248 
840 
(%) 
79 
72 
67 
62 
60 
65 
£'000 
1880-84 
Brisbane 
Rockhampton 
Townsville 
Maryborough 
Cooktown 
Mackay 
22,168 
6,350 
4,881 
2,141 
1,569 
1,220 
1860-84 
Brisbane 
Rockhampton 
Townsville 
Maryborough 
Cooktown 
Mackay 
Trade 1860-1884 (Quinquennial Totals) 
(£'00,000) 
Centre 
21 
42 
43 
47 
65 
218 
(7o) 
20 
22 
17 
14 
15 
17 
North 
2 
12 
40 
80 
103 
237 
(7„) 
1 
6 
16 
24 
25 
18 
73,543 
20,048 
10,587 
9,094 
5,854 
2,049 
Total 
106 
191 
248 
334 
416 
1,295 
Table lb: Port Trade 1885-1899 
Share of the Three Main Ports in Total and Regional Port Trade 1885-1899 
(Quinquennial Average) 
(7o) 
Brisbane 
1885-89 
1890-94 
1895-99 
1885-99 
1885-89 
1890-94 
1895-99 
1885-99 
Brisbane 
S 
85 
88 
i i 
87 
T 
47 
40 
39 
42 
S — South 
Rockhampi 
C 
99 
99 
96 
97 
C — Centre 
ton Townsville 
T N 
17 53 
23 59 
21 66 
20 60 
N — North 
T 
15 
18 
22 
19 
T — ' 
The First Six Trading Ports 1885-1899 (Quinquennial Totals) 
1885-89 
Brisbane 
Rockhampton 
Townsville 
Maryborough 
Mackay 
Cooktown 
1895-99 
Brisbane 
Townsville 
Rockhampton 
Bundaberg 
Mackay 
Maryborough 
(£'000) 
25,931 
9,367 
8,021 
3,509 
1,324 
1,201 
28,257 
15,861 
14,961 
2,250 
1,647 
1,598 
Regional Port Trade 1885-1899 
South 
306 
271 
321 
898 
(7„) 
56 
46 
44 
48 
1890-94 
Brisbane 
Rockhampton 
Townsville 
Maryborough 
Normanton 
Mackay 
1885-99 
Brisbane 
Rockhampton 
Townsville 
Maryborough 
Mackay 
Bundaberg 
23,736 
13,503 
10,897 
1,943 
1,698 
1,689 
77,924 
37,831 
34,779 
7,050 
4,660 
4,793 
' (Quinquennial Totals) 
(£'00,000) 
Centre 
95 
137 
157 
389 
(7o) North 
17 150 
23 186 
22 242 
21 578 
(%) 
27 
31 
34 
31 
R'hampton 
T'ville 
T 
79 
81 
82 
81 
rotal 
Total 
551 
594 
720 
1,865 
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Table Ic: Port Trade 1900-1919 
Share of the Three Main Ports in Total and Regional Port Trade 1900-1919 
(Quinquennial Average) 
(7c) 
Brisbane 
Brisbane Rockhampton Townsville R'hampton 
T'ville 
S T C T N T T 
1900-1904 
1905-9 
1910-14 
1915-19 
1900-1919 
1900-1904 
Brisbane 
Townsville 
Rockhampt 
Cairns 
Bundaberg 
88 
91 
98 
98 
94 
44 
52 
73 
78 
62 
S — South C 
89 
94 
85 
71 
84 
— Centre 
The First Six Trading Ports 1900-. 
32,500 
15,000 
on 10,000 
3,000 
1,700 
Maryborough 1,600 
1900-1904 
1905-9 
1910-14 
1915-19 
1900-1919 
1915-19 
Brisbane 
Townsville 
Rockhampton 
Gladstone 
Cairns 
Bowen 
(£'000) 
1905-9 
Brisbane 
Townsville 
Rockhampton 
Cairns 
Bundaberg 
Mackay 
71,600 
] 10,500 
4,000 
1,600 
1,200 
1,200 
14 
13 
8 
4 
10 
N — 
58 
49 
76 
77 
65 
20 
14 
12 
11 
14 
78 
79 
93 
93 
86 
North T — Total 
1919 (Quinquennial Totals) 
51,200 
14,200 
13,000 
6,600 
3,200 
3,000 
1900-1919 
Brisbane 
Townsville 
1910-14 
Brisbane 
Townsville 
Rockhampton 
Cairns 
Gladstone 
Bowen 
216,500 
49,900 
Rockhampton 33,600 
Cairns 
Bundaberg 
Mackay 
12,100 
4,900 
3,000 
Regional Port Trade 1900-1919 (Quinquennial Totals) 
South 
368 
560 
622 
723 
2,273 
(7„) 
49 
58 
75 
79 
66 
(£'00,000) 
Centre 
112 
137 
78 
56 
383 
(%) North 
15 
14 
9 
6 
n 
257 
290 
134 
136 
817 
(7o) 
36 
28 
16 
15 
23 
61,200 
10,200 
6,600 
1,300 
1,300 
1,200 
Total 
11,1 
987 
834 
915 
3,473 
Table Id: Port Trade 1920-1939 
share of the Three Main Ports in Total and Regional Port Trade 1920-1939 
(Quinquennial Average) 
Brisbane 
S T 
(%) 
Rockhampton 
C T 
Townsville 
N T 
Brisbane 
R'hampton 
T'ville 
T 
1920-24 
1925-29 
1930-34 
1935-39 
1920-39 
99 
99 
100 
100 
100 
S -
S3 
78 
74 
74 
76 
- South C 
74 
57 
47 
47 
55 
— Centre 
5 
3 
4 
4 
4 
N -
69 
50 
52 
53 
55 
- North 
7 
8 
9 
11 
9 
T — 
95 
89 
87 
89 
89 
Total 
274 STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
1920-24 
Brisbane 
Townsville 
The First Six Tt 
118,000 
10,400 
Rockhampton 6,400 
Cairns 
Gladstone 
Bowen 
1920-24 
1925-29 
1930-34 
1935-39 
1920-39 
2,800 
2,200 
700 
1935-39 
Brisbane 
Townsville 
Gladstone 
Rockhampton 
Cairns 
Mackay 
ading Ports 1920-1 
(£'000) 
1925-29 
Brisbane 
Townsville 
Cairns 
Rockhampton 
Mackay 
Gladstone 
119,000 
18,400 
8,100 
7,200 
6,900 
5.800 
939 {Quinquenni 
127,000 
13,300 
6,700 
5,200 
4,100 
4,000 
1920-39 
Brisbane 
Townsville 
al Totals) 
1930-34 
Brisbane 
Townsville 
Calms 
Gladstone 
Rockhampton 
Mackay 
447,900 
52,700 
Rockhampton 23,000 
Cairns 
Gladstone 
Mackay 
21,100 
19.000 
12.600 
Regional Port Trade 1920-1939 {Quinquennial Totals) 
tf>f\(\ nnA^ 
South 
1,196 
1,279 
828 
1,191 
4,494 
(%) 
83 
78 
74 
70 
76 
Centre 
86 
92 
89 
153 
420 
(%) North 
6 150 
6 268 
8 204 
9 348 
7 970 
(%) 
11 
16 
18 
21 
17 
82,800 
10.600 
4,700 
4.700 
4,200 
2,700 
Total 
1.432 
1,639 
1.121 
1,692 
5,884 
SOURCES: 1860, 1873-1939, from the Statistical Registers 1861-1872, from Pugh's Almanac 
(Brisbane. 1862-1874). 
NOTE: £1 = J2. 
Table 2a: Rail-Port Mileage 1860-1885 
Section 
Ipswich-Toowoomba 
Toowoomba-Dalby 
Gowrie Junction-Warwick 
Brisbane-Ipswich 
Dalby-Roma 
Warwick-Stanthorpe 
Roma-Dulbydilla 
Miscellaneous 
Brisbane 
Maryborough-Gympie 
Maryborough-Howard 
Maryborough 
Bundaberg-Mt. Perry 
SOUTH 
Date 
Open 
1867 
1868 
1871 
1875 
1880 
1881 
1885 
1885 
1884 
1883 
1885 
1884 
1885 
Mileage 
78 
52 
58 
24 
165 
41 
93 
125 
636 
61 
16 
77 
66 
779 
Section 
Date 
Open 
Rockhampton-Westwood 1867 
West wood-Comet 1878 
Clermont Bridge-Clermont 1884 
Comet-Alice 1885 
Rockhampton 
CENTRE 
Townsville-Charters 
Towers 
Ravenswood Jn.-
Ravenswood 
Charters Towers-
Torrens Ck. 
Townsville 
Mackay-Eton and 
Hamilton 
Cooktown-Palmer Roads 
NORTH 
QUEENSLAND 
1885 
1885 
1882 
1884 
1885 
1885 
1885 
1885 
1885 
1885 
Mileage 
32 
110 
62 
186 
390 
390 
82 
24 
97 
203 
31 
31 
265 
1,434 
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Table 2b: Rail-Port Mileage 1885-1900 
Section 
Brisbane pre-1885 
Morven-Charleville 
Charleville-Wyandra 
Wyandra-Cunnamulla 
Miscellaneous 
Brisbane 
Maryborough pre-1885 
Theebine-Kilkivan 
Cooroy-Gympie 
Biggenden-Mungar Jn. 
Maryborough 
Bundaberg pre-1885 
Isis-Childers 
Bundaberg-Howard 
235 Milepoint-Rosedale 
Bundaberg 
SOUTH 
Iveragh-Gladstone 
Rosedale-Iveragh 
Gladstone 
Rockhampton pre-1885 
Alice-Barcaldine 
North Rockhampton-
Emu Park 
Miscellaneous 
Rockhampton 
CENTRE 
Date 
Open 
1888 
1897 
1898 
1900 
1900 
1886 
1891 
1893 
1900 
1887 
1888 
1892 
1900 
1900 
1896 
1897 
1900 
1886 
1888 
1900 
1900 
1900 
Mileage 
636 
56 
61 
60 
372 
1,185 
77 
26 
26 
47 
176 
66 
12 
38 
50 
166 
1,527 
27 
50 
77 
390 
32 
29 
62 
513 
590 
Section 
Townsville pre-1885 
Torrens Ck.—Hughenden 
Hughenden-Stamford 
Miscellaneous 
Townsville 
Mackay pre-1885 
Miscellaneous 
Mackay 
Bowen-Guthalungra 
Miscellaneous 
Bowen 
Cairns 
Cooktown pre-1885 
Miscellaneous 
Cooktown 
Normanton-Haydon 
Blackbull-Croydon 
Miscellaneous 
Normanton 
NORTH 
QUEENSLAND 
Date 
open 
1887 
1897 
1900 
1900 
1900 
1900 
1890 
1900 
1900 
1900 
— 
1900 
1889 
1891 
1900 
1900 
1900 
1900 
Mileage 
203 
56 
38 
99 
396 
31 
2 
33 
29 
19 
48 
48 
31 
37 
68 
40 
38 
18 
96 
689 
2,806 
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Table 2c: Rail-Port Mileage 1900-1919 
Section 
Brisbane pre-1900 
Warwick-Thane 
Thane-Inglewood 
Inglewood-Goondiwindi 
Goondiwindi-Talwood 
Talwood-Thallon 
Thallon-Dirranbandi 
Miscellaneous 
Brisbane 
Maryborough pre-1900 
Kilkivan-Kingaroy 
Kingaroy-Nanango 
Degilbo-Mundubbera 
Nanango-Tarong 
Kandanga-Brooloo 
Maryborough 
Bundaberg pre-1900 
Cordalba-Dallamil 
Bundaberg 
SOUTH 
Gladstone pre-1900 
Gladstone-Rockhampton 
Boyne Valley Jn.-
Many Peaks 
Gladstone 
Rockhampton pre-1900 
(main line) 
Jericho-Blackall 
Rlflckall-Renlidi 
Benlidi-Emmet 
(other lines) 
Mt. Chalmers-Yeppoon 
Clermont-Blair Athol 
Mt. Morgan-Wo wan 
Bajool-Pt. Alma 
Miscellaneous 
Rockhampton 
CENTRE 
Date 
Open 
1904 
1907 
1908 
1910 
1911 
1913 
1919 
1919 
1904 
1911 
1914 
1915 
1915 
1919 
1913 
1919 
1919 
1903 
1910 
1919 
1908 
1913 
1914 
1917 
1909 
1910 
1912 
1912 
1919 
1919 
1919 
Mileage 
1,185 
25 
48 
53 
54 
38 
40 
584 
2,027 
176 
55 
16 
56 
18 
9 
330 
166 
31 
197 
2,554 
77 
68 
53 
198 
513 
72 
39 
26 
32 
17 
11 
29 
16 
234 
989 
1,187 
Section 
Townsville pre-1900 
(main line) 
Hughenden-Marathon 
Marthon-Richmond 
Richmond-Cloncurry 
Cloncurry-Selwyn 
Cloncurry-Koolamarra 
(coast line) 
Townsville-Rollingstone 
Miscellaneous 
Townsville 
Mackay pre-1900 
Paget Jn.-Sarina 
Sarina-Kaumala 
Miscellaneous 
Mackay 
Bowen pre-1900 
Bobawaba-Homehill 
Don-Proserpine 
Miscellaneous 
Bowen 
Cairns pre-1900 
Mareeba-Atherton 
Atherton-Herberton 
Herberton-Tumoulin 
Cairn s-Babinda 
Miscellaneous 
Cairns 
Cooktown pre-1900 
Normanton pre-1900 
NORTH 
QUEENSLAND 
Date 
Open 
1903 
1904 
1908 
1910 
1914 
1915 
1919 
1919 
1013 
1915 
1919 
1919 
1913 
1917 
1919 
1919 
1903 
1910 
1911 
1911 
1919 
1919 
1919 
1919 
1919 
1919 
Mileage 
396 
41 
30 
174 
72 
42 
33 
185 
973 
33 
20 
14 
37 
104 
48 
15 
38 
3 
104 
48 
21 
15 
18 
37 
56 
195 
68 
96 
1,540 
5,281 
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Table 2d: Rail-Port Mileage, 1940 
Section 
Brisbane 
Maryborough 
Bundaberg 
SOUTH 
Gladstone 
Rockhampton 
CENTRE 
Mileage 
2,112 
465 
242 
2,819 
177 
1,281 
1,458 
Section 
Townsville 
Mackay 
Bowen 
Cairns 
Cooktown 
Normanton 
NORTH 
QUEENSLAND 
SOURCE: Annual Reports nf the Commissioner for Railways, Qyp, QPP-
2a:(1886) 3: 3025 
2b: (1900) 4: 707 
2c:(1919-1920) 3: 482-83 
2d: (1941), p. 585. 
NOTE: 1 mile = 1.609 kilometres. 
Mileage 
1,175 
215 
140 
527 
96 
2,221 
6,498 
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Table 3a: Port Expenditure 1860-1885 
Part One (Harbours & Rivers' Figs.) 
(£) 
Port 
Logan 
Brisbane 
Brisbane Graving Docks, etc. 
Maryborough (River) 
SOUTH 
Gladstone (Jetty) 
Rockhampton (River) 
CENTRE 
Bowen (Jetty) 
Mackay 
Townsville 
Cooktown 
NORTH 
Dredge Plant etc. 
Working Exes. 
Miscells. 
UNALLOCATED 
TOTAL—Part One 
Expenditure 
6,487 
100.996 
50.267 
14,428 
172,178 
16,305 
84,416 
100,721 
12,574 
32,928 
1,444 
4,131 
51,077 
221.429 
22,485 
28,049 
271,963 
595,939 
Part Two (Reg.-Gnl.'s Figs.) 
Port Expenditure 
Logan 1,043 
Brisbane 
Dredging 115.305 
Graving Docks 3,283 
Wharves 1,286 
Maryborough Improvements 23,500 
Bundaberg 
Improvements 5,276 
Dredging 3,384 
SOUTH 153,077 
Gladstone Jetty 
Rockhampton 
Dredging 
Pt. Alma Wharves 
CENTRE 
Bowen Jetty 
Mackay Harbour Works 
Townsville Harbour Works 
Port Douglas 
Lucinda Wharf 
Cooktown dredging 
Gulf Survey 
NORTH 
Dredging 
General Exes. 
Lytton Dredge 
UNALLOCATED 
16,471 
90,361 
38,869 
145,701 
12,766 
73,397 
93,700 
10,847 
100 
4,361 
1,042 
196,213 
222.203 
1,142 
5.600 
228,945 
TOTAL—Part Two 720.650 
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Table 3b(i): Port Expenditure 1860-1900 
(£) 
Port 
Logan 
Southport 
Brisbane 
Graving Docks 
Improvements 
Wharf 
Upper Brisbane 
Maryborough 
Bundaberg 
SOUTH 
Gladstone 
Rockhampton 
Training Walls 
Improvements 
Broadmount 
Narrows 
Broadsound 
CENTRE 
Expenditure 
3.148 
5.141 
7.113 
512,315 
2,948 
4,284 
91,685 
46,240 
672,874 
5.108 
19,449 
89,978 
10,880 
5,790 
855 
132,060 
Port 
Bowen 
Townsville 
Harbour Works 
Improvements 
Mackay 
Cooktown 
Cairns 
Port Douglas 
Normanton 
Burketown 
Lucinda 
Geraldton 
Thursday Island 
NORTH 
Dredging 
General Exes. 
UNALLOCATED 
TOTAL 
Expenditure 
14,206 
255,943 
91,298 
174,429 
25,894 
43,317 
8,615 
32,228 
2,837 
6,552 
2,236 
707 
658,262 
388,316 
6,618 
394.934 
1 858,130 
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Table 3b(ii): Port Finances 1885-1900 
(£) 
Part One: Indebtedness of the Harbour Board Ports in 1899 
Rockhampton Townsville Bundaberg 
Government e 
Less Harbour 
Indebtedness 
Government s 
Less Harbour 
Indebtedness 
Part Two: Em 
Money 
Land 
Dredges 
Money 
Land 
Dredges 
ixpenditure 
Dues 
expenditure 
Dues 
iowments to the Ha 
257,124 
31,510 
225,614 
Mackay 
89,263 
17,274 
71,989 
rbour Boards, 1899 
Rockhampton 
97,529 
35,978 
133,510 
Mackay 
4,244 
2,400 
1,400 
8,044 
327,522 
42,519 
285,003 
Maryborough 
82,684 
14,837 
67,848 
Townsville 
19,854 
18,350 
34,800 
73,004 
Maryborough 
2,718 
33,025 
35,742 
73,585 
9,531 
64,054 
Bundaberg 
670 
15,600 
1,400 
23,682 
Part Three: Indebtedness of Non-Harbour Board Ports in 1899 
Government expenditure 
Less Harbour Dues 
Indebtedness 
Government expenditure 
Less Harbour Dues 
Indebtedness 
Government expenditure 
Less Harbour Dues 
Indebtedness 
Brisbane 
630,598 
153,378 
477,220 
Lucinda 
12,120 
4,296 
7,824 
Cooktown 
Broadsound 
4,461 
579 
3,882 
Geraldton 
2,391 
3,300 
909 Cr. 
Thursday 
Island 
Gladstone 
28,511 
2,492 
26,019 
Cairns 
43,999 
9,786 
34,213 
Normanton 
Bowen 
51,002 
4,349 
46,654 
Port Douglas 
28,971 
1,111 
27,860 
Burketown 
24,474 
3,013 
41,888 
3,883 
41.912 
4513 
645 
865 
21,461 38,005 37,398 220Cr. 
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Table 3c: Port Finance 1900-1918 
Harbour Board Indebtedness 1919 
(£) 
Port 
Bundaberg 
Gladstone 
Rockhampton 
Bowen 
Mackay 
Townsville 
Cairns 
TOTAL 
Debt 
28,861 
6,005 
336,714 
32,253 
41,087 
309,288 
165,918 
920,126 
Harbour Dues Trust Fund 1919 
Port 
Brisbane 
Maryborough 
Broadsound 
Lucinda 
Innisfail 
Port Douglas 
Cooktown 
Thursday Island 
Normanton 
Burketown 
General Dredging 
TOTAL 
Debt 
571,355 
30,812 
574Cr. 
6,854Cr. 
10,210 
16,253 
8,166 
19,276 
2,440 Cr. 
l,740Cr. 
644,465 
Table 3d: Port Finance 1918-1939 
(£) 
Harbour 
Port 
Bundaberg 
Gladstone 
Rockhampton 
Bowen 
Mackay 
Townsville 
Cairns 
TOTAL 
Board Indebtedness 1939 
Debt 
4,383 
98,163 
510,534 
272,711 
292,113 
130,162 
231,961 
1,540,027 
Harbour Dues 
Port 
Brisbane 
Brisbane Dry Dock 
Brisbane River 
Maryborough 
Broadsound 
Lucinda 
Innisfail 
Port Douglas 
Portland Roads 
Cooktown 
Thursday Island 
Normanton 
Burketown 
TOTAL 
Trust Fund 1939 
Debt 
35,586 Cr. 
4,127 Dr. 
7,267 Cr. 
31,280Dr. 
594 Cr. 
2,834 Dr. 
92 400 Cr. 
4,279 Cr. 
124Cr. 
24,918 Dr. 
5 483 Dr. 
16.783 Dr. 
1 825 Cr. 
"ifi.eSOCr. 
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Table 3e: Harbours and Rivers' Share in the Public Debt, 1886,1900,1919,1938 
(£) 
1886 1900 1919 1938 
Railways 16,334,400 22,864,800 44,980,500 65,597,800 
Immigration 2,525,000 2,775,000 2,775,000 2,763,100 
Telegraphs 746,100 959,300 1,014,300 524.400 
Public Buildings 1,008,800 1,633,100 1,931,100 6,461,500 
Roads and Bridges 747,000 952,000 914,000 4,627,900 
Local Authority Loans 950,000 1,919,700 4,587,900 13,664,800 
Forestry _ _ _ 1,177,700 
Housing - - - 3,891,900 
State Enterprises — — 1,152,900 4,160,600 
Agriculture - 657,200 1,529,300 -
Miscells. 2,576,400 5,003,800 9,928,200 26,604,400 
Harbours and Rivers 1,663,400 2,530,400 2,551,900 2,797,500 
Total 26,550,900 39,298,300 68,364,100 132,271,700 
SOURCE: 3a: Part One HM, 1886 ^^^^(1887)4: 54-57 
3a: Part Two Statistical Register, QVP (1886) 1: 506 
3b(l): Statistical Register, Q/'P (1901) 2: 939 
3b(ii): Harbour Dues and Expenditure—Ports of Queensland—Return to an Order, 
QVP (IS99) 3: 1077 
3c; Auditor-General's Report, QVP (1919-1920) 1: 864 
3d: Auditor-General's Report, QVP (1940), pp. 62-63 
3e: Public Accounts: CiKP(1886) 1: 1167; (1900) 4: 305 
e ^ P (1919-1920) 1: 1115 
Queensland Year Book', 1941, p. 299. 
NOTE: £1 = $2. 
Table 4: Queensland's Regional Population 1861-1947 
Censal years 
1861 
1864 
1868 
1871 
1876 
1881 
1886 
1886 
1891 
1901 
1911 
1921 
1933 
1947 
South 
27,133 
49,261 
76,785 
91,548 
122,604 
150,193 
221,693 
222,331 
268,760 
328,390 
427,620 
526,669 
689,177 
816,088 
Centre 
2,840 
10,355 
17,583 
17,740 
22,650 
27,835 
38,821 
37,996 
46,881 
63,919 
62,911 
88,638 
79,547 
101,208 
North 
86 
1,851 
5,533 
10,816 
28,029 
35,493 
62,339 
62,526 
78,077 
110,957 
111,414 
137,373 
178,810 
189,119 
Queensland 
30,059 
61,467 
99,901 
120,104 
173,283 
213,521 
322,853 
322,853 
393,718 
503,266 
601,945 
752,680 
947,534 
1,106,415 
SOURCES: QVP (1887) 2: 861 (7th Census of Queensland); QPP (1902) 2: 953-54 (9th Census 
of Queensland); Census of the Commonwealth of Australia (1911) 1: 430; 
ibid. (1921) 2: 375-78; ibid. (1933) 1: 250-61; ibid. (1947) 1: 362-64. 
NOTE: The two sets of figures for 1886 are both official, the latter being a revised estimate 
of the 1901 Census. 
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port growth. 
English historians have also so far paid little attention to port development. 
James Bird's geographical surveys are models of their kind, but unfortunately 
there are no historical equivalents (J. Bird. The Major Seaports of the United 
Kingdom. London, 1963). Stuart Mountfield's history of the Mersey Docks 
and Harbour Board discusses the evolution of port administration in Liverpool, 
but does not attempt to paint the full national picture (S. Mountfield. Western 
Gateway, a History of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board. Liverpool, 1965). 
Arthur Bryant's work on the port of London is disappointingly brief and gives 
in to the temptation to put the romance of port history before the practical 
details of how the port was developed. It raises many interesting questions but 
does not answer them (A. Bryant. Liquid History. To commemorate fifty years 
of the Port of London Authority 1909-1959. London, 1960). Broodbank's older 
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and much longer study of London is still the most authoritative, but it too fails 
to put the port's growth in a broader historical perspective (J. G. Broodbank. 
History of the Port of London. 2 vols. London, 1921). 
Australian port history is also a neglected field. There are the official 
histories, such as the South Australian Harbours Board centenary publication, 
Donnely's book on Townsville, and the journals published by the Sydney and 
Melbourne port authorities (South Australian Harbours Board. A Century of 
Progress. Adelaide, 1938; A. Donnely. The Port of Townsville. Sydney, 1959; 
Port of Sydney. Sydney, since 1946; Port of Melbourne Quarterly. Melbourne, 
since 1947). These provide a great deal of factual information but rarely rise 
above the local level. Some popular accounts have appeared, such as 
Stephensen's work on Sydney, but they too fall short of being serious historical 
inquiries (P. R. Stephensen, The History and Description of Sydney Harbour. 
Adelaide, 1966). Academic studies of Australian port development, as in 
England, have so far been more frequently made by geographers than by 
historians. Chapman's work on Central and North Queensland ports is valuable, 
as is Bird's Austrahan material (E. C. Chapman. "Queensland Ports and the 
Bulk Shipment of Australian Raw Sugar." Geography 47 [1962]: 310; and 
"The Ports of Central and North Queensland." A.N.Z.A.A.S. paper. Brisbane, 
1961. J. Bird. Seaport Gateways of Australia. Oxford, 1968). Otherwise, the 
inconclusiveness of the article by Clements and Richmond on Port Albert 
suggests that wider historical studies of the Australian ports need to precede 
detailed accounts (J. A. Clements and W. H. Richmond. "Port Albert and 
Gippsland Trade 1840-66." Australian Economic History Review, Sep. 1968, 
p. 129). 
There is no one special source of information for the history of the Queens-
land ports. The ofiicial and other records at the state archives and the Harbour 
Board oifices are invaluable, but they only become comprehensive after 1900. 
Before that time, the best sources are the special parliamentary papers, the 
annual reports of the Harbours and Rivers Department, newspapers, parlia-
mentary debates, and the many scattered references in the contemporary books, 
articles, and miscellaneous sources which touch on the ports. 
In the Votes and Proceedings the most valuable reports are: Rivers and 
Harbours, 1864; Brisbane Wharfage, 1875; Australasian Marine Departments 
Conference, 1874; Pennefather's Report on the Gulf, 1880; Port Douglas-
Cairns Railway, 1885; the Pilot Service, 1894; Hughenden-Winton Railway, 
1895; Port-Alma Railway, 1895; and the Bowen Railway, 1900. The Annual 
Report of the Harbours and Rivers Department is the basic guide to the ports' 
condition and to their improvement schemes. They are most helpful in the early 
years. The special reports of Cullen, Coode, and Bates are valuable, particularly 
Cullen's on the Burnett (1884) and the Mary (1888), Coode's on Mackay and 
Townsville (1887), and Bates's general report (1898). The newspapers are an 
essential, if time-consuming, source. The Brisbane Courier, the Rockhampton 
Morning Bulletin, and the Port Denison Times were most frequently relied on. 
The PDT, as locals called it, was taken as the North's most representative paper. 
Few copies of the Townsville dailies are extant and Bowen's closer position to 
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Townsville, as against the relative geographical security of Cairns, meant that 
thePXTalways had one eye on Townsville's port situation. Some of the smalle, 
journals, especially the Maryborough Chronicle, and the Mackay Mercuryi 
were excellent sources for port history, as larger papers like the Brisbane Courier 
often overlooked the ports. The 1892 and 1895 parliamentary debates are 
specially valuable for the foundations of the Harbour Board system. Other 
informative debates were: Brisbane-Ipswich Rivalry, 1871; Navigation Act and 
Harbour Dues, 1874; Brisbane Harbour Board, 1900; the Broadmount Railway, 
1895. 
Books and articles on Queensland's port history usually cover the nine-
teenth century in more detail than the post-1900 period. Two types may be 
distinguished: the more recent publications which draw on earlier pioneering 
works, and the original histories which offer full details but are frequently 
handicapped by an inflated sense of local importance. North Queensland ports 
have had the best recent coverage. Bauer's study of the Gulf ports, Jones's 
history of Cardwell, and, most notably, Bolton's book on the North, are all 
useful (F. H. Bauer. Historical Geographical Survey of Part of Northern Aus-
tralia. Canberra, 1959; D. Jones. Cardwell Shire Story. Brisbane, 1961; G. C. 
Bolton. A Thousand Miles Away: A History of North Queensland to 1920. 
Brisbane, 1963). In contrast, the Centre and South have been neglected. 
Golding's account of early Gladstone and Jan Nolan's forthcoming history of 
Bundaberg are the only revisions of port history in those regions (W. R. Golding. 
The Birth of Central Queensland. Brisbane, 1966). Otherwise, one must fall 
back on earlier works, such as Knight and Coote for Brisbane (Jay's and 
Davies's more recent articles are helpful, but brief), Lennon on Maryborough, 
Walker on Bundaberg, Hogan on Gladstone, and Rhodes's article on Rock-
hampton (J. J. Knight. In the Early Days. Brisbane, 1895; W. Coote. History 
of the Colony of Queensland 1770-1881. 2 vols. Brisbane, 1882; L. J. Jay. "The 
Origins and Growth of Early Brisbane." Geography 37 (1952): 166; A. G. 
Davies. "The Genesis of the Port of Brisbane." JRHSQ 2 (1935): 274; J. 
Lennon. Maryborough and District 1824-1924. Maryborough, 1925; J. Y. 
Walker. The History of Bundaberg. Brisbane, 1890; J. F. Hogan. The Gladstone 
Colony. Sydney, 1897; F. Rhodes, "The Port of Rockhampton." JRHSQ 5 
(1955): 1110). Though only touching on the port, Greenwood and Laverty's 
book on local government in Brisbane is essential background material (G. 
Greenwood and J. Laverty. Brisbane 1859-1959. Sydney, 1959). 
Of the miscellaneous sources, the most informative are Rhodes's Morning 
Bulletin supplement on Rockhampton, the Queenslander's report on the Gulf 
ports, and Bonwick and Boyd's pamphlets on port conditions in the 1880s 
(F. Rhodes. Port of Rockhampton. Morning Bulletin Special Publication. 
Rockhampton, 1940; "Papers and Reports Descriptive of the Country on the 
Watersheds of the Rivers running into the Gulf of Carpentaria." Queenslander. 
Brisbane, 1880; J. Bonwick. The Resources of Queensland. London, 1880; 
A. J. Boyd. Queensland. London, 1882). Lastly, some of the shipping hand-
books provide valuable material (Burns, Philp. Queensland Handbook of Inform-
ation. Brisbane, 1884; B.L & Q.A. Handbook of Information. London, 1900). 
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After 1900 most of these sources are less useful. The material at the Harbour 
Boards and the Archives becomes more relevant, together with some govern-
ment reports on the ports and railways, and some parliamentary debates. The 
Harbour Board records consist of Annual Reports, General Minutes, News 
Cuttings and Correspondence. Of these, the news cuttings are most valuable. 
They preserve sections of many Queensland papers which are now missing, 
especially in Gladstone and Townsville. The Harbour Board records are, in 
fact, a major untapped source for Queensland's economic history. Until much 
of the material is reorganized, however, it is too voluminous for historical use. 
At the Archives in Brisbane many Board records have been preserved in a more 
manageable form. Some are readily accessible through the use of the Treasury 
Registers and correspondence, despite many annoying gaps (QSA, TRE). There 
is also a large amount of separate Harbour Board information (QSA, HAR). 
These include full correspondence with most of the Boards and these special 
reports: Brisbane Wharves, 1900-1928, 1931-1940; Bowen Pier 1912-1924; 
Mackay Improvements Schemes, 1907-1918; Townsville Improvements 
Schemes, 1887-1900. The most informative Commissions after 1900 are: the 
1909 Port Alma Railway; the Mackay Outer Harbour, 1911; the Rail-Port 
Select Committees of 1908, 1914-1916. In the inter-war years, the reports of 
Brigden, Buchanan, and the 1937 Transport Commissioners stand out. Lastly, 
there are the most important post-1900 parliamentary debates: Port Adminis-
tration, 1906, 1918, 1922, and 1935; the Mackay Outer Harbour, 1914, 1934; 
the Port Alma Railway, 1909; Brisbane and Townsville, 1905. 
There are many more secondary sources available for the history of 
shipping, though few deal directly with Queensland. Several recent works on 
Australian and British shipping provide an essential background to the Queens-
land story, and sometimes discuss the state's shipping activities. Blainey's 1966 
book has already established itself as the most interesting yet scholarly intro-
duction to the history of the Australian shipping trade, and it discusses the 
Torres Strait service (G. Blainey. The Tyranny of Distance. Adelaide, 1966). 
Burley's and Trace's studies are practical accounts of the economics of the 
Australian shipping trade; Hutchins's book is the most authoritative on 
American shipping history; Marx's study of shipping cartels is very relevant 
background to considering the Australian scene; lastly, Robinson's book on 
English overseas mail services and Hyde's studies of Liverpool shipping also 
touch on the Australian maritime story (K. Burley. British Shipping and Aus-
tralia 1920-39. Cambridge, 1968. K. Trace. "Australian Overseas Shipping 
1900-1960." Ph.D. thesis, University of Melbourne, 1965. J. G. B. Hutchins. 
The American Maritime Industries and Public Policy 1789-1914. Cambridge, 
Mass., 1941. D. Marx. International Shipping Cartels. Princeton, 1953. H. 
Robinson. Carrying British Mails Overseas. London, 1964. F. E. Hyde. Blue 
Funnel: a History of Alfred Holt and Coy. of Liverpool from 1865 to 1914. 
Liverpool, 1957; and Shipping Enterprise and Management. Harrisons of Liver-
pool 1830-1939. Liverpool, 1967). Apart from these, there are the official 
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histories of the British shipping lines, such as Blake's or Cable's, which are 
sometimes useful (G. Blake. The B.I. Centenary 1856-1956. London, 1956; 
B. Cable. A One Hundred Year History of the P. & O. 1837-1937. London, 
1937). 
By far the most valuable source for Queensland's shipping history is 
N. L. McKellar's excellent but as yet unpublished study of the A.U.S.N. This 
is written from the A.U.S.N. records which McKellar holds in trust at Tam-
worth. Otherwise, only Brigden's article on A.S.O.F., Wilkinson's book which 
considers the coastal trade, and North's theoretical article on freight rates, are 
worth mentioning (J. B. Brigden. "Australian Overseas Shipping." Economic 
Record 6 (1930), Supplement, p. 173; H. L. Wilkinson. The Trust Movement in 
Australia. Sydney, 1914; D. C. North. "Ocean Freight Rates and Economic 
Development 1750-1913." Journal of Economic History 18 (1958): 542). News-
papers were unhelpful, with some exceptions: the Courier's coverage of the 
A.S.N.-Q.S.N. rivalry in the mid 1860s; and two sets of news cuttings in the 
Mitchell Library, vol. 213 on the 1928 strike, and Nicholas's 16 vols, on Aus-
tralian shipping history. Reports in the Queensland parliamentary papers were 
also relatively few, and restricted to the nineteenth-century correspondence 
between the government and the companies over the Torres Strait service, the 
mail runs, and some early twentieth-century overseas contracts. In the Com-
monwealth parliamentary papers, the two 1906 shipping inquiries and the 1923 
Commission into the Navigation Act were important. Finally, part of the 
Harbour Board correspondence is helpful. Correspondence at Townsville and 
Gladstone, particularly, clarifies the role of the shipping companies in the ports. 
However, there is still a wealth of potential information in these records on 
Queensland's maritime history. 
Queensland waterside unionism is very poorly served by the available 
material. Inquiries at the ports suggest that local W.W.F. records have rarely 
been preserved, even in the main ports. The Federal W.W.F. records in Canberra 
contain material relevant to the post-1900 history of waterside unions in 
Queensland, but it mostly appears to concern the relations between the state 
and federal unions. Dunlop's book on industrial relations and Hobsbawm's 
discussion of British waterside unions are good methodological guides (J. 
Dunlop. Industrial Relations Systems. New York, 1959; E. J. Hobsbawm. 
Labouring Men. London, 1964). May's article on Australian waterside industrial 
relations is also helpful (R. J. May. "Determinants of the Industrial Relations 
Pattern in the Australian Stevedoring Industry." Journal of Industrial Relations 
3 (1961): 157). But finally one is reduced to following the maritime disputes 
through the newspapers and the few relevant published studies, namely: Nairn 
on 1891, Morrison on 1912, Turner on 1917, and Dixson on 1929 (N. B. Nairn. 
"The 1890 Maritime Strike in N.S.W." Historical Studies, Nov. 1961, p. 1; 
A. A. Morrison. "The Brisbane General Strike of 1912." Historical Studies, 
May 1950, p. 125; Ian Turner. Industrial Labour and Politics. Canberra, 1965; 
M. Dixson. "The Timber Strike of 1929." Historical Studies, May 1963, p. 479). 
Government reports on waterside unionism are rare, but the Queensland 
Inquiry of 1926 is important, as is Basten's Federal Report in 1952. 
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The Economy 
The materials used for the history of the Queensland economy were almost 
entirely primary sources. With the exception of John Laverty's recent survey, 
there are practically no published studies of Queensland's economic history 
(J. R. Laverty. "The Queensland Economy 1860-1914." In Prelude to Power, 
edited by D. J. Murphy et al, p. 28. Brisbane, 1970). The sources mostly relied 
on were the many commissions and inquiries in the parliamentary papers, the 
newspapers, unpubhshed theses, and some miscellaneous material. In nine-
teenth-century (Queensland there were a large number of massive inquiries into 
most aspects of the economy. The most important were: Immigration, 1863, 
1867; Land Settlement, 1867, 1884, 1892, 1897; Railways, 1872, 1875; Sugar, 
1889; Mining, 1871, 1897; Separation, 1885-1886, 1890, 1893-1894, 1898. 
After 1900 annual reports of various newly established departments tend to 
replace these as the basic source of information, although there still were some 
significant inquiries: Sugar, 1901; Pastoral Industry, 1902, 1913, 1928, 1929; 
Mining 1911-1912, 1930; Agriculture 1933, 1934; Manufacturing, 1946. Again, 
the newspapers relied on were the Brisbane Courier, the PDT, and the Rock-
hampton Morning Bulletin. Some unpublished theses were also very helpful 
(D. Blackmur. "The Primary Industries of Queensland 1919-1929." B.A. thesis, 
University of Queensland, 1965; M. Jones. "The Government and Economic 
Growth in Queensland 1930-1940." B.A. thesis, University of Queensland, 1966; 
M. J. Thompson, "The Political Career of W. F. Smith." B.A. thesis. University 
of Queensland, 1965; J. Stoodley. "The Queensland Gold Miner in the Nine-
teenth Century." M.A. thesis, University of Queensland, 1964). Lastly, the two 
special reports of Jay's and Piddington's were specially valuable for the problems 
of the Queensland economy in the twentieth century (J. R. Jay. "Employment in 
Queensland Industries." Brisbane, 1936; A. B. Piddington. "Report on the 
Productivity of Queensland and the Remuneration of Labour." Queensland 
Trade Unions Research Committee, 1925). 
There is little point in evaluating any further the primary sources used, as 
the ground they cover is so very wide. Instead, the basis used in selecting and 
examining the material will be clarified. I relied on three types of secondary 
works: English and American parallels, Australian sources, and accounts 
dealing directly with Queensland. These were used for four main sub-topics: 
nationalism and liberalism, regionalism, agrarianism and the economy, and 
politics. Of the English sources, Thornton and Wingfield-Stratford on politics 
and Empire, and Schumpeter and Semmel on English attitudes to economic 
affairs were most helpful (A. P. Thornton. The Imperial Idea and its Enemies. 
London, 1959; and The Habit of Authority. London, 1966. E. Wingfield-Strat-
ford. The History of British Civilization. London, 1942. J. Schumpeter, 
Imperialism and Social Classes. New York, 1951. B. Semmel. Imperialism and 
Social Reform. London, 1960; and The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism. 
Cambridge, 1970). American studies, however, were most suggestive as to what 
social attitudes to economic development might have been in a new region like 
Queensland. Especially so were: Gerschenkron and Bruchey on social values 
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and economic growth; Daniel Marx (among many others) on agrarianism; 
North's earlier writings on regionalism and export bases; and Louis Hartz on 
the application of the American "consensus" theory to Australia (A. Gers-
chenkron. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, Mass., 
1962; S. Bruchey. The Roots of American Economic Growth. London, 1965; 
D. Marx. The Machine in the Garden. New York, 1964; D. C. North. "Location 
Theory and Regional Economic Growth." Journal of Political Economy, June 
1955, p. 243; Louis Hartz. The Founding of New Societies. New York, 1964). 
Of the Australian secondary sources, Coghlan, Greenwood, Fitzpatrick, 
and Ward seem to me to have been the mainstream interpreters of Australian 
nationalism and liberalism (T. A. Coghlan. Labour and Industry in Australia. 
4 vols. Oxford, 1918; G. Greenwood, ed. Australia. Sydney, 1955; B. Fitz-
patrick. The Australian People 1788-1945, Melbourne, 1946; R. Ward. The 
Australian Legend. Melbourne, 1958). Clark's and Buthn's contributions are 
also of special interest for the study of social attitudes and economic develop-
ment (C. M. H. Clark. Select Documents in Australian History. 2 vols. Sydney, 
1955; and A History of Australia. Vol. 1. Cambridge, 1962, Vol. 2. Cambridge, 
1968. N. G. Butlin. "Pubhc Enterprise in Austrahan Economic Development." 
In Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, March 1950, p. 141; "Colonial 
Socialism". In The State and Economic Growth, edited by H. J. G. Aitken. 
New York, 1959; and Investment in Australian Economic Development 
1861-1900. Cambridge, 1964). Otherwise, McCarty's adaptation of American 
staple theory to Australian conditions was useful. The method is essential in 
considering the history of regional economic change (J. W. McCarty. "The 
Staple Approach in Australian Economic History." Business Archives and 
History, Feb. 1964, p. 1). Three studies were helpful in discussing agrarianism 
and the economy: Gollan's, Glynn's, and Mitchell's (R. Gollan. "American 
Populism and Austrahan Utopianism." Labour History, Nov. 1965, p. 15; 
S. Glynn. "Government Policy and Agricultural Development: Western 
Australia 1900-1930." Australian Economic History Review, Sep. 1967, p. 115; 
T. J. Mitchell. "J. W. Wainwright and the Industrialization of South Australia." 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, May 1962, p. 27). Lastly, Encel and 
Mayer were suggestive for Australian politics (S. Encel. "The Concept of the 
State in Australian Politics." Australian Journal of Politics and History, May 
1960, p. 62; also "Power". In Australian Civilization, edited by P. Coleman. 
Sydney, 1962; and Equality and Authority. Melbourne, 1970. H. Mayer. "Some 
Conceptions of the Australian Party System." Historical Studies, Nov. 1956, 
p. 253). 
Three writers stand out in dealing with Queensland's history—^Morrison, 
Bolton, and Waterson. Morrison is primarily concerned with political history, 
as are the more recent studies by Higgins, Murphy, and, to a lesser extent, 
McQueen (A. A. Morrison. "Town Liberal and Squatter." JRHSQ 4 (1952): 
599; "Queensland: A Study in Distance and Isolation." In Melbourne Studies 
in Education 1960-1, edited by E. L. French, p. 191. Melbourne, 1962; and 
"Colonial Society 1860-1890." Queensland Heritage 1 (1966): 21 E. M. Higgins. 
"Queensland Labour: Trade Unions versus Premiers." Historical Studies, May 
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1960, p. 140. Prelude to Power, edited by D. J. Murphy, et al. Brisbane, 1970. 
H. McQueen. A New Britannia. Penguin, 1970). Bolton's and Waterson's works, 
however, are regional studies that combine economic and political history in an 
encouraging way (G. C. Bolton. A Thousand Miles Away. Brisbane, 1963; 
D. B. Waterson. Squatter, Selector and Storekeeper. Sydney, 1968). Bolton is 
specially good for Northern mining and Waterson for Downs agriculture. Other 
briefer studies of Queensland's economic history are Hughes on manufacturing, 
Heathcote on land settlement, and Kingston and Taylor on the early land laws 
(Helen Hughes. "Federalism and Industrial Development in Australia." Aus-
tralian Journal of Politics and History, Dec. 1964, p. 323; and Hughes, et al. 
Queensland, Industrial Enigma. Melbourne, 1964. R. L. Heathcote. Back of 
Bourke. Melbourne, 1965. B. R. Kingston. "The Search for an Alternative 
to Free Selection in Queensland 1859-66." Queensland Heritage 1 (1966): 
3. G. P. Taylor. "Political Attitudes and Land Policy in Queensland, 1868-1894." 
Pacific Historical Review, Aug. 1968, p. 247). Some of Blainey's extensive 
writings also deal with Queensland (G. Blainey. Gold and Paper. Melbourne, 
1958; Mines in the Spinifex. Sydney, 1960; The Rush That Never Ended. Mel-
bourne, 1963). Lastly, Neale's article on regional separation is accurate and 
suggestive (R. G. Neale. "The New State Movement in Queensland." Historical 
Studies, Nov. 1950, p. 198). 
The choice of these sub-topics as guidelines for the discussion of Queens-
land's economic history was aimed at explaining how social attitudes influenced 
economic growth. There are other equally legitimate ways of writing Queens-
land's economic history, but it seemed to me that the role of social intentionality 
in determining economic growth needed to be stressed more than most Aus-
tralian economic historians have been willing to do. This concern was not 
derived from historians, although Bruchey and Gerschenkron were very helpful, 
but from my reading of Sartre on the philosophy of history and from Amaury 
de Riencourt's philosophical-historical studies (Jean Paul Sartre. The Problem of 
Method. London, 1963; A. de Riencourt. The Coming Caesars. New York, 1957). 
Both stress the role of social values and choice in human affairs though from 
quite different viewpoints. 
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